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PLATO'S PHILEBUS

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PHILEBUS OF PLATO

EDITED BY

CHARLES BADHAM.

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PLATO. PHILEBUS

THE
PHILEBUS OF PLATO,

WITH

INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDIX;

TOGETHER WITH A

CRITICAL LETTER ON THE LAWS OF PLATO,

AND A CHAPTER OF

PALAEOGRAPHICAL REMARKS;

BY

CHARLES BADHAM, D.D.,

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SECOND EDITION
REVISED AND ENLARGED.



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TO THE REV. W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.,

MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

My dear MASTER,

A vivid remembrance of you arises in my thoughts whenever I am called upon to occupy myself with Plato; and now that I am once more editing the Philebus, I cannot but revert to the time when I derived so much help and encouragement from you in the execution of my earlier task. What then is more natural than that I should wish to see your name appearing in the present work, which is not merely a new edition, but an attempt to redeem a hasty and crude performance by something which I shall be content to leave behind me? There are many reasons why I desire to make this record of our friendship; one is the intrinsic worth of the friendship itself as it affects me. During the two and twenty years which have passed since the First Edition, your good will has never flagged. First you spared no pains to enable me to remain in England; and afterwards when some *δεύτερος πλοῦς* became expedient, it was through your good opinion and the weight of your authority, at least as much as through any other cause, that I found my way to a haven not altogether undesirable. You also were one of the few who understood that among the trials of banishment not the least is the fear of being utterly forgotten; so while many good friends, and some very eminent scholars, have scarcely ever found sufficient leisure to prove that fear to be groundless, your letters have sustained my hopes. One other English Scholar, of whose friendship we are both proud, was not less considerate; and now I must record my great affection for him in a Book which he will not read. Never did any one so generously interpret the obligations of his high place to the prejudice of his own ease and comfort, and in favour of all who claimed his help, as the late Lord Lyttelton. He was,

as you well know, a man of infinite modesty; and of the genuineness of that modesty none could doubt, who saw how perfectly free he was from any sickly fear of publicity. He took his place in the world with frank boldness, and did his work in it according to his sense of right. As an excellent scholar, and as a champion of scholarship, he did good service to a cause not overburdened with defenders; but while he was glad to seek refuge from sadder thoughts in Classical studies, he never hid himself in them to escape from any troubles or labours which could make him useful to mankind. There is yet another common friend of ours, who needs my praise as little as the other, and who is equally removed from all human comments; but this is probably the last time I shall ever publish anything, and I will not lose my only chance of glorying in his friendship. Frederick Denison Maurice was, as he informed me many years ago, an enthusiastic admirer of Plato's Philebus. He saw more deeply into it, and indeed into all Philosophy, by reason of that devout humility which made him so accurate an observer of many things which a man who is thinking half of his author and half of himself is sure to overlook. Where other men perplexed themselves with their own ingenuity and love of systems, his teachable sympathy with all that he studied led him into truths which they had neglected as unmeaning. But it is not for me to celebrate that great Heart and Mind. I merely claim him as one of those friends for whom my affection revived with peculiar vividness while I was busied with the preparations for this Book.

As for the Book itself, you will perhaps have leisure to decide, whether on the whole it contains many improvements on its predecessor: but having once addressed myself to you, I am loth to let you go, without taking some note of certain Platonic lucubrations, the fruit of the past year. They are verbal criticisms; but verbal criticisms which make an author more legible, seem to me no barren exercise. Nor will *you* think so, who have never had any lot or part with the supercilious and ignorant dogmatisers who have brought scholarship to so low an ebb in England. You will be glad to find any text made a little more worthy of its author, than the Græculi have made it; and will rejoice for the sake of those who are to come after us, if they are not scared away from important works by the almost hopeless state in which

they have been left. This is why I have again taken up the same inquiry into the later books of the Laws, which I commenced in a certain Epistola. My belief is now stronger than ever, that three fourths of the bad grammar, obscurity and nonsense which we find in good authors is due to nothing more than interpolations, whether purposely inserted or accidentally derived from the Margin. Not that the other part of criticism which detects the right word lurking under the wrong has done all its work; very far from it. Take the following example from the Sophist, p. 218, A. Ἄρα τοίνυν, ὡς ξένε, οὐτω καὶ καθάπερ εἶπε Σωκράτης πᾶσι πεχαρισμένος ἔσει; if you will read Heindorf's note, you will see that second thoughts are not always wiser. One easily confounded letter has caused all this trouble. Theaetetus says: Ἄρα τοίνυν, ὡς ξ., οὐτως—Or take this in the Politicus, 286, D; where for ἐφαμεν δεῖν μεμνῆσθαι, it is self-evident that you want ἐφ. δ. μεμερισθαι.—In the Laws, 904, D where we now read διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλε τόπον ἄγιον ὅλον μετακομισθεῖσα, common sense bids us read, δ. κ. μετέλαβε τόπον, ἀγίαν ὅδὸν μετακομισθεῖσα, leaving out what follows. I do not know whether you have seen a striking proof of the audacity of interpolators, which I adduced from the Phædo. It is in the passage¹⁾ beginning σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαντοῦ σκιὰν, where the *very opposite* precept is put into Socrates' mouth in place of that which Plato had assigned to him; and all for what? Because the two forms ἐῶς ἂν and ἐώης ἂν were disputing for admission, some one inserted both, but one with a change of accent and breathing, and then another came and changed χαίρειν ἐώης ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα, into χαίρειν ἐώης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίνατο, ἔως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο. And on this rubbish Wyttenebach comments as on a sound logical precept. Another such forgery occurs in Euthydemus 305, C, D. Here ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις and so forth down to κολούεσθαι, ought to be removed back so as to precede ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν. But because it was inserted out of its place, in order to give it some air of continuity, the scribe built for it this beautiful bridge: εἰναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους: which Cobet, little dreaming whose work he was correcting, altered into σφεῖς σοφώτατοι. In the same dialogue 287, B, C, we have these glaring interpolations: [ἄ τὸ πρῶτον

1) P. 101, D.

εἰπομεν νῦν ἀναμιμήσονται καὶ]—[ῳ λέγεις]—[ἔπει τίπε . . . τοῖς λόγοις.]

But I must now enter upon the Laws. Shall I follow Pindar's precept of *πρόσωπον τηλανγές*? or that given in Troilus and Cressida, which I will quote, *ut obiter emendem*?

- 1) Let us like merchants shew our fouler wares
And think perchance they'll sell: if not, the lustre
O'fh' better yet to shew will shew the better
By shewing the worse first.

I will not presume to say that the following correction is better or worse than the general run, but the passage is at all events a strikingly corrupt one, and so an emendation of it, if tenable, deserves a special place.

In the twelfth Book p. 960, c, n, of Stephens we find the following passage, which looks at first impenetrable; but by and by we discern a kind of bush-track, and at last, if I am not altogether mistaken, with a very little thought and very sober dealing with difficulties, we are able to restore an old highway in all its completeness.

ΑΘ. Ὡ Κλεινία, πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καλῶς ὑμινηται, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὰ τῶν μοιρῶν προσρήματα.

ΚΛ. Ποῖα δὴ;

ΑΘ. Τὸ Λάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν "Ἄτροπον δὲ τρίτην, σώτειραν τῶν λεχθέντων, ἀπεικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων τῷ πυρί, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζομένων δύναμιν· ἀ δὴ καὶ πόλει καὶ πολιτείᾳ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς σώμασι παρασκευάζειν, ἀλλὲ καὶ εὔνομιαν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων. ἡμῖν δὲ ἔτι μοι φαίνεσθαι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἐλλεῖπον τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ τὴν ἀμετάστροφον αὐτοῖς ἐγγίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν.

I will not trouble you with the attempts already made: they are one and all random guesses, only half serious, rather indications of an obstacle than attempts to remove it. We see thus much; that as the destiny Atropos preserves the work of her sisters, τὰ κλωσθέντα, so he wishes that his and his friends' work, τὰ λεχθέντα, should be made ἀμετάστροφα. Now Atropos cannot be σώτειρα τῶν λεχθέντων; it is therefore safe, at least provisionally so, to write τὴν "Ἄτροπον δὲ τρίτην σώτειραν. τῶν ΑΕΛΕχθέντων—

1) Act 1. Sc. 3.

The allusion to the well known τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι is obvious, and justifies us in placing σώτειραν thus by itself. Then we come to ἀπεικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων—, and the question is; who or what is made like to what? But that question is soon answered. The preservation of their statutes is to be made like to the preservation of the fatal thread. But as ἀπεργάζεσθαι must be the act of the old men, and as in these Books we find five or six instances of μεθα being confounded with the participial ending, μενος μενη &c., it is worth while to try ἀπεργαζώμεθα, and therefore to adapt ἀπεικασμένοι to it. The moment this is done the rest of the sentence corrects itself. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων, ἀπεικασμένοι τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων σωτείρῳ ΑΙ, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζώμεθα δύναμιν. The remainder is likewise faulty; but in the first place a little thought will soon shew us *how* this sentence is to be connected with the foregoing, and a little more will suffice to clear away what is at once an impropriety and a tautology. εἰ δὴ καὶ πολιταῖς καὶ πολιτίσι δεῖ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν κ. τ. ἐ.

A shorter but equally corrupt passage is in the tenth Book, p. 905, c. γιγνώσκειν δὲ αὐτὴν, ὡς πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, πῶς οὐ δεῖν δοκεῖς; ἦν τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδέ τὸν τύπον ἴδοι ποτέ, οὐδὲ λόγον ἔνυμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατὸς ἀν γένοιτο εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ δυσδαιμονια τύχην. This αὐτὴν refers to τὴν συντέλειαν. "What you call the neglect of the Gods, you so call, because you do not understand that all which they do contributes to a great whole." We may therefore translate συντέλεια by *joint action*. This then the youth is told that he must know. But it is precisely what he cannot know, and, not knowing, ought to distrust his own judgment concerning the prosperity of the wicked. Eusebius in quoting this passage has πρὸς οὐδὲν, the MS Ω has as a correction in the Margin πόσου δεῖν, and although this rests on MS authority, and is confirmed by the corrupt reading in Eusebius, and yields the only admissible sense, the Editors have passed it over. Again though we may use ἀνδρεῖος ironically of an unabashed man, this is not the language of monitors to a youth of infidel tendencies; and here, where they are reminding him of his weakness and incapacity, the word is altogether unsuitable. I have no hesitation in reading; γιγνώσκειν δὲ αὐτὴν, ὡς πάντων ἀχρειότατε, πόσου δεῖν δοκεῖς; You will observe that the mere substitution of χ makes the whole difference of the

reading.—I have before me the larger Zurich Edition; what may have since happened to the text of the Laws I know not; but I can scarcely conceive that such obvious blunders as the following can have been left as they were by any subsequent Editor.

878, b. τρανμάτων οὐν ἐνεστώτων ὁργῆ γενομένων for τ. οὐν ἐν ἐστω τῶν ὁ. γ. Thus also in 829, a we read ταῦτὸν δὴ τοῦτο ἐστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχειν, γενομένη μὲν ἀγαθῆ βίος εἰρηνικός κ. τ. ἐ. in place of ἐστι καὶ πόλει· ὑπάρχει γ. μ. ἀ. κ. τ. ἐ. and in 837, c, ὁρῶν δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ἐρῶν τῇ ψυχῇ, δεόντως τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιτεθυμηώς κ. τ. ε., for ἡ ἐρῶν, τῇ ψυχῇ δὲ ὅντως τ. ψ. ἐ. 836, c, ἀκολουθῶν for ἀκολουθὸν, and πιθανῷ for ἀπιθάνῳ. 898, e, περιπεφυκέναι (an absurd repetition of π) for πεφυκέναι. 899, a, αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον for ἀρ' οὐν δὴ ἄμεινον, omitting χρεών. 903, e, μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ ἐμψυχον!, καὶ μὴ ξύμπολλα ἔξ ἐνός—for ὕδωρ, ἐμψυχα καὶ μὴ, ξύμπολλα ἔξ ἐνός. and lastly, in 904, b, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διενοήθη—for ὅσον ἀν ἀγαθὸν ψυχὴ διανοηθῆ. But I will pass to other places, where the correction is not so self-evident. In 829, b, for τοῦτο ἀποδιδόντων, the sense requires οὗτοι δὲ ἀποδιδόντων, and in e, for τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ λόγῳ. In 832, c, we find: τὸ δὲ τῆς νῦν πολιτείας, ἦν νομοθετούμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκπέφευγεν ἀμφότερα. There will be no more harshness or obscurity, if we read ἦν νομοθετοῦμεν, ἀ λέγομεν ἐκπέφευγεν ἀμφότερα. In 833, a, for σύστασις which is quite foreign to the purpose, for even if you interpret it according to προσιστώμεθα in the Philebus, it would amount to συμπλοκὴ, so that we should have, ἐν συμπλοκαῖς συμπλοκὴ, read σύντασις, *contentio*. 834, a, τόξοις καὶ πέλταις καὶ ἀκοντίοις. This would do very well if the peltasts threw their targets at the enemy. Till this is shewn to be the case, I should vastly prefer καὶ παλτοῖς. There is a strange order of words a few lines further: τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἵππων δὴ περὶ ἀγῶνος γίγνοντο ἔξης ἀν νομοθετούμενα. The first ΔH is nothing but AN in its right place, and ἀν νομοθετούμενα is a corruption from ἀ νομοθετοῦμεν. 836, c, I have no doubt that the nearest approach to the true reading now possible, is πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο, οἱ διὰ πάντος . . . τούτῳ ἐν τούτοις τίς οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ; τοῦτο is the aim, τούτῳ the advocate of purer manners, τούτοις are the measures he recommends. 839, a, For λήψεται γόνιμον κ. τ. ἐ., a new light breaks in upon us, if we read γονίμον δὲ ἀπεχομένους ἀρούρας θ. πάσης. Thus

we have the opposition between the absolutely sterile, and that which though fertile in itself, we do not mean to use as such. 841, c, For *περιλαβὸν* read *παραλαβὸν*, and for *τὰ νῦν λέγομεν’ ἔστιν εὐχαῖ*, read *τανῦν λέγομεν· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν εὐχαῖ κ. τ. ἐ*. The interpolations which spoil the next sentence were probably only meant for the margin. You will see that I mean *παλλακῶν* and *ἀρρένων*. Who can suppose that Plato would speak of *their σπέρματα?* 844, d, I am altogether for the other reading, *παιδιὰν Λιοννισιάδα*, and in place of *ἔχει χάριτος αὐτη̄*, I have no scruple in writing *ἡ θεὸς ἔχαρισατο αὐτη̄*. The copyist wrote *εχαχα* and forgot to put his dots under the first *χα*. Then came another, and made this absurd correction. *παιδιὰ Λιοννισιάς* is a very suitable expression for all the fruit obtained by *grafting*. 846, d, For *δεόμενον ἐπιτηδεύειν*, read *δεχόμενος ἐπιτήδευσιν*. 864, A, *ἐσεσθαι τούτων* should be *ἐπεσθαι τούτω*. 898, B, The displacement of two words has caused a woeful confusion in an otherwise simple passage. I will merely indicate it. [μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ] φερομένη . . . μηδ' ἐν (ἐνὶ) τινι λόγῳ κίνησις—. But I must break off from this desultory work, which is fatiguing to any reader who shall be good enough to verify my references, and keep on steadily through one Book; and as the Seventh is that on which I have been very recently engaged, I will ask of you to accompany me through it.

798, A, καὶ ἂν ποτ’ ἄρα ἀναγκασθῆ μεταβάλλειν αὐθις—The sentence, having up to this point turned upon *σώματα* as the subject, is now varied, and we look for an individual to whom to refer *ἀναγκασθῆ*, *συνταραχθεῖς* and *ἀπολαβών*. But he is not far off. For *αὐθις* let us read *αὖ τις*, and there he is. In c we have *παιδῶν* where it is certain that the author meant us to understand *ἀνδρῶν*. When these children who have made innovations in their games and amusements grow up to be men, they are different from former—*children!* Who can be expected to treat copyists with any respect, after such a taste of their quality? In d the same *mala sedulitas* has bestowed on us the word *μεταβαλλόμενα* which is out of its place, and the sense of which is expressed by *ὅσα . . . πάσχει τὸ τοιοῦτον* which is in its place. In e, the faulty redundancy in *οὐδαμῶς ἄλλως πως* may be accounted for, if we suppose that *οὐδ’ ΑΛΛΩΣ* was copied twice and subsequently changed by a would-be corrector.

799, ε. In speaking of *νόμοι* he says, *οἱ παλαιοὶ τότε περὶ κιθαρωδίαν οῦτω πως, ὡς λοικεν, ὀνόμασαν*. By reading *TOTC* in place of *TOTE* we make the sentence clear and get rid of a *then* which points nowhere. “The ancients were not ignorant of the connexion between *νόμοι* and *ῳδαῖ*,” says he; *καθ’ ὑπνον δὲ οἶον πού τις ἦ καὶ ὑπαρ [έγρηγορῶς] ὠτεῖρωξε μαντεύομενος αὐτῷ*. If he only dreamed it, he would have no right to *μαντεύεσθαι*; but I presume he dreamed it *καθ’ ὑπνον Θεῖον*. 800, β. I see here as elsewhere the utmost confusion between *δὲ* and *δὴ*, but it would be rather dull sport to fly the falcons of criticism upon such exiguous game. c. For *φαῖμεν*, I should much prefer *φαμὲν* in a parenthesis, though I am aware that he has already used it. δ. A slight transposition will give the *δήματα* and the *δυνάμοι* their fair share in a necessary epithet. I read *ἀρμονίας γονδεστάταις*. ε. I hope you will consent to the removal of *χορούς*. The gibe is all the more bitter when he substitutes these funeral singing men for the Tragic Chorus. I note *εἰ . . ἐν τοῦτο . . κείσθω* as a confirmation of Elmsley’s *οἶσθ’ ὡς μέτενξατ*.

801, Α. Instead of *μηδὲν ἐπανερωτῶ*, which would mean, “am I to ask no question”? I propose *μηδέ*. “An *ne rogare quidem oportetδεῖ* to the margin where it must have stood as a help to beginners. c. He says that *τὸ τῶν ποιητῶν γένος* is *οὐ πάνυ ἵκανὸν* in judging what men should or should not pray for: and that they might put into our mouths prayers for wealth, though we have already decreed that we shall have no gold or silver statue of Plutus in our City. What will be the result? They will make us *contradict* ourselves in our prayers. This is logical; but not so, that they will make us pray *εὐχὰς οὐκ ὁρθὰς*, for they may be right, and we wrong. Therefore away with the insertion, which while it is not to the purpose of the argument, is a sore let and hindrance to the syntax. δ. He has never appointed any *νομοθέτας* for the purpose mentioned, but certain *ἀθλοθέτας*, of whom he treats in 764, ι &c.

802, β. For *ἐπανερόμενον* I venture to suggest *ἐπανορθώσεως δε)όμενον*. c. The direction, *νομοθέτου βούλημα*, cannot begin with *πᾶσα δέ*. No wonder then that *A* and *Ω* omit the conjunction. The *γε* is also to no purpose. Ought we not to read, *πᾶσα τακτὴ ἢ τάξιν λαβοῦσα π. M. διατριβῆ?* This would refer to the originally proper compositions, and those that had been made

so by adaptation. D. Sense and Grammar call for the change of ἐκατέρας into ἐκατέρα. E. The passage about suiting the compositions to the sexes looks very hopeless at first; but the observation of a frequent source of mistake in these books, the confusion between the participial endings and μεθα will at once set us on the right track. Εστι δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμενα ἀποδιδόναι, is nothing more than ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμενα ἀποδιδόναι. When this is replaced, and Ast's supplement introduced, we need only write τούτω for τούτῳ, and the passage is as simple as any in Plato.

803. A. Having settled the general characters of both kinds of songs, he goes into the details of education. But here we are left suddenly in such darkness as this: τίνα τρόπον χρὴ καὶ οἵστισι καὶ πότε πράττειν ἔκαστα αὐτῶν. What are ἔκαστα, and of what αὐτῶν are they the particulars? As to οἵστισι and πράττειν they help out each other; for the dative gives us a palpable hint to change πράττειν into προσάπτειν, and the succeeding sentence about τρόποι and τροπιδεῖα, and indeed the whole scope of what follows down to the end of this page of Stephanus, shew that our business is to ascertain τίνα τρόπον χρὴ καὶ οἵστισι καὶ ὅποτε προσάπτειν ἔκαστων αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν ἀρρένων τε καὶ θηλειῶν. A. B. οἷον δή τις ναυπηγὸς τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχὴν καταβαλλόμενος τὰ τροπιδεῖα ὑπογράφεται τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, ταῦτὸν δή μοι κάγὼ φαίνομαι ἐμαυτῷ δρᾶν τὰ τῶν βίων πειρώμενος σχήματα διαστήσασθαι κατὰ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν, ὃντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβάλλεσθαι, ποίη μηχανῆ καὶ τίσι ποτὲ τρόποις ξυνόντες τὸν βίον ἄριστα διὰ τοῦ πλοῦ τούτου τῆς ζωῆς διακομισθησόμεθα, τοῦτο σκόπειν ὄρθως. In this passage it is a matter of controversy whether τροπιδεῖα is governed by καταβαλλόμενος or by ὑπογράφεται, and the rest of the construction will depend on this. But as Ast's *appositiō*, that is, that τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχὴν is a sort of anticipating description of τροπιδεῖα, is in itself unlikely, for then the words might just as well be away; and seeing that, if καταβαλλόμενος governs τροπιδεῖα, and ὑπογράφεται governs τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, we have this result; that a man is sketching the ship's hull at the same time that he is laying down its timbers, which is at least a day too late, and lastly since the play on words requires that the stress of the antithesis should fall on τροπιδεῖα

ὑπογράψεται == βίων σχήματα κατὰ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν διαστήσασθαι, I leave σχήματα to find a regimen where it can, only not in this text, to which it is a stranger, and I conclude that, just as the interpolator borrowed the word σχήματα from the following clause, so when he inserted ὅντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβάλλεσθαι, he helped himself from what preceded. Who needs such an explanation of a play upon words? and is not ταῦτὸν κ. φ. έ. δρᾶν enough? Then again what have we to do with any μηχανῆ? I think it certain that ποιὸς μηχανῆ was added, because some one did not see the purport of καὶ in καὶ τίσι ποτὲ τρόποις. Of course μοι ought to be expelled, and as for τὸν βίον it looks very like a wish to bring back the τῶν βίων which we had before.—The next sentence but one ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν, εἴ πως διὰ προσήκοντός τινος αὐτὸς πράττοιμεν, ἵσως ἂν ἡμῖν σύμμετρον ἀν εἶη is not very clear, nor will the *Græcitas* of διὰ προσήκοντός τινος commend itself to you. But *ΔΙΑ* is the palæographical twin of *APA*, and εἰ πως ἄρα προσηκόντως αὐτὸς πράττοιμεν seems all that is required. D. “We are the playthings of the Gods, and our best earnest, such as it is, consists in acting as such, and rejoicing before them. People now-a-days say that War is the serious part of life, and Peace the playful part; thus they make the serious to be for the sake of the playful.” τὸ δ' ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὕτ' οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκνιὰ οὕτ' αὖ παιδεία ποτὲ ἡμῖν ἀξιόλογος, οὔτε οὖσα οὔτε ἐσομένη. τὸ δή φαμεν ἡμῖν γε εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, δεῖ δὴ τὸν κατ' εἰρήνην βίον ἔκαστον πλεῖστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον διεξελθεῖν. τις οὖν ὁρθότης παῖζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον, τίνας δὴ παιδιάς θύνοντα καὶ ἄδοντα καὶ ὁρχούμενον. τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα means more than Cornarius understood by it. I should render it: “Whereas we have found that in war &c.” The stop should be removed from ἐσομένη, and we must read, ὁ δή φαμεν ἡμῖν γ' εἶναι σπουδαιότατον. “War has no sport nor education worth mentioning, and to have that was just what we affirm to be most serious.” But if you insist upon preferring ὡ . . . σπουδαιοτάτω, non repugnabo. The rest I read thus: τις OTN Ἡ ὁρθότης; τίνας δὴ παιδιάς παῖζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον; θύνοντα κ. τ. έ. It is incredible that any one should have attempted to correct this passage, and that others should have adopted his correction, and yet all have consented to leave such an absurdity as παιδιάς θύνοντα in the text.

804, *b.* πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπιδὼν καὶ παθών—Was it once εἰκότα παθών? *d.* Perhaps you will approve of οὐχ ὃν μὲν ἂν ὁ πατὴρ βούληται [φοιτῶντα] ὃν δ' ἂν μὴ ἔωντας [τὰς παιδείας]. *D & E.* τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλεῶν ὃ μὲν ἐμὸς νόμος ἂν εἴποι πάντα, ὅσα περ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἵσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν. καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἴππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον. Never was a passage more miserably interpolated than this. First his law speaks, and then he speaks; his law would say the same about women as about men, *that women ought to be trained and drilled as much*. Any one who knows what ἵσα καὶ is, will welcome the conjecture, which joins ἵσα καὶ with οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς¹⁾, and so gets rid of this repetition about women; and as the law is still the subject, the spurious εἴποιμ ἄν absconds from before it.

805, *b.* ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τελῶν καὶ πόνων. This is untrue; for the women add their labour to that of the men. Read πόρων. *c.* ἐν τούτοις. Perhaps ἐν τούτῳ γ'; in the meanwhile, till he has found some better reasons.

806, *A.* Ας ἀργοὺς μὲν ταλασίας is opposed to θεραπείας δὲ, and not to ἀσκητικόν τινα βίου, for δέ τινα we should read δή τινα. Then follows a passage which must be given in its whole state. τῶν δὲ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἴ τις ποτε διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεως τε καὶ πατέων ἀναγκαῖα τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὐτ' ἂν τόξων, ὡς τινες Ἀμαζόνες, οὐτ' ἄλλης κοινωνῆσαι ποτε βολῆς μετὰ τέλχης δυνάμεναι, οὐδὲ ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ λαβοῦσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, ὡς πορθονυμένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος γενναιώς ἀντιστάσας φόβον γε, εἰ μηδὲν μεῖζον, πολεμίοισι δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατοφθείσας; Σανδομάτιδας δὲ οὐδ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειν μιμήσασθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαβιοῦσαι, παρὰ γυναικας δὲ αὐτὰς ἄνδρες ἂν αἱ ἔκείνων γυναικες φανεῖεν. I need not point out the impossibilities of this passage, nor refute their champions. One specimen of their logic will suffice. We have κοινωνούσας, δυνάμεναι, λαβοῦσαι, ἀντιστάσας, κατοφθείσας. “It is nothing: the nominative may precede the infinitive”. Yes! and so may the accusative; but can both do so indifferently—and in one and the same sentence? This, and the barbarism of ὥστε οὐδὲ suffice to shew the condition of the text; but where is the remedy to

1) Omitting τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν.

come from? From the nature of the argument. Which is the worse case? that described by πορθούμένης τῆς πατρίδος, or that which is here called διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῶν φιλτάτων? The latter. Which demands most courage, to appear ἐν τάξει, or to use the weapons of close fighting? The latter. Then why does he weaken his sentence by putting the worse case, and the greatest instance of courage, first? Moreover what a clumsy arrangement is this, that he should interrupt his examples of warlike females, the Amazons, Minerva, the Sarmatian women, by a long sentence which might have as well appeared elsewhere?—It did appear elsewhere, till some blunderer left it out, and the same or some equal blunderer brought it back, not *postliminio*, but through a breach in the text. By re-transposing what has been displaced we surmount nearly all these difficulties, grammatical and rhetorical; for the rest we must trust to probable conjecture. τῶν δ' εἰς πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, ὡστε (πορθούμένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος, γενναῖος ἀντιστάσας φόβον γε εἰ μηδὲν μεῖζον πολεμίοις δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατοφθείσας);—all this depends upon φῶμεν δεῖν ζῆν; Then follows the direct. οὐδ' εἴ τις ποτε διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεως (πόσεως?) τε καὶ παίδων ἀναγκαῖα τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὐτε τόξων, ὡς τινες Ἀμάζονες, οὐτ' ἄλλης κοινωνῆσαι ποτε βολῆς μετὰ τέχνης δυνάμεναι (φανεῖεν ἄν) οὐδ' ἀσπίδα καὶ δορὸν λαβοῦσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, Σανδοματίδας δὲ οὐδ' ἄν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειν μιμήσασθαι κ. τ. ἐ. c. No one need despair of making a brilliant correction: Stallbaum's οὐχὶ ἥμισυ founded on the reading of the best MSS, οὐ ΔΙ ἥμισυ is deserving of much praise. e. For ἀποτελοῦσιν it is absolutely necessary that we read ἀποτελοῖτεν. The explanation offered by Ast of αὐταῖς in παίδων τε ἄμα θηλεῖων καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταῖς, that it is put for αὐτῶν, is only too like many of his notes on the Laws; αὐταῖς, as I need not tell you, is *ipsis seorsim*. But this leads me to offer a conjecture on the words immediately preceding. ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκεναμένα εἴη χωρὶς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἔγγὺς δ' ἔχόμενα τὰ τῶν υἱέων, αὐτοῖς, instead of τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων which is a most vague designation. For what can οἰκεῖοι mean? Not a man's household, for his wife and daughters are provided with a mess-table apart; certainly not his *domestics*, who are not members of a συσσίτιον; and certainly not his friends who, being citizens, would sit with him. Of course τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων is not so bad as τῶν

αὐτοῖς μητέρων, but what writer would ever dream of putting more than *τῶν οἰκείων* in such a case? Why the youths are apart from their fathers, but the girls are with their mothers, is obvious to that great umpire in all truisms, the meanest capacity.

807. A. Having provided the members of his city with their public meals and festive occupations, he asks whether each member has no needful and suitable work left him to do, ἀλλ' ἐν τρόπῳ βοσκήματος ἔκαστον παιωνόμενον αὐτῶν δεῖ ζῆν; I shall offer you no excuse for altering this into, ἀλλ' ἡ τ. β. ἐ. ἀ. π. διαζῆν. Immediately after, we have *οὐκονν τό γε δίκαιον φαμὲν οὐδὲ καλόν, οὐδ' οἶόν τε κ. τ. ἐ.* where again the explainers *τολμῶσιν ἀδύνατα*. I read, *οὐκοῦν, (τό γε δίκαιον ΦΑΝΑΙ) οὐτε καλόν, οὐθ' οἶόν τε—*. B. *τετρυχωμένων*. Pray do not alarm yourself: I am not going to discuss the merits of the word; I simply copy it from the Zurich Edition and set it up as a mark to unwary readers; who, while sliding over the smooth surface, will, unless warned, find themselves suddenly in a very comfortless chasm. *One whole paragraph is missing*, either because a page in the source of our MSS was lost, or because the page was too *τετρυμένον* to be deciphered. How is this to be proved? By unfulfilled promises. He asks *τις δὴ τρόπος τοῦ βίου* and the rest, and after a description of their messes, he again asks *ἄρα οὐδὲν λειπόμενόν εστι κ. τ. ἐ.* This question he does not answer, nor has he told us how he proposes to escape from his own prophecy, that these well-conditioned citizens of his will necessarily became the prey of some wiry hungry daredevils. And yet that he *has* pointed out some escape is evident from the sequel, which whether corrected or left as it is, can yield but this sense. “We cannot hope that *all this* will be done with great minuteness, as long as citizens have separate houses.” *All what?* “But if the other second-best measures were tried”,—*What other?* “But men *living so* have yet another duty and that not a small one”—*Living how? Hardily;* as is plain from the context, and from the sequel; but these precepts of hardihood, voluntary penances or whatever they were, and their effects on the character, are all gone, and as a proof of the diligence with which Plato is read, not an asterisk marks where they were. There is some broken ground, as you would expect, on the brink of this chasm; but if I am not mistaken,

I have pointed it out before¹). *εἰ ξητοῖμεν ἄν* stands its ground in all editions just now before me. The right reading seems to be; *ταῦτ’ οὖν δὴ δι’ ἀκριβείας μὲν ἴκανῆς, ὡς καὶ νυνὶ ξητούμεν’ ἄν, λίσας οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο.* c. If the Zurich Editors had thought for a moment, they would have adopted Ast's emendation *εἰς ἀρετήν*. Of course the scribes wrote *ἀρετῆς*, because it was next door to *ἐπιμέλειαν*, and they looked no further.

808, c. Are you very tired of proofs of the *lacuna*? Just one more, and I have done. *νῦξ μὲν δὴ διαγομένη τοιαύτη τις πρὸς πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀνδρείαν ἄν τινα προσπαρέχοιτο κ. τ. ἐ.* d. For the miserable *πῶ βιωτέον*, I have exhausted every verb beginning with *π* that I could think of, and found no plausible substitute, except perhaps *προλειπτέον*, which the scribes would very readily change to *προλιπτέον*. But a certain form of the *β*, now out of use, is very like the semiuncial *λ* and one form of *π* is an *ω* with a lid to it. But this is dwelling in the "Meadow of Conjecture". e. *ό δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον. ὅσῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμὺ καὶ υβριστότατον θηρίων γίγνεται.* To speak frankly, this is downright nonsense. "A boy is of all animals the hardest to manage: because having a germ of reason, he becomes the most rebellions of all creatures." This any one can see to be far from neat: but how much worse it becomes if we write;—"having his germ of reason not yet daunted and tamed"? Nor is the grammar a whit better: *ὅσῳ μάλιστα* with two positives and one superlative; the latter probably contrived "to meet the demand". Again why use *μήπω* for *οὔπω* in a direct declaration such as this? There can surely be no doubt that Plato wrote: *ό δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον, ὅσῳ γε μάλιστα ἔχει τινὰ πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν. μήπω κατηρτυμένον δὲ, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμὺ καὶ υβριστὸν θηρίον γίγνεται.* e. One is rather taken aback by the statement that the lad is to be sent *τοῖς διδάσκοντις καὶ ὄντοις*. (*Tί γὰρ; ἢ καὶ τοῖς κλέπτειν καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν διδάσκοντες;*) And why is *καὶ μαθήμασιν* added? Grant that they are *bonds*; they are surely not so in the sense in which *οἱ διδάσκοντες* are so. Consider, pray, whether we have not here a corruption of *καὶ ὄντοιν ΚΑΛὶ* (*καλὸν*) *ΜΑΘΗΜΑ.*

1) Book 10. 905, d. *εἰ δὲ ἐπιδεής ἐτι λόγου τινὸς ἄν εἴης.* Read *λ. τ. ἄλλον εἰ.*

809, B. τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ χορείας πέρι μελῶν τε καὶ ὁρχήσεως ἐρήθη. Not even a Dithyrambic poet, unless very drunk, would sing of the χορεία μελῶν τε καὶ ὁρχήσεως. Plato had discussed the question concerning their *employment*: χορείας πέρι. c. καὶ τοι τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, ἂ δεῖ μανθάνειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ μελετᾶν, ἔχεις τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ γράμματα πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον λύρας πέρι καὶ λογισμῶν, ὃν ἔφαμεν δεῖν, ὅσα τε πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν χρῆναι ἐκάστους λαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔτι τὰ χορήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ἀστρῶν τε πέρι καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνης, ὅσα διοικεῖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι περὶ ταῦτα πάσῃ πόλει ταῦτα οὕπω δοι πάντα ἴκανῶς, ὃ φίλε, παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου διείρχεται. In this sentence, ὅσα τε points to things unknown and beyond discovery, χρῆναι is out of structure, διοικεῖν occupies a place where μανθάνειν alone is apposite, and this mention of *arrangement* seems to have dropped from the clouds. The chief author in all this mischief is the man who introduced ὅσα τε: λογισμῶν ὃν ἔφαμεν δεῖν πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν is in perfect order. Then follows, somewhat loosely, but in a highly Platonic manner —χρῆναι δ' ἐκάστους λαβεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔτι τὰ χορήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ἀστρῶν τε [πέρι] καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνης, ὅσα [διοικεῖν] (oh! these interpreters!) ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι [περὶ ταῦτα] πάσῃ τῇ πόλει. (Subaudi λαβεῖν.)—I take this opportunity of observing that in Thuc. II, 102, where we now read, Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμαίων τῷ Ἀμφιάρεω, ὅτε δὴ ἀλασθαι αὐτὸν μετὰ τὸν φόνον, τὸν Ἀπόλλω ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰτεῖν, the right reading is ὅτε δὲ εἰ ἀλασθαι.—Soon after the sense is obscured through faulty punctuation; it ought to be pointed: ἐπικαλοῦντες τί τῇ λέξει; τόδε· ὡς οὕπω διείρχεται. In the next sentence we have προσοιστέον twice; in the first place it occurs in connexion with ἵτεον: πότερον ἵτεον, ή τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ προσοιστέον. And these two verbals have the common complement of εἰς ἀκριβειαν; the second προσοιστέον is followed by εἰς γράμματα. It cannot be denied that such a verbal may be used in a passive sense; but who ever heard of such an expression as προσερέθεσαι εἰς γράμματα? My own persuasion is that the Margin of the Vossian MS offers a right conjecture in προσιτέον. The passage in the beginning of the Republic, τότε μὲν εὐ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες is in favour of repeating the same verb, and the pre-

position is added because the verb would look too bald when separated from εἰς. In the very next sentence (810, a) we have a marginal note which changes the construction for the worse. The commands of the law are in the infinitive. προσιτέον μὲν τοίνυν φαμὲν εἰς μὲν γράμματα παιδὶ δεκτεῖ σχεδὸν ἐνιαυτοὺς τρεῖς, λύρας δὲ ἄφασθαι τρία μὲν ἔτη καὶ δέκα γεγονόσιν ἀρχεσθαι, [μέτριος ὁ χρόνος] ἐμμεῖναι δ' ἔτερα τρία. I point out παράνομον which ought to be παρὰ νόμον, and, in b, τισὶν οἷς, which should be οἰστισι, and proceed to lay before you as corrupt a passage as any in the Book. πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄλυρα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ὑνθμῶν τμημάτων, ἡ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα ὑνθμοῦ τε καὶ ἀρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμματα ἡμῖν ἔστι παρά τινων τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα· οἷς, ὡς πάντων βέλτιστοι νομοφύλακες, τί χρήσεσθε; To what interpreter shall we betake ourselves for help in this labyrinth, saying ἐν σοὶ κείμεθα τλάμονες? But behold our very invocation has helped us so far, that we may confidently read, ποιητῶν κείμεθα ἐν γράμμασι! But what are we to do with ὑνθμῶν τμημάτων? I should certainly reject the former and retain the scornful expression τμημάτων, more especially as ὑνθμοῦ occurs very soon after. Then I propose to separate the text from the gloss upon it, thus: ἡ δὴ [συγγράμματα] κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα ὑνθμοῦ καὶ ἀρμονίας, [σφαλερὰ γράμματα] ἡμῖν ἔστι παρά τινων [τῶν πολλῶν] τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα. He cannot call them σφαλερὰ γράμματα as yet, for though τοιούτων (i.e. τητωμένων ὑνθμοῦ καὶ ἀρμονίας) is a sneer, he does not prejudge the question whether they shall use those books. D. The commentators may settle it among them, whether the faulty construction of this sentence is a piece of graceful negligence, or of corruption: but τῆς αὐτῆς is very awkward, even if we understand it to mean that the same way pleases some and displeases others, and κελεύεις γάρ is certainly faulty, for this has no connexion of cause and effect with ἀληθὲς λέγεις. The simplest correction would be, κελεύοις δέ με, ὡς τ. φ., ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ κ. τ. ἐ.

811, b. The parts of the dialogue are so distributed, that Clinias becomes the protagonist. The persons ought to stand thus:

AΘ. . . . εἰ δ' οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει, κίνδυνόν φημι εἶναι φέρουσαν τοῖς παισὶ τὴν πολυμαθίαν. Πᾶς οὖν καὶ τί παραινοίης ἀν τῷ νομοφύλακι;

ΚΛ. Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Τοῦ πρὸς τὶ παράδειγμά ποτε ἀποβλέψας ἀν τὸ μὲν ἐῷ πάντας μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους, τὸ δὲ ἀποκωλύοι.

ΚΛ. Λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκνει λέγων.

812, B.C. **ΑΘ.** "Ἐφαμεν, οἶμαι, τοὺς τοῦ Αἰονίσου τοὺς ἔξηκοντούτας ὥδονς διαφερόντως εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περὶ τε τοὺς ὁνθμοὺς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρμονιῶν συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μίμησιν τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται, τά τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς ὄμοιώματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ὡν τις τὰ μὲν ἀποβάλλῃ, τὰ δὲ προφέρων εἰς μέσον ὑμνῇ καὶ ἐπάρδη ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούμενος ἐκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔπεισθαι κτῆσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων. Can any one believe that ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται is correct, or that μιμησις μιμεῖται τὰ ὄμοιώματα means anything conceivable? When a comic actor imitates popular tragedians in a burlesque, he may be said to imitate their imitations; but the province of music is μιμεῖσθαι τὰ παθήματα; and this is, I think, enough to justify us in expelling ὄμοιώματα, which was invented to fill up a fancied gap in the sense, and in reading: ἵνα τὴν τ. μ. μίμησιν, τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι, ὅσ' ἀν ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνηται, τά τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ [τὰ] τῆς ἐναντίας, ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ὡν π. τ. ἐ. By this very slight change we have the true object of imitation, παθήματα; and the construction δυνατὸς ἐκλέξασθαι μιμησιν μεμιμημένην τὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is complete and satisfactory. D & E. The grammar requires παρεχομένον and προσαρμότοντος. Πυκνότης and μανότης appear to be well explained by Mr. Chappell, History of Music, p. 144.

813, A. Ἀληθέστατα τοίνυν. καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν π. τ. ἐ. should be read continuously. E. διεξόδων τακτικῶν. *Significantur*, says Ast, *exercitus in acie constituti expeditiones*. If it signifies this, it signifies nothing, for this has no meaning. Αἰτέσοδοι are *evolutions*, and *τακτικῶν* is a bad gloss. Στρατοπέδων is of no better origin; but the worst corruptions are those in the following passage. πάντων γὰρ τούτων διδασκάλους τε εἶναι δεῖ κοινούς, ἀρνυμένους μισθὸν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τούτων μαθητὰς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παῖδας τε καὶ ἄνδρας· καὶ [κόρας καὶ γυναῖκας πάντων τούτων ἐπιστήμονας,] κόρας μὲν οὖσας ἔτι πᾶσαν τὴν ἐν ὅπλοις ὁρχησιν [καὶ μάχην] μεμελετηκυίας, γυναῖκας δὲ διεξόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ θέσεως καὶ ἀναιρέσεως ὅπλων ἡμένας, εἰ μηδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' εἴ ποτε δεήσειε

πανδημεὶ [πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει] καταλιπόντας τὴν πόλιν ἔξω στρατεύεσθαι τοὺς φυλάξαντας παῖδάς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ἵκανάς εἶναι τό γε τοσοῦτον—I offer you the passage unaltered, but for the brackets, except that I change καταλείποντας into καταλιπόντας; that I follow Α and Ω in φυλάξαντας, (those who had kept guard, youths and others, are gone out, and the women must supply their place); and that I read ἵκανάς, for which there is no authority except the sense. These then are to be sufficient *at least for this purpose*: and again, ὃν οὐδὲν ἀπάμοτον, *it being an inevitable chance*, that an enemy should some day break into the town, and force them to fight *pro aris et focis*, πολλή που κακία κ. τ. ἐ.

814, D. Read, if you approve, Νῦν δὴ τῆς μὲν παλαίστρας περὶ δυνάμεως—. Soon after follows a long passage, which I am tempted to place before you, not in its present state, but as it must have been before it met with any misfortunes either from wounds or surgery. He is speaking of κίνησις of the body and observes: δύο μὲν αὐτὰς χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχιόνων τὸ φαύλον· καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο, καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο ἔτερας, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν βιαίοις ἐμπλεκέντων πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνδρικῆς, τὴν δὲ ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε οὕσησι σώφρονος, ἐν ἥδοναις τε ἐμμέτρουν. εἰρηνικὴν δὲ ἂν τις λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην δόχησιν λέγοι. τὴν δὲ τούτων ἄλλην οὖσαν τῆς εἰρηνικῆς πυρρίχην ἂν τις δρθῶς προσαγορεύοι, ταῖς τε εὐλαβείαις πασῶν πληγῶν, καὶ βολῶν ἐκνεύσεσι, καὶ ὑπείξει πάσῃ καὶ ἐκπερδίσει καὶ ἐγκύψει, καὶ ταῖς ταύταις ἐναντίαις ταῖς ἐπὶ τὰ δραστικὰ φερομέναις αὖ σχῆματα, τόξων βολαῖς καὶ ἀκοντίων, καὶ πασῶν πληγῶν μιμήματι, ἐπιχειροῦσαν μιμεῖσθαι τό τ' ὄρθδον ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ εὔτονον. τῶν οὖν ἀγαθῶν σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν ὅπόταν γίγνηται μίμημα, εὐθυφερὲς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν γιγνόμενον, ὄρθδον μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ τούτοις τούναντίον ἀποδιδόν οὐκ ὄρθδον ἀποδεχόμεθα. Though I do not suppose that you ever joined in the charge against me, that I did not sufficiently explain the reason of my corrections, others who read this will perhaps be nursing the accusation, and if I should now leave the above passage without other comment but a recommendation to compare it with the received text, many will say, *There, there!* and a few will even go further and say, *So would we have it.* And yet what a misery it is that a man cannot change τε into γε, or ΠΑΘΟΣ

into ΠΛΗΘΟΣ, without turning showman, and pointing out what every body can see for himself. To explain an emendation is as ungraceful a performance as to comment on a joke, and as *this* is seldom done except when the joke is ψυχρότερον τῶν Πλάτωνος νόμων, as that ribald Lucian has it, so *that* had better be reserved for sorry specimens of criticism. But, assuming that any chance reader will take the same trouble as yourself, to compare the received text with that here given, I will observe that αὐτῆς τὰ εἰδη is an explanation of αὐτάς, that ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν is a Platonic elegance adapted to a wrong place, that ἐμπλεκέντων is an Attic form preserved in our oldest copies, as likewise in the best MS of Thucydides, that ἥδοναι are μέτριαι, but men are ἔμμετροι, that ταπειώσει is probably the gloss of ἔγκυψει, or else the substitute for it when it had disappeared into ENΓΨΕΙ, that the pyrrhic dance *and that alone* can undertake to imitate skill and vigour, and can only do so by a twofold representation, namely of defence and of attack, that, if I am wrong in inserting οὐν, I have no objection to any better mode of conjunction, that, if ἀποδιδὸν is rash, you can leave a mark of hiatus, or else read ἐναντίον, (in which I should not follow you) and that ἀποδεχόμεθα was first discovered by Ast, and is the fourth instance in this Book of similar confusion of terminations.

In turning over some loose papers, I find the following observations bearing on the next few pages of our author. They are written in Commentator's Latin or an imitation thereof, but with the help of the text, it is to be hoped that they will be intelligible. I present them as they are.

815, c. ὅση μὲν βανχεῖται τὸ ἑστί, καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ὡς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πᾶνας καὶ Σειληνοὺς καὶ Σατύρους ἐπονομάζοντες, ὡς φασι, μιμοῦνται κατωτωμένους, περικαθαρμούς τε καὶ τελετάς τινας ἀποτελούντων, ξύμπαν τοῦτο τῆς ὁρχήσεως τὸ γένος κ. τ. ἐ. Diu mihi suspectum fuit verbum ἐπονομάζοντες. *Saltationes quasdam Nympharum et Faunorum aliorumque numinum nominibus appellant.* Fac Platonem illud voluisse. Sed quid porro imitantur? Eadem hæc numina ebria. Quæ est hæc negligentia, ut eadem vocabula utpote ab ἐπονομάζοντες pendentia saltationum nomina significant, ad μιμοῦνται autem relata de numinibus ipsis capiantur? Adde quod ἐπονομάζοντες, ὡς φασι, ita conjuncta sunt, ut hoc ad illud necessario referatur. Quasi his saltatoribus proprium esset, ut his

nominibus uterentur; vel potius non uterentur, sed uti se dictarent. Quod vero ad Nymphas attinet, quis unquam illas ebrias finxit, nedum saltatione imitatus sit? Quid vero sibi volunt τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων? Si sic interpretaberis: “qui Bacchus sequuntur”, praesto erit Astius, qui te commonefaciat, ἃς referendum esse ad ταύταις. Quod quoniam rectissime et ex linguae norma dictum est, sequitur ut ἃς etiam de Bacchabus ipsis intelligi oporteat, non de saltatoribus. Atqui si hoc concesseris, quid de reliqua sententia fiet? Quid multa? Corruptam orationem agnoscas necesse est; vel si forte etiamnum dubitas, vide num vera lectio te ab ista religione liberet. ὅση μὲν βαρχεία τ' ἔστι, καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἃς Νύμφας ἐπονομάζοντες, Πάνας καὶ Σειληνὸς καὶ Σατύρους ὡς φασι μιμοῦνται πατωνωμένους. Mulieres Nymphaeum partes agunt: viri Faunos temulentos Nymphaeum fugientium amatores imitantur. In verbis τοῦτο [τῆς ὀρχήσεως] τὸ γένος, quae et infra repetuntur, non difficile est Platonem ab interpolatore diconoscere.

Ibid. d. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπολέμου Μούσης, ἐν ὀρχήσεοι δὲ τούς τε θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν παιδας τιμῶν—Si scriptum esset ἀπολέμου μὲν ἐν ὀρχήσεοι δὲ τιμώσης, vel ἀπολέμου μὲν ἐν ὀρχήσεοι δὲ σπουδαῖοις τιμῶν, quidquid de reliqua oratione statueremus, δὲ saltem suo loco positum videretur. Nunc autem plane supervacaneum est. Vide, num aliquando a margine in orationem invectum fuerit. Nam in Cod. E scriptum est τὸ δὴ τῆς ἀ. M.: unde suspiceris, dubitasse librarios utrum δὲ an δὴ scribendum esset. Evidem neutrum probo. Ad propositum redeentes μὲν οὖν usurpant. Sed de τιμῶν longe gravior est controversia; quæ lectio nullus dubito quin alteri, τιμώντων, præferenda sit. Sed unde factum est ut illam nullus bonæ notæ Codex praeter E præbuerit? Scilicet qui illum librum exaravit, ipse finxit. Minime; nam si ita esset, verba illa quæ Bekkerus ex illo codice enotavit, “τὸ τιμῶν οὐδετέρως”, in margine, non in orationis serie, scripta fuissent. Itaque hoc statuendum; vel lectionem τιμῶν etiam in A vel Ω exstare, sed a Bekkero prætervisam fuisse, vel E non totum ab illis pendere, sed habere propriam auctoritatem, utpote ab antiquiore libro, qui nonnunquam meliores lectiones præberet, descriptum. Mox pro τὸ μὲν ἐκ πόνων τιμῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κινδύνων διαπεφευγότων, lege: τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ, τῶν ἐκ πόνων τιμῶν π. τ. ἐ.

816, c. ἐν τάξει. Hæc non intelligo. Aliud est καθιεροῦν,

aliud τάττειν, neque illud fieri potest nisi hoc præcesserit. Quæ vero ad τάξιν pertinent omnia supra memorata sunt; ut jam nihil supersit quam καθιεροῦν πάντα, ἀν τάξην.

Ibid. d. Lege: Τὰ μὲν οὖν .. ψυχῶν, οἷα εἰς τὰς χορείας, εἴρηται. Cetera quam primum abjicienda. Mox dele κωμῳδήματα, et κατὰ ante ὄρχησιν, et lege: καὶ τὰ τοιούτων πάντων κωμῳδήματα.

818, a. ὡς ἀκριβεῖας ἔχόμενα. “*Cum perfectione conjuncta, h. e. perfecte s. exacte, ἀκριβῶς s. δι’ ἀκριβείας*”. Sic Astius, falsa veris permiscens. Lege: ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα οὐχ ὡς ἀκριβεῖας ἔχομέν ους δεῖ διαπονεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλά τινας ὀλίγους.—Mox sequuntur hæc: οὗτω γὰρ πρέπον ἄν εἴη. τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα καὶ πῶς ὁρθότατα λέγεται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρόν, δι’ ἀκριβείας δὲ ζητεῖν πάντα οὔτε φάδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατόν. Quæ sit horum verborum grammatica ratio, οὔτε φάδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατὸν ἔξηγεῖσθαι. Locus sic mihi constituendus videtur: τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα πῶς ὁρθότατα λέγεται; ἢ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρόν, κ. τ. ἐ.

Ibid. c. οἶος δυνατός. “*Alterutrum fortasse delendum est*”. Ast. Imo δυνατός quantocius expellendum. De Dis loquens consulto maluit οἶος h. e. *idoneus* dicere, quam de potentia eorum videri dubitare.

819, a. οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν ἀπειρίᾳ τῶν πάντων οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακόν. Hic οὐ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν οὐδὲ μέγιστον haud minus absurde collocantur quam μέγιστος καὶ σφοδρὸς ἔρως, quæ Cobetus, spreta certissima nostra correctione, in Convivio legenda proposuit. Et quemadmodum illic, ubi de universo amore sermo est, τὸ σφοδρόν, quod in partem tantum cadit, prorsus alienum est, sic in nostro loco omnium rerum ignorantiam σφοδρὸν κακὸν vocare nec Græcitas nec rei natura patitur. Lege: οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδὲ νῆστος καὶ σφοδρὸς ἀπειρίᾳ τῶν πάντων, οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακόν. Neque vero hinc exemplum petere possis adjectivi positivi cum superlativo conjuncti; nam δεινὸν nequaquam ad κακὸν pertinet. “Nulla in civitate periculosa est—neque est summum malum.” Mox dele τούτων.

Ibid. b. c. Lege: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοὺς ἀτεχνῶς πάρεστιν ἔξηγομένα μαθήματα μετὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ήδονῆς μανθάνειν. Vulgo παισίν. Tum enumerantur τὰ μαθήματα, sc. μῆλων καὶ στεφάνων διανομαῖ, καὶ πυκτῶν . . . ἐφεδρεῖαι τε καὶ συλλήξεις ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς, [καὶ] ὡς πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι. Vulgo ἐφεδρεῖας

—συλλήξεως; unde effectum est ut πεφύκασι sine nominativo es-
set, et genitivi a διανομαὶ pendere crederentur; quasi quis pugiles
spectantibus eodem modo quo poma vel coronas distribueret. Alterum καὶ omisi; quod qui inseruit, parum intellexit quid esset
ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς, et tanquam inter se opposita essent, (quod
fuisse, ἐν μ. τε καὶ ἐ.) tertium aliquid in ὡς πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι
contineri putavit. Sed unumquodque par et singuli tertiarii prior-
res ἐν μέρει excipiebant, atque hoc in omnibus *deinceps* fiebat.
ὡς πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι adjectum est ut significaretur certam esse
harum permutationum conjunctionumque rationem, si quidem nu-
meri natura immutabiles essent. καὶ δὴ καὶ παιζοντες, φιάλας ἄμα
χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων κερα-
νύντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλας πως διαδιδόντες, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἰς παιδιὰν ἐναρ-
μόττοντες τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἀριθμῶν χρήσεις—Tria hic præcipue
quaerenda sunt. 1. Quid sit φιάλας κερανύντες, 2. quo modo ab
ὅλας διαδιδόντες differat, 3. ubi dixerit, quod hic se iterum dicere
ait. Duplex, nisi fallor, discrimen in poculis fingitur; nam et e
diversa materia facta sunt, et diversum liquorem continent. Si
hoc verum est, recte opponuntur οἱ κερανύντες τὰς φιάλας, h.e.
qui pocula vino cum aqua permixto implent, et οἱ φ. ὅλας διαδι-
δόντες, quod idem est ac φ. ἀκράτου πότου πλήρεις διαδιδόντες.
Sed vocem ἄκρατος consulto vitavit, quoniam non minus de aqua
pura quam de vino mero cogitabat. Quo autem spectant illa, ὅπερ
εἶπον? Planissime ad verba ἀρμοττόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν. At-
qui non prorsus idem est, sive numeros *convenire* dicas, sive nu-
meros *accommadari*; et quoniam hoc verius, malim ἀρμοττομένων.
Nam qui hoc dixit, idem dixit quod infra, εἰς παιδιὰν κ. τ. ἐ.
Præterea cum prorsus otiosum sit ἄλλων, et οἱ δὲ alterum quod-
dam sui simile flagitet, lego: ἄλλοι μὲν κερανύντες. At unde il-
lud μὲν arripui? Nempe a Cod. Ξ, qui pro κερανύντες μερα-
νύντας habere dicitur. Ceterum si quis inutilem esse particulam
πως contendet, simulque ὅλας φιάλας ἀερε feret, quidni ὅλας πό-
σεις reponat?

Ibid. d. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς μετρήσειν, ὡς, ὅσα ἔχει μήκη
καὶ πλάτη καὶ βάθη, περὶ ἄπαντα ταῦτα ἐνοῦσάν τινα φύσει γελοῖαν
τε καὶ αἰσχρὰν ἔγνοιαν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι, ταύτης ἀπαλλάσσο-
ντιν. Supplevi ὡς. Idem valet ὡς ἐνοῦσαν atque κρίνοντες ἐνεῖναι.
Mox pro ὑηνῶν lege ὕηνῶν.

820, A. Εἴ δ' ἔστι μήτε σφόδρα μήτε ἡρέμα [δυνατὰ ἔντια, ἄλλα]

τὰ μὲν, [τὰ δὲ μή,] σὺ δὲ πάντα ἡγεῖ, πῶς οἴει πρὸς ταῦτα διακεισθαι; Non defuturos scio, qui hos uncinos meos tanquam summæ audaciæ exempla citaturi sint. Ego contra librariorum audaciam me compescere arbitror, qui talem compositionem οὐκ ἔνια ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὐ, pro Platonica nobis obtulerunt. Sed cur δυνατὰ inclusi? Videamus præcedentia. Ἡρόδοτος δὲ οὐδεὶς . . ταῦτα εἶναι μετρητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα; Ναῦλος τε, οἶμαι, πρὸς μῆκος κ. τ. ἐ. Vides orationem continuari, et hæc omnia a μετρητὰ εἶναι penderē. "Imo", inquit, "a δυνατὸν εἶναι μετρεῖν φύσει". Atqui, ut hoc concesserim, qua ratione haec inter se conciliabis: δυνατόν εστι ταῦτα μετρεῖν et ταῦτα δυνατά εστι? Scilicet intelligendo μετρεῖσθαι. Et ubi erit Platonicus ille nitor sermonis, quem omnes laudant, paucissimi tuentur? Sed paucissimi illi δυνατὸν εἶναι μετρεῖν φύσει sine ulla dubitatione damnabunt.

Ibid. A. Τί δ' αὖ; μῆκος τε καὶ πλάτος πρὸς βάθος, ἢ πλάτος τε καὶ μῆκος πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστε πως ἁρῷ οὐδεὶς διανοούμεθα περὶ ταῦτα οὕτως κ. τ. ἐ. Sic A et Ω. Pro ὥστε πως Winkelmannus infelicititer ἀμῶς γέ πως conjectit. Scribendum videtur: πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστα πως; ΚΛ. Πῶς; ΑΘ. Ἡρόδοτος διανοούμεθα—.

Returning from the Latin notes the first thing we meet with in the text, that seems to require notice is in 820, c. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ σκοποῦντα διαγιγνώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ παντάπασιν εἶναι φαῦλον, προβάλλοντά τε ἀλλήλοις ἀεί, διατριβὴν τῆς πεττείας πολὺ χαριεστέραν πρεσβυτῶν διατριβόντα, φιλονεικεῖν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀξίαισι σχολαῖς. You will probably assent to ἀλλοις—πρεσβύτην—φιλονικεῖν, and likewise to the removal of τὰ μαθήματα in Clinias' answer. Those who want to remove οὐ, shew that they do not understand the force of the particle in ἔστι γέ οὖν. E. The Zurich Editors have gone back to the wrong distribution of persons, which Bekker had rectified. Why should the Athenian not call Clinias ὁ ξένε? And how can οὔκοντι κείσθω suit any other mouth than τοῦ θέντος?

821, c. Orellius is right in proposing ταῦτα ἀεί, but there are worse faults in the next sentence. ΑΘ. Ταῦτα εστι τοίνυν, ὁ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, νῦν ἂ δή φημι δεῖν περὶ θεῶν τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν τούς γε ἡμετέρους πολίτας τε καὶ τοὺς νέους τὸ μέχρι τοσούτου μαθεῖν περὶ ἀπάντων τούτων, μέχρι τοῦ μὴ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτά, εὐφημεῖν δὲ ἀεί θύοντάς τε καὶ ἐν εὐχαῖς εὐχομένους εὐσεβῶς. How can the following bear each other's company: τοίνυν—νῦν, περὶ θεῶν

τῶν κατ' οὐρανόν—περὶ ἀπάντων τούτων, τοὺς πολίτας τε—καὶ τοὺς νέους? *Nῦn* and the celestial clause must go, and the cross division must be changed into a subdivision by removing *τούς*. “Those who are *at once* our fellow-citizens and our youth.” E. The words ἐγὼ τούτων οὔτε νέος οὔτε πάλαι ἀκηκοώς σφῶν ἀν νῦν οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δηλώσαι δυναίμην. καίτοι χαλεπά γε ὅντα οὐκ ἀν ποτε οἰος τ' ἦν δηλοῦν τηλικούτοις οὖσι τηλικοῦτος ὥν. I have added the last word, but there are other difficulties which you will require to see solved before you will look on me as the corrector of the passage. I presume you do not approve of either *νέον* or *νεωστὶ*: for a man who has heard a thing οὕτε *νεωστὶ* οὔτε *πάλαι* can scarcely have heard it at all. *Τούτων* seems to have given no offence, though it is wrong both in number and case. Now as one of the possible hindrances to teaching is the age of the teacher, to which the speaker again alludes, we may restore this feature while we correct *τούτων*, by supposing that the old reading was *τουτουτῶν* (i.e. *τοῦτ' οὐτ' ᾧν*) *νέος*—but what second hindrance does he allude to? “That he had not heard it for some time:” but the Greek for “it is long since I heard it”, would be *πάλαι οὐκ ἀκήκοα*, not *οὐ πάλαι ἀκήκοα*, and with οὕτε the same difference would hold good. I therefore incline to read: *τοῦτ' οὐτ' ᾧν νέος πάλαι τ' οὐκ ἀκηκοώς*.—Perhaps the belief that there was something wrong in οὕτε—τε induced the scribe to make the alteration.

822, A. Read: *τὴν [αὐτὴν] γὰρ αὐτῶν ὄδον, καὶ ἔκαστον . . μιαν κ. τ. ἐ.,* and soon after *τὸν ἡττημένον.* c. I should print the text as follows: ἀρ' οὐκ ολόμεθα τὸ γελοῖόν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄρθὸν ἔκει γιγνόμενον ἄν, ἐνταυθὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις γίγνεσθαι; KΛ. Γελοῖον μέν, ὄρθὸν δ' οὐδαμῶς. After this I return to another scrap of *Adversaria*, which will lead us to the end of the Book.

Ibid. D. ἐπὶ μεῖζον nullo modo ferri potest; sed non mutandum in ἔτι μεῖζον, quod nescio quis proposuit; nam quis dixerit *hoc etiam majus*, nisi qui prius alterum quiddam *magnum* esse contendit? Nec quae sequuntur sine offensione legi possunt. Quorsum enim τι iteratur, ἔτερόν τι—μεταξύ τι? Deinde si quis doceat πεψυκέναι τι μεταξὺ νουθετήσεως τε καὶ νόμων, quivis hoc intelligat; sin adjectiat νουθετήσεως τε ἢ μα καὶ νόμων, diversa confudisse videatur, sc. τὸ μετέχειν ὅμα τούτου καὶ ἐκείνου, et τὸ μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ ἐκείνου πεψυκέναι. Satis patere arbitror verborum ordinem a scribis

turbatum parum feliciter a correctore aliquo constitutum esse. Quid si sic legamus? πινδυνεύει γὰρ δὴ νομοθέτη τὸ προσταττόμενον ἔτερόν τι μεῖζον εἶναι τοῦ τοὺς νόμους θέντα ἀπηλλάχθαι, ἅμα δ' εἶναι μεταξύ τι νουθετήσεώς τε πεφυκός καὶ νόμων.

Ibid. B. οἶον περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παίδων τροφὴν· οὐ γὰρ δητά φαμεν εἶναι, λέγοντες τε αὐτὰ ὡς νόμους οἰεσθαι τιθεμένους εἶναι πολλῆς ἀνοίας γέμειν. Non δητὰ sed ἄρρητα desiderari vidit C. F. Hermannus, sed non vidit id ipsum leviter corruptum in omnibus libris haberri. Post λόγοις plenius interpungendum est, legendumque οἶον (τὰ) περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παίδων τροφὴν οὗτ' ἄρρητά φαμεν (δεῖν) εἶναι, λέγοντες τ' αὐτὰ νόμους οἰεσθαι τιθέναι πολλῆς (ἄν) ἀνοίας γέμειν.

Ibid. B. Dele αὐτόν τις. Structura est οὐ τέλεος ὁ ἐπαινος, ὅταν φῇ τὸν ὑπηρετήσαντα κ. τ. ἐ. Mox quod Ξ̄ præbet ad sensum loci necessarium est. ὡς ἄρα ὃς ἂν τοῖς τοῦ (νομοθέτου) νομοθετοῦντος τε καὶ ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ ψέγοντος πειθόμενος γράμμασι διεξέλθῃ τὸν βίον ἄκρατον. οὗτος ὁ τε λόγος ὁρθότατος—Locum hucusque descripsi ut mancam esse sententiam ostenderem. “Quicunque non modo legibus verum etiam præceptis consiliisque legum latoris vitam regit”—quid tum? Inepte autem dicitur βίος ἄκρατος, et conjunctio sic posita οὗτος ὁ τε λόγος neminem non offendat. Scripsit Plato: ἀνθράτας οὗτος. ὁ τε λόγος κ. τ. ἐ. Horum partem video jam a Winckelmanno occupatam. Mox post μόνον dele γράφειν.

823, B. Jampridem monui legendum: οἶον μάρτυρα ἐπαγό μενοι δηλοῖμεν ἄν ὁ βουλόμενθα μᾶλλον.

Ibid. B. Locum sic interpungi et corrigi velim: πάμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ περὶ θηρεύματα [οὐ μόνον θηρίαν]. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄξιον ἐνοεῖν θήραν, τὴν τε κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ κλωπεῖαν καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων. πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλίαν—Vulgo hæc per amicitiam venatio, in qua procul dubio rem amatoriam, atque omnem suadendi artem et omnia blanditiarum genera includi volebat, inter τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον θήραν atque hujus exempla media interposita est; ipsa autem verba sic corrupta sunt: καὶ κλωπεῖα καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων στρατοπέδοις θῆραι. Quem nostra reponit correctio chiasmum librarius parum intellexit.

Ibid. c. Transpone sic: καὶ μετὰ ξημίας νομοθετηθέντων.

Ibid. E. Lege διαπονουμένης . . alioquin nec erit quo τῆς referri

possit, et dativi illi ἐγρηγορόσι, εῦδουσι, prorsus ἀσύντακτοι erunt. Ordo est, τῆς διπονουμένης κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν τῶν ἐνύδρων ξώων, μήτε ἐγρηγορόσι μήτε εῦδουσι. Mox incredibile est quemquam in verbis μηδ' εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον ἐπέλθοι νοῦν hæsisse. Qui tot ineptias invito Platoni obtrusas defendunt, simul atque Plato ipse in notissimo proverbio jocari cœpit, statim nauseant, et cum procellis jactu decidere parant.

824, A. Lege: η τὸν δί' ἀναπαύματα πόνον ἔχουσα. Mox pro ὁ διειρημένος lege ὅδ' ὁ εἰρημένος. Pro ἐν ἔργοσιμοις δὲ καὶ λεροῖς ἄγιοις suspicor olim lectum esse ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἄγιοις, quod ultimum nescio quis per λεροῖς interpretatus est. Melius fecisset, si in ΑΓΙΟΙC veram lectionem ΑΓΡΟΙC latere admonuisset. In Α et Ω dittographia ex proba et mala lectione conflata servatur ΑΓ(P)ΙΟΙC.

I had hoped to wander through two or three more Books with you, picking up specimens of palæography and discoursing on them as we went. But from this egotistical design you and all others are delivered for the present by the peculiar character of this ἀντίχθων; which, though we are not quite so remote as Philolaus would place us, holds too scanty a communication with you to satisfy a garrulous correspondent, and forces me, if I would see this in print before the end of this year, to address it forthwith to the European Publisher. With heartiest respect and affection,

Believe me,

Yours ever,

CHARLES BADHAM.

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY,
FEBRUARY, 1877.

C O R R I G E N D A.

- | | | |
|--------|------------|--|
| P. VI | last line. | <i>For me: read we.</i> |
| " IX | 9th " | <i>After τούτῳ add (i.e. τῷ σχήματε).</i> |
| " XIII | 26th " | <i>For became: read become.</i> |
| " XVI | 6th " | <i>from bottom. For κελεύοις: read κελεύεις.</i> |
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PLATONIS PHILEBUS

WITH

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

INTRODUCTION.

THE aim of this noble Dialogue is to ascertain the relation of Pleasure and of Intellect to the absolute Good.

The form of the inquiry is a controversy between Socrates and two young Athenians named Philebus and Protarchus. The latter, espousing the cause which his friend had first taken up, and then through laziness abandoned, affirms that pleasure, using the word in its largest sense, is entitled to the name of *good*; to which Socrates advances an opposite claim on behalf of intellect, knowledge, and all kindred species; observing that, if it should prove that some third competitor showed a better title than either of the original claimants, then, whichever of the two should be found most akin to the successful candidate would be entitled to the *second* prize.

Protarchus is then reminded of the great variety and discrepancy in the kinds of pleasure, and is invited to show what common nature there is in all these, over and above their being *pleasant*, which nobody disputes, in virtue of which he calls them all pleasures. In reply, he denies that there is any variety or discrepancy between them, *in so far as they are pleasures*. Socrates shows the fallacy of his argument, and points out that this reliance upon the identity implied by a common name, as if it excluded all diversity, would put an end to all reasoning. This leads to the mention of the great problem about Identity and Diversity, the delight of young arguers and the terror of quiet, respectable people, the argument of *Ἐν καὶ πολλά*.* The contradiction between the individual as *one* in nature, and yet *many* in his many changes of circumstance, and that between the Whole as *one* and

* The bearing of this discussion on the main subject is twofold. The importance of the πέρας in dialectics is a suitable introduction to the part which it is to play in physics; and the necessity of the careful division of pleasure under its several heads is shown beforehand.

the Parts as *many*, are touched upon; but Socrates affirms that, though men now look upon these paradoxes as childish and sophistical, there exist other forms of the contradiction which are really important. For, if we consider any genus as one in itself, and then again observe that the representatives of it are many and unlimited, it is difficult to conceive how this One, at the same time that it remains one in itself, is yet one in all the individuals and in each of them. This contradiction is the inherent and unchangeable property of *all* objects of reasoning; but though as such we cannot remove it, there is a remedy provided against its practical difficulty. For, while all things are constituted out of the One and the Many, they have, associated in their constitution, the Limit and the Indefinite. We must therefore, in all objects of inquiry, accepting this natural constitution, begin by taking a unit, which we are sure to find if we look for it; from this we must proceed to the next definite number supplied by the object itself in its own natural divisions, and so, continually advancing through all subordinate divisions, proceed till we arrive at the point where the limit (or given numbers) ceases, and the unlimited begins. This process from the one to the indefinite by means of *number*, or the contrary process from the indefinite to the one, is the gift of the Gods, the true dialectical method, the origin of all discovery, and the opposite of that sophistical manner which passes *per saltum* from either extreme to the other. Socrates beautifully exemplifies this position by language, music, metre, and the art of writing; and proposes that the rival claimants, pleasure and intellect, should be subjected to the same method of scrutiny.

But finding that Protarchus is scared by the difficulty of the undertaking, he professes to remember a shorter solution of the problem before them, by which it can be shown that neither competitor can hope for the *first* prize. It lies in the very conception of the Good that it should be *perfect* and *self-sufficient*. But, if we take either pleasure or intellect in absolute isolation from each other, they are alike imperfect and insufficient; for no one would accept pleasure alone as all in all, if he had no memory, no consciousness, no faculty by which he could be cognisant of the pleasure enjoyed: nor would any one accept a life of mere intellect without at least some admixture of

pleasurable feeling. To either of these states of being, all men would certainly prefer *a combination of the two*; therefore each has failed in its pretensions to be the absolute Good. But which comes the nearest to the mark? That which has most right to be considered either itself the Cause of the Combination, or at least as having most affinity with that Cause. Thus we are led to inquire into the nature of combination itself, and the laws which govern it.

Now it has already been said, that the Limit and the Indefinite* are the elements out of which all things are compounded; these, therefore, will be the first two γένη or kinds which we must consider; the Combination of these two will be the third kind, and the Cause which effects their union, the fourth.

Every quality of matter considered in its abstraction, extends indefinitely in the direction of two opposites, as in the instances of moister and drier †, hotter and colder, &c. The attempt to limit it at once dissolves the abstraction, because it fixes to a point that which is only conceivable as continually capable of *more* and *less*. All things which thus admit of more and less are comprehended in one ἰδέα, and receive the name of the Indefinite, τὸ ἄπειρον. The opposites of these are the things which effect equality and proportion, and these are classed under the name of the Limit, τὸ πέρας ‡ or περατοειδές. The examples of this kind are *all definite numbers* whatever and their relations to each other, but they can be more easily seen at the same time with the third kind, that is to say, in Combinations of τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας. In music, bodily health and strength and beauty, the temperature of the seasons, and above all, in the instance of pleasure, which would be absorbed in its own indefinite cravings, but for the imposition of law and order to limit and preserve it,—

* This doctrine Plato is said to have borrowed from the Pythagorean Philolaus, who, through extreme poverty, consented to sell him the book in which he had embodied the tenets of his sect.—See Diog. Laert. in *Philolaus*, and the Extract from Böckh's *Philolaus* in the Appendix.

† The comparatives of all such words are used by Plato because the positive might be misunderstood as implying a ποσόν, or definite quantity, or proportion; but afterwards, he uses the positive, 'Εν δ' οὗται καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπειροτελεῖ οὐσίᾳ. (26, A.)

‡ πέρας is properly the ἰδέα, or that according to which they are one, and περατοειδές, the γένος: τὰ περατοειδῆ again would be the γέννα, which we must not confound with γένος, as Ast and others have done, but which is the multitude contained in the γένος, its numerous specimens.

in all such instances, where *qualities* are blended with definite *proportion*, we see at once the second element of the combination, and the result of that Combination as manifested in some *γένεσις*. In the fourth place there must be a Cause of such combinations; for that which *is made* cannot be the same as that which *makes*, but must always be subsequent to it. Therefore we may consider the first three kinds to be (1) (2) the elements* of natural things, and (3) the natural things themselves; but the fourth kind is that which operates with these and upon them.

The question then arises: To which of these four kinds does the Mixed Life of pleasure and intellect bear most resemblance? It is decided that it resembles most the third kind or the Combination. Pleasure again seems most akin to the Indefinite.

The kind which answers to Intellect is not so evident, and Socrates warns his friend against any rashness in the decision, as touching upon impiety. The gay Philebus laughs at his scruples, but Protarchus has more reverence, and is so awestruck by Socrates' manner, that he is afraid to make any conjecture. Then Socrates declares that his own solemnity was all in sport, and that it is no wonder if philosophers are so ready to pay themselves a compliment, in declaring Intellect to be the King of the Universe; but that it is worth while to see what right it has to the designation. Protarchus is then asked to choose between two opinions; one that the universe is subject to chance and blind caprice, and the other, that it is governed by intellect and mind. He unhesitatingly chooses the latter. But, argues Socrates, in this universe there are the same elements which we find also in the constitution of our own bodies, only that here they occur small in quantity and poor in quality, while in the universe they are abundant and wondrous. Now, the terrestrial elements must have been derived from the universal ones, the earthly body from the body of the universe: but our body has a *mind* which

* Socrates speaks also presently (29, A) of the Four Elements, as they are called, which are as old as Empedocles, and probably much older. But the elements with which we are here concerned are elements in a different sense. They are not matter, nor even properties of matter, but the *ἀπειρον* is the condition of all the properties of matter, and of number itself, till controlled by *πέρας*. Though the Pythagoreans held *ἀριθμός* to be the condition of existence and the ground of knowledge; this its virtue was derived from the decad, that is from proportion, for the decad contained every kind of proportion. Indefinite number, *η ἀόριστος δυάς*, was reckoned among the *ἀπειρά*.

it must have also derived from the same source; for if we men have a mind, much more must the universe, possessing as it does all that we possess, only in greater perfection, have one also: and if it is in virtue of the fourth of our kinds, viz. Cause, working through the human mind, that that mind gains credit for skill and wisdom (as when, for instance, it trains the body to health and repairs its disorders), much more must the heavens and the order of nature be recognised as effects of the same Cause, operating therein on a grander scale and through a nobler and purer mind. It follows from this, that the Cause which is the chief of the four kinds, will[“] be supreme in heaven and in earth, being the essence of the mind and of the soul of Zeus himself.* The result of this inquiry is to establish that Intellect rules over all things, and that *our* intellect is therefore also akin to the fourth or highest of the kinds.

The next step is to consider Pleasure and Intellect not abstractedly, but as they are, and to enquire how they arise in living creatures.

The first kind of Pleasure noted is that which arises when the constituent elements of the creature tend towards *Harmony*; but, when that harmony is more or less dissolved, pain is the consequence. This is illustrated by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, in all which there is a tendency to some loss or dissolution, which is pain, and in the relief of which there is a return to natural completeness, which return is pleasure. A second kind of pleasure (and pain) is in *Expectation*: this kind belongs to the mind alone, without the body participating in it.

These two classes are considered sufficient for the present purpose, and another observation is added, of which Protarchus is told that he will see the importance further on. It is, that there must be an *intermediate state* of the body, when it is tending neither towards completeness nor dissolution of any part; when this state prevails, there can be neither pleasure nor pain. Such a state is quite compatible with a life of mere intellect; it is also such a life as we may conceive the gods to possess.†

* That is, of the highest mundane divinity. The argument is, that *αἰτία* ἐν τῷ Σλω is the highest of all the four kinds; but *αἰτία* is *voūς*, and *voūς* is inseparable from *ψυχή*; consequently, *αἰτία* is the ground of the highest *voūς* and *ψυχή*, i. e., that of *Ζεύς*.

† Page 33, n. The sense I have given here is not very clearly expressed Platonis Philebus.

This, therefore, is another point to be scored in favour of *νοῦς* in its competition for the second prize.

It is in the second kind of Pleasure, that which springs from Expectation and belongs to the mind, that the nature of pleasure and its relation to *νοῦς* become most apparent. Expectation of pleasure must depend upon Memory (that is, not recollection, but the state which is the necessary condition of recollection), and this memory presupposes Sensation. If the body alone is affected, and the movement does not reach to the mind, there is no sensation and no memory. In addition to sensation, which is the common movement of body and mind, and memory, which is the preservation of sensation, we must also notice Recollection, which is the rehearsal by the mind alone of the sensations which it formerly experienced in common with the body; and lastly, Desire. For desire also is a property of the mind and not of the body, as may be shown thus: We desire the opposite of that which we feel; but desire implies memory of the thing desired; for all our relations to things desirable must be either through sensation or through memory: but sensation is occupied with the present state, whereas desire yearns for the opposite of the present state;* therefore, it must be through memory that desire is brought into relation with the thing desired; and hence it follows that desire belongs not to the body but to the mind.

A third state of pleasure (and pain) is, when, whilst the body suffers through a present void, the mind is conscious of a former satisfaction; in such a case, if there is hope of attaining the desired satisfaction, the memory of it affords a pleasure simultaneous with the bodily pain; but if there be no hope, then there is a double pain: a present void in the body, and a consciousness in the mind that the satisfaction is unattainable.

The great importance of this observation is, that it will enable us to answer a question, without settling which we cannot hope to bring the controversy to an issue: Are there *False Pleasures*?

Protarchus denies this, and affirms that *beliefs*† may be true in the original as it stands in the Editions: it would come out much more forcibly by the very slight change of γε into τε. Οὐκοῦν οὔτως ἀν ἔκεινω τε ὑπάρχοι, καλ λόγως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.

* The same argument is used by Socrates in the Convivium.

† I have rendered δόξαν in this manner; it is on the whole a handier word than *impressions*, but is to be taken in the sense of that word as popularly used.

or false, but that *pleasures* are all true. And yet, says Socrates, we speak of the pleasures of dreams or of madness as false. And if it be objected that pleasure is still pleasure though the ground of it may be false, surely the same may be said of beliefs also. If again it should be said that, in such a case, the belief is false though real, but the pleasure is true as well as real, this must be shown to arise from some peculiarity in the nature of pleasure which differentiates it from belief. But we do not find any such; for both alike admit of all other qualities, such as great and small, and good and bad. There are also correct and mistaken pleasures following on correct and mistaken beliefs. And here it is worth while to consider the nature of these $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ in general. What we believe, results from a comparison of that which we see or feel with that which we remember. This result we record either to ourselves or to others. Now, suppose the former case: then a man carries the record about with him; and it may be said to be written on his mind. Besides this power which writes impressions upon us, there is another which paints them; that is the power by which we recall to the fancy the very images which we formerly beheld with our eyes; and when the beliefs are false, these images will be false also. Among these written and painted records there will be some which have reference to future time, and these are called *Hopes*. The good man will have true hopes and true images of the future, and the bad will have false ones. But these images are *pleasures*, for it was before admitted that some pleasures arose from expectation; consequently, there are false pleasures, which bad men have, and which are the caricatures of the true pleasures of good men. Having established this analogy between $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ and pleasure, Socrates argues that, as only those $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$, which do not answer to things past or present or future, but are false, are admitted to be *bad*, so those pleasures only, which are false, are bad also. Protarchus objects to this, that the badness of pleasures has very little to do with their falsehood; but Socrates defers his answer to a later stage in the controversy, and proceeds to another and stronger proof of the possibility of the falsehood of pleasure. When the body is in pleasure, and the mind at the same time is apprehensive of pain, or the body is in pain and the mind anticipating pleasure, the simultaneous presence of pleasure and pain will produce a similar

effect to the illusion of the eyes when they attribute greater size to near objects and less to those more distant. For the *immediate* pleasures or pains will seem greater than they are, in proportion to those expected; but that degree of pleasure or pain by which they exceed their real dimensions will be false, and cause a false belief: so that not only false beliefs cause false pleasures and pains, but false pleasures and pains cause false beliefs also. The strongest example of falsehood in pleasure is that which is next adduced. If we suppose a state in which there is no change either towards satisfaction or dissolution, such a state will be one devoid both of pleasure and pain. Now it is true that they who maintain the doctrine of a perpetual flux* deny the possibility of such a motionless state; but it will be enough to suppose that the motion or change is not great enough to reach the sense and the mind; and that there is such a condition nobody will deny. If a man in this state should say that he has pleasure, he would say what is false, and the pleasure which he speaks of would be false. But this is the very thing which happens when a man is relieved from pain without the acquisition of pleasure, and calls this negative state by the name of pleasure; for this supposed pleasure is false, since that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot *come to be* truly either. But there is another set of teachers,† who tell us that these things which we have been considering as three, are in fact only two; that pleasure is a mere illusion, and is nothing more than the removal of pain. Though we shall find reasons for disagreeing with them, they have something to teach us. For if we would judge rightly of pleasure, we must take in view the *highest degree* of it. Now the highest degree of pleasure is that which follows the gratification of the strongest desires; but it is in morbid conditions of the body that the strongest desires arise. Upon this, Socrates enters into a painfully vivid description of the mingled sensations which are produced by the application of relief to an itching surface or an inward irritation, and of the intense pleasure alternating with pain which men in these cases experience. In all such instances the pain is the condition of the pleasure; and these may be

* The schools of Heraclitus and Protagoras. *Theaetet.* 152, 180. *Sophist.*, 146.

† Antisthenes and the Cynics. A saying is attributed to Antisthenes, μανεῖται μᾶλλον ηγετεῖται. Diog. Laert. 6, 3.

classed with the former examples where the body and the mind were differently affected, either mingling its pleasure with the pain of the other. Then again, the mind by itself has pleasures inseparable from pains; for of this nature are all the passions. Such is the sweetness of anger, and the indulgence of violent grief, and the mimic sympathies with tragic heroes. Nay, in comedy also, the same principle is at work; for ridicule deals with that which is evil; e.g. the ignorant conceit of men about their wealth or their bodily perfections or their wisdom, is evil, and it is in such foibles that ridicule finds its objects. When, therefore, we laugh at our friend's ignorance, we have, it is true, pleasure, for laughter is a sign of pleasure; but we have also pain, for taking pleasure in a friend's evil is $\varphi\theta\circ\text{v}\circ\text{s}$; and $\varphi\theta\circ\text{v}\circ\text{s}$ is unquestionably a pain of the mind. Thus we see that those stern despisers of pleasure are so far right, that there are many and intense kinds of enjoyment, which owe their very intensity to the pain with which they are connected.

But then there are other species of pleasure which this School has overlooked: *pure pleasures* not resulting from any previous perceptible want, such as those of Sight, when it has for its objects beautiful outline or beautiful colour, unassociated with desire; those of Hearing, when they are of the same kind, and those of Smelling. (It is remarkable that Touch and Taste are excluded from this list.) And lastly, there are the Intellectual pleasures, which are not preceded by any painful want, and the loss of which is not followed by any sense of void.

Such being the Impure and the Pure pleasures respectively, which are most truly pleasures? As a little *White*, if perfectly unmixed, is more truly white than ever so great a quantity having the admixture of some other colour, so pure and unmixed pleasure, however small, is more truly pleasure than a mixed kind, however great. Consequently, when we come to the comparison of pleasure and intellect (in order to determine which of the two is the predominant element in that Mixed Life, which was found to be better than either of them alone), we shall have to remember that the *pure* pleasure is the true kind, and, therefore, that by which we must make our judgment.

But before the judgment commences, Socrates proposes two more reflexions concerning pleasure. All things may be divided into

two classes; that which exists for the sake of something else, and that for the sake of which something else exists. The former will include *γένεσις*, temporal existence, that which is *ever becoming*; the latter, *οὐσία*, eternal being, that which is; indeed, the entire former class exists for the sake of the latter. But whereas the Good must be that for the sake of which other things exist, pleasure, we are told by certain ingenious men,* is a *γένεσις*; and if so, it will be in the *opposite* class to that of the Good. And again, if pleasure be a *γένεσις*, they who make it their good, and pursue it, are most irrational; for they pursue also the state opposite to pleasure, that of want or desire, on the relief of which the generation of pleasure depends; but if pleasure be a genesis or production, its opposite is a corruption; so that those who choose pleasure as the Good, choose generation and corruption rather than pure being.

There are also many other absurdities following on the supposition that pleasure is the Good, but the greatest, and indeed the sum of them all, is that, if it were so, a man would be good in proportion to the pleasure of which he partook, and bad in the opposite proportion.

The next step is, to subject *νοῦς* and *ἐπιστήμη* to the same process, and to ascertain if here too we shall find purer and impurer sorts. Science is divided into the Productive and the Instructive. In the former class, some branches are more immediately associated with mathematical science, and others are content, to a great degree, with mere guesswork and practical skill. Such a difference marks some as more, and others as less, pure. But the mathematical sciences themselves may be viewed either as they are conversant with absolute properties of figure and number, or as dealing with figures and numbers in the concrete; so that we may say there is a twofold arithmetic and a twofold geometry; and so in like manner of other mathematical sciences, of which the one branch is pure, the other impure. But the pure science above all others, is Dialectic; for it is that which has for its object the absolute, invariable, and eternal, and which therefore seeks after the truest of all knowledge. Other sciences may be more immediately useful or imposing, but this is more truly science than all

* Trendelenburg gives it as his opinion that Aristippus is here meant.

others; for whereas they depend on opinions, and are busied about mere phenomenal existence, Dialectic deals with immutable realities.

Having now determined the Pure and Impure both of Pleasures and of Sciences, we are ready to blend them so as to effect that combination of which the Mixed Life consisted. But which shall we use? To begin with intellect and knowledge, shall only the purer sorts enter into the combination? If it were so, there would be an end to all practical life, which is obliged to content itself with the imperfect and impure sciences. Therefore we are compelled to admit into the combination *both* sorts of intellect and knowledge. Shall we do the same with pleasure? Certainly not; for while the pleasures themselves would desire an union with intellect, as that which should give to them a meaning which they have not in themselves, intellect would reject all impure and tumultuous delights, as hindering its efforts and stifling its productions; but with the temperate and healthful pleasures, and such as walk in the train of virtue, as priestesses in the procession of some deity, with these it is willing to have fellowship.

Having, then, the elements of the mixture, it remains for us to enquire according to what law they must be combined. Now, first, no combination can be worth anything which is not a *true* blending: *Truth*, therefore, is a necessary condition; and if it is a condition of combination, and the Good is a result of combination, we must look for the Good in Truth. Again, no mixture can be successful which is without *Measure*; on measure and proportion all combination depends, and in these, therefore, likewise the Good must abide. Lastly, the effect of measure and proportion is *Beauty* and symmetry; and thus we conclude that herein also the Good is to be found.

And now, having not indeed a perfect comprehension of the Good,* but a knowledge of the three shapes in which it manifests itself, we may endeavour to decide the question, which of the two, Pleasure or Intellect, is most akin to it. This is easily determined, for pleasure is false and fickle, but intellect is either the same as Truth or the nearest akin to it: pleasure is in its own nature immoderate, but intellect and knowledge depend upon Measure: pleasure has so little claim to Beauty, that it often

* Which Plato thought unattainable. See *Republic*, vi. 508, 509.

shuns the light, and its expression is always unseemly, but intellect is a stranger to all that is not comely and decent.

Upon arriving at this conclusion of the whole argument, Socrates delivers the joint decision of the disputants in these words: *Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τ' ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράξων, ὡς ἥδονὴ κτῆμ' οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδὲ αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτρον καὶ καίρον καὶ πάνθ' ὄπόσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν ἀττίδιον ἥδησθαι φύσιν.* (66, A.) We shall presently have to consider the exact reading and interpretation of these words; it is sufficient for the summary of the Dialogue which I have attempted to give, if we gather from them that Measure and things partaking of the nature of measure are declared to be the nearest approach to the Good. Next to this, and in the second place, Socrates places the Beautiful, the Symmetrical, the Self-sufficient and Perfect; the third place is given to Intellect and Thought; the fourth to the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs; and the fifth to the Purer Pleasures. The Dialogue concludes with a short recapitulation, and a noble warning, in forming our judgment of pleasure, not to rely, as the meaner soothsayers do, on the teaching of irrational natures, but on the oracles of the philosophic Muse.

Of the difficulties presented by this Dialogue none is so important, and at the same time so perplexing, as the assignment of places to the five different Classes.

The classification proposed by Ast needs only to be stated for any attentive reader to see that it is perfectly irreconcilable with the words of Plato, and with the whole tenor of the argument. He arranges them thus:—1. The Definite, which is the *νοῦς βασιλεύς*, the controlling and arranging principle of the world; 2. The Indefinite, which is the material substratum on which the supreme intelligence is exercised; 3. The Real Synthesis of the two former, the Pythagorean *κόσμος*; 4. The Ideal Synthesis, the human intelligence as the reflex of the divine; 5. Pleasure. Nothing, as Trendelenburg observes, can be more remote from the terms *σύμμετρον* and *καλόν*, than the formless and discordant elements of matter; nor are *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις* capable of being understood as the world of beauty and harmony, the living work of the supreme mind. Such manifest violence to the plain words

of the author can only be accounted for by the desire of making a system for Plato, and the vain notion of helping out his supposed imperfect strivings after a regular gradation from the most absolute intellectual to the most sensual.

Schleiermacher proceeded on a much more reverent and a sounder principle. It seemed to him very remarkable that the two competitors whose relative claims the whole Dialogue is occupied in discussing, should appear at the final award not as second and third, but as fourth and fifth. How could the introduction of these new claimants be accounted for? His answer is, that we must look for the explanation to those treatises to which the Philebus is intended to be subordinate and introductory, the Timæus and the Republic. As in the former Plato proposed to give an account of the constitution of the world, and in the latter, that of human society, he prepares us for both by intimating that in the gradation of Good that which is universal must be placed before that which concerns men in particular. He accounts for the third place only being assigned to *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις* by observing that it is not the *divine* mind which is here intended, but that mind, which is itself an element in the Mixture. This mind, according to him, is the *truth* spoken of above as one of the three conditions of combination. 'For the mind is the sole home of Truth, which first gives a reality to things, and it occupies therefore, as a kind of mediator, a middle place between the universal generated good, and the particular good of man.' Few readers will be satisfied with an explanation which accounts for the introduction of new and important matter into the very conclusion of an argument, by supposing an anticipation of what is to be said elsewhere. There is an end to the unity of the Dialogue, and, indeed, to all the laws of disputation, if we are suddenly to be informed of some most important doctrines, as to the proof of which we are left to guess (for no promise of the kind is held out) that it may be forthcoming on a future occasion. But the distribution of Schleiermacher is likewise so far unsatisfactory, that he does not explain in what respect the second class differs from the first. I cannot however assent to Trendelenburg's objection to his view of the third class, that the mind which gives reality to things is the *Supreme Mind*, and consequently can have nothing to do with the *νοῦς*

and φρόνησις, which are ingredients in the Mixture. For it is evident that the meaning of Schleiermacher is, that the mind here spoken of *gives to us* a sense of the reality of things, and is therefore convertible with ἀλήθεια, and is thus a fit intermediate between the Universe and Man. But this question will be better discussed when we have examined Trendelenburg's own classification.

Trendelenburg himself understands the μέτρον καὶ μέτριον π. τ. ἐ. to include all the three conditions of combination; for, according to his view, the first class contains the absolute Idea of Good and all those Ideas which are connected with it; and the second differs from the first, as being the realisation of these same Ideas in the Universe. But it is unaccountable why Plato, if he had intended the καλὸν and ἀλήθεια to occur twice in his enumeration, should have suppressed the latter altogether, and mentioned the former only in its secondary phasis; and altogether it is a strange way of indicating *the same things*, to designate them, first as absolute, and then as manifested in forms, by a perfectly distinct set of names. But the whole hypothesis rests on a translation which the words above quoted will not bear: “*et quidquid ejusmodi aeternam naturam suscepisse credendum est.*” In the first place, ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν π. τ. ἐ. cannot be taken so: for this would be expressed by ὁπόσα, τοιαῦτ’ ὄντα, χρὴ νομίζειν,—and though the order might be changed, the participle would still be indispensable.* But even if we conceded such an interpretation, what would become of πρῶτον μὲν πῃ περὶ μέτρον? It is obvious that, in such a case, περὶ has neither meaning nor construction. But, above all, such an expression as “to have adopted (or received) the eternal nature,” is at variance with the whole method of Plato. For if the Good is to be sought for in these things, it must be because they are emanations or productions of it; whereas, according to this view, the Good is *superadded* to them, and that through their seeking it. But no one conversant with the language will understand ἥρησθαι in the sense of παρειληφέναι, or still less of

* The order *has* been changed, and most injuriously to the sense, on the authority of the Bodleian MS., from τοιαῦτα χρὴ to χρὴ τοιαῦτα. Χρὴ νομίζεται is plain enough when used of some conclusion, which, but for the argument, disputants would not have admitted. But what force or even sense is there in saying, ‘all such things as we are bound to believe to have taken upon themselves the eternal nature?’ It is therefore evident that we must read ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα, and understand ἔστι.

εἰληγέναι. And then, again, why have we the perfect? In speaking of a fact which has no reference to any particular time, the only proper tense would have been ἐλέσθαι. Those who feel these objections will not need to have them confirmed by a consideration of the unsuitableness of the sense thus extorted from them; and yet the sense is in itself very objectionable, because it would amount to this,—that Plato having sought, by a laborious argument, for that which had most affinity with the Good, at last found it—in the Idea of the Good! The continual allusions to this *search*, finding its neighbourhood, coming to its threshold, its taking refuge with the Beautiful and the like, all point to the true reading of the passage, which, by the slight change of 'HIP into 'HYP, removes all the objections alleged above.* It will not be necessary to do more than point out the other misconceptions on which Trendelenburg's explanations are built, viz. the supposed opposition between *ἡρῆσθαι* and *γενέας*, which is annihilated by the particle *αὐ*, which shows that another kind is spoken of; and the notion that the third kind is the Idea considered subjectively, the Idea in so far as it is the ground of human knowledge. Surely if the Idea is not just this and nothing else, it is a mere abstraction, and Plato would not bid us look for the Good in *that*.

Stallbaum's view will be at once understood from the classification with which he accompanies that of Plato. 1. τὸ αἴτιον. 2. τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον. 3. τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ πέρας. 4. τὸ καθαρὸν πέρας. 5. τὸ καθαρὸν ἄπειρον. Those who look for realities in Plato, and who believe that Plato looked for them himself, will never be brought to admit that his own desire—μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι τί ποτ' ἔν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τίν' ιδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον (64, A) could be satisfied with a barren dialectic scheme, or that he would offer such a result to his readers. There is not a single hint (and we know how fond Plato is of hints) to show that he any longer dwells upon the fourfold division of *γένη*, propounded before. Nor does the classification of Stallbaum at all tally with that of Plato; for τὸ μέρον καὶ τὸ μέρηιον καὶ τὸ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτα is such a way of expressing the Idea of the Good (which Stallbaum rightly looks

* For a further discussion of this point see Notes on the Text.

upon as synonymous with *altria*)^{*} as nobody would ever have thought of, unless he had been predetermined by some theory to find that meaning in the words: and this remark applies to many other interpreters of the passage under consideration.[†] As to the second class,—τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον is, doubtless, equivalent to τὰ ὄντα; but I deny that τὰ ὄντα are intended, or could be conveyed, by such a periphrasis as τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλόν, καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ίκανόν, καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτῆς ταύτης ἔστιν. The only observation that need be made as to the third class, is, that it is a confusion in place of a division. The *νοῦς* which is *altria*, (A), may be considered as *πέρας*, that is, the absolute Mind may be thought of only as contemplating its own Ideas. And, again, the *νοῦς* which is *πέρας*, (B), may be considered as so far *altria*, that it imitates the productions of the *νοῦς* which is *altria*. But B is identical with the fourth class, or *ἐπιστῆμαι*, and A is liable to the same objection as Trendelenburg's explanation; namely, that such a view supposes us to look for the Good in that which is no *thing*, but the mere common name or property of two things.

I will now venture to offer my own solution of these difficulties.

The Good which appeared most suitable for *man* was found in the combination of two *human* conditions. It is reasonable, then, to expect that in combination *universally* we approach most nearly to the *universal* Good; but combination depends upon three things—Measure, Beauty, Truth: and wherever we trace these, the Good cannot be far off. Now, we trace Measure in τὸ μέτριον, τὸ καίριον, and all that evinces adaptation of *one to another*; Beauty in τὸ καλόν, τὸ ίκανόν, τὸ τέλεον, and all that is complete and harmonious *in itself*; Truth (subjective) in the *νοῦς* καὶ φρόνησις of man, as that wherein the real is distinguished from the seeming, and the eternal from the accidental: νοῦς δὲ ἡτοι ταύτων καὶ ἀλήθειά ἔστιν, η̄ πάντων ὅμοιότατον. (65, D.) But why do the three occur in this order? Not because there is any superiority of *πρεσβεία* or *δύναμις* in any of them, as in the case of τἀγαθόν, but because there is a difference between them as to priority

* *Phaed.* 97, foll. *Tim.* 30. A. *Rep.* 508, foll. Nevertheless, I entirely agree with Trendelenburg, that τἀγαθὸν and ὁ δημιουργὸς were held by Plato to be quite distinct.

† The very multiplication of kindred adjectives is a proof that we are to find one object in many, not to contemplate an Idea in itself.

in thought, or because the sphere in which they are exhibited differs as to extent. Everything in the whole universe presents an example of *τὸ μέτρον* in some form or other; this, therefore, comes first. One of the results of this adaptation is the perfection of individual things as to beauty or use (*τὸ ἱκανόν*): and this, being a result and part of the former, is placed after it. The least comprehensive of the trio is Intellect and Thought; to these therefore, as the embodiment of Truth, (whence it is plain that the pure speculative faculty is meant) the third place is assigned. In the fourth place come the subordinates of *νοῦς*, viz. the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs. Nor are we unprepared for this division, since all along *νοῦς* has been used to express either the Divine Intelligence or the Human indifferently; whereas it is to the latter that, the practical faculties belong so that when the corresponding division to that of *ἡδονὴ* had to be made, it was made not in *νοῦς*, which did not admit of it, but in the *ἐπιστήμαι*. The Pure Pleasures will naturally come next in order.

It may be objected that something more than a greater extent of sphere is implied in the question in p. 64, c: *Tί δῆτ' ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἄμα καὶ μάλιστ' αἰτιον π. τ. ξ.* which is answered by naming *τὸ μέτρον*: with the further remark that from *μέτρον κάλλος* necessarily flows, so that the first would seem to be upheld as the antecedent condition, and the second as one of the effects of that condition. In like manner also it may be said that the third, which in the inquiry figures as *ἀληθεῖα*, but in the declaration of the verdict is called *νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις* (a variation which is accounted for by the paragraph at the end of p. 63, 'Ο δέ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος π. τ. ξ.) is spoken of as necessary to the *φρόνησις*, only because, as had been formerly said, without Truth "no true mixture can be made, nor, being made, exist"; so that this also is inferior to the first, because, though it is a condition as the other is, it is one in the quality of the ingredients, and not lying in the very conception of all mixture.

But this mode of explanation does not help us when we come to enquire why *ἀληθεῖα* is postponed to *κάλλος*; why, if Socrates had intended to bring these three as rival claimants into competition, and to assign them their places according to their comparative merits, he should have made that remarkable state-

ment at the beginning of p. 65, Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μία δυνάμεθα ἱδέα τάγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σύντοισι κ. τ. ἔ.; and lastly, why, in mentioning the three, which he does seven or eight times, he observes no order, but places any one of them indifferently in the middle or at either extreme of the series.

It must be remembered that the main object of enquiry is to ascertain the relative claims of Intellect and Pleasure to the name of Good, and that the question arising out of this is, not *What* is the Good, but *Where* is it? To such a question the first answer would naturally be *in Measure*, which is the largest sphere, (because Measure contains all things,) and in things according to Measure, which are in fact all things made conformably to the great pattern, the *οὐ* *ἔνεκα*, according to which the supreme *αἴτια* works. In brief, the wider and more populous region deserves the first mention in a question of dwelling-place, or place of manifestation, such as has here been the object of search. If we do not understand Plato thus, there is no other possible way of understanding him except as intending to tell us that mere Form is a better thing than Beauty, and Beauty than Reason, which is quite incredible.

This way of explaining the enumeration of the classes is very different from that which is given in an author quoted by Stobaeus *Ecl. Eth.* ii. 6, 4, Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἱδέαν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνεται, ὅπερ ἐστὶ θεῖον καὶ χωριστόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐκ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς σύνθετον, ὅπερ ἐνίοις δοκεῖ κατ' αὐτὸν εἶναι τέλος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου ζωῆς· τρίτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν φρόνησιν· τέταρτον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν σύνθετον· πέμπτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. This division is expressly referred to the *Philebus*; but when we consider that the writer was himself making a system of Plato's definitions, and dividing them under the heads *τῷ γένει*, *τοῖς τόποις*, *τοῖς εἶδεσι*, we are prepared for a little straining of his author to suit his theory. The objections to this theory are the same as have been urged against Stallbaum, and may be summed up in this, that such a division is not reconcilable with the language of Plato. At the same time, I do not deny that Measure and all its cognates, are, according to Plato, the *nearest* approach to the Idea, nor that the *κοινὸς βίος* in its quality of *ἴκανὸν* will come under the *second* denomination, in that it partakes of it; but in a discussion as to

what causes make a certain thing an object of choice, in ascertaining which, we find the Good, it is absurd to class the thing itself as one of the results of our search. Else indeed, it might be thought to have an equal right to the *first* place; but Plato seems to have confined this to the instances of *antecedent suitability*, or of the modes of combination, and to have reserved for the *second* those things which owe their own excellence to such combinations.

The parts in this Dialogue which are confessedly Pythagorean, namely the power of Number, the elementary and opposite properties of *néros* and *áneígor*, and the distinction between Empirical and Mathematical knowledge as applied to music, could not be better illustrated than by setting before the reader the Extracts from Böckh's *Philolaus*, and the fragments of Philolaus himself, which bear upon these topics. These will be found in the Appendix. A few other Extracts from different authors are added in order to illustrate various matters touched upon in the course of the Dialogue.

For all other more or less certain information, such as the bearing of the Philebus on the rest of the Platonic doctrines, the date of its composition, its intrinsic value as a contribution to Moral Philosophy etc., I must leave the reader to those who profess to teach them; I have been content to confine myself to the task of endeavouring to understand what appeared on the face of the text, and of ascertaining as far as possible the very words of the author, unencumbered by the additions of ignorant men, and set free from the blunders of negligent transcribers. I have trusted no other MS. authority save that of the Bodleian in the first place, and of the Coislinian in the second. Where these guides have failed to satisfy me, I have endeavoured to constitute the text according to the principles of Criticism, without caring to suit the taste or to defer to the prejudices of any School. Much that I had spared, and even tried to defend, in a former Edition I now unhesitatingly condemn, whether I have seen my way to correcting it or not. I have known critics to be charged with making difficulties and fancying faults for the pleasure of displaying their ingenuity in conjecture. The charge shows a thorough ignorance of the very frame of mind in which a critical scholar is obliged to work: such an one well knows

that, if he durst so tamper with his own sense of truth, he would most certainly and speedily injure the one instrument on which he relies for success, his judgment. Others there are who treat all conjecturing as at best an effort of wit, and a pretty pastime. Such persons seem not to have considered that, if the ἀπειρον of verbal criticism consists of changes of similar letters and compendia, transpositions, bracketings and indications of hiatus, the πέρας which is to bring these elements to a γένεσις is, not a dithyrambic ecstasy which exults in its own contortions and tosses about wildly whatever it picks up, but a cold, severe, watchful calculation of probabilities, which shuns all outbreaks of fancy as interruptions of its work. But why should any one try to expostulate with the gainsayers? Some of them are too ignorant of the language to see any faults, and therefore cannot see the use of corrections. And yet it is useless to tell them so, for they can count on the applause of the many hundred minds which they have perverted. Some have tried verbal criticism and failed; and hate the pursuit which would not gratify their vanity and yield them fame. Let us dismiss the former with:

εὐδαιμονίζων ὄχλος ἐξέπληξέ σε.

and the latter with:

ἀπόλωλεν ἀλήθει', ἐπεὶ σὺ δυστυχεῖς;

The only kind of observation to which I do not feel indifferent, is the imputation of having offered the corrections of others as my own. But this I anticipate by saying that I possess no edition of Plato later than that of Didot, and no Philological journal except the two series of the *Mnemosyne*. If any one has claims on aught that appears in this Book, let him give me the opportunity of righting him, and I shall be thankful for it.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧΟΣ, ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 11
Steph.

1. Ὡρα δή, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου δέχεσθαι νῦν καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀμφισβῆτεν, ἐὰν Β μή σοι πατὰ νοῦν ἥ λεγόμενος. βούλει συγκεφαλαιωσάμεθ' ἔπιτερον;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημ' ἐστὶ μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων

Πρώταρχος] The dialogue is supposed to commence at the moment when Socrates turns from Philebus to Protarchus. When the speaker changes his address from one person to another, or from several to some one or more out of the whole number, ὁ is often omitted before the vocative, as in *Farm.* 136 D; *Symp.* 216 A, 217 B; *Euthyd.* 296 E; *Prot.* 358 E, 359 A; *Phileb.* 12 A, 28 B. The same omission also takes place when the speaker is represented as calling in an especial manner on the attention of the person addressed; as in *Gorg.* 489 A, 521 A (where Callicles would fain let the conversation drop), *Symp.* 172 A, 175 A, 213 E; *Euthyd.* 293 D, 294 C, 295 D. In *Symp.* 173 E, if a second ἔταρχος is speaking (which is probable on other grounds), the omission may be accounted for in the same manner. I confess that in *Phaedr.* 261 A, *Soph.* 220 D, 284 D, *Euthyd.* 300 A, the reason is not so evident: though in the first three instances there is a suspension of the argument, and an appeal to the person addressed.

ἀγαθόν] Not τάγαθόν: for Philebus'

Platonis Philebus.

assertion is not represented as being one about The Good in itself, but merely this; that pleasure, and that which is akin to it, has a right to the name of good in its proper signification, which Socrates denies, while claiming the name for mind, knowledge and all things belonging to that class.

τέρψιν] Why not τὴν τέρψιν? Probably because verbal forms of this kind have less of the nature of the noun than ἀρετῇ, δόξᾳ, ἡδονῇ; and because, as denoting a process, and not a state, they cannot assume the article without being thereby confined to a particular instance.

μὴ ταῦτα] not ἀγαθὰ εἰναι, but ἀμελῶ γίγνεσθαι, which is equivalent to ἀμελον εἶναι ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι. I have no doubt that τῆς γ' ἡδονῆς is an interpolation. A still worse one is δυνατοῖς, which was probably inserted to fill up a lacuna caused by the obliteration of the syllable ΤΟ. There is no way of avoiding an absurd repetition, but to make μετασχεῖν a new subject, and this cannot be done without the article.

αὐτὸν ξυγγενῆ, δόξαν τὸ ὄρθην καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, [τῆς γένδος νῆσος] ἀμείρω καὶ λιώ γίγνεσθαι ξύμπασιν, ὅσαπερ αἰτῶν δινατὰ μεταλαβεῖν· τὸ [δινατοῖς] δὲ μετασχεῖν ὠφελιμώτατον ἀπάντων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. μῶν οὐχ οὕτω πως λέγομεν, ὡς Φίληβε, ἐκάτεροι;

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Λέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὡς Πρώταρχε, λόγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπειρήκεν.

ΣΩ. Λεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τἀληθές πῃ περανθῆται;

Δ **ΠΡΩ.** Λεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἰδι δί, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησάμεθα καὶ τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς τὸν ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἔξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνεν τινὲς ἐπιχειρίσει τὴν διναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονία παρέχειν. ἀρ' οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ὑμεῖς δ' αὐτὸν φρονεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τὶ δ' ἀν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φαῆ; μῶν οὐκ, Εἳν μὲν ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ξυγγενής, ἡττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφότεροι τοῦ ταύτην ἔχοντος βεβαίως βίον, κρατεῖ δ' ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς 12 τοῦ τῆς φρονήσεως;

[Δέχει] It is a fond fancy of one of the Editors that δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον is a proverb; and that the answer Ἀνάγκη is in allusion to this. In the passage quoted for the purpose (*Gorg.* 499, c) τὸ παρὸν εὑποεῖν is the popular saying referred to. The oracle given to *Myscellus* δῶρον δέ σε τι δῷ τις ἔπαλνε, “be content with your portion” is quoted indeed by the Paroemiographers, but it is not alluded to here. I take this opportunity of restoring another proverbial saying to one of the so called Platonic Dialogues. (*Amatores* 184, b.) Ἐγὼ μέν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡμηγῶν

τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν γνῶναι. Read καὶν ὥν γνῶναι. See *Laches* 196, D, and the Scholium thereon.

[διάθεσιν] The place of this word and its redundancy, to say nothing of the technical character of the word itself, incline me to put καὶ διάθεσιν in brackets.

[ταῦτην ἔχοντος] The common reading is ταῦτα, which is explained as referring to τὸ κρείττων φανῆσαι; but though ἔχειν might be used in such a sense, ἔχειν βεβαίως shows that a real possession is intended,—that is, the ξένες καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς spoken of above.

ΠΡΩ. *Nai.*

ΣΩ. *Ἄν δέ γε φρονήσει, πικῆ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται; ταῦθ' οὐτως διμολογούμενά φατε, η̄ πᾶς;*

ΠΡΩ. *Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.*

ΣΩ. *Tί δὲ Φιλήβῳ; τί φῆς;*

ΦΙ. *Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως πικῆν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνάσει.*

ΠΡΩ. *Παραδούσ, ὁ Φιλήβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἀν ἔτι κίριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη διμολογίας η̄ καὶ τούταντίον.*

ΦΙ. *Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιωθῆσαι καὶ μαρτύρουμαι βαῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν.*

ΠΡΩ. *Καὶ ἴμεις σοι τούτων γ' αὐτῶν συμμάρτυρες ἀν εἰμειν, [ώς ταῦτ' ἔλεγες ἢ λέγεις]. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἔξης, ὁ Σώκρατες, διως καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἐκόντος η̄ ὅπως ἀν ἔθελη πειρώμεθα περαινέειν.*

Nor again is it conceivable that Plato would indicate these by a neuter plural, or by any plural at all, since they are not really two things, but the same thing differently viewed. The confusion between the apostrophus and the compendium for τῷ is one of the commonest which occur in manuscripts. I have changed τὸν τ. φ. into τοῦ τ. φ. It is ridiculous to appeal to Greek Tragedy as a standard of prose syntax. The spurious passage in the Birds (v. 420) χρατεῖν δὲ η̄ τὸν ἔχειρον, is worthy of φίλασσεν ἀφελεῖν which follows it.

ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται] I formerly proposed τῆς δὲ ἡττᾶται, but this would be almost as much a repetition as the other. Perhaps the redundancy is due to the construction with μὲν, which was wanted for the sake of emphasis.

δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξει] Unless we are prepared to suppose with Stallbaum that a certain climax is intended in these words, ‘videtur, et vero etiam videbitur’ we must believe τε to be indispensable, though ‘all the MSS.’ (that is, two independent sources, and the copies made from them) omit it.

αὐτὸς γνάσει] Literally, *yourself shall determine; you shall do as you please.* Gorgias 505, &c. Σω. Εἰλεῖ τι οὖν ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον κατα-

λύομεν; Κα. Αὐτὸς γνάσει. Eurip. Ion 1356 Πυθ.: λαβὼν νυν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκούσαν ἐκπόνει. Ιων: Ασιάδ' ἐπθέσει πάσσαν. Εὐράτης Τρόπους; Πυθ.: γνάσα τάδ' αὐτός.—for this is the true reading of that passage. See also Thucyd. Δ, 99, init. and Xen. Hell. V, 1. 34, where the men implicated in the bloodshed αὐτοὶ γνόντες ἀπῆλθον ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου.

ἀφοσιωθῆμαι] *I set myself free from the pollution; I disclaim all share in the guilt.* This was done by a variety of trifling formal acts, such as pretending to spit, &c., or by the use of certain words. Hence, in the later Greek writers, to do anything for form's sake and without serious purpose, is δρᾶν τι σάτιας χάραν or δοσον ἀφοσιώσασθαι. In the Attic authors I know of no instance where the words are thus used without some accompanying notion of the discharge from a religious obligation or compliance with a religious ceremony.

[ἢ ταῦτ' θέλεις ἢ λέγεις]] A most unnecessary addition after τούτων αὐτῶν, or rather a false gloss, for τούτων αὐτῶν means τοῦ ἀφοσιώσασθαι σε καὶ μαρτύρασθαι τὴν θέον.

ἡ έτειν ἀν ΘΘῃ] A polite way of implying η̄ βίᾳ Φιλήβου.

ΣΩ. Πειρατέον, ἀπ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς θεοῦ, ἢν ὅδ' Ἀφροδί-
την μὲν λέγεσθαι φησι, τὸ δ' ἀληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομ' ἡδο-
νὴν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν
ὄνόματ' οὐκ ἔστι πατέρα ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φό-
βου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὥπῃ καίνη φίλον, ταύτη
προσαγορεύω· τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν οὐδὲν ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ διερ
εῖπον, ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκο-
πεῖν ἡττινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀπούειν μὲν οὖτως ἀπλῶς,
Ἐν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δίποιν παντοίας εἴληφε καὶ τινα τρόπον ἀνο-
D μοίους ἀλλήλαις. ίδε γάρ, ἡδεσθαι μέν φαμεν τὸν ἀπολασταί-
νοντ' ἀνθρώπουν, ἡδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντ' αὐτῷ τῷ
σωφρονεῖν· ἡδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δο-
ξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἡδεσθαι δ' αὖ τὸν φρονοῦντ' αὐτῷ
τῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκατέρας πῶς ἀν τις δύοις
ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοιτ' ἐνδίκως;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὃ Σώκαρτες, αὗται
προγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γ' ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή
Ε γ' ἡδονῇ [μὴ] οὐχ δημοιότατον ἀν εἴη, τοῦτ' αὐτὸς ἐαντῷ, πάν-
των χρημάτων;

ἀπ' αὐτῆς δέ] Some MSS. have δή. It is impossible to decide between them while the rest of the sentence remains faulty. Every one will perceive that ἀρχαμένος, or ἀρχτέον, or some word to that effect, must have dropped out.

Tὸ δέ ἡδονός δέος] That this was the real feeling of Socrates as well as of the men of his time is plain from many passages. Compare *Cratylus* 400, where nevertheless he regards the current names of the Gods as of human invention. The fear is that there is more risk of offending Ἀφροδίτη, by giving her a new name, though even the old one is not certainly correct, or free from offence.

καίνη] This pronoun is here used in preference to ταύτη, because the person is in her own nature remote and invisible. In the next sentence, ἀπ' ἐκεί-
νης is put for ἀπὸ ταύτης, on account of ὅπερ εἴπον, which makes ἡδονὴ ap-

pear not as the present subject, but as that of a former proposition.

οὖτως ἀπλῶς] There has been a strange scruple, whether these words, which are so commonly joined together, can be so here; and recourse has been had to the expedient of a comma in order to separate them. In the double contrast which follows it is to be observed, that on one side the healthy desires and the healthy intellect are themselves the *source* of the satisfaction, αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν, αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν, whereas their opposites are but the *channels* of pleasure. This is why he adds ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν.

πῶς γὰρ κ. τ. έ] We have above πῶς οὐκ ἂν φαίνοτο, which is the ordinary construction. The μὴ is nothing more than a result of carelessly reading ΗΔΟΝΗΙΟΥΧ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὃ δαιμόνιε, [χρώματι] κατά γ' αὐτὸν τοῦτ' οὐδὲν διοίσει, τὸ χρῶμ' εἶναι πᾶν· τὸ γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὃν τυγχάνει· καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα [σχήματι] κατὰ ταῦτὸν γένει μὲν ἔστι πᾶν ἔν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατ' ἀλλίθοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητ' ἔχοντα μηδίαν 13 ποι τυγχάνει. καὶ πόλλῃ ἔτερῃ οὖτως ἔχονθ' εὑρήσομεν, ὅστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστενε, τῷ πάντα τὰντιώταθ' ἐν πιοῦντι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή πινας ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὑρήσομεν ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. "Ισως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθ' ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. "Οτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὸν ἀνόμοιον οὐθὲν ἔτερῳ, φήσομεν, οὐδόματι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὐν μὴ οὐχ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ· παντὶ δὲ Β οὐτὸν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, δημοίως σὺ προσαγορεύεις [ἀγάθῳ αὐτά], δημολογῶν ἀντὶ ἀνόμοιον εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ,

[χρώματι] This addition is due to some blunderer, who made two sentences out of one. Had κατά γ' been the beginning of a new sentence we should have had some conjunction. The same reason applies to σχήματι. Any one may see how much elegance is gained by their omission.

μυρίαν This is to be understood not of the number of differences, but of the extent of some particular differences. Comp. *Apolog.* 23, c. ἐν πεντακισ μυρίᾳ εἰμι.

φοβοῦμαι Σὲ μή] Compare, among other passages, *Rep.* 451, A; *Phaedo* 84, E, φοβεῖσθε μὴ διάκειμα, and Arist. *Nub.* 493, δέδουκά σ', ὃ πρεσβύτα, μὴ πληγῶν δέει.

Οτι προσαγορεύεις Because, my side will say, you call all these, though unlike each other, by a new common name. This would be assuming a second ground of agreement between them; for that they agree in being pleasures is proved by their common name of pleasure; but it does not follow that they agree in anything else, as, for instance, in being good. But if Protarchus asserts that they are all alike, and yet must confess that they are not alike good, he is bound to mention some other ground

of likeness. Socrates therefore cannot be introduced as asking him for a proof that they are ἀγαθά, but as wanting to know, forasmuch as they do not agree in this respect, in what else they do agree. But the received text makes him say: "You know they are not all "good, and you are ready to admit that "they are so far unlike; and yet you "call them all good": which is so absurd that I have changed δημως into δημοίως, and put ἀγαθῷ αὐτά and ἀγαθῶν εἶναι in brackets. The worse MSS. have πάντα before σύ. Had Plato written it, he would certainly have placed it immediately next to αὐτά; but it is due to a misconception of the meaning, caused by δημως. I have supplied ἀν after δημολογῶν, τε before ταῖς, and ταῖς before ἀγαθαῖς for obvious reasons. The restoration of ἀν is necessary for the sense; it was probably absorbed by the following word.

τῷ λόγῳ This belongs to ἀνόμοια: for προσαγορεύειν implies δημως, and the ground of the δημως is in the λόγος or description. It is worth while to quote a passage from the Laws which bears on this point, and which has been suffered to remain hitherto in a very corrupt state. Legg. 895, 896,

εἴ τις σε προσαγαγμάζοι. τι οὖν δὴ ταῦτὸν ἐν τε ταῖς κακαῖς ὅμοίως καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸς πάσας ἡδονᾶς [ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] προσαγοφεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; οἵτι γάρ τινα [συγγωρήσεσθαι,] θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τάχατόν, εἰτ' ἀνέξεσθαι σον λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας [ἔτερας] αὐτῶν κακάς;

ΣΩ. Άλλ' οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι καὶ τινας ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτι καθ' ὅσον γ' ἡδοναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὁ Πρώταρχε. οὐδ' ἄρδεν ἡδονὴς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὅμοίας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντ' οὐδὲν πιρωσκειν, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἔροῦμεν ἀπερ οἱ πάντων φαντόδι τατοί τε περὶ λόγους ἄμια καὶ νέοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὄτι σὲ μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιότατόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιοτάτῳ πάντων ὅμοιό-

"Ἔστι (τι) που δίχα διαιρούμενον ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ. τούτῳ δῆτα τῷ κατ' ἀριθμὸν σηματά μὲν "Ἄρτιον, λόγος δὲ, Ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἵστα δύο μέρη . . . Μόνι μὲν οὐ ταῦτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἀν τε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι τοῦνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἀν τε τοῦνομα τὸν λόγον, "Ἄρτιον" ὀνόματι, καὶ λόγῳ, "δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμόν" προσαγορεύοντες ταῦτὸν ὃν; Εἰ δὲ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἀρέτη (τι) ποθούμεν, τῇ ἰκανῷ δεδικτα ψυχῇ κ. τ. ἐ. (A little lower down after γενομένη supply φανεῖσα γε.)

[συγχωρήσεσθαι] As εἴτις depends immediately on the participle θέμενον, if we retain συγχωρήσεσθαι we have two infinitives συγχωρήσεσθαι and ἀνέξεσθαι with an equal right to a position which cannot belong to more than one, unless we suppose this to be Greek: νομίζω σφαλῆναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οἰωνέντας ἀμαρτεῖν. "Ἐτέρας is the supplement of a man who had never heard of τὰς μέν τινας.

πιρώσκαν] The MSS. have τίτρωσκει. But it cannot be said that "these examples do not damage them"; but

only that they refuse to see it. Nor could a new independent clause be added by means of καὶ ... οὐδὲν in place of οὐδέ.

πεισόμεθα] The common reading is πειρασθέντα, but some of the better MSS. have πειρώμενα, and the best of all, the Bodleian or Codex Clarkianus, πειρόμενα. The common reading is probably the conjecture of a copyist, who felt that a future was wanted. It will not be expected that I should adduce any proof in support of so obvious a correction as that introduced into the text. The critic who approved of my correction, but at the same time wondered that, in finding it, I did not also find that καὶ ἔροῦμεν was spurious, does not appear to have considered that φερόμενα is connected with πειρόμενα, and φήσομεν with ἔροῦμεν. "We shall be in the condition of unpractised disputants, and talk their language". As φυλάσσεται does not refer to any other φυλάσσης but that in the art of disputation, I have transposed καὶ from περὶ to before νέοι.

ιατον, ἔξω ταῦτα σὺ λέγειν, παὶ φρούριμεθά γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέσμωτος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπιτεσῶν οἰχήσεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουόμεθα, καὶ τάχ' ἀν ιόντες εἰς τὰς δημοίας ἵσως ἄν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε πᾶς; ἡ μεταγραφὴ παῖς τοῦ δέσμου;

ΣΩ. Έμὲ θὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὃ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Φρόνησίς τε παὶ ἐπιστήμη παὶ τοῦς παὶ πάντ' ὅπόσα δὴ παὶ ἀρχὰς ἐγώ θέμενος εἶπον [ἀγαθόν], διερωτώμενος ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστι τάγαθόν; ἀρ' οὐ ταῦταν πείσονται τοῦθεν διπέρ οὐ σὸς λόγος;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλαὶ οὐδὲν αἱ ξυράπτασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξονσιν εἶναι παὶ ἀνόμοιοι τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις. εἰ δὲ παὶ ἐναντίοις τῇ γίγνονται τινες, ἀρ' ἄξιος ἀν εἴην τον, [διαλέγεσθαι νῦν,] εἰ 14 φοβηθεὶς τοῦτον αὐτὸν μηδεμίαν ἀνόμουον φαίνεται ἐπιστήμη γίγνεσθαι, πάπειρ' ἡμῖν οὗτος δὲ λόγος ὥσπερ μῆδος ἀπολόμενος οὔχιστο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σωζούμεθ' ἐπὶ τινος ἀλογίας;

νεώτερος τοῦ δέσμους] *Euthyd.* 285 D. ἀρχαιότερος εἰ τοῦ δέσμοντος. The latter is obviously the familiar expression, and that in the text a play upon it.

ἀναρούνωμεθα] This figurative expression, which is properly used of bucking a ship, has induced some to believe that ἐπέσων οἰχήσεται is part of the same metaphor. But in all the instances given, ἀνατίττεται is used of the casting away of a voyager, not of the stranding of a vessel. Its use here is rather singular, - but it probably means nothing more than *having failed*. Why ἀνατίττεται is in the middle voice, and whether αὐτὸν is genuine, others must determine. Perhaps we should read αὐτόδεν.

τὰς ὄμολας] We must supply λαβάς. The Scholiast explains the phrase as a metaphor from wrestling. Socrates, therefore, proposes that they should resume their former position as disputants, in order that he may show Protarchus the unfairness of the feint through which he sought to elude Socrates' question, by professing that he should consider himself bound to afford

Protarchus the same grip or handle, that is to distinguish the kinds of ἐπιστῆμαι, when called upon to do so. As the phrase is ἀλλεῖν, and not ἀνελλεῖν, εἰς λαβάς, it is better to read τάχ' ἀν λόγτες. With τάχα and ἵσως used separately the ἀν is sometimes repeated even in prose.

[ἀγαθόν]] As διερωτώμενος χ. τ. δ. contains the occasion—"which I mentioned when I was asked what was The Good"—the word ἀγαθόν is as superfluous, as it is inelegant.

ἄξιος] It is altogether foreign to the spirit of Attic dialogue to speak of being worthy of the honour of disputing &c.; and even if such a sentiment were allowed, it would have been expressed by ἄξιος διαλέγεσθαι without the article. But all that Plato wrote was: ἀρ' ἄξιος δὲ εἴην τον.

μῆδος ἀπολόμενος] It is not clear whether the original proverb was ὁ μῆδος ἐσώθη or ὁ μῆδος ἀπόλετο. Photius' testimony is in favour of the former: μ. ἐσώθη . . . Ἐπίρρημά ἔστι λεγόμενον ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ τοῖς λεγαμένοις μῆδοις τοῖς παιδίοις. The Scholiast on

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ' οὐ μήρ δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆναι. τό γε μήρ μοι ἵσσον τοῦ σου τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει· πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ διάφοροι.

Β **ΣΩ.** Τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ τὸ ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σου μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμῶμεν ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχόμενοι μηρύσσωσι, πότερον ἥδονὴν τάγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ή φρόνησιν ἢ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι. νῦν γὰρ οὐ δίποτε πρόστις γένεται αὐτὸν τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ πιλῶντα, ἢ ταῦθ' ἂ σύ, τῷ δὲ ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.

ΠΡΩ. Λεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

С **ΣΩ.** Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον δι' ὄμολογίας βεβαιωσάμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντ' ἀνθρώπους πράγματα ἐκοῦσι τε καὶ ἀκούσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως περικότα θαυμαστόν. ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πόλλα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυ-

this place, with less probability, explains δὲ μ. ἀπώλετο, as used by those who find they are speaking to *inattentive hearers*; and he quotes the comic poets, Crates and Cratinus, as employing it, but without adducing the passages. I suspect from the otherwise unnecessary redundancy in *Rep.* 621, in μῆδος ἔσωθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, that the latter is the original form, and that the former is Plato's own coining. The allusion in this passage is to men suffering shipwreck and escaping on a raft. (Compare *Phædo* 85, d.) *And so the argument would, like a tale, come to nothing, and we should make our escape upon an unreason.*

τολμέμεν] This word appears to be the main difficulty of a sentence which has perplexed so many critics and editors; but for it I should have adopted Winckelmann's conjecture, and inserted οἱ λόγοι after ἐλεγχόμενοι, but nothing can be determined with certainty till we know what ails τολμῶ-

μεν. Either some other verb has been corrupted into this, and we might read κατατίθεται. δὲ εἰς τὸ μ. τῷ λόγῳ, ὅρμην—or a whole line has dropped out. The words ἐλεγχόμενοι μηρύσσωσι would seem to favour the latter supposition, for there seems to be an allusion to the practice of giving up one's servant to the judicial "question". τολμῶμεν (ἐκάπεροι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον παρέχειν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν) ἄν πῃ κ. τ. ἐ. may serve to represent the sense of the missing clause.

ἢ τι τρίτον ἄλλο] The best MSS. omit τι; but the sense is incomplete without it. I believe the right reading to be ἢ ἄλλο τι τρίτον εἶναι. See below 20, n. ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον.

Τοῦτον τοίνυν] We should have expected τόνδε, for this λόγος has not yet been mentioned, but is now to follow. I am inclined to read τούτον. "Let us by question and answer make good the λόγος, not of you or me, but τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου."

μαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ δάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων διποτεροῦν τιθέμενῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρε' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρωταρχον, ἔνα Δ γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

ΣΩ. Σὺ μέν, ὡς Πρωταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἔν καὶ πολλά, συγχεχωρημένα δ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἥδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἀπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ δάδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι· ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἐκάστον τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἔν Ε ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ παταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα διηγάγασται φάναι, τό τε ἐν ὧς πόλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἐν μόνον.

ράδιον ἀμφ.] *Affording a ready objection against any one who advances either.*

Ἄρε' οὖν λέγεις κ. τ. 4.] Unless καὶ joins ἐναντίους with πολλούς, it is of no use in the sentence; I have therefore removed the comma from πάλιν. The sense is as clear and well-expressed as could be desired. *Do you mean, when a man says of me Protarchus, who am one by nature, that I am again many and opposite 'me's', bringing forward the same person as at once great and small, heavy and light, and so forth?*

τῶν θαυμαστῶν] Rather θαυμάτων, *Conjuring tricks.* Συγχεχωρημένα μὴ δεῖν, given up and admitted to be such as men ought not to meddle with. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν qualifies πάντων. It is strange that one of the editors should not have known such a common usage.

ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε] The proper construction would have been either, μηδὲ τῶν ταῦτα (ἀπτεσθαι δεῖν συγχεροῦσι) or ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὰ τοιάδε (συγχεροῦσι, δεῖν αὐτῶν ἀπτεσθαι). But as the very form ἐπεὶ μηδὲ is colloquial, a certain looseness of syntax is perhaps allowed, and the reader is left to supply μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἐλέγχεσθαι, προσφέρεσθαι, (δεῖν συγχεροῦσι) or any

other passive answering to ἀπτεσθαι. Otherwise we must look on τὰ τοιάδε as interpolated.

μέλη] Legg. 795, ε, μελῶν καὶ μερῶν. The MSS. and edd. all exhibit μέλη τε καὶ ἄμα μέρη, which, if it means anything, means that the μέλη and μέρη are the same, whereas it is plain that μέρη is added because the body cannot be properly divided into μέλη only. If it were μέλη δ' ἄμα καὶ μέρη, there would be no objection to the word but its inutility. I have written ἄλλα, which is continually confounded with ἄμα by the copyists. In p. 17 D, ἄμα ἐνοεῖν, the Bodleian and Vatican have made the opposite mistake.

διομολογησάμενος] *Having made another admit.* Properly, *having admitted each to the other.* Διομολογεῖσθαι is to διομολογεῖν, what διαλέγεσθαι is to λέγειν, διακελεύεσθαι to κελεύειν &c., διὰ and the middle voice together expressing reciprocal action. No one will regret to see συγχεχωρημένα in the next speech of Protarchus banished from the text; the wonder is, who could have taken it into his head to put it there. οὐ γάρ δήπου τὰ συγχεχωρημένα δημεύομεν, τὰ δὲ δεδημευμένα, ὅταν δόξῃ, συγχεροῦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Σὲ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὁ Σώφρατες, ἔτερα λίγεις, ἀ μήποι
[συγκεχωρημένα] δεδίμεναι περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον;

ΣΩ. Οπότεν, ὁ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν μηνόμενων τὸ ναὶ
ἀπολληλιμένων τις τιθῆται, παθάπερ ἀρτίως ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν. ἐν-
ταῦθι μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νῦν δή, συ-
γκεχωρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δέ τις ἔν ἄνθρωπον ἐπι-
χειρῇ τιθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἔντα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
ἔν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἔναδεν καὶ τὸν τοιούτον ἡ πολλὴ [σπου-
δή] μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

Β ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ἑπο-
λαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὖσας· εἰτα πῶς ἀλλα ταύτας, μίαν ἐκάστην
οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτ’ ὀλεθρον προσδεχο-
μένην, δῆμος μὴ εἶναι βεβαιώτατα μίαν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο

ἐνταῦθῃ So with Elmsley for ἐνταῦθοι.
ἡ πολλὴ [σπουδὴ] I once thought
σπουδὴ to be genuine, and therefore
added δὲ after μετά; I am now con-
vinced that the word is neither ap-
propriate nor genuine, but supplied by
a copyist who had in his head the well
known passage in the *Phaedrus* 248, οὐ
οὐδὲ διεισδύει τῇ πολλῇ σπουδῇ χ. τ. ἐ.
Then arises the great controversy as
soon as we attempt to decide.—What
else is needed? or what have we to
do with the earnestness of the dis-
putants, except indeed as a measure of
their difficulty? But the difficulty being
expressed, any other word is super-
fluous.

Πρῶτον μήν When I endeavoured to explain this passage in a former edition, I maintained that there were only two questions proposed, although πρῶτον, εἰτα, μετά δὲ τοῦτο made it appear that there were three. As the text then stood, it was impossible to see more than two questions, that beginning with πρῶτον, and a second; for if εἰτα . . . μίαν ταύτην were considered as an independent question, and not rather as the beginning of that propounded afterwards, the question would have been, *how it was conceivable that that which is one and imperishable should be nevertheless unchangeably one*:—than which nothing could be more absurd. But the words πρῶτον, εἰτα, μετά δὲ

τοῦτο ought to have opened my eyes to the absolute necessity of finding three points of enquiry, or, if they were not to be found, of treating the text as corrupt. I now feel confident that I have discovered the source of all the perplexity in the omission of μὴ after δῆμος. The first question is; have these monads a real being? The second is; if each of them is one and not subject to the changes of γένεσις and ὀλεθρος, how can we imagine it ever to vary in the least from this oneness? The third is; when it does so vary by entering into individuals, does the unity cease when the plurality begins, or are they concurrent?—in other words are the monads to be regarded as distributed into as many parts as there are individuals to partake of them, or as remaining as wholes in each individual, so that each monad is at once one in each, and again one in many? This last supposition is πάνταν ἀδυνατώτατον, because in this case the one both agrees with itself and contradicts itself. *Parm.* 131, Λ οὐκοῦν ἡτοι δλον τοῦ εἴδους ἡ μέρους ἔκαστον τὸ μεταλάμβανον μετα-
λαμβάνειν; — πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι δλον τὸ εἴδος ἐν ἔκαστω εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν, ἐν ὅν; ή πῶς; Τί γὰρ κα-
λένει—ἐνελνεῖ; “Ἐν ἀρα δὲ καὶ ταῦ-
τον ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὐσιῶν δλον ἄμφα
ἔνεσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν χωρὶς
ἄν εἴη.”

ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονιαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρίς, διὸ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φάνεται· ἄν, ταῦτὸν καὶ ἐν ἄμφι ἐν ἐνι τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτ' ἔστι τὸ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐν C καὶ πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπείτα, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αἴτια μὴ καλῶς διμολογηθέντα καὶ εὑπορίας [ἄν] αὐτὸν καλῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοῦ πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Ως γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίνην·

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβε σιγγαρεῖν σοι τούσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δὲ Ἰωνας κράτιστον ἐν τῷ τοῦ [ἐπερωτῶντα] μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.

ΣΩ. Εἰειν. πόθεν οὖν τις [ταύτης] ἀρξῆται, πολλῆς οὖσης D καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης; ἀρέτηνδε;

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν;

ΣΩ. Φαμέν που ταῦτὸν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενον περιτρέχειν πάντη καθ' ἔκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεὶ καὶ πάλαι καὶ τοῦν. καὶ τοῦτ' οὐτε μὴ παύσηται ποτ' οὐτ' ἥρξατο

εἰπορίας κ. τ. 4.] Not ἔντα but ἔστι being understood, the construction with ἔν is a barbarism. The sense is not conditional; for we have the statement of a fact founded on experience no less than its opposite. The appearance of ἔν in the text is due to a repetition of αὐτόν, and a subsequent attempt to correct what should have been expunged.

τὰ τοιαῦτα] One would rather have expected ταῦτα ταῦτα, for this does not refer to the ἐν κ. π., but to the proposed investigation.

Φίληβον] The proverbial saying was μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὐ κείμενον: for κακὸν he puts Φίληβον. We had better let well alone, and not ask Philebus for his consent. But ἐπερωτῶντα thus placed before μὴ κινεῖν would make it appear that the participle is a means not τοῦ κινεῖν, but τοῦ μὴ κινεῖν; and as it is quite superfluous, there can be little doubt of its origin.

[ταύτης]] I have cancelled this word without hesitation. He is not going to begin a fight; but to begin a subject, of which the very beginning point is

difficult to find, because almost everything is a matter of controversy. Besides ταύτης μάχης is bad Greek.

Φαίνειν τον] The construction is not φ. π. ἐν κ. π. ν. λ. ταῦτὸν γιγνόμενα (Stallib.), for if Socrates had spoken here of the reconciliation effected between the one and the many by dialectics, it is inconceivable that Protarchus should answer, εἰ τις τρόπος

ἔστι καὶ μηχανῆ τὴν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν τιμῆν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὔμενος πιὼς ἀπελθεῖν. Nor are the young men described as delighting in the discovery and exercise 'of the synthetical and analytical processes', but on the contrary, in the sophistical employment of this contradiction which is the inherent property (ἀταύτατον καὶ ἀγῆρων πάθος) in all objects of conception, by which they throw into perplexity both themselves and others. Either therefore we must read ταῦτὸν . . . γιγνόμενον, or suppose that πολλά has by attraction affected the number of the participle, which, considering the presence of ἐν, is most unlikely.

παύσηται] I formerly wrote παύση-

νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάρατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γενσάμενος ἐκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἱσθεὶς ὃς τίνα σοφίας Ε εὑρημώς θησαυρόν, ὑφ' ἥδονῆς ἐνθουσιαῖς τε καὶ πάντα πινεῖ λόγον ἀσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα πυκλῶν καὶ συμφύων εἰς ἔν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀποφίαν αὐτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα παταβάλλων, δεύτερον δ' ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἄν τε νεώτερος ἄν τε πρεσβύτερος ἄν τρίτης ἄν
16 τυγχάνῃ, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκούοντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγον δ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, [οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων,] ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενός ἄν φείσαιτο, εἴπερ μόνον ἐρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.

ΠΡΩ. Άρ; ὁ Σώφρων, οὐχ ὅρᾶς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλίφου ἔντεπιθάμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῆς; ὅμως δέ, μανθάνομεν γὰρ

ταῖς in obedience to Dawes' Canon. But it is only in the older Attic that the first aorist subjunctive with *οὐ μή* need excite our suspicion; whereas *οὐ μή* with the future in this sense I take to be a poetical usage.

πάντα κανεὶ λόγον] This is an allusion to the proverbial saying πάντα λέγον κανεῖν. But the expressions ἐπὶ θάτερα πυκλῶν, and πάλιν ἀνειλίττων, *rolling them up one way, and again unrolling them another* allude to the manner of handling a volume. Συμφύων εἰς ἔν, and διαμερίζων are added to shew the application of the figurative words.

ὀλίγου δ' οὐδὲ] This I have written in lieu of ὀλίγου δὲ κατι, which would mean *nearly sparing*. The repetition οὐδε-οὐδε was probably treated by some copyist as a blunder, and one half was left out. Then came the corrector who felt the want of a conjunction and inserted κατι. I agree with Stallbaum as to the spuriousness of *οὐ μ. τ. ᾧ*; but ἐπεὶ β. γε shews that some bolder assertion has just been made, and justifies τ. ᾧ ζ. In the next sentence I have added κατι, because Protarchus gives two grounds for Socrates' fear, their number and their youth.

ὅμως δέ] In this sentence Protarchus is made to offer two suppositions; "if it is possible either to conjure away

the perplexity, or to find some other method of investigation". I believe that the second alternative is Socrates' suggestion. Εἴ τις ἔστι τρόπος καὶ μηχανὴ καλλίων δόδον ἀνευρεῖν is in itself a clumsy circumlocution for εἴ τις ἔστι καλλίων ὁδός, and what is the subject of ἀνευρεῖν? Σὲ or ἡμᾶς cannot be understood; μὲν and δὲ would imply that the two requests put into the mouth of Protarchus are not alternative; but if so, the latter must be the means to the former, and in that case what becomes of *coaxing the difficulty out of the way?* Σύ τε προδύμοι τοῦτο is quite proper as answering to τὴν ταραχὴν ἀπελθεῖν, but as the clause now stands in immediate dependence on ἀνευρεῖν, προδύμοι is not only enough, but rejects anything between itself and the infinitive. The New Way is said to be ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, instead of out of it. For these reasons, and because it is more in keeping that Socrates should be the first to suggest some other method, I condemn δόδον—ἀνευρεῖν as spurious, and μὲν as invented to give it currency. As in most cases of this kind, the interpolator has borrowed his words from the neighbourhood, καλλίων ὁδός from Socrates' next speech, ἀνευρεῖν from his next but one.

δὲ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν [μὲν] τοιαύτην ταρσαχῆν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὑμενῶς πιστὸν ἀπελθεῖν, [όδὸν δέ Β τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνειρεῖν,] σύ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συναπολονθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ συμ-
χρὸς δὲ παρεὸν λόγος, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὃ παῖδες, ὡς φίσιν ὑμᾶς προσαγορεύων Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίστην ὑδὸς οὐδὲ ἄν γένοιτο, ἡς ἐγώ ἐραστής μὲν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ μ' ἥδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄποδον κατέστησεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς αὕτη; λεγέσθω μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ήν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάντα χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι δὲ παγ- C χάλεπον. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμεν' ἀνενδέθη πάπτοτε, διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ην λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐν θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τυνος Προμηθέως ἄμα φαρο-
τάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, πρείττονες ὅντες ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, τὴν φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐξ ἐνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὅντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι; πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξέμφυτον ἔχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τού- D των οὕτω διακεκομημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἐκά-

Θεῶν μέν] In this remarkable passage everything seems out of its place. For εἰς ἀνθρώπους belongs not to δόσις but to ἐρρίφη. ὡς γε x. διολ ought to be ὡς ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται, the enclitic ποδὲν can scarcely come first after such a break in the sentence, θεῶν δόσις ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη is also quite intolerable; add to this that if the gift was thrown from Heaven, it could not be sent διά τυνος Προμηθέως. Though I have thus stated why I can no longer stand by this reading, I cannot offer any certain emendation of it; but I believe that the following is not very far from our author's sentence. Σω. Εἰς ἀνθρώπους, ὡς ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται, ή δόσις ποδὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη τυνος, [Sch. in Marg. Προμηθέως] ἄμα ωνοτάτω τινὶ πυρί.—I have supplied δότες, which is necessary to the construction, and was absorbed by the preceding termination οὐες.

ἔγγ. θεῶν οἰκοῦντες] Dwelling nearer to the gods,—i.e., in more familiar intercourse with them.

τὴν φήμην] Bodleian has ταύτην φήμην, Coislinian φήμῃ. The former, if for ταύτην we read τὴν, seems preferable to the latter, because,—although there is no impropriety in saying that they handed down the gift by traditional report,—the construction ὡς—ὅντων—ἔχόντων must depend on a word meaning belief, and therefore on φήμη rather than δόσις; and this is less apparent if the φήμη is made the mere instrument, in which case δόσις as the principal word would be that on which the subsequent construction rested.

πέρας] We must not confound this with the ἐν or genus, as Stalbaum does. It is the determinate number, the production of the one, which reconciles the one and the many.

στοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν εἰρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. ἐὰν οὖν [μετά] λάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ή τιν' ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἔκεινον ἔκαστον πάλιν ὥστε τις, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ὅτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ [καὶ ἄπειρα] ἔστι μόνον ἵδη τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ διπόσα. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπειρονος ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, ποὺν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ Ε τοῦ ἐνός· τότε δὴ δεῖν τὸ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἀπειρονος μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐστιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὔτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἄλλιλον· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μέρι, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, 17 [καὶ πολλὰ] θάττον καὶ βραχύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος [μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν] ἀπειρα εὐθύς· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει· οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐφιστικῶς ἔμας ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

Θεμένους [ζητεῖν] It is difficult to see how these words can be reconciled, for how can a man look for that which he has already laid down? I strongly suspect that the passage originally ran thus; ἀεὶ μίαν ίδεαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους, εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν, μετὰ μίαν κ. τ. ἐ-

[μετάλαβωμεν] μεταλάβωμεν is the reading of the MSS., which Stallbaum in vain endeavours to defend. In place of adopting Stephens' conjecture, καταλόβωμεν, I suspect that the copyist had at first omitted the verb, and written the following μετά, and then on discovering his mistake, neglected to place the usual dots over the superfluous letters. I have therefore put μετά in brackets.

τῶν ἐν ἔκεινον Ast, with Stallbaum's approval, reads τῶν ἐν ἔκεινῳ,—i.e., τῷ παντὶ. But we must not adopt any correction of this passage which removes ἐν, for this ἐν is evidently referred to immediately afterwards, where it is distinguished from τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν. But as the subordinate *Ones* are to be distinguished from the *original One*, this can only be done by speaking of the former as ταῦτα, and the latter as ἔκεινον; and this is as fatal to Schütz's conjecture—τὸ ἔκεινον ἔκαστον, as it is to the received reading.

But what should prevent Plato from using τὰ ἐν, τῶν ἐν, τοῖς ἐν, if he had occasion for a plural? Thus below we have ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ὅτιον. For this reason I incline to read either τῶν ἐν ἔκαστον or τῶν ἐν τῶν ἐν ἔκεινῳ ἔκαστον.

πολλὰ [καὶ ἀπειρα] It is possible by application to discover τὰ πολλὰ ὄπόσα ἔστι: but all the dialectic in the world will not enable you to find τὰ ἀπειρα ὄπόσα ἔστι. It is therefore inconceivable that Socrates should bid them "not only see that the original ἐν is one, and many, and indefinite, but also how many it is." The word αὐτοῦ in τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ refers to πλῆθος.

τότε δὴ δεῖν See Addenda.

οἱ δὲ νῦν κ. τ. ι.] This passage has been corrupted and interpolated so as to become quite unintelligible. I have changed βραδύτερον into βραχύτερον, and separated the genuine parts of the sentence from the spurious. It is impossible to make ἐν καὶ πολλὰ either quickly or slowly; for they are not things of man's making, but ready to his hand. What your modern captious disputers do, is to make ἐν to be ἀπειρα without passing through the intermediate stages. As to βραχύτερον, compare Politeia 279 c, ὅτι μάλιστα διὰ βραχέων ταχὺ πάντ' ἐπελθόντες.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ μέν πως, ὡς Σώφρονες, δακῶ σον μαρθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαιρέστερον δέομαι ἀλλέγεις ἀκοῦσαι.

ΣΩ. Σαφὲς μήν, ὡς Περιταρχεῖ, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν δὲ λέγω, καὶ λάμβανε αὐτὸν ἐν τούτοις οἰσπεροῦ καὶ πεπαίδευσαι. **Β**

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἐστί πον μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἴνσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὖ πλήθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἑκάστου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδετέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοῖ, οὐδὲ δια τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἵσμεν οὐδὲ δια τὸ ἔν· ἀλλὲ δια πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ δοπιᾶ, τοῦτ' ἐστι τὰ γραμματικὰ ἔκαστον ποιῶν ἡμῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Άληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν δὲ τιγχάνει ποιῶν, τοῦτ' ἐστι ταῦτόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μέν πον καὶ τὸ πατέρα ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ μία [ἐν αὐτῇ].

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὲ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Άλλο δὲ θῶμεν, βαρὺ καὶ δέξι, καὶ τρίτον διμότονον.
ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Άλλ' οὐπω σοφὸς ἀν εἶης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ἡσ γέπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἐσει.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γάρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Άλλ', ὡς φίλε, ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα δόποσα

[ἢ τούτοις οἰσπερ] Either ἐν οἰσπερ, or ἐν τούτοις ἐν οἰσπερ.

[οὐδετέρῳ] The books have οὐδὲν ἐτέρῳ, which is inadmissible. οὐδὲ ἐν ἐτέρῳ for ἐν οὐδετέρῳ would be according to Attic usage. But if he were speaking of that *whereby* 'a man' is skilled, he would say οὐδετέρον; not ἐν οὐδετέρῳ; the dative expresses that whereby he becomes skilful.

[Φωνὴ μέν πων] The text follows the inferior MSS. in reading καὶ τό—. καὶ is so useful an addition, that one is justified in adopting it; nor is τό καὶ ἐκείνη a likely variation for a scribe

to have made *de suo*. I formerly thought that καὶ ἐκείνη must refer to the first mentioned art, that of grammar, but οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος, though never used capriciously, as some learned men tell us, sometimes apply not to the greater or less proximity of mention, but to that of interest, as in the beginning of the Euthydemus, or to the different degrees of familiarity, as here. Of ἐν αὐτῇ I can make nothing, unless we transpose it to a place where it would be welcome if not necessary. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν ἐν αὐτῇ.

[διαστήματα] These intervals are

ἐστιν τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὁξύτητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος,
δεκαὶ ὅποια, καὶ τὸν δροντανὸν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων
δύο συστίματα γέγονεν, ἢ κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέ-
δοσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἐλείσιν αὐτὰ ἀρμονίας, ἐν
τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖτοῦ σώματος ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη
γιγνόμενα, ὃ δὴ δι' ἀριθμῶν μετριθέντα δεῖν αὖτις φασὶ δινθ-
μοὺς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἄμ' ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περὶ¹
παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν· ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα τε λάβῃς
Εοῦτο, τότε ἐγένοντο σοφός, ὅταν τ' ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ὄτιον ταύτη
σκοπούμενος Ἑλῆς [οὕτως ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας]. τὸ δ'
ἀπειρόν σ' ἐκάστων καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις πλῆθος ἀπειρον ἐκάστοτε
ποιεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδὲ ἐνάριθμον, ἀτ' οὐκ
εἰς ἀριθμὸν αὐδέν' ἐν οὐδενὶ πόλοι ἀπιδόντα.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα, ω̄ Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ τοῦ λεγόμενα εἰρη-
ζέναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

18 ΦΙ. Κάμοι γ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ τί δή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς
ὁ λόγος οὗτος τοῦ εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;

nothing more than *musical notes*; ὅποι are musical *proportions*. See Plat. *Timaeus* 36, B, and Cicero's translation.

ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα κ. τ. 4.] The particle γὰρ marks the resumption of an incomplete sentence. The antithesis between τότε ἐγένου σοφός, and ἔμφρων γέγονας, is a poor verbal contrivance, and the tenses are strangely chosen, ὅταν λάβῃς, ἐγένου . . . ὅταν Ἐλῆς, γέγονας. Stallbaum translates the last word by "evades" which would answer to γέγονώς ἐστι. ἐγένου may be defended by the well known usage of the aorist; compare παρέσχοτο in 46, E. If the words οὗτως—γέγονας were omitted, nobody would miss them. I have followed the Bodleian in ὅταν τε for ὅταν δέ, and in τῶν ἐν ὄτιον for τῶν οὗτων ὄτιον. That a writer can if he likes, break his sentence so as to give more emphasis to the second half, by introducing such terms as ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνεῖ τὴν σήν δίκην, οἷμα δέ καὶ ἐμὴ τὴν ἐμήν, in place of σύ τε,—ἔγω τε, no one will deny. But here the speaker begins with a

general precept, and then applies it to the particular instance of music, and so returns to the general rule. A very little reflexion will shew that in such a case if he commenced with "and indeed whatever you take up", he would have the air of opening out some new application in place of resuming a previous statement. I prefer ἐν to οὗτων, because it is more likely that a scribe should stumble at τῶν ἐν than invent it. The Bodleian has also περὶ τούτων which I prefer, because it is a worse reading, and so throws more discredit on a suspected passage.

τὸ δ' ἀπειρον] The reader will not fail to admire the skilful play upon the words ἀπειρον, ἐλλόγιμον, and ὄντας· μόνον. Stallbaum compares Tim. 55, c, τὸ ἀπειρον κόσμους εἶναι λέγειν τὴν γῆνας· ἐν τις οὗτος ἀπειρον τοῦς δόγμα ὧν ἔμπειρον χρεών εἶναι: and the oracle given to the Megarians, Υμεῖς δ', ω̄ Μεγαρεῖς, οὔτε τρίτοι οὔτε τέταρτοι Οὔτε δυωδέκατοι, οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ. ***

Κάμοι γ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα] Commonly Καὶ

*** A sheet of the Editor's MS. has been lost in transmission from Sydney. The missing notes will appear in the Addenda.

[Publisher's Note.]

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς μέντοι ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἡρώτημε
Φίληβος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνον γε αὐτῷ.

ΣΩ. Δράσω ταῦτα, διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ὕσπερ γὰρ ἐν διποὺν εἴ τις ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀπείρον φύσιν ἔδει βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ’ ἐπί τιν’ ἀριθμόν, οὕτω καὶ τούταντίον, δταν τις τὸ ἀπειρον ἀγαγασθῆ B πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, [μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ’ ἐπ’] ἀριθμὸν αὐτὰν πλῆθος ἔκαστον ἔχοντά τι καταροεῖν δεῖ, τελευτῶν τ’ ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἐν. πάλιν δ’ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸν λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν ἀπειρον κατενόησεν] εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἀνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεύθ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, πρῶτος τὰ φωνήσατα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἐν ὅντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἔτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὐ, C φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἰναι· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μέτα τοῦτο διήρει τά τ’ ἄφθονα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐνὸς ἔκαστον, καὶ τὰ φωνήσατα, καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἔως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἐνὶ θ’ ἐκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχείον ἐπωνόμασε. καθορῶν δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ’ ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἔνεν πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὐτὸν λογισάμενος ὡς ὅνθ’ ἔντειν πάντα ταῦθ’ ἐν D πως ποιοῦντα, μίαν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπερθέγξατο προσεπτών.

ἔμοι ταῦτά γε αὐτά. The first change I have adopted from Bodl., which has καὶ μοι, the second from Coislin., which has ταῦτά γε ὅντα αὐτά. Stallbaum has a strange way of explaining the misplaced αὐτά—*per se seorsum spectata.*

τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφαμεν]***

[Θει] ***

[μὴ ἐπὶ κ. τ. ἡ.] ***

.Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν δ. κ.]] ***

λέγων, πρῶτος] ***

τά τ’ ἄφθονα] We should rather have expected τὰ ἄφθονα τε καὶ ἄφωνα, but τε is sometimes moved from its place

(cf. Elmsl. *ad Heracl.* 622), and in this place the hiatus is avoided by the change. The μέσα, which he describes above as partaking not of voice but yet of sound, are the liquids which stand midway between vowels and mute consonants.

καθορῶν δέ] Because we can have no true conception of φωνὴ except as distinct from φθόγγος; nor of this again without also knowing both φωνὴ and τὸ ἄφωνον.

μίαν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐσαν is explained by Stallbaum as ὡς οὐσαν μίαν;

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[Publisher's Note.]

ΦΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον. τὸ δὲ αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ συμπρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.

ΣΩ. Μῶν, ὃ Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτ' ἔστιν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρώταρχος.

Ε **ΣΩ.** Καὶ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γ' ἡδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φήσ, πάλαι.

ΦΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Άριστον οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ λόγος, δοπτέρεον αὐτοῖν αἰρετέον;

ΦΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γ' ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι φαμεν.

ΦΙ. Πάντα μέν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον αὐτὸν τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, τὸ πῶς ἔστιν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ [πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα

he has illustrated this position of ὡς by *Sophist*, 242, c. παυσὸν ὡς οὔσων ἡμῖν, and other examples; but he should not have quoted for this purpose Arist. *Clouds* 256, οἷμοι Σωκράτην (sic) "Οσπερ με τὸν Ἀνάμενων" δύος μηδὲν θύετε.

αὐτά γε π. Δ.] This means that the several parts of the last λόγος are consistent with each other. ἐλλείπεται, is left unperformed, is deficient.

τὸ πρὸς ἔπος] *Euthyd.* 295, c. Εἰν μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι, i.e. nothing to the purpose.

Kαὶ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γ'] And yet you are close upon that which, as you say, you have been some time looking for. The Zurich editors have placed a mark of interrogation after this sentence, which is certainly incorrect; but as the common formula is καὶ μή—γε, and H is continually confounded with the compendium of καὶ, I have altered γ into καὶ accordingly.

πῶς ξετίν οὐ] The impudence of the interpolator in this passage betrays the author of it. In place of letting Socrates ask what number of kinds we can discern in ἡδονῇ and φρόνησι, he makes him enquire, how they are not straightway indefinite (as if there could be a *how* of that which is simply negative,) and again how either of them

has some number, a question which Plato himself could not have answered. I have no hesitation in condemning what appears in brackets, and in making τίνα interrogative, without which it would have no right to ποτέ. But even πῶς ξετίν οὐ καὶ πολλὰ εἰκάστερον is far from satisfactory. Either it is a clumsy way of asking what is more plainly asked in τίνα ποτ᾽ ἀριθμὸν κέχτηται, or it proposes a question which the upholders of Ideas have been content to leave unsolved (*Phaedo* 100, D, τοῦ καλοῦ παρουσίᾳ, εἴτε κοινώνιᾳ, εἰτὶ διπλῇ δη καὶ δύος προσγενομένη) for so that passage should be read. In our text I propose to read ἀπαιτεῖ πῶς, εἰ ξετίν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν εἰκάστερον, τίνα ποτ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἔμπροσθεν κέχτηται τοῦ ἀπειρα γεγονέναι. The reasons for interpolating εἰκάστερον and αὐτῶν εἰκάστα are quite obvious; the first word was repeated because of the previous supplement, and itself was thought to be inconsistent with ἀπειρα; to accord with which εἰκάστα was contrived. And the result of all this ingenuity is that we have the same things designated twice as εἰκάστερον, and once as εἰκάστα in such proximity, that a single designation was alone needful or bearable.

εὐθίς, ἀλλά] τίνα ποτ' ἀριθμὸν [έκατερον] ἔμπροσθεν κέπη-
ται τοῦ ἄπειρα [αὐτῶν ἔκαστα] γεγονέναι; 19

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γ' ἐρώτημα, ὡς Φίληβε, οὐκ οἴδ'
ὅτινα τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκρά-
της. καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ τοῦ ἐρωτώ-
μενον. Ἰσως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμέ, τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς
ὑποστάντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ τοῦ ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι
σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελοιότερον δ' οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ B
μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δίνασθαι. σκόπει δὴ τι δράσομεν. εἴδη γάρ
μοι δοκεῖ τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε
μή, καὶ δπόσ' ἐστὶ καὶ δποῖα· τῆς τ' αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι πατὰ
ταῦτα ὠσαντας.

ΣΩ. Άληθέστατα λέγεις, ὡς παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμε-
νοι τοῦτο πατὰ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ δμοίου καὶ ταῦτον δρᾶν καὶ
τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμήνυσεν, σὺνδεὶς ἀν ἡμῶν
εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος.

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ κα- C
λὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γυγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἰ-
ναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὐτόν. τί δή μοι τοῦτ'
εἴρηται τὰ τοῦ; ἐγώ σοι φράσω. σὺ τίνδ' ἡμῖν τὴν συνονοίαν,
ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωνας πᾶσι [καὶ σεαυτὸν] πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι

διάδ. παντελῶς ὑποστάντα] Having unreservedly taken your place as your successor. παντελῶς qualifies διάδοχον ὑποστάντα as taken together. The Attic Orators have χορηγός ὑπέστην, ὑπο-
στήγαι πρατήρα, ἔβελοντὴν ὑποστῆναι τριταρχὸν, without any infinitive to follow. In Xen. *Anab.* IV, 1, εἰ τις ἔβελει ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι καὶ ὑπο-
στάς ἔβελόντης πορεύεσθαι, the order of construction is, καὶ πορεύεσθαι, ἔβε-
λοντας ὑποστάς.

οὐδεὶς ἀν ἡμῶν] The received text reads ἀν ἡμῶν after οὐδενός, the ἀν being placed most perversely in the midst of all these negatives; but as ἡμῶν certainly belongs to the first of them, we may infer that the words ἀν ἡμῶν were both omitted together, and then restored, but to a wrong place.

τῷ σώφρονι] I cannot explain why

this was added, unless there was some current saying πάντα καλὰ τῷ σώφρονι, on which Protarchus plays by adding γυγνώσκειν.

ἐπεδώκας] You bestowed upon us all this conversation [and yourself.] for the purpose of discussing what is the best of human possessions. Compare *Laws*, XII, 944, A, δπλα, ἀ Πηλεῖ φησὶν δ ποιη-
τῆς παρὰ θεῶν προίκα ἐν τοῖς γάμοις ἐπιδούνται Θεῖδε. The difference between ἐπιδιδόνται in such passages, and the simple verb, is that the former applies only to making presents. But for these very reasons a man could not be said ἐπεδώκει καυτόν. The addition is borrowed from a passage occurring a few lines below, where the reading of all authorities is ἔδοκες; but this is said of a later period and one contained within our own dialogue (p. 16, A. B). The present reference is to

τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πτημάτων ἄφιστον. Φιλήβον γὰρ εἰπόντος ἥδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρᾶν παὶ πάντ³ ὅπόσσα τοιαῦτ³ ἔστι, οὐ πρὸς αὐτ³ ἀντεῖπες ὡς οὐ ταῦτ³ ἀλλ³ ἐκεῖν³ ἔστιν, ἢ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμυνήσκομεν ἐπόντες, ὁρθῶς δρῶντες, ἵν³ ἐν μηῆμη παφαλείμενα ἐκάτερα βασανίζηται. φῆσ³ δ³ ὡς ἔουκε σὺ τὸ προσερηθσόμενον ὁρθῶς [ἄμεινον ἥδονῆς γ³] ἀγαθὸν εἰναι τοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σίνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντ³ αὐτὸν τούτων ἔνγγενη, ἢ πτᾶσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλ³ οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα. τούτων δὴ μετ³ ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐκατέρων λεχθέντων, ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδίας Ε ἡπειρήσαμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν οὕκαδέ σε, πρὶν ἀν τούτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἵκανὸν γένηται τι διορισθέντων. σὺ δὴ συνεκώρησας καὶ ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθ³ ἡμῖν σαντόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὁρθῶν δοθέντων ἀφαιρέσεις οὐκ ἔστι. παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις;

20 **ΠΡΩ.** Εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὃν μὴ δυναίμεθ³ ἀν ἱκανὴν ἀπόρωσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διεδόνται σοι. μὴ γὰρ οὐώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν γεννητῶν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν. ἀλλ³ εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθ³ ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, οοὶ δραστέον· ὑπέσχον γάρ. βούλεντος δὴ πρὸς ταῦτ³ αὐτός, πότερον ἥδονῆς εἰδῆ σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ή καὶ ἔατέον, εἴ πη [καθ³ ἔτερον] τίνα τρόπον ολός τ³ εἴ καὶ βούλει δηλῶσαι πιὼς ἄλλως τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ³ ἡμῖν.

B **ΣΩ.** Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκῶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ³ οὔτως εἰπεις· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ὥσθεν λένε πάντα

his first consenting to hold the conversation, so that *σαυτὸν* ἐπέδωκας would be a ludicrous hyperbole.

τὸ προστρητόμενον ὄρθως [δ. ἡ γ³] See Addenda.

τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι] i.e. the end and aim.

καθ³ ἔτερον] There cannot be a more feeble tautology than καθ³ ἔτερόν τινα τρόπον πιὼς ἄλλως. The first two words were added by a scribe who did not see that τινὰ τρόπον belongs to ολός τ³ εἴ.

τὸν ἡμέ] i.e., me, the threatened one,

—poor me. Plat. Ep. 7. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἐμὲ παρεμβάντο,—i.e., Plato, who had apprehended mischief from Dionysius. Theat. 166, A, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε,—i.e., Protagoras, who complains of hard usage.

τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ἥσθεν] It has not been observed that this is said generally, and ἔκαστων πέρι has been mistranslated in consequence. The sense is, When men say 'if you please', it does away with all fear in every case. I confess that I have no great faith in the genuineness of ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ³ οὐ. εἰπ.

φόβον ἐκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δ' αὐτὸντοις μηδιμνὴ τινὰ δουεῖ τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεᾶν ἡμῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;

ΣΩ. Λόγων ποτέ τίνων πάλαι ἀπούσας ὄντας ἢ καὶ ἐγρηγορώς τὴν ἐννοῶ περὶ θεῶν ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστὶ τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἔτερον μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δ' ἀμφοῦν. καίτοι τοῦτο γ' ἀν ἐναργῶς ἡμῖν φανῆ C νῦν, ἀπήλλασται μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ τυπῶν· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἀν ἔτι ταῦτὸν αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τῶν δέ γ' [εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν] εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν. τηροῦν δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον δεῖξει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἰπών, οὕτω καὶ διαπέραν.

πρὸς δ' αὐτὸντοις] The Bodleian has αὐτὸν τοῖς, which form is inadmissible here. The origin of the error, which has been corrected from Coisl., is obvious.

καίτοι τοῦτο γ' ἂν] The Bodleian has καίτοι οὕτω γε ἂν, which Orelli changed into καὶ τοῦτο γ' ἂν. But this will not mean what we want. For as he has not yet named this *something better*, he cannot say "if it should appear such", but either "if any such thing should appear" which would require τι, or, "if this thing should appear". As γε is in the best MSS., it is admitted by Orelli into his correction: but καὶ—γε means "and besides", whereas καίτοι—γε is equivalent to "and yet you must admit", which is the proper transition. I therefore retain τοῦτο from the inferior MSS., but adopt γε from the Bodleian.

[εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν]] In order to get rid of the awkwardness of saying: "we shall not want the εἰδή of pleasure to serve the purpose of διαίρεσις", (as though they had to look for the εἰδή first, and then to begin διαίρεσιν into those very εἰδῆ) as well as to escape the intolerable harshness of the construction, I resorted to the expedient of taking τῶν by itself and not as the article of εἰδῶν. But this was too violent a proceeding. I now believe that any attempt to reconcile oneself

to εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν is a waste of time on words which do not belong to the author. Those who understand, "εἰδή for the purpose of διαίρεσις", will say that transposition would be a milder remedy; but Socrates intends to give up the διαίρεσις *itself*, and not merely some particular means towards that end.

προϊδὼν δὲ τ. π. δεῖξει] The proverbial expression is, αὐτῷ δεῖξει, *the event will make things clear*. But we are told that both δεῖξει and δηλώσει are used in the same manner without αὐτό. The first occurs in Arist. *Frogs*, 1261, where, however, μέλη may be the subject, and in Herodotus III, 82, where διέδεξε follows the impersonal αἴτεβη. All the other instances quoted are of δηλοῖ or δέηλωσε. If therefore this is a real instance, it is a very rare one. It is uncertain whether the thing which is to shew itself is the ἄλλο τι τρίτον, or the correctness of Socrates' δόξα. οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κ. τ. δ. In either case, what is the meaning of οὐδὲν ἔτι σαφέστερον, where at present nothing is σαφές? If it be said that δεῖ belongs to προϊόν, this is only admissible if εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν or some equivalent phrase be added to it. A MS. of no authority gives δεῖ τι. I should prefer προϊόντι δεῖ, "It will appear more clearly (whether I am right) as I proceed".

ΣΩ. Σμίνδος ἄπτα τούνν εὑμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

Δ ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον [ἢ μὴ τέλεον] εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δή που τελεώτατον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ίκανὸν [τάγαθόν];

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ οὖν; καὶ πάντων γ' εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὅντων.

ΣΩ. Τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἴμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγνωστάτον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸν θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται [βουλήμενον] ἔλειν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει [πλὴν] τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἂμα ἀγαθοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀπειπεῖν.

Ε ΣΩ. Σκοτῶμεν δή καὶ κρίνωμεν τὸν θέριον τῆς ήδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἴδοντες χωρίς.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἰπεις;

ΣΩ. Μήτ' ἐν τῷ τῆς ήδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις, μήτ' ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ήδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἔστι τάγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δὲν φανῇ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτ' ἔτι τὸ ὅντως ἥμιν ἀγαθόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειράμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

[ἢ μὴ τέλεον]] No one in his senses would ask “whether the Idea of Good necessarily implied incompleteness”. And yet this nonsense has been left unchallenged since the revival of letters, nay was so perhaps even under the Ptolemies. Another evident addition is τάγαθόν. For with τάγαθόν we must understand ἔστι. But that the true construction is ἀνάγκη... εἶναι appears from the answer, in which all the MSS. give διαφέρων. A third interpolation disfigures the clause ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸν θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλήμενον ἔλειν. Εφίεται is sometimes followed by the infinitive as in Eur. *Ion* 521, εἰ φιλεῖν ἐφίεται; but some one who did not know this, supposed αὐτοῦ to be understood, and introduced βουλήμενον to govern ἔλειν.

πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων δῆμα ἀγαθοῖς is the reading of all MSS. and Editions, as far as I know; and one editor undertakes to explain it, and his explanation is commended by another. But we may be quite certain that Socrates is intended to say, that men care for no other results than such as are in themselves good. Why then represent him introducing, as the sole objects of men's care, other results produced *along with* good things? I had once proposed to cancel πλὴν and to read ἀλλ' η ἀγαθῶν. But this violent change is unnecessary. *Antiquum obtinet*. The intrusion of πλὴν has made nonsense of a simple and easy sentence.

πότερον] used here and elsewhere as = σπότερονοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίσθων δή.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Αέξαι' ἂν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἀπαντά ἡδό-
μενος ἡδονᾶς τὰς μεγίστας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Λαρ' οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖται ἵγοιο, εἰ τοῦτ'
ἔχους παντελῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Όρα δὴ, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι
[τὰ δέοντα], καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μᾶν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι; B

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμ' ἄν πον τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίον [ταῖς μεγίστας
ἡδονᾶς] χαίροις ἄν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Νοῦν δέ γε [καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν]

[Πρώταρχ!] ω seems to be omitted here on account of the pronoun being placed after the name of the person addressed, which is usual either when the speaker first turns to him, or makes an especial appeal to him.

[τὰ δέοντα] Five lines lower down the list of mental powers or qualities is again given as νοῦς, μνήμη, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα ἀληθῆς. Of that list it will be time to speak when we come to it: but a third series follows immediately upon the second one, which tallies pretty exactly both in substance and order with that before us: 1. τὸ φρονεῖν=φρόνηστε. 2. τὸ νοεῖν=α. μνήμην of past things, b. δέξη of future. 3. τὸ λογίζεσθαι=λογισμές. 1. Consciousness or immediate Perception. 2. The Representative faculty. 3. Inference, not logical, but in its lowest type. If any one will compare this passage with the other, he will see why τὰ δέοντα ought to be rejected without hesitation.

μᾶν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι] The MSS. have μηδὲ ὄραν τι. Several scholars have proposed to change ὄραν into ὄντα, but they all appear to leave τι, which in this case would be contrary to Greek usage. I made this correction in the year '55; but, unless my memory fails me, the Leipzig Edition by C. F. Herrmann appeared in '54. Any one who

has that Edition will see in Herrmann's Preface the name of the scholar to whom he attributes the emendation. I am unable to recall it, but I confess that I have been beaten by at least one year.

[ταῖς μεγίστας ἡδονᾶς] Even supposing that Plato could use χαίρειν ἡδονᾶς in the sense of enjoying pleasures, the words τ. μ. τ. are nothing to the purpose, for the amount has been already mentioned, and the drift of this passage is, that he would be in a continual state of pleasure—and never once know it.

νοῦν δέ γε] It has been shewn above that there is an exact correspondence between the series given in the sentence beginning "Ορα δή," and that which occurs in the argument commencing with πρώτον. But the list now before us, though so much nearer to this last, has no such congruity. And indeed it is worse than unnecessary; for what sort of reasoning is this? "As you do not possess Memory, Knowledge, and Belief, you cannot know whether you are in pleasure or not, because you have no Consciousness." All that Plato wrote was Νοῦν δέ γε μὴ χειτημένον πρώτον μὲν κ. τ. ἐ. As he has no νοῦς, he cannot have φρόνηστε, which is a part of νοῦς.

μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ], πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτ' αὐτό, εἰ δὲ χαίρεις
δὴ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δή πού σε ἀγνοεῖν, κενόν γ' ὅντα πάσης
φρονήσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δή
πού σε μήδ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνῆσθαι, τῆς τ' ἐν τῷ παρα-
χεῖμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδ' ἡττινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν.
δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ] μὴ δοξάζειν χαί-
ροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στεφόμενον μηδ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς
χαίρουσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπον βίον
ἄλλα τινος πλεύμονος η̄ τῶν ὅσα [Θαλάττια] μετ' ὀστρέεσσιν
ἔμψυχά ἔστι σωμάτων. ἔστι ταῦτα, η̄ παρὰ ταῦτ' ἔχομεν ἄλ-
λως πιστούς διανοηθῆναι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Άρ' οὖν αἱρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὡ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ
λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ τῦν.

ΣΩ. Μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζόμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μετα-
λαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἀν δῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν παὶ τοῦν
καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων κεκτημένος, ἡδονῆς
Ε δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν, μηδ' αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ
παράπαν ἀπαθῆς πάντων ὃν τῶν τοιούτων.

πού σε μήδε^[3]] πού μηδὲ is the reading of the MSS. But it is necessary to insert the pronoun, and Stallbaum was right in his first edition when he changed μηδὲ into μητε. There is no reason why μὴ μεμνῆσθαι should receive more stress than μὴ δοξάζειν or μὴ λογίζε-
σθαι; (for though we have μηδὲ in this last instance, the “not even” or
“also not” refers not to δυνατὸν εἶναι
λ., but to εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον).

[ἀληθῆ]] The reason for putting ἀλη-
θῆ in brackets is that any δόξα, whether
false or true, would suffice πρὸς τὸ δο-
ξάζειν χαίρειν, and, where there is no
νοῦς, there can be no δόξα.

[Θαλάττια]] If Plato had cared to tell

us that shellfish lived in the sea, he
would not have done so by placing an
adjective where it is out of construction.
He would at least have written θαλάτ-
τια ἔντα. Let us therefore leave the
commentators to decide, when they can,
whether the sense is ὅσα θαλάττια
ἔστιν ἔμψυχά, or ὅσα ἔμψυχά ἔστι
θαλάττια.

μεταλαβόντες] i.e. οὐ μέρει λαβόν-
τες. Compare below 51, A.

πάντων ὃν] I have supplied ὃν, which
is required by the rules of the language.
Not even an inferior writer would say,
μὴ μετέχων ἀλλ' ἀπαθῆς. The syl-
lable was absorbed by that which pre-
ceded it.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέτερος δὲ βίος, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἰτετός, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ μή ποτε, ὡς ἐγώμαι, φανῆ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ὁ ξυναμφότερος, ὁ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμ- 22 μιχθεὶς ποιητὸς γενόμενος;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονὴς λέγεις παὶ νοῦ [καὶ φρονήσεως];

ΣΩ. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἔγωγε.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δίπου τοῦτόν γέ αἰρίστεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ὅποτερονοῦν, παὶ τιρδὸς τούτοις γέ οὐχ ὁ μέν, δέ οὐ.

ΣΩ. Μαρτάνομεν οὖν δέ τι τοῦ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ ξυμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάρν μὲν οὖν, δτι τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προύτερησαν, τοῖν δυοῖν δέ οὐδέτερος ἵπανθος οὐδὲ αἰρετὸς οὔτ' ἀνθρώπων οὔτε Βζώων οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἥδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τάγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἀν ἵπανθος παὶ τέλεος παὶ πᾶσι [φυτοῖς παὶ] ζώοις αἰρετός, οἰσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίον ζῆν. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ἥρεῖθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἀν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἰρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκιντας ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

ΠΡΩ. Εοικε γοῦν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Ως μὲν τοίνυν τίν γε Φιλήβον θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖ- C σθαι ταῦτὸν παὶ τάγαθόν, ἵπανθος εἰρησθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΦΙ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ δὲ σὸς νοῦς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔστι τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἔξει πον ταῦτα ἐγκλήματα.

ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμιχθείσ] i.e., διὰ τὸ συμμιχθῆνατ. This use of the participle is very frequent in Plato. Compare Rep. 506, n., προδύμωμένες ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτ' ὄφλησο,—i.e., διὰ τὸ προδύμεσθαι. In the next sentence καὶ φρονήσεως is a manifest interpolation.

καὶ πρὸς τούτους γέ] This is commonly understood to mean *and besides*; but it is evident that nothing additional is stated. Stallbaum's defence of it, 'notio atque vis præcedentis πᾶς confiratur et augetur,' is only true as to *confiratur*, whereas *augetur* is the point in question. Schleiermacher understands, *in addition to those lives* (the unmixed); but this would have been ἔκεινος; and, besides, how can a man

choose both contraries, the unmixed and the mixed together? I cannot uphold my own former solution of this difficulty, for "in addition to my friends here" would be πρὸς τοῖσθε. As some addition is intended, the only conceivable addition to "every body will choose this life", is "and one and all will bear me out in saying so". This might be, καὶ προσθήσται τούτας γέ οὐχ ὁ μέν, δέ οὐ.

[φυτοῖς καὶ] [ἴσοις] He afterwards adds, εἰ δέ τις ἡμῶν, and is evidently thinking of ζῶα capable of choice, and possessed of intellect. It is therefore high time these φυτὰ were weeded out of the text. 'Ἀνάγκη οὐκ εὐδαίμων is one of the many euphemisms for Madness.

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν, ὡς Φίληβε, ὃ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τὸν γ'
ἀληθινὸν ἀμια καὶ θεῖον οἴμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως πως ἔχειν.
τῶν μὲν οὖν πικτηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ
[πω] ὑπὲρ νοῦν, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι
Δ τί δράσομεν. τάχα γὰρ ἄν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιώμεθ'
ἄν ἐκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν [αἴτιον], δ' ἥδονήν [εἶναι], καὶ
οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ὄντες εἴη, τάχα
δ' ἄν αἴτιόν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἴραι. τούτου δὴ πέρι
καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην ἄν, ὡς ἐν τῷ μικτῷ
τούτῳ βίῳ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτον δὲ λαβὼν ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγο-
νεν αἱρετὸς ἀμια καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἥδονή ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ ξυγ-
γενέστερον καὶ ὀμοιότερον ἔστι. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον
Ε οἵτ' ἄν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δευτερείων ἥδονή μετὸν
ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο. πορρωτέρῳ δέ ἔστι τῶν τριτείων,
εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῦν δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἥδονή
σοι πεπτωκέναι παθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων.
τῶν γὰρ πικτηρίων πέρι μαχομένη πεῖται. τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς
23 ἔστι, λεκτέον ὡς ἀμφορώς οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν πικτηρίων.
τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἔπαθεν ἄν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στερηθεῖσα

οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ [πω] It is difficult to account for πω in this place, for he evidently renounces for ever the claims of νοῦς to the first prize, and contends only for the second. Perhaps the reservation may be accounted for by his mention of the θεῖος νοῦς, the relation of which to that of man is afterwards treated of. But then again if this had been intended, he would scarcely have used the words πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον: and altogether why confuse the argument with an afterthought about some other νοῦς? I now believe πω to be a mere reproduction of the preceding τῷ in ἀμφισβητῶ.

αἴτιώμεθ' ἀν! See Addenda.

οὔτε—οὐδὲν ἀν] Of this construction Stalbaum gives the following instances: *Phileb.* 42, c; *Laws* 840, A; *Rep.* 608, B; *Ibid.* 426, B; from which it appears that although οὔτε—οὐδὲ is inadmissible, οὔτε—οὐδὲν αὐτὸν or οὐδὲ γε is correct.

μετόν] As you cannot say λέγεται ὕν, but λέγεται εἶναι, you would here expect μετεῖναι, not μετόν. But μετόν came to be looked upon as almost a noun, so that in λέγοιτο ἄν μετόν we understand the infinitive εἶναι. Thus in *Laws* 900, B, we read: θεῖος δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν τῶν ταῖούτων μετὸν ἔρουμεν.

νῦν μέν] The Bodleian has no μέν, but I think it is an accidental omission, for the opposition is between this *first* bout and *another*, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων—.

σοι πεπτωκέναι] σοι cannot belong to πεπτωκέναι, for ὑπὸ σοι is the proper construction after πίπτειν. Nor can it belong to πληγεῖσα, for then Socrates the agent, and λόγοι the instruments, would be made to change places. It is difficult to say what should be done with the word, for it does not look like an interpolation. Did Plato write ὑποπτωκέναι?

ἡδονὴ παντάπασιν ἀν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοῖη πρὸς τῶν αὐτῆς ἐραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτ’ ἀν δομίως φαίνοιτο παλή.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἔτιν ἡδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Άρετοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν; B

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὐδείς πώ σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει, πρὶν ἀν εἰς τέλος ἐπεξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.

ΣΩ. Βαθαὶ ἄρα, ὃ Πρώταροχε, συχροῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ πάντα τι ἁρδίου. νῦν γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν [ἄλλης μηχανῆς], ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ τοῦ πορευόμενον, οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἐπερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν [λόγων]. ἔστι δὲ ἵσως ἔνα καὶ ταῦτα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν; τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διενλαβεῖσθαι C πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ δικῇ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, τριχῆ.

ΠΡΩ. Καθ’ ὃ τι φράζοις ἀν.

[ῥῆσίον] The best MSS. have ῥῆσίον; but the μὲν after συγχροῦ appears to me conclusive in favour of the other reading. In the common text, we have ῥῆσίον πάντα τι νῦν.

νῦν γὰρ δὴ κ. τ. ἔ.] But the enquiry is no more difficult now than at any other time; whereas we want νῦν with φ. δ. “we must now begin a new argument”. Because the misplaced πάντα τι seemed an awkward desinence, some scribe brought the νῦν into the first sentence, and contrived καὶ as the beginning of the next.

δεῖν [ἄλλης μηχανῆς]] This is a singular construction of δεῖν, at once with a genitive and an infinitive; it may be said that as the ἄλλη μηχανή consists in ἔχειν β. ἔ., this is added by way of explanation. But is there any beauty or propriety in such a manner of writing? Plato imitated the freedom, even the license, of common conversation,

if you will. But is this tolerable even in common conversation, or is it the slipshod talk of uneducated men? Again we have another such *pleasing negligence* in βέλη ἔτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων.

Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;] This is given in the Books as the answer to Socrates. But Οὐκοῦν χρή is the answer, and Πῶς γὰρ οὖν; is Socrates' assent. Χρή is the answer to δεῖν . . πορεύομενον . . ἔχειν, another proof of the spuriousness of ἄλλης μηχανῆς.

διενλαβεῖσθαι πειρώμενοι furnishes one of the editors with the excuse for a learned note to shew that verbs and participles sometimes change hands. Surely it needed neither Heindorf ad Gorgiam, nor Schäfer on Gregorius Corinthus, nor Seidler on the Iphigenia in Tauris to shew that you can say either *percurro ridens*, or *rideo percurrrens*. It costs more effort διενλαβεῖσθαι than τίθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἄττα τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἀπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὅντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθάμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον Δῆξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἔν τι ξυμμισγόμενον. εἰμὶ δ', ὡς ἔσκεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις [ικ]ανός, τά τ' εἴδη διστάς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Τί φήσ; ὢ γαθέ;

ΣΩ. Τετάρτον μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνος.

ΣΩ. Τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἵτιαν ὅρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.

ΠΡΩ. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτον προσδείσει διάχρισίν τινα διναμένον;

ἄπειρον . . πέρας] It is evident that the πέρας and ἄπειρον of 16, c, are different from those now brought forward. In the former case they express the indefinite multitude of the individuals and the definite number of species; in the latter, the unlimited nature of all quality and quantity in the abstract, and the definite proportions of the same in existing things. But in both cases we find that the effect of the πέρας is analogous; that knowledge in dialectics and life in physics are the result of a certain limitation.

πέρας] Heindorf and Schleiermacher are by no means to be followed in reading πέρας ἔχον. As Böckh rightly observes in his *Philolaus*, the opposite power to the ἄπειρον is not that which is limited, but that which limits. Unless we keep πέρας here clear from the proposed addition, and cancel ἔχον in two subsequent places, we make nonsense of the whole disputation.

Τούτῳ δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν] I have adopted Stallbaum's emendation, which the context makes necessary. "Let us lay down these two, as two of the Classes required." But in the manifestly corrupt sentence which follows, something less weak and flat than γελοῖός τις, οὐχ

ικανῶς κατ' εἴδη δ. is wanted. The Bodleian has ικανὸς τά τ' εἴδη. It is probable that in the archetypal MS. the text ran thus: ΓΕΛΟΙΟC TICANOC, i.e. γελοῖός τις ἀνθρώπος, and that some scribe thought that in ICANOC he saw ικανός. The other various reading τά τ' appears decidedly preferable to κατά, for he is endeavouring not to separate *things according to their kinds*, but to point out distinct kinds, and then to repeat the catalogue of them. On the whole there is little violence done to the oldest text, and nothing left unsaid or said improperly. In the reading: εἰμὶ δ', ως ἔσκεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἀνθρώπος, τά τ' εἴδη διστάς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.

πρὸς τοῖς τρισίν] See Addenda.

Μῶν οὖν] This question and the answer given to it are of importance, being introduced by Plato not only as an example of the care which is requisite in every dialectic process to leave no distinction unnoticed which may help towards a complete classification, but still more because it serves to bring out in its full significance the αἵτια τῆς ξυμμίξεως. Had this latter been a mere agent, one would expect the counter-agent to be also mentioned; but Socrates observing in his ironical

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄντις οὐ μὴν οἷμαι γε ἐν τῷ νῦν. ἐὰν δέ τι δέη,
συγγράψει πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι [πέμπτον βίον].

E

ΠΡΩ. Τί μή;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ
δέο τούτων πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ ἔπατερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διε-
σπασμένον ιδόντες, εἰς ἐν πάλιν ἔπατερον συναγαγόντες, νοῆ-
σαι πῇ ποτὲ ἣν αὐτῶν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἔπατερον.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχ' ἀν-
έποιμην.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δέο, ἡ προτίθεμαι, ταῦτ' εἶναι ἀπερ 24
νῦν δή, τὸ μὲν ἀπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἔχον]. Ότι δὲ τρόπον
τινὰ τὸ ἀπειρον πολλά ἔστι, πειράσσομαι φράζειν τὸ δὲ πέρας
[ἔχον] ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σλέψαι δή. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητίσιμον
δι κελεύθῳ σε σκοπεῖται, δημος δὲ σκόπει. Θερμοτέρον καὶ ψυχρο-
τέρον πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα πέρας εἴ που ἔστι νοῆσαι, ή τὰ μᾶλ-

manner, 'that he does not think he shall want any such,' prepares us to attach a higher importance to the *αἰτία* than to anything yet spoken of. Nor indeed is there any εἰδος; διάκρισιν τινὰ δυνάμενον. For these ἄπειρα are represented as forced into this conjunction with the πέρας, and kept so against their will. So that dissolution is not an act of the *αἰτία* but a consequence of its not acting. I have changed τινάς into τινά, and further on, I have followed all later editors in bracketing βέον, which is clearly out of place; but it is probable that πέμπτον was added at the same time; at all events it is needless and worthless.

τὰ τρία] More probably τὰ τρίτον, i.e. γένος: for the process is not to take three out of the four, and then two from those three; nor would διελέμενον be the right word in such a sense as *separating*, but ἀπολαβόντες. Such a roundabout way of getting at the first two is evidently unmeaning; but we are bidden to take the κανόνην, which is the third, and resolve it into its constituents, πέρας and ἄπειρον. And this is the simplest way of arriving at those two: for the instances of the

κανόνη are found in sensible objects, out of which we obtain by analysis the qualities which in their own nature are More or Less, and the proportion which limits and confines them. τὰ δύο τούτων, if the reading is correct, must be taken to mean the first and second of these γένη. We shall find lower down another striking instance of the cardinal and ordinal numbers being confused through their being expressed by the same compendia. πολλὰ ἔσχισμένον is like μέρη διατερῆν Polit. 283, D, and elsewhere. It is a variety of the accusative of effect, like ὑψηλὸν αἴρεται, βραχὺν συστέλλει, σμικρὰ κατακόπτει &c.

πέρας [ἔχον]] This expression both here, and two lines lower, is certainly faulty. Τὸ πέρας ἔχον is that ἄπειρον which has ceased to be such by being submitted to the πέρας; so that this description belongs properly to the third γένος.

εἴ που εἴ ποτε τι νοῆσαι ἀν is the reading of all the MSS., and followed by, I believe, all editors. Nothing can be more unsuitable than the use of the optative, or rather the conditional, where all that the speaker

Β λόγ τε καὶ ἡττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦντε, τοῖς γένεσιν, Ἐωσπερ ἀν
ἐνοικήτον, τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψετον γίγνεσθαι γενομένης γὰρ τε-
λευτῆς καὶ αὐτῷ τετελευτήματον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Άει δέ γε, φαμέν, ἐν τε τῷ θερμοτέρῳ καὶ τῷ ψυ-
χροτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἡττον ἐνι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Άει τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τούτῳ μὴ τέλος ἔχειν·
ἀτελῆ δ' ὅντε δύτον παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ γ', ὡ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ἑπέλαβες, καὶ ἀνέμυη-
C σας μ' ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦθ', ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθέγξω, καὶ τό γ'
ἡρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον τῷ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἡττον. ὅπου
γὰρ ἀν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ ἕατον εἶναι ποσὸν ἔκαστον, ἄλλ', ἀεὶ σφο-
δότερον ἡσυχαιτέρον καὶ τούτωντον ἔκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμ-
ποιοῦντε, τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν
ἀφανίζετον. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νῦν δή, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν,
ἄλλ' ἔάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτρον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ
D ἡττον [καὶ] σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα ἔδρα ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει
ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆρ. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον
οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἀν, λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν· προχωρεῖ γὰρ

intends is, "tell me if you can discern." The common copy from which our MSS. are derived was probably made by a scribe who had before him, ΕΙΠΟΥ ECTI NOHCAI, and as the Y looked very like T (with which it is continually confounded) he thought he saw IIOTE; and out of IIOTECTI he made IIOTE TI. After this, νησαι would necessarily pass for an optative, and the sense would suggest the correction of νοήσαις ἀν. The same mood has been forced upon the next sentence through the prevailing habit among the later Greeks of confounding, (as indeed they still do), ε and αι; so that the word would pass through the following changes: ἐπιτρέψετο—ἐπιτρέψαιτο—ἐπιτρέψατην with ἀν. A due consideration of Ἐωσπερ ἀν ἐνοικήτον would have stopped the course of this corruption.

οἰκοῦντε] This is Stallbaum's correction for οἰκουν. The words τοῖς γένεσιν

are not to be taken with ἐν αὐτοῖς, in the kinds themselves, which would be needlessly emphatical, but with τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψετον γίγνεσθαι, will not allow any bound to be fixed to the kinds (hotter and colder), as long as they reside in them.

αὐτά] i.e., the More and the Less.

ἀνέμυης μ'] See Addenda.

[καὶ]] He is no longer speaking of μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον in the abstract, but of a new instance of them in σφοδρέτερον καὶ τούτωντον, an expression which he here varies by μᾶλλον καὶ τοτον σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα.

λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν] If they were to admit Quantity. As λαβόντε here = εἰ λαβούεν, and not εἰ λαβού, the optative εἴτη which rests on Εἴτη in Bodl. and Εἴτην in Ven. is better than Τοτην (Bekk. and Stallb.), which was conjectured by the scribe of the Vat. MS., who could make nothing of Εἴτην.

καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὁσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προϊὸν ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἀν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοὺντινον ἄμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαινεται γοῦν, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἔστι δ', ὅπερ εἶπες, οὐ φάδια ταῦτα ξυνέπεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐθίς τε καὶ αὐθίς ἵσως [λεχθέντα] τὸν τ' ἐφωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐφωτώμενον ἴσανῶς Εὖντας ξυμφωνοῦντας ἀποφίρειεν.

ΣΩ. Άλλ' εὖ μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν· νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες μηκύνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. 'Οπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥπτον γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἐν δεῖν πάντα 25 ταῦτα τιθένται, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον, δην ἔφαμεν, ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆματα κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τινὰ φέσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τάγεντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἵσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ

τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἰστη καὶ προϊὸν ἀπαύταρον] But the So Much stood still, and ceased to advance,—namely, before it was expelled by μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥπτον. This will account for the use of the aorists. The difference between μᾶλλον καὶ ἥπτον and σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα is not such as Stallbaum expresses in his paraphrase; 'It is an Indefinite, not only *extensively* as to quantity, but also *intensively* as to quality;' for the example chosen (of heat and cold) belongs much more properly to the latter. Besides, if quantity had been intended, he would have expressed that by πλέον καὶ έλαττον. Intensity of degree is meant in both instances, but the distinction is marked by the speaker himself, when he adds to one τοῖς γένεσιν, and to the other ταῖς πράξεσιν. In the first case the quality is looked upon as a *state*; in the second, as an immediate effect. τὸ ποσὸν is the limit of the

former; τὸ μέτρον of the latter.

τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐθίς τε καὶ αὐθίς] The article which formerly gave me so much trouble is restored to its just rights by the expulsion of the word λεχθέντα; for it gives to the words which follow it the nature of a subject. "Hereafter and Hereafter will bring us into unison." He does not say τὸ αὐτόν, because this repetition is not to take place now, as is evident from the opposition νῦν μέντοι.

δεῦν] For δεῖ I read δεῦν, which depends on λέγω, as implied in τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τινὰ φύσιν] To sit upon them the seal of some one nature,—i.e., by giving them a generic name. We should have expected τούτοις, but where two regimens occur together, as here συναγαγόντας and ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, the case of one or the other is suppressed. See Porson on *Medea* v. 734.

ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὁ τί περ ἀν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθ-
Β μὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας
ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἀν δοκοῦμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο; ἢ πῶς σὺ φής;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γ', ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτὸν ἐκ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν τίνα
ἰδέαν φέρουμεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἄν πέρ γ' ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήρους γίγνη-
ται τις θεῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Εὔχον δὴ καὶ σκόπει. ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶ, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὡς Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος
ἡμῖν τὸν δὴ γεγονέναι. τοιοῦτον τοιοῦτον

C **ΠΡΩ.** Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; καὶ τίνι τεμηρίῳ χρῆ;

ΣΩ. Φράσω δῆλον δτι. σὺ δέ μοι συναπολούθησον τῷ
λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θεομότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα τὸν δὴ πού τι καὶ ψυχρό-
τερον. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Πρόσθετες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ πλέον
καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ θαττον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμι-
κρότερον, καὶ δόποσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθετεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥτ-
τον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν [εἰς ἐν] φύσεως.

D **ΠΡΩ.** Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ναι. συμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν
αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Ἡν καὶ τὸν δὴ δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου
συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἐν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγα-

καὶ τὸν δὴ περ κ. τ. ἐ.] That is the triple, the quadruple, the third, the fourth, and so on with all multiples and all measures, whether in numbers or magnitudes.

[τὸ δέον εἰς ἐν “to place in a genus” is correct, and so likewise is τιθέναι τι τινος φύσεως, “to declare anything as belonging to a certain nature.” But τιθέναι τι εἰς ἐν τινος φύ-

σεως is unexampled and inconceivable. Here again we have a specimen of that officious interference which has ruined so many texts.

γένναν] Not ‘finiti genus’ (Stallb.), a misconception which has led to a wrong view of the whole passage, but the whole race or family, τὰ δεχόμενα τὸ πέρας. See the following notes.

γεῖν, [οὐ] συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἵσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτὸν δράσεις.
[τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανῆς κάκείνη γενήσεται.]

[οὐ] συνηγάγομεν] “It may be asked, was there not a sufficient συναγωγὴ above in Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα κ. τ. ἐ? or if not, in what is the definition which follows better than that former one? But this is not Plato’s meaning. The deficiency complained of is, that they had not made an enumeration of the things which contain the πέρας. For while we have πέρας corresponding to ἄπειρον, and ίσον καὶ διπλάσιον to μᾶλλον καὶ τῆτον, σφόδρα καὶ τήρεμα, and the like, we have nothing to answer to ὑγρότερον καὶ ξηρότερον and the other examples. These are supplied by Socrates further on in the passage beginning ‘Ἄρ’ οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις’.” I leave this note as I find it in the first Edition, but I have two serious objections to make to it. 1. The passage beginning ‘Ἄρ’ οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις regards the κοντὸν and not the πέρας, nor can any other enumeration of the πέρας in itself be given, except what occurs above in Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα κ. τ. ἐ, and immediately after this passage, in Τρίτῃ τοῦ Ισού κ. τ. ἐ. 2. ταῦτὸν, whatever is added to it, implies that the thing has been done before. Moreover, although, as a general rule, after δέον you expect a negative, this is the result of circumstances, and not involved in the nature of the word; and it appears to me, that neither καὶ nor νῦν δῆ is compatible with οὐ συνηγάγομεν. “The very thing which we just now did” is so natural, and “the very thing which we just now did not do” so much the reverse, that I have not hesitated to cancel οὐ. It is true that one of my reasons depends on a disputed passage, to the consideration of which I now pass. ταῦτὸν δράσεις is interpreted by Stallbaum, “it will do as well.” His example is taken from *Epist. 5, 822*. ταῦτὸν δὴ οἷμα δράσεις καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἔμβολην. But if any one will give himself the trouble to read the context, he will see that the sense required is this. “I offered no advice to my own people, because I thought them incurable, and it was of no use running into jeopardy where

I could get none to listen. I suppose any adviser would do the same by my company: εἰ δέξαιμεν ἀνατῶς ἔχειν, “he would leave us to our own devices.” Of the passages quoted by Winckelmann, that from the Republic Ηῆ—ποτε ταῦτὸν, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς, needs no comment; that from Thucydides *B. 2*, οἱονται σφίσι καὶ ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ ποιήσει τὸ αὐτὸν, would not be to the purpose even were it sound; but “Read, σφίσι.” “They think they will do as much by sea.” That in Thuc. *B. 7*. ταῦτὸν ἥδη ἐποίει αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένοις διὰ παντὸς καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι is very much to the purpose, and shews that an infinitive is the subject of the phrase in question, and that the phrase is (as one would expect) not ταῦτὸν δράσει, but ταῦτὸν ποιήσει. Another difficulty is presented by τούτων ἀμφ. συναγομένων καταφανῆς κάκείνη γενήσεται. ΠΡΩ. Ποιάν καὶ πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ίσου κ. τ. ἐ: for beyond all doubt κάκείνη refers to the third γέννα which they have been some time in quest of. But who could help taking πολαν to refer to κάκείνη? and yet πολαν is answered by Socrates as referring to the second. If the reader will look very closely into this matter, he will see that ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων μ. κ. γ. is an interruption to the argument. “We have (or have not) already told over the members of the πέρας family. Let us do it again (or let us do so now).” What ought to follow? Most undoubtedly the question of Protarchus: “What do you mean by family? and what family?” Then would follow the enumeration; but after this it is most surprising that Protarchus should answer:—“I understand: you mean, I suppose, that if we mix them, certain products will result”—. How could he say this, if something about this combination had not been mentioned after the description of the family itself? I think there cannot be any doubt that a clause has strayed from its place, and that we should restore it after ἀπεργάζεται, at the end of Socrates’ next speech.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἔσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὅπόση παι' ει πρὸς Ε ἄλληλα τάνατία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα, ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμόν, ἀπεργάζεται. (τούτων δ' ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων παταφανής πάκειν γενίσεται.)

ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μηγνῦσι ταῦτα, γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ' ἐκάστων συμβαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Ορθῶς γάρ φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.

ΣΩ. Αρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις *** ἡ τούτων ὁρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ἴγιειας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

26 **ΠΡΩ.** Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δ' ὅξει καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις.

[Τὴν τοῦ ἔσου] Socrates describes the πέρας family as, *whatever puts an end to the contradiction in Opposites*. For every Indefinite has two opposite extremes, μᾶλλον καὶ ἔττον, which being unlimited, and having no proportion in themselves, would be in continual contradiction, if they were not tempered and harmonized by the agencies belonging to the class of πέρας, which effects this end by introducing in each case a suitable number or basis of proportion. He does not say τὸν ἀριθμόν, for he is speaking of particulars. This doctrine of the power of Number as the ground both of things in themselves, and of our perception of them, is the chief characteristic of the Pythagorean School, from whom it was adopted by the semi-Pythagorean Epicharmus. Böckh has an ingenious remark that this basis of the Doric Philosophy stands half way between the material groundwork of the Ionic School, and the intellectual principle of the Attic. See Extracts from the "Philolaus" in the Appendix.

[μηγνῦσι ταῦτα] The MSS. and Edd. have μηγνύς, an anacolouthon, where such a figure is a capricious violation of grammar, serving no purpose of clearness or emphasis. I have therefore adopted the correction proposed by Klitsch.

[νόσοις] "The indefinite extremes of hot and cold, moist and dry, &c. τούτων and ταῦτα ταῦτα are the γένη τοῦ πέρατος, instances of the Limit, not

the πέρας and ἀπέτρον, as Stallbaum supposes, for how can they be said to be ἐν τοῖς ἀπέτροις or πέρας ἀπεργάσασθαι? On the other hand, we can say with perfect propriety that each limitative agent produces a Limit." When I wrote the above, if any one had asked me why these Limits were not mentioned by name, I could not have answered him. But I now see by other certain signs that this defect is chargeable upon our present text, which is very different from that of Plato. When Schleiermacher met with ταῦτα ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα in the very next sentence, he was surprised that it was not rather αὗτη ἐγγιγνομένη, (sc. κοινωνία) and proposed a transposition, which would not have mended matters; for the previous τούτων was still to be accounted for. But no one seems to have stumbled at the worst difficulty; namely that in 'Αρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις, followed by 'Ἐν δ' ὅξει καὶ βαρεῖ, κ. τ. λ., we have a most ludicrous attempt at antithesis. The same remedy will allay both this perplexity, and that caused by τούτων. There is a lacuna in the text, where I have indicated one. This the reader can fill up for himself; but the substance of his supplement must be as follows: ἐν μὲν νόσοις (τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ ύγρον καὶ τὸ ἔηρον ἐν ἄλληλοις στασιάζετον, τὸ δὲ πυρὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον ὅταν ἐγγένηται,) τῇ τούτων ὅρμῃ κοινωνία κ. τ. λ.

οῖσιν, ἀρ' οὐ ταῦτα ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦθ' ἄμα πέρας τ' ἀπειργάστο, καὶ μουσικὴν ἔνυπασαν † τελεώτατα ἔνυεστίσατο;

ΠΡΩ. Μάλιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήρ' ἐν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενόμενα τὸ μὲν πολὺ λιαν καὶ ἀπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἄμα σύμμετρον ἀπειργάσατο.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήρ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτων ὥραι τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάνθ' ἡμῖν Β γέγονε, τῶν τ' ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων συμμιχθέντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἂλλα δὴ μνῷ ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἶον μεθ' ὑγείας καλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἔτερα καὶ πάγκαλα. Ὡριν γάρ που καὶ ἔνυπασαν πάντων ποιησίαν αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ σὴ θεός, ὡς καλὲ Φίληβε, πέρας ἔχόντων οὗθ'

[ἔνυπασαν τελεώτατα] I do not profess to understand the force of either of these words. The first seems false in fact; for although all music arises from this source, each several combination does not produce *all* music. And again why ἔνυπασαν, not ἀπασαν? There is one use of ἔνυπας which we often meet with in Plato; where, after speaking of a subordinate genus, he passes to a more comprehensive one: as for instance he would say τὴν ταχτικὴν καὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἔνυπαστα. (Compare below; οὐδεὶς καὶ ξ. πονηράν.) As for τελεώτατα, that will surely depend on the purity of the medium and the variety of the ποσά. But this tempering of flat and sharp, and swift and slow, produces effects on recitation also, and on movement. The one good quality of all these is λειτής; and I venture to suggest, καὶ μουσικὴν ἔνυπασάν τε λειτήτα.

[Μάλιστά γε] The best authenticated reading is Καλλίστα; but the continual confusion of the two words is known to all who are familiar with palaeography, and there cannot be a doubt which of the two is most appropriate here. In *Phaedr.* 263 c, for καλὸν γοῦν ἄν, we must read μάλλον γοῦν ἄν. A few pages further on, in the Vatican MS. has καλίστα for μάλιστα, where the latter is obviously right.

τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων is correct: the par-

ticular proportions belong to the πέρας. Elsewhere they are called περιττοί: δῆ.

[οὐδεὶς γάρ που] There seems no occasion for που: it is not improbable that Plato wrote: γάρ ποτε.

[ἡ σὴ θεός] The notion that ἡ Ήδὼς is a personification of the third γένος; as ὁρμὴ κοντωντα is sufficiently refuted by the appeal to *Philebus*, which could only be made because his goddess was in question. It is so probable that σῇ was lost in consequence of its nearness to ἡ, and it seems so necessary for the sense, that I have restored it conjecturally.

[πέρας ἔχόντων οὗθ' ἡδονῶν] πέρας οὔτε ηδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἔνδιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἔχόντων Εὔτε. Such is the reading of the Bodleian and the two MSS. which mostly agree with it. It is utterly out of construction, and even Stallbaum appears to be only half in earnest in defending it. The inferior copies have ἔχοντ', which I regard as a conjecture, such as one often finds from the hands of the more recent scribes; nor are they always unfortunate ones. But of what use can ἔχοντε be to us? Law and order are the limit in this case, and can scarcely be said to have it. I have therefore accepted ἔχόντων as right, but in its wrong place; that is omitted by accident, and then restored to a part of the text to which it did

ηδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμοιο καὶ τάξιν
С πέρας ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκνεῖσαι φῆς αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τού-
τωντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. σοὶ δ', ὃ Πρώταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα, ὃ Σώφροτες, ἔμοιγε πατὰ τοῦ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτ' εἴρητα, εἰ ἔννοεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ' οἶμαι πατανοεῖν· ἐν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ
ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἐν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσι· τρί-
τον δ' οὐ σφόδρα πατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ πλῆθός σε, ὃ θαυμάσιε, ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ
Δ τρίτου γέννησις· καὶ τοι πολλά γε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον παρέσχετο
[γένη], ὅμως δ' ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου
γένει ἐν ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Άληθη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας τὸ οὔτε πολλὰ είχεν, οὔτ' ἐδυσκο-
λαίνομεν ὡς σὸν ἦν ἐν φύσει.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς γάρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάσι με λέγειν, ἐν τοῦτο τι-
θέντα, τὸ τούτων ἔχονον ἄπαν, γένεσιν [εἰς] οὐσ[i]αν ἐκ τῶν
μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.

not belong, after the second πέρας instead of the first.

ἀποκνεῖσαι] Plato uses this word in Rep. 406, b, for to enfeeble. In comedy it occurs in the sense of to bore to death. There is no evidence of its being 'verbum palæstricum,' as Winckelmann supposes; at least, not in the sense he intends by his paraphrase, 'Deam Voluptatem rationibus et argumentis tanquam icibus percussam concidisse.' The sense is, and you say that she has enfeebled them (πάντας), but I affirm that she has saved them. Though if we durst insert τῷ μᾶλλον after αὐτήν, the Αἰο τε Αεαίδα ambiguity of the syntax, which has led more than one scholar a strange dance, would be removed by the order of the two accusatives.

γέννησις] The Books have γενέσεως, and one editor informs us that πλῆθος τῆς γενέσεως means αἱ πολλαὶ γενέ-
σεις. If so, πλῆθος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου will be an equally elegant variation of οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρώποι. Till this is certain, it will be more prudent to take the word which has occurred so often, and

always in the very same acceptation.

[γένη] This supplement, which I have put in brackets, is in the true style of the interpolator.

οὐτε πολλὰ είχεν] This is a strange assertion after πέρας had been declared to contain 'every possible relation of number to number and measure to measure,' and the instances of it were said to be μυρία. I propose διτὶ for οὐτε, and οὐτοὶ διδ. for οὐτ' διδ.

γένεσις κ. τ. έ.] "In order to understand this passage, it is again necessary to observe the same kind of distinction as was made in the case of πέρας between the λοτής, τῷ μᾶλλον, δι-
πλοῦν, on the one side, and the instances of it in Nature on the other.
τὸ τούτων ἔχονον ἄπαν, is here equivalent to the instances; these are also included under the term γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, by which is implied that every existing thing arises from this combination. They are said to arise ἐξ τῶν μέτρων, from the proportions, or proportionate quantities and degrees, ἀπειρ-
γασμένων μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος, which are effected simultaneously with the πέρας

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθον.

ΣΩ. Άλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτον τι τότ’ ἔφαμεν Ε εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον. κοινὴ δὲ ἡ σκέψις· ὅρα γὰρ εἴ τοι δοκεῖ ἀναγναῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τιν’ αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἀν χωρὶς [τούτου] γίγνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος φύσις οὐδὲν [πλὴν ὀνόματι] τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὁρθῶς ἀν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἴν];

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον οὐ- 27 δὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δῆ, διαφέρον εὑρήσομεν. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Άρετον ἥρεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπανολούθει [γιγνόμενον] ἐκείνῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Πανύ γε.

ΣΩ. Άλλο ὅρα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αἰτία τ’ ἔστι καὶ τὸ δον- λεῖον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ.

(Proportion in the abstract), for as soon as ever the πέρας enters into anything, its properties immediately receive their due proportion. The whole passage may therefore be translated,—*But understand me to mean by the third kind the whole produce of these two, considering all such produce as one, as a coming into being, derived from the proportions produced along with the Limit.*” On looking over this old note, I feel but one misgiving; and that is as to my implied approval of the words γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν. As every γένεσις must be εἰς οὐσίαν, understanding οὐσία in a lower sense as a γεγνημένη οὐσία, (see *inf.* 27, B), the redundancy is in itself suspicious; but this suspicion becomes still more serious, when we reflect that according to Greek usage this kind of apposition would be connected by a participle; for it is not a description appended, but a reason for the previous name. ξηγονον γένεσιν δὲ would of course by attraction become ξ γένεσιν οὐσίαν.

πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τοῖς has been at last inserted before τρισὶ, *in vivis codicibus.*

χωρὶς [τούτου]] The attempts to de-

fend τούτου are conclusive against it. χωρὶς is used adverbially, *ut sexcentiens.*

όρθως ἀν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἴν]] The sentence which ends thus, consists of two parts, the first in which *Cause* and *that which makes* are affirmed to have no difference as to *nature*, and the second in which the two *names* are said to be convertible. The first has been confused with the second by the intrusion of πλὴν ὀνόματι, borrowed from below. This makes Plato say, “that there is no difference in their essence, except their name;” which is like saying, there is no difference in their stature, except their complexion. The second part is made ungrammatical by the intrusion of Εν; for if τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ αἴτιον are both of them subjects, λεγόμενα is indispensable. But what a clumsy way of saying, “that you can apply either name indifferently” is this? “The Maker and the Cause would rightly be called one.” Νορ can λεγόμενον ἀν εἴη be used for λέγοιτο ἀν with Εν or with any name we may apply occasionally, but only where some declaration of a name to be permanently borne henceforth is intended.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

Β ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγωμεν τέταρτον, [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἵκανῶς ἔτερον ὃν ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν· ἔτερον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς μήν ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων, ἐνὸς ἑκάστου μυήμιτρος ἔνεκα ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ παταριθμήσασθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἀπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἀρα μὴ πλημμελούσῃν ἄν τι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

[τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἱκ. ἔτερον δν] See from the other three Classes is that on Addenda.

[ἔτερον γὰρ οὖν] The inferior MSS. have Δέγωμεν γὰρ οὖν. Stallbaum, who is always haunted by a perverse suspicion that the older MSS. are full of grammatical corrections (a fact notoriously truer of the recent copies), prefers the latter, and asserts that γὰρ οὖν is better suited to λέγωμεν than to ἔτερον. But if λέγωμεν means anything, it means βούλεται λέγωμεν (it could not be used for λέγεται ἡμῖν ξεστοι), and is therefore a proposal; and γὰρ οὖν is not, and cannot be, used in the assent to a proposal; whereas in the admission of a thing proved, nothing is more common. The drift of the whole argument confirms the correctness of the Bodleian ἔτερον. πιστὸν precedes, πιστούμενον follows, but πιστὸν=αἰτία and πιστούμενον=δουλεῦνον κ. τ. ἐ. Therefore αἰτία and δουλεῦνον are different. Now our first three Classes belonged to the πιστούμενα=γιγνόμενα, or their elements, and as πιστὸν is different from these, it has a right to a separate (fourth) Class. (Strictly speaking only one Class, the third, is γιγνόμενον, and for that reason he uses the expression δουλεῦνον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία, in order to include the first and second, and in like manner he speaks of τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται.) The distinctness then of Cause

which the whole stress of the sentence falls. But it was not necessary to change λέγωμεν into λέγωμεν. I did so, because the rules of dialogue are very strictly observed by Plato, and therefore Protarchus would have to answer to λέγωμεν. But why should he not answer to both that and ἔτερον, by the adoption of both readings? For γὰρ οὖν compare in this Dialogue 14, B. 16, B. 17, C. 30, C. D. 32, C.

ἄρα μὴ πλημμελούσῃν] The Bodleian and its two followers have no μή. But as it is easier to account for its omission in some copies than for its interpolation in others, there is *prima facie* evidence in its favour; for, although μή and μή ποτε are very common forms of interrogation among the lower Greeks, ἄρα μή is a colloquial Atticism, of which they could know nothing save from books. The following passages will shew the manner in which this form of interrogation is used, and that it is employed alike where the speaker is uncertain of the answer, and where he merely demands an assent on which he has a right to reckon: *Phædo* 64, c (twice) and *Parmenides* 163, c (in these instances ἄλλο τι makes the question negative) *Phædo* 103, c. *Crito* 44, E. *Charmides* 174, A.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτον τίς ὁ λόγος; καὶ τι ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτα ἀφικόμεθα; ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τόδι ἦν; δευτερεῖα ἐξητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνοιτο [ἄν] ή φρονήσεως. οὐχ οὕτως ἦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Άλλος οὖν τοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτω διειλόμεθα, κάλλιον ἄν καὶ τὴν ψρίσιν ἐπιτελεσσαίμεθα πρώτου πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ἀντὶ δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιφισβητήσαμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

D

ΣΩ. Ιθι δή, πικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν.

ΣΩ. Οἶνοιν τούτον μὲν τὸν βίον δρῶμέν που τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ δοποίου γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς γὰρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γ' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου, οἷμα, γένους. οὐ γὰρ δυοῖν τυνοῖν ἐστὶ μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ ἔνυπάντιον τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ὥστε δρῶσις ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγνοιτο ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ορθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰνεν. τί δ' ὁ σός, ὁ Φίληβος, ἡδὺς καὶ ἀμικτος ἄν; Εἰν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος δρῶσις ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο; ὥδε δ' ἀπόνοινται μοι πρὸν ἀποφίγμασθαι.

[γίγνοιτο] As the direct question is proved.' The answer to this objection not, "to whom would the second prize belong" but, "to whom does it," (πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνεται η φρονήσεως;) the dependent question should take the optative without ἄν. I have accordingly expelled ἄν, *invitis codicibus*.

μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο] As the whole γένος is meant, of which the βίος is a part, it is plain that the common reading, μικτὸν ἐκεῖνος, is a blunder of the copyist. The correction was long ago proposed by Schütz. It may be objected: 'If all mixtures belong to the κοινὸν γένος, of course the μικτὸς βίος does so: but, as Socrates has only shewn that the κοινὸν γένος contains all mixtures of a particular kind, namely τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ νοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, unless he can first shew that this βίος is compounded of ἀπείρον and πέρας, his case is not

is, that the fourfold division professes to be exhaustive; there are no other elements in any mixed thing, than these two: consequently, if any thing is found mixed, we may at once conclude that it is compounded of ἀπείρον and πέρας. But later on, though we learn that ἡδονὴ is of the ἀπείρων, νοῦς is declared to be of close kin to ἀλτία, the fourth Class. To this apparent contradiction I make answer that νοῦς has more than one relation to τὰ γίγνομεν. In that it blends with the qualities of matter, and appears as consciousness, it is πέρας; in that it controls and adapts inatter to its ends, it appears as σοφία, and as such resembles the σοφία of the Universal νοῦς, which is ἀλτία. This remark will prepare the reader for the next turn in the dialogue.

ΦΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον; ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἥττον δεχομένων ἐστόν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὡς Σώκρατες· οὐ γάρ ἀν ἥδονὴ πανάγαθον ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἀπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυτὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

28 **ΣΩ.** Οὐδέ γ' ἄν, ὡς Φίληβε, λύπη πάγκακον· ὥστ' ἄλλο τι νῦν σκεπτέον ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, ὡς παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἥδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τοῦτο δέ σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γεγονός ἔστω. φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νῦν εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὡς Πρώταρχέ τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν θέντες οὐκ ἀν ἀσεβοῦμεν; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

B **ΦΙ.** Σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαντοῦ θεόν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὡς ἑταῖρε, τὴν σαντοῦ τὸ δ' ἐρωτώμενον ὅμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Όρθως τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὡς Φίληβε, καὶ αὐτῷ πειστέον.

ΦΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προήρησαι λέγειν;

[πανάγαθον] πᾶν ἀγαθὸν is the reading of the MSS. But whether this be taken, like πᾶς ἄναγνος in Soph. *Ed. R.* 823, as *good throughout*, or as being *all the good* that is in the world, and therefore the *only good*, neither of these facts would prove that it was without limit; for it might be all good so far as it went, and yet not go very far, or it might have an exclusive title to the name, and yet be ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε. Nothing therefore can be truer or more necessary than Bekker's corrections, πανάγαθον and πάγκακον. In Philebus' creed ἥδεν is simply the very best and λύπη the very worst thing.

Οὐδέ γ' ἄν, ὡς Φ.] Socrates' just and ingenious retort supplies the omission in Philebus' answer, and brings us to the twofold conclusion that pleasure and pain are in their own nature without limit, and that this want of a limit, since it admits pain as well as pleasure, the supposed evil as well as the supposed good, cannot be that in which the good of pleasure consists,

for as it is alike the condition of both opposites, it cannot belong to either of them to the exclusion of the other.

[σκεπτέον . . ὡς] Some Editors have changed ὡς into δὲ without authority. If σκεπτέον could be used in the sense of "we must look for", this would have been a plausible change. But this sense it cannot have; and therefore the suspicion falls upon σκεπτέον itself. It is possible that λεκτέον or ὑποληπτέον is the right reading, either of which would require ὡς.

[τοῦτο δὲ] The MSS. have τούτων δῆτούτων is a blunder due to τῶν ἀπεράντων. I have substituted δὲ for δῆ, because we need the conjunction to oppose τοῦτο to ἄλλο τε. γεγονός ἔστω is somewhat unusual for ὡμολογήσω εἶναι.

[ὁ Φίληβε] The accidental omission of these words in the Bodleian, has supplied Stallbaum with another confirmation of his strange theory that the better MSS. have undergone the revision of fastidious critics. Fastidious critics in the eleventh century must have been rare aves.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα γε· νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ δέομαι γ', ὁ Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, [ἴνα] μὴ δὴ ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξάμεθά τι.

ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὁ Πρόταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἐπι- C τάττεις. ἀλλ' ὅντως σε ἐγώ, παθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος, σεμνύ- νων [ἐν τῷ παῖζειν] ἐθορύβησα, νῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος δποίου γέρους εἰεν.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι γ', ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δάδιον. πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σο- φοί, ἐαντοὺς ὅντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἔστι βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἵσως εὖ λέγονται. διὰ μακροτέρων δ', εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησάμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' δπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπολογιζό- D μενος, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες. ὀφεγξάμεθα δέ πως ὥδ' ἐπανερωτῶντες.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ηὔτερον, ὁ Πρόταρχε, τὰ ἔνυπτα καὶ τόδε τὸ παλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν· ἡ τάραντία, παθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὁ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες, δὲ μὲν E

[ἴνα] μὴ δὴ . . . φθ. τι] The MSS. have ἴνα μηδέν. This μηδέν must belong to φθεγξάμενα, because μηδέν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες would be the very contrary of that which he dreads. But μηδέν and τι are incompatible, except in the combined form μηδ' οὐ τι, which is foreign to our purpose. The most probable correction seems to be [ἴνα] μηδὲν, ἴνα having been supplied after μηδὲν was corrupted. ἴνα δὴ and μηδὲν are used where the person addressed is appealed to as to the reasonable nature of the thing expected or feared.

Παστέρον κ. τ. ἐ.] The connection of the clauses is this. "You thought it difficult, because I frightened you."—"You certainly did."—"Nay but it is easy." I have therefore removed the sign

of interrogation after εἰεν. The words ἐν τῷ παῖζειν are very suspicious. They explain what might be left to the intelligence of the hearer, and force σεμνύνων to stand alone, whereas σεμνύνων ἐθορύβησα, νῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος is not a very violent displacement of the natural order, and any reader will see why it is made.

ὑπολογιζόμενος] This is properly a term of book-keeping, and is used of anything which we set against the account of profit, such as χίνδυνος, πόνος &c. ἀπεχθάνοματ, I give offence.

Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] When Socrates offers to Protarchus the alternative belief either in capricious and hap-hazard power, and mere accident, as that which has the universe in its keeping, or in mind and marvellous intelligence, as

ἐν ἀρχῇ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὐδὲ ὅσιον εἶναι μοι φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ νῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάγαι καὶ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσῃς τῆς περιφροδᾶς ἕξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι οὐδὲ ἂν δοξάσαιμι.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτ' ἔτι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν [ὅμολο-
29 γούμενον] ξυμφῶμεν, ὡς ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μὴ μόγον οἰώ-
μεθα δεῖν τάλλοτρια ἀνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκυ-
δνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνήρ δεινὸς φῆ ταῦτα
μὴ οὕτως ἄλλ' ἀτάκτως ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βούλοιμην;

that which arranges and regulates it, we expect Protarchus to reject the former, and approve the latter supposition. Now Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is a most complete rejection, and so is οὐδὲν εἶναι μοι φαίνεται; but there is in the received text a fatal want of distinctness as to what he rejects; for Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is left by itself, and οὐδὲν ὅσιον is predicated of δὲ σὺ .. λέγεις. This shews that the copyists cannot have done their duty. The difference of the readings is remarkable. Bodl. ὃ μὲν γάρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις: Coisl. ὃ μὲν γάρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις: Eusebius, ὃ μὲν γάρ δὴ σὺ λέγεις. It will be seen that they all three concur in μὲν γάρ, which is the source of all the difficulty. But Eusebius' ΜΕΝΓΑΡΑΔΗ I take to have been the first deflection from the true reading ΜΕΝΕΝΑΡΧΗ, and the νῦν δὴ of the best MS. will justify the change of λέγεις into λέγεται. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is properly, *Nothing like*, and is so used by Isocrates. 270 init. (Steph.) 277 med. 279 med. 241 extr. (τι τῶν αὐτῶν) and περὶ Ἀντ. p. 302. Lips. 1825. We may here render it by *Nothing of the kind*, or *Nothing like the fact*.

Βούλε δῆτ' ἔτι καὶ ἡμεῖς] Do you wish, then, that we also should agree in affirming that which is professed by the ancients before mentioned? I have changed δῆτά τι into δῆτ' ἔτι; τι, which the inferior MSS. omit, is quite foreign to the sentence, while ἔτι καὶ in this sense is of continual occurrence in Plato and other writers.

[ὅμολογούμενον]] The MSS. generally agree in this reading. Schleiermacher

reads ὁμολογούμενα, some worthless copies ὁμολογούμενοι. But if we adopt -μενα or -μενον, we must have the article, and the perfect is more correct, as Theodoret quotes it, ὁμολογημένοις: and lastly, whether Anaxagoras be meant, or, as I suspect, some older seer or poet, it is not proper to speak of the first expounders of a dogma as ὁμολογούντας. Some one may propose ὁμολογούμενοι, agreeing with, but this is said of things that agree, not of persons. It is wonderful that no one has seen that ξύμφωνι is followed by a dative in its own right, and that ὁμολογεῖν, in whatever form you use it, introduces either a tautology or a redundancy.

ξύμφωμεν] MSS. give ξύμφήσωμεν. It is true we have ξυνέργησες μαγις, Rep. 242, E, and in Sophist. 236, D, πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ ξύμφησαι—but as to the first example, we have ξυνέρη both preceding and following it, and as to the second, the whole clause is an interpolation. In Timaeus 72, D, ξύμφήσαντος may be defended on the ground that the God does not simply assent to their doctrine, but reasserts it with higher authority. Where assertion is intended, we find the form ξύρησα, so that practically it is an aorist of φάσκω, but for this very reason ξύμφησι would seldom want any such inflexion. ξύμφωμεν in this place is to be looked upon as a present tense, like οἰώμεθα, ξύγκινδυνώμεν, μετέχωμεν.

τάλλοτρια ἀνευ κινδύνου λέγαν] This is evidently a proverbial phrase, slightly changed, probably from ξητιν.

ΣΩ. "Ιδι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγον ἄθρει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντων τῶν ζώων, πῦρ καὶ ὑδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα, καθορῶμέν που, καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ Βοί χειμαζόμενοί φασιν [, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ συστάσει].

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὅντις ἐπ' ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον;

ΣΩ. "Οτι σμικρόν τε [τούτων ἐκάστου παρ' ἡμῖν] ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον, [καὶ] οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὅν, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἐνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταῦτόν. οἶον πῦρ μὲν ἔστι που παρ' ἡμῖν, ἔστι δὲν τῷ παντὶ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς Σ καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δὲν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ πάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὖσῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλισθεν δὲ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται [ἐκ τούτου] καὶ ἀρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρός; ἢ τούναντίον ἐπ' ἐκείνου τό τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπαρτ' ἴσχει ταῦτα;

[ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ συστάσει] If this means the σύστασις of our bodies, it is an idle repetition; if of the Universe, it comes too soon. The question is, not whether we see the Elements in composition, but whether we see them at all; that they are περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν is assumed as the general belief. He argues from the elements παρ' ἡμῖν which we do see, to the same elements ἐν τῷ παντὶ.

[τούτων I. π. ἥ.] Note the miserable repetition περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν . . . τούτων ἐκάστου παρ' ἡμῖν in one sentence, for this is virtually the case, since ὅτι depends on λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε.

The sentence which I have relieved of this burden affords us the very ἔνεστι from which the interpolator helped himself above. "It is present here in small quantity and poor quality," and then the double nature of this φαῦλον is shewn; it is impure and feeble in its effects. This connexion is spoiled, and the grammar made to suffer, by the intrusion of καὶ.

[ἐκ τούτου] ἐκ τ. is quite suitable to γίγνεται, but by no means to τρέφεται; when we omit the words, the sentence becomes ten times more elegant and forcible, ὑπὸ being quite appropriate enough for the three verbs taken together.

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲ ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾶς.

Δ. **ΣΩ.** Ὁρθῶς· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔρεῖς, οἶμαι, περὶ τε [τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις] γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦτον πάντων ὅσων ἡρώησα δίλιγον ἔμπροσθεν, οὕτως ἀποκρινεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἂν ποτε φανεῖ;

ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδὲ δυτισοῦν. ἀλλὰ τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο³ ἔξῆς ἐπον. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ τοῦ δὴ λεχθέντα⁴ ἀρ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν συγκείμενα ἴδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

Ε. **ΣΩ.** Ταῦτὸν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦτο⁵ δν πόσμον λέγομεν. [διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, σύνθετον δν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρ'⁶ ἡμῖν σῶμα, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ'⁷ ἡμῖν τοῦτο, τρέφεται τε καὶ, δσα τοῦ δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἴπομεν, εἴληφέ τε καὶ ἵσχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο⁸ ἔτερον, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως.

30 **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ; τοδ' ἀρ' ἄξιον; ἢ πᾶς ἔρεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ'⁹ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἀρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Αἴδον δὲ τι φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὡς φιλε Πρόταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ

[Ὀρθῶς] Compare ἴμ. 53, A. In instances of this kind, we must not take this word as merely expressive of assent, but rather of satisfaction that the argument is advancing as was intended. This will justify the use of γὰρ in the next clause.—The designations τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις (ἱμ. 31, D) and τῆς ἐνθάδε both apply to γῆς; but one would be sufficient, and the latter is better here as contrasting with τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ. In place of καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων I suspect that we ought to read καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ πέρι πάντων.—I have changed τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο into τῷ μ. τ.

[Θεῖ] τὸν αὐτὸν γ. τρόπον] The cause of its being a body is given in σύνθετον δν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. Therefore the causal δὲ seems out of place here as

well as unsuited to τρόπον. We should rather have expected καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, but τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον expresses nearly the same thing. The copyist was perhaps thinking of διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.

δσα τοῦ δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἴπομεν] This refers to καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἀρχεται. But περὶ αὐτῶν is surely out of place; for that, concerning which they are speaking here, is τὸ παρ'⁹ τὴν σῶμα, and though that σῶμα contains the four elements, those elements have already passed out of the argument.—ἴσχει is both better supported than ἔχει, and more appropriate, as Socrates is speaking of a continual derivation.

[Πόθεν] The reasons given seem to be two “The Universe has a soul, for

παντὸς σῶμα τῷ μψυχον δύν εἰνῆγαρε, ταῦτα γέ τέχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;

ΠΡΩ. Άηλον ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γέ, ὡς Πρωταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἔκεινα, τέτρας καὶ ἀπειρον καὶ ποινὸν ** καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν [Ψυχὴν Β τε παρέχον] καὶ σωμασίαν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταισαντος σώματος

what else could have given us our souls?" and "The Universe has a soul, because it has all that we have in greater perfection". But the latter alone is intended. "If we have a soul, the Universe which has all that we have &c. must likewise have one". πάντη refers to quantity, purity, intensity &c. mentioned above.

Οὐ γάρ πων] The subject of ἔπικαλεῖσθαι is evidently *Cause*. But if so, there is no predicate to τέτταρα ἔκεινα. To remedy this, some propose to read ὄντα before τέτταρα; but neither Grammar nor Logic allows such a contrivance. Not Grammar, because if Plato had intended the clause to be taken absolutely, he would certainly have written ὄντων τῶν τεττάρων. Nor Logic, for if we were to take it thus: "Seeing that these four are"—we should immediately ask "are where"? If παρ' ἡμῖν, that could not be omitted. If every where, that is as yet unproved, nay the very thing to be proved, for in the next sentence of Socrates the conclusion is stated ὡς ἔστιν ἀπειρόν τε ἢ τῷ παντὶ κ. τ. λ. There can be no doubt that the four γένη ought to be mentioned, else how can we make any conclusion about them? So that the words τὰ τ. ἔκεινα are not an interpolation. On the other hand we know that there is an hiatus in the best MS., for it omits πέρας, and though the others have it, it is just as likely that in these it was supplied by conjecture. But the hiatus may have been far greater than that of one word. My impression is that the text in this place was in a very bad condition even in remote times, and that all which intervened between ἔκεινα and καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος was unreadable. The place was then filled up pretty nearly as we find it. But not correctly: for the

enumeration of these γένη without an article is in itself most unlikely, and if καὶ τὸν had been mentioned here, it is scarcely credible that Protarchus should so very soon afterwards beg to be reminded what καὶ τὸν meant. I believe that a more probable mode of filling up the gap would be in this fashion: τὰ τέτταρα ἔκεινα ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μόνοις εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν κ. τ. λ.

[Ψυχὴν τε παρέχον]] He argues that αἰτία here below enjoys *many and various appellations* of *σοφία* (as we say σοφὸς παιδοτρίβης, λαρός, τέκτων, χαλκεὺς, and so forth) and he divides the operations of αἰτία under two heads of *combining* and *repairing* (συντίθεν καὶ σύκομενον) and gives an example of each in *σωμασίαν* ἐμποιοῦν and *λατρείην* (ἐμποιοῦν). It is evident throughout that he is speaking of the human *Ψυχὴν* being enabled by this αἰτία to work on our inferior elements by introducing πέρας into the ἀπειρά, and, when the μέτρον thus introduced has been disturbed, by readjusting it; in other words he is speaking of *human skill*. And, pray, what human skill can be said *Ψυχὴν παρέχειν*? But some Greek reader, who did not understand the argument, saw something about cause, and something about σῶμα, and thought it was a pity that the *Ψυχὴν* should be missing, and so by his *Ψυχὴν τε παρέχον* he killed all the sense of the passage. The application of these facts concerning human skill to a higher skill must be carefully noted. He does not say "there must be *some other higher effects elsewhere*"; but "we know of certain effects; we know that there is a φύσις τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμωτάτων (i.e. the planets and the whole Heavens) and *this must be an*

ιατρική, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀπούμενον, πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι· τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων ὅντων ἐν δηλῷ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ πατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι παλὸν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἄρα μεμιχαῆσθαι τὴν τῶν παλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.

C ΠΡΩ. Άλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτο γ' ἀν λόγον ἔχου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν [εἴ μὴ τοῦτο,] μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἀν ἐπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν, ὡς ἔστιν, οὐ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἀπειρόν τ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολὺ, καὶ πέρας ἵκανόν, καὶ τις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττοντα ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιότατ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Αἰκατάτατα δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἀνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἀν ποτε γενοῖσθη.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, -βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δ' ἄλλοις ἄλλα παλά, παθ' δὲ φίλον ἐκάστοις λέγεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξῃς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, εἰρημέναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει, ξύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.

effect of this same αἰτία operating in a higher ψυχή." Ast's Lexicon will give the student several examples of ἄρα in this kind of reasoning, where we would show the absurdity of denying in one case, what has been admitted in another less evident case. I should prefer ἐν δώλῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ.

[εἴ μὴ τοῦτο] These words are out of construction, and redundant. Let them be restored to the margin, or, better still, be forgotten. In this sentence the reader will perceive the playful way in which ἄπειρον is called πολὺ, and πέρας ἵκανόν, and αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, and will be able to judge of the worth of Winckelmann's conjecture, when he proposes to foist κανόν without an epithet into the text.

Διὸς] Then Jove is subordinate to αἰτία. This looks like Pantheism, but

in the *Timaeus* we are told of a δημιουργὸς καὶ πατήρ by whom Jove and all other Deities were made. He too is not independent of αἰτία, for the αἰτία is given which caused him to make the world, namely that he was good, and since in that which is good there is no grudge, he begrudging not the world its being, but would have all things like himself. Thus the First Cause is The Good, but the δημιουργὸς does not owe his being to τάγαθὲν—αἰτίᾳ; but through its presence in him he becomes the author of all things, including the Gods. Jove himself appears among these divine beings whom he addresses thus: Θεό, δῶσιν ἔγώ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἀτε δὲ ἔμρο γενόμενα, ἀλλα τέ θεού γ' ἀνέλοντος—for so the passage ought to be read. *Tim.* 41, A.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ ἔγραψει πεπορικῶς ἀπόχρισιν, ὅτι νοῦς ἐστὶ τριερούστις τοῦ πάντων αὐτίου λεχθέντος. [τῶν τεττάρων Εἴην ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ.] ἔχεις γὰρ δήπου νῦν ἴμων ἥδη τὴν ἀπόχρισιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐχεις καὶ μάλιστανος· καὶ τοι με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες.

ΣΩ. Ανάπαντα γάρ, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοθεν ἡ παιδιά.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Νοῦς δή που, ὡς ἔταιρε, οὖν μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα 31 ποτὲ δέναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδήλωται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήτη ἡδονῆς γ' ὁσαιτώς πάλαι τὸ γένος ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν ξυγγενῆς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονὴ δ' ἀπειρός τ' αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτη ἀρχῆς μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἔξοντός ποτε γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

B

ΣΩ. Λεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ τ' ἐστιν ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν, καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον, ὅπόταν γίγνησθον, ἵδεν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐβασανίσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λύπης δ' αὐτὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἔν ποτε δυναίμεθα· ἴκανῶς βασανίσαι.

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ' εἰ ταύτη χρὴ πορείεσθαι, ταύτη πορευάμεθα.

[γενούστης] This word is quoted from this passage by the lexicographers. It is not formed according to analogy, and offers no meaning but what γεννήτης would have supplied. It may have arisen from a dittographia, γέννους, γεννήτης.—I once thought that Stallbaum's conjecture, when he put a stop after λεχθέντος and supplied δὲ after τεττάρων, was undoubtedly right. I now see in the words τῶν τεττάρων ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ a marginal note, on which all correction is thrown away.

ἔχεις γάρ ought to follow immediately upon the statement of the ἀπόχρισις, in place of being separated from it by this reference, which is itself quite superfluous.

[ταῦτα πρότερα] Namely, where it is to be found existing, and how it arises. Henceforth, pleasure is no longer considered as an abstraction, and belonging to the class of ἀπειρά, but as having come into being, and consequently as belonging to the κοινά.

ΣΩ. Ἡρ' οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ ποιῷ μοι γένει ἄμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δέ γ', ὡς φίλε Σώνφατες, ὑπομίμησκε ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἐσται ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὡς θαυμάσιε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν δὲ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Οἱ μετὰ τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν τῷ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ἀρμονίαν, ἐπίθεσο;

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. τὸν νῦν δὲ τι μάλιστ' ἥδη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν, τῆς ἀρμονίας μὲν λνομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζῷοις, ἄμα λέσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντι λέγεις εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὲ ἀρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἁπιούσης, ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεπτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων δὲ τι τάχιστα δηθῆναι.

ΠΡΩ. Οἷμαι μέν σε δρθῶς λέγειν, ὡς Σώνφατες, ἐμφανέστερον δὲ ταῦτα ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσιά πον καὶ περιφανῆ δῆστον συντροεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Πείνη μέν πον λέσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ἀπούσης] The same word is again used below of the same thing, and there also with πάλιν. The expression seems strange for a *return* to a natural state. On the faith of εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν

οδόν, and τὴν ἀναχώρηστην, I should be inclined to write πάλιν ιούσης, or ἐπανιούσης, which last is perhaps more like the text.

ΣΩ. Λίψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις, ἥδονή. διάκρισις 32 δὲ [γ'] αὖ καὶ [διάλυσις] ἡ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ πνίγοντος πάθη, λύπη· κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἡ δίγοντος πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῆξις, ἥδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ [δίγονος] ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζώου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις, λύπη. πάλιν δ' τοῖς ταῦτον ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὄδός, ἥδονή. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴς σου μέτρως ὁ λόγος, δις ἀν φῆ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονός εἰδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρό- B σθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθειρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὄδόν, ταύτην δ' αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων, ἥδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τιν' ἔχειν.

[διάλυσις] This differs so little in sense from διάκρισις that it is useless, and moreover it answers to nothing in the antithesis. The opposites are διάκρισις=ἀπόδοσις, παρὰ φύσιν = κατὰ φύσιν, πνίγοντος πάθη=ψῆξις, λύπη=ἥδονή. In this scheme the only word that suggests any scruple is ἀπόδοσις; a word which conveys no meaning unless we are told what is τὸ ἀπόδοσιςμενον. That is to say, we want a genitive, and it must be the genitive of that which is opposed to πνίγος. But, for this we need not look very far, for in the very next speech we have δίγονος, where it is as much in the way as it would be serviceable here. It seems almost certain that we should read τῇ δίγονος πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῆξις, ἥδονή.

[δίγονος] See the preceding note. But a more serious difficulty is offered by εἰς ταῦταν ἀπιόντων, which is doubtful not only because of the preposition ἀπέ, but also because the plural refers to nothing yet mentioned; nor does ταῦταν satisfy me, for, though εἰς ταῦταν λόντων would do very well for the meeting of things separated, here the natural way is that of separation, as is plain from the nature of the case, and from the word διακρινομένων.

Schleiermacher, in view of Stobæus' reading, εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν, for εἰς ταῦταν, conjectured εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν. Stallbaum finds every thing to his mind: ἀπιόντων is said of τῶν ὑγρῶν, implied in ὑγρότητος, and εἰς ταῦταν is "to the same state in which they were before". The reader will observe that there may be as much rashness in defense as in attack. Our only guide is the antithesis, in which τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις can only answer to τῆς ὑγρότητος διάκρισις. From this it would appear to follow that πάλιν δὲ ταύτης διακρινομένης was the original reading. Or perhaps it was πάλιν δὲ τῶν παγέντων διακρινομένων: but at all events it was something very different from what we now read on the authority of some unknown person who did his best to patch up a reading from his damaged copy. In what follows, the construction is purposely loose, in order to admit of more detail, and especially to prevent the φθορὰ being understood of anything save the dissolution of the compound formed from the union of τὸ ἀπείρον and πέρας: hence also the double μῆν and its double apodosis.

[τύπον] A general outline of truth. See Trendelenburg's *Excerpta*, where there is a very good note on the word.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν εἰδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔκατέροις.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων [ἔλπιζόμενον] ἥδū καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἔτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος [αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς] διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἷμαι, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέστι Φ ἔκατέροις γιγνομένοις, τῶς δοκεῖ, καὶ

[ἔλπιζόμενον]] It is not the expected thing, but the state of expectation which is either painful or pleasant. Nor can we put τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔλπιζόμενον for τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔλπιζουσῆς πάθος with any shadow of propriety.

[αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς]] Protarchus' answer is an admission that there is another species of pain and pleasure *independent of the body*, for so he varies the expression of that which Socrates had called αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς. But this variety does not satisfy the sciolist; so he gives us a tautology in its place, by again repeating αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.

'Ορθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ] The γὰρ after ὅρθῶς ὑπέλαβες shews that a certain satisfaction is implied. See above 29, D.

ἐν γ. τούτοις οἷμαι] It is commonly supposed that Socrates is here speaking of the προσδοκήματα alone; but it would be strange that he should speak of these as pure, and unmixed with pleasure and pain, just after he has made them appear as one kind of them. Nor is it easy to see why he should lay so much stress on this particular εἶδος, as expecting from it a solution of the whole question. ἐν τούτοις however manifestly means not ἐν τούτοις τοῖς προσδοκήμασι, but ἐν τούτοις τοῖς εἶδεσι, for it follows immediately on Protarchus' ἔτερον εἶδος. But ἔκατέροις cannot be so applied, because ταῦτα here involving only two εἶδη, each of them would be ἔκάτερον. This is one difficulty; and here is another. Socrates cannot speak of either εἶδος

as unmixed with pain and pleasure, since they are kinds of them. But the plurals εἰλικρίνεσται &c., if they do not refer to εἶδεσι, must refer to λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς; and by substituting this emendation for λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, we get rid of both difficulties at once. It may appear somewhat bold to change so many terminations, but only to those who are unfamiliar with the wholesale dealing of the ancient correctors, who would think themselves quite justified in adapting all the neighbouring endings to τούτοις. I do not however admit this conjecture into the text, because, until we are certain about ὡς δοκεῖ, we must be content with uncertainty in every thing else. I once thought that these words meant, that Socrates wished to represent himself as not sure till after further examination whether he should find those pure and unmixed εἶδη, but in that case he would have said ἐὰν εὑρωμένης οὐκ μοι δοκῶ εὑρύσσειν or any thing sooner than ὡς δοκεῖ. If we adopt εἰλ. Φ ἔκατέραις γιγνομέναις καὶ ἀμίκτοις λύπαις τε καὶ τῆδοναῖς, they will be the instrumental datives to ἔμφαντες ἔσεσθαι. Perhaps οἵς δοκεῖ is merely a gloss to κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν, before δόξαν was added by way of explanation.

οἷμαι, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν] The second of these phrases modifies the confident air of the first; there is therefore no redundancy, such as some have imagined to be purposely introduced to imitate ordinary conversation!

ἀμίκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ὥδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ὥδονήν, πότερον δλον ἔστι τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν Δ ἑτέρῳ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ὥδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ, καθάπερ Θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τουτοῖς, ὡς τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δ' οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν δπῃ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτῃ πῃ δεῖ διαπορευθῆναι τὸ τοῦ μεταδιωκόμενον.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε ξινίδωμεν. [ώς] εἴπερ ὄντως ἔστι τῶν γενομένων διαφθειρομένων μὲν [αὐτῶν] ἀλγηδών, Ε ἀνασωζομένων δ' ὥδονή, τῶν μήτε διαφθειρομένων μήτ' ἀνασωζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποθ' ἔξιν δεῖ τότε ἐν ἐκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζώοις, δταν οὖτα σχῆ. σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εἰπέ· δρ' οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῶν μήτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι μήτ' ἔδεσθαι, μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπούμενου. 33

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς τοτὲ μέν] After δοτέον governing these several datives, the sentence requires οὗτοι or ως; I have inserted the latter.

[Ἐστιν δπῃ] For the MS. reading ἔστιν δτε, which is a mere repetition of ἐνίστε, the nearest palaeographical change would be ἔστιν οὗ, the Y and T being often confounded; but the most appropriate and, in itself, a very probable change, is ἔστιν δπῃ, “on certain conditions”. This I have admitted into the text.

διαπορευθῆναι] The argument is compared, as in many other parts of Plato, to a beast of the chase being tracked.

τῶν γενομένων] τὸ λεγόμενον is the reading of all MSS. and Edd. in place of my τῶν γενομένων. But without some qualifying adverb τ. λ. cannot be used in any other sense but “what is commonly said”. And again αὐτῶν refers to no plural expressed or implied. Stallbaum tells us, first that αὐτῶν is put for

ἔκεινων (motive unknown) and that ᔁκείνα are ὑγρόν, πνῆγος, βῆγος and so forth. The reader need scarcely be reminded that ὑγρόν and the rest never perish, but the γενέστεις from them do, and it is these γενέστεις, if ἔμψυχοι, which feel the pain or the pleasure of their jarring or blending. It is also usual to say ἀληθῶς λέγεται of statements and οὐτως ἔστι of facts, whereas here we have a confusion of the two. I have restored what in my opinion must have been the original text.

ὅταν οὖτος σχῆ] I have put σχῆ for τσχῆ; we want the aorist, and τσχῆ here is as misplaced as if we should ask a man, Πῶς τσχεῖς; μήτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι μήτε λυπεῖσθαι has no more right to τι than μήτ' ἔδεσθαι, and neither needs it.

ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη] ἡμῖν is the reading of the Coislinian and is much to be preferred to that of the Bodleian, τμῶν.

ΣΩ. Ἡγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνῆσθαι· πρὸς γάρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐδίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν [μεμνῆσθαι ταύτην] ἔσθ' ἥμιν [ἢ μή]. βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ποῖον.

ΣΩ. [Τῷ] τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν [έλομένῳ] βίον οἶσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

Β ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἔλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ’ οὕτως ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Οὔκουν οὕτως ἀν ἐκείνῳ θ’ ὑπάρχοι, καὶ ἵσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γ’ οὔτε χαίρειν τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε τοὐγαντίον.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰνός· ἀσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰσαῆγις οἱ ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ἦ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὰ δεντρεῖα, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνάμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.

[μεμνῆσθαι ταύτην] Protarchus is to try and remember this, because it is an important fact; not because it is important to remember it. The change from ταύτης, which the author of this foolish supplement saw above to ταύτην, which he certainly wrote, would almost make one suspect that he meant μεμνῆσθαι for a passive. Just so in the *Politicus*, 286, c, we read, μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ μάκη χρίνοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς μετρητικῆς μέρος, ὃ τότε ἔφαμεν δεῖν μεμνῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον. But there the whole context shews that Plato wrote μεμρέσθαι.

[Τῷ] . . [έλομένῳ] This again has been borrowed from below, and placed here so that it makes ἀποκωλύειν govern a dative. As to οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει being used with the accusative suppressed, this is a common idiom. “*It is quite possible* to live the intellectual life in this manner.”

Οὐκούν οὔτος] I ought not to have followed two previous editors in preferring οὔτος, which rests on no good authority. The argument runs thus: “This neutral life is compatible with pure intelligence; for the man who chose the life of intelligence was obliged to forego all delight. *In this way then* (this being so) it would be the very life which he *had already chosen*, and it would also probably be the nearest approach to the life of the Gods.” The transition from the philosopher to the Gods is marked by ἔκτιντο τε καὶ. The γε which has usurped the place of τε in the Editions, is absolutely without meaning.

Ἐπισκεψόμεθα] This is Bekker’s conjecture for ἐπισκεψόμεθα, which occurs in all the Books, but is both less suitable in itself, unusual with εἰσαῆγις, which requires a future, and quite incompatible with προσθήσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴ τὸ γένεσιν εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστὶ γεγονός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Μνήμηγ, ὡς ἔσουεν, δὲ τι ποτέ ἐστι, πρότερον τάναληπτέον, καὶ αινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἰσθησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πηγενῆ^D σεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς φῆς;

ΣΩ. Θέσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὸς ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῆ καίνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἴόντα καὶ τινὲς ὁσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἵδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἐκπατέριψι.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἴόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀρ' ὅρθότατα^E ἐροῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβης ὡς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθά πον γένεσιν. ἐστι γάρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος· ἢ δὲ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὐπω γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ μήτ' ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τινὲς ἀποβολὴν ἀτοπον. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ἀναληπτέον] Δημητέον alone is the proper verb. Παραληπτέον would be just as unsuitable as ἀναληπτέον; for they are not going to receive the information from others, but to learn it by observation. Nor is it at all likely that Plato would play on the word ἀναλαμβάνειν, as denoting the proper function of μνήμη. I therefore conjecture πρότερον δὲ τὴν ληπτέον.

κατὰ τρόπον] This is the opposite of ἀπό τὸ τρόπον. See below, 34, A.

ἐνταῦθά πον] Somewhere here,—i.e., in the state we have been describing. By λήθης γένεσις is meant a state of forgetfulness arising out of a previous

opposite state. With this he contrasts that state of unconsciousness as to any particular impression which precedes αἰσθησις, and consequently μνήμη. The latter is described in order to bring into greater relief the proposition which he is now advancing, that Desire being of the opposite to that which is present, as the body is taken up with that which is present, the mind alone can be conversant with the absent opposite, and this through Memory, without which Desire is impossible.

μήτε γεγονότος πω] I have adopted Stallbaum's conjecture for πως without hesitation.

ΣΩ. Άντι μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἀπαθῆς αὕτη γίγνεται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, [ἢν νῦν λήθην 34 καλεῖσ], ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενα κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δὲ αὐτὴν κίνησιν ὄνομάζων αἰσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοις ἔν.

ΠΡΩ. Αἱληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡδη μανθάνομεν δὲ βουλόμεθα παλεῦν τὴν αἰσθησιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Σωιηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὁρθῶς Β ἔν τις λέγοι, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἀρέον δὲ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Άρεον οὖν τόδε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν, δὲ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχε ποθὲν ἡ ψυχή, ταῦτα ἔνεν τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὁ τι μάλιστος ἀναλαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι που λέγομεν. ἡ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν καὶ ὅταν, ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτε αἰσθήσεως εἴτε αὐτὸς μαθήματος, αὐθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν αὐτῇ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ἔνυπταντο ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν.

[ἢν νῦν λήθην καλεῖσ] Protarchus does no such thing. He is bidden to use ἀναισθησία in place of τὸ λεληθέναι, and to keep λήθη in the same sense as hitherto.

γιγνόμενα] "Pro γιγνόμενον Sydenhamus γιγνόμενα tentat. Non video causam." Stallb. And then, of course, we are referred to Matthiæ. That the compiler of a Grammar should treasure up all the anomalies and exceptional instances, which either the self-will of authors or the stupidity of scribes supplies him with, is no more than we should expect. But the province of an editor is, as far as possible, to resist such

evidence and to oppose common sense to the craving after curiosities. In such a passage as this a departure from the common rule is above all things improbable, for here the notion uppermost in the mind of the writer is the joint participation in a certain state, the common effect of two things, which a singular participle would render less apparent.

ποθὲν ἡ] The Zurich editors have not improved this passage by the conjectural reading of πάθη; the word ποτὲ adds to the clearness of the sentence, and is fully supported by analogous passages in this part of the dialogue.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ χάριν ἀπαντ' εἴρηται ταῦτα, ἔστι τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἰν' ἄμα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὃ τι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἄμι^ν ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτ' ἀμφότερος² ἔστικε δηλοῦσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἥδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορ- Δ φὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔστικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, ταῦτά γε, ὡς Πρώταρχε, εἰρήνητες ἀ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, [ἀπολοῦμεν] τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἀπορίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς ἡμύνω· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώμενα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πόλλα³ ξερα- τοιαντ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τινας ἐπιθυμίας; E

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί ποτ' ἄρα ταῦτὸν βλέψαντες, οὕτω πολὺ δια- φέροντα ταῦτ' ἐνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δι² οὐ ἁρδιον ἵσως εἰπεῖν, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅμως λεπτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐλεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν δή;

[Ἴν' ἄμα] The reading of all the MSS., Ἄντα μή, has sorely puzzled the editors; some have left it in despair, others have betaken themselves to πή; but this particle is in contradiction to the superlatives which follow, and would be more appropriate to an attempt then commencing, than to a review of the ground already won. I once adopted δή, but with misgivings. I now see that INAMA was divided amiss, and so MA was changed into μή. "Άμα τοῦτο καὶ ἄμα ἔστιν" is a very common formula. See below 41, δ, ἄμα παρακεῖσθαι καὶ ἄμα γίγνεσθαι.

πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορφήν] As he means every phase of it, and not its whole

appearance, the article has no business here.

ἀ νῦν ζητοῦμεν] The common reading is, Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὡς Π., εὐρόντες δ νῦν ζητοῦμεν· ἀπο- λοῦμεν κ. τ. ἐ. It is impossible to make any sense of καὶ ταῦτά γε, nor is the first ἀπολοῦμεν, without a case, supported by usage. The corruption of the passage appears to have originated with the insertion of the second ἀπολοῦμεν, which probably stood at first as a gloss in the margin. Under any circumstances δ would be untenable, for αὐτὰ ταῦτα proves that a plural must have preceded.

ΣΩ. “Διψῆ” λέγοντες, λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε τι.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δέ γ' ἐστὶ κενοῦται.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Άρ' οὖν τὸ δίψως ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, πώματός γε.

35 **ΣΩ.** Πώματος, ἡ πληρώσεως πώματος;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.

ΣΩ. Όντες οὐδὲν τὸ δίψως ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἐγαντίων ἡ πάσχει. κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρῆται πληροῦσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατά γε:

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δὸς πρῶτον κενούμενος ἐστιν διόθεν εἴτ' αἰσθήσει [πληρώσεως] ἐφάπτοιτο ἀντεῖτε μνήμῃ τούτου, δομήτ' ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτ' ἐν τῷ πρόσθε πώποτε ἐπαθεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πᾶς;

B **ΣΩ.** Άλλὰ μήν δ' γ' ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα δ' γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψῆ γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· δὸς δ' ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πληρώσεώς [γ'] ἄρα πή τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἀντεῖπτο.

ΠΡΩ. Αναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ πον.

“Διψῆ”] There are two readings Διψῆ γέ πον and Διψῆν πον. As to the variety in the Bodleian ἐκάστου τι, we have but to turn it back into the uncial character and we see that it was simply another instance of Y being mistaken for T, ΕΚΑΣΤΟΥΤΙ. Now if we try to make sense of Διψῆ κ. τ. ε. it can only mean, that something sometimes thirsts, which is an incredible manner of expression, to say nothing of the perfect uselessness of γε. If we try Διψῆν, we may by some effort obtain this sense, “We speak of thirsting as something”, i.e. There is such a thing as thirsting. But then ἐκάστοτε loses all its meaning, and we are obliged further on to read κενοῦσθαι, whereas

all the Books have κενοῦται. This is one of those examples that in criticism nothing should be looked on as insignificant. Just as in one of the old Epigrams, I have shewn that ἐν δὲ χθένιον is ἐν δὲ ἢ Θῶν i.e. ἐν δὲ χοροῖσι Θῶν, so here Διψῆ ΛΕΓ was read as if it were Διψῆ ΓΕΠ. The rest was either invisible or neglected, and γεπ was so supplemented as to become γέ πον.

Πληρώσεώς [γ'] άρα] The construction is ἄρα τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἐφάπτοιτο πη πληρώσεως. Some part, then, of the man who is thirsting is in contact with repletion. The γε is useless, unless we change its place and read Η. ἄρα εγ γε τι.

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν,
τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· τῷ γὰρ ἀν ἔτ' ἄλλῳ ἐφάψαιτο; C

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηκ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν
λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος
γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὄτι τοῖς ἑκείνον παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς
ζώου μηνεῖ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὁρμή γ' ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἔγουσα ἢ τὰ παθήματα
δῆλοι πον μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμεν' ἀποδείξας D
μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ξύμπασαν τὴν θ' ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν
καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζώου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ορθότατα.

ΣΩ. Διψῆρ ἄρ' ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆρ ἢ τι τῶν τοιού-
των πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Άληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν.
βίον γὰρ εἰδός τι μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δῆλον ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν
ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίον περὶ βίον φράζεις; E

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ
σωτηρίαν τ' ἔστι τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τού-
των ἐν ἐπατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ
τὰς μεταβολάς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγουσαν] The argument, δ λόγος αἱρεῖ] Evinces, makes good.
then, in showing that Memory is that Compare Rep. 604 c; Parm. 141 d;
which introduces one to objects of desire, Crito 48, c. The figure of speech seems
has proved that to the soul belong the to be borrowed from the draught-
whole activity and desire, and the di- board.
rection of the entire creature.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;

ΣΩ. Άια μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῆ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων ὃν γενομένων παύοιτ' ἀν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω τί 36 τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀλγοῦνθ' ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Λί', ἀλλὰ διπλῆ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὁ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες; ἀρ' οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερῷ τοῦ πληρωθήσεσθαι παθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τούναντίον ἀνελπίστως Β ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ μεμνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἀμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τότ' ἄρ' ἀνθρωπος καὶ τὰλλα ζῶα λυπεῖται Φ ἄμα καὶ χαίρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι πληρώσεως; ἀρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτ' ἀν περὶ τὰς λύπας Σ πάθος, δὸ σὺ νῦν δὴ πατιδῶν φήθης ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε χρησώμεθα, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονᾶς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν· ἢ τὰς μέν τινας ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ' οὐ.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀν εἰεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ ἢ λῦπαι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δέ, ὁ Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἀν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς, ή προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Αόξας μὲν ἔγωγ' ἀν που συγχωροίην, τὰ δ' ἔτερα ταῦτ' οὐκ ἄν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομέν οὐ πάντα σμικρὸν ἐπεγείρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Άλλ' εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὡς παῖς πείνου τάνδρος, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ισως τοῦτο γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ διτροῦν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον λεγομένων.

ΠΡΩ. Ορθῶς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι· θᾶττα γάρ ἐμέ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους ἀεὶ Επερὶ ταῦτα, ἀ τοῦ δὴ προύθέμεθα, ἀπορήματα. πῶς δὴ φῆς; ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἥδοναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὔτε δὴ ὅναρ οὕθ' ὑπαρ, ὡς φῆς, [ἔστιν] οὔτ' ἐν μανίαις οὔτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθ' ὃς τις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδὲ, αὐλαῖς δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δὲ οὐ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ' οὕτω ταῦτ', ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπελήφαμεν.

ΣΩ. Άρος οὖν δορθῶς, ἢ σκεπτέον εἴτ' δορθῶς εἴτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;

ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον, ως ἐγὼ φαίνην ἄν.

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ΣΩ. Διορισμέθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ τοῦ δὴ λεγόμενον ἥδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστι γάρ που δοξάζειν ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἥδεσθαι;

ὡς ταῖς 'καίνου τάνδρος] The word ἔκεινος is often substituted for the proper name in speaking of an absent or deceased person with respect. Soph. Fragm. οὐ παῖς Ἀχιλλέως, ἀλλ' ἔκεινος αὐτὸς εἰ. In the *Republic*, Socrates addresses Glaucon and Adimantus as ὡς παῖδες ἔκεινον τάνδρος. It is not known who was Protarchus' father, except that Socrates above calls him Callias, but he no doubt belonged to a principal family in Athens. Stallbaum's notion that Protarchus is addressed as the disciple of that man, meaning Philebus, is, I regret to see, repeated in his last

τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν] All other long discourses, except those which are to the purpose: ἢ καὶ ὁτιών τ. τ. ξ., is equivalent to, or even short ones, when they are not to the point.

ἀεὶ περὶ ταῦτα] I have substituted ταῦτα for the unmeaning τὰ αὐτὰ of the Editions. A little further on, I have restored πῶς δὴ φῆς; from Protarchus to Socrates.

[ἔστιν]] I have followed Stallbaum in bracketing this word, which arose from the scribe not understanding the adverbial use of ὅναρ and ὑπαρ.

ΠΡΩ. Ναι'.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξάζομενόν ἐστι τι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ γε, φ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἥδεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἂν τ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς
Β δοξάσῃ, τό γε [δοξάζειν] ὄντως οὐδέποτ' ἀπόλλυσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἂν τ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ ὀρ-
θῶς ἥδηται, τό γ' ὄντως ἥδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἀπόλετο.

ΠΡΩ. Ναι', καὶ τοῦθ' οὖτως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Ὄτι φ ποτ' οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθῆς
ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς μόνον ἀληθές, [δοξά-
ζειν δ' ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα δομοίως εἴληφεν,] σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Άρα, ὅπῃ δόξῃ μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψευδός τε καὶ
C ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά
τις ἐκάτερα, σκεπτέον φῆσ τοῦτ' εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ναι'. πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν
τὰ μέν ἔστι ποιὸν ἄπτα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἀπερ ἔστι,
ποιώ τινε δ' οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν διομολογητέον.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Άλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ ποιώ τινε.
πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα
D ἐκάτεραι γίγνονται [, λῦπαι τε καὶ ἡδοναι].

Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον] *That which fancies,*
whether it fancies correctly, or incorrectly,
never loses its property of really
fancying. It is an actual notion, though
it may not correspond to an object.
The same may be said of pleasure;
the feeling is actually present, though
the object is unreal. Thus there is no
difference as to truth and falsehood
between τὸ δοξάζον and τὸ ἡδόμενον.
Unless indeed we say that pleasure is
of such nature that it does not admit
of any quality; but this is not so, for
we speak of great and little pleasures,
of good and bad pleasures, and so forth:
then why not of false and true? I
have removed the idle supplement δο-
ξάζειν, which betrays its origin by not
knowing its place.

"Οτῷ] This is the reading of the best
MS. for Τῷ. I have adopted it, and
added σκεπτέον as Baiter first suggested,
but my σκεπτέον is that already given
to Protarchus. It would exceed the
compass of a note to discuss the other
changes which I have made, and the
reasons for them are sufficiently ob-
vious. Let it suffice to note that the
disputants do not consider, nor have
they any reason for considering, why
both δοξάζειν and χαίρειν have the ὄν-
τως, so that had the sentence in brackets
been as well expressed as it is clumsy,
it could not have belonged to Plato.

σφόδρα ἐκάτεραι] *Violently the one*
or violently the other, as the gloss λῦ-
παι τε καὶ ἡδοναι explains the words.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὡς Πρώταρχε, προσγίγνηται τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτῳ γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Άλλὰ τί μήρ, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἀν δρθότης ἡ τοὺνταντίον δρθότητι τινὶ τούτων προσγίγνηται; μῶν οὐκ δρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐφοῦμεν, ἀν δρθότητ' ἵσχῃ; ταντὸν δ' ἡδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Αναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον γῆ, τὴν δόξαν τόδ' ἀμαρτάνονταν γ' οὐκ δρθὴν διμολογητέον οὐδὲ δρθῶς δοξαζούσαν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἀν αὐτὸν τὸν ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφ' ϕ λυπεῖται ἡ τοὺνταντίον ἀμαρτάνονταν φωρῶμεν, δρθὴν ἡ χρηστὴν ἡ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ' οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ ἀμαρτήσεται γ' ἡδονή.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔσπειρε γ' ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης δρθῆσ αλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδοις ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν 38 οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. Άλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ τῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ' ἀπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

ΣΩ. Λιαφέρει δ' ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὡς ἔταιρε, η μετὰ δόξης τ'

[Ἄν δέ γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον] “If, when the object of a belief is misapprehended, the belief itself is wrong, shall we not also call that pain or pleasure wrong, which arises from a misapprehended object? If not, we must call it ὄρενή, χρηστήν, and all manner of handsome names.”

[φωρῶμεν] The Books have ἔφορῶμεν, which is out of the question. Inquirers are not supposed to gaze upon an error, but to detect it.

[λέγομεν] This is Stallbaum's conjecture for ἔλέγομεν; the change was

owing to ΤΟΤΕΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ, which some copyists read as τότε ἔλέγομεν, supposing the imperfect to be required after τότε. When the bad fashion began to prevail of writing the words without the apostrophus, a practice which has led to endless corruption and confusion, this would become τότε ἔλέγομεν.

[Οὐδέν γε] The γε is added to οὐδεὶς and οὐδέν before πλὴν and its equivalents. Compare *Iph.* T. 548 (564) οὐδεὶς γε πλὴν θανοῦσαν οὐχ ὅρεν φίσος. Arist. *Nub.* 734. οὐδέν γε πλὴν τῇ. *Protag.* 310, n. Οὐδέν γ' εἰ μή.

δοθῆσ καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ὑδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδοις καὶ ἀγροίας πολλάκις ἐκάστοις ὑμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης;

B ΠΡΩ. Εἰνὸς γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ Θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡγε ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε δὴ ἄγω;

ΠΡΩ. Πῃ;

ΣΩ. Λόξα, φαμέν, ὑμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδῆς, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπεται μὴν τοάταις, δὲ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὑδονὴ καὶ λόπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μηδίμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ὑμῖν καὶ Σ τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν γίγνεσθον ἐκάστοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Άρε' οὖν ὑμᾶς ὡδε περὶ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἥγουμενος τοῖχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἴδοντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς [τὰ καθοράμενα] ἔνυβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἀν ταῦτ' ἀπερ ὥρᾳ.

καὶ τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν] The MSS. have, with few exceptions, τὸ δοξάζειν. This is interpreted as *distinguishing one notion from another*. But the argument throughout turns upon the mere act of δοξάζειν, and not a single allusion is made to the distinction here introduced. The confusion of δὴ and δεῖ is one of the commonest in MSS., and there is a peculiar force in δὴ which may be illustrated by Sophist, 234 c, Ὅπει ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σφωτάτον πάντων ἀπαντ' εἶναι. In this and other instances it is of the same force as καὶ δὴ καὶ, and expresses a kind of accumulation. The word ἐγχωρεῖν has been changed on the authority of the Bodleian, &c., to ἐγχειρεῖν, but to undertake is surely less appropriate here than to be capable, for so we may render the impersonal ἐγχωρεῖν.

γίγνεσθον] Most MSS. read γίγνεσθ', a strange elision; but the Bodleian has preserved the traces of the true reading which I have restored; for γίγνεσθ' in that Book is one of the many examples of the compendium for στ, the sign of the grave accent, being mistaken for an apostrophus. The sense is plain enough. "From Memory, then, and from Sensation, our notions, and indeed the capacity for forming notions at all, are derived in every instance."

[τὰ καθοράμενα] .. κρίνειν .. ταῦτο ἀπερ ὥρᾳ] It is very unnecessary for a man κρίνειν τὰ καθοράμενα. But whoever is capable κρίνειν ταῦτο ἀπερ ὥρᾳ, will not fail καθορᾶν, the reason why we are thus mocked with a double object. A little further we read something from the same source in ἔσταντα φανταζόμενον. If any place requires simple language, it is that where such a simple

ΠΡΩ. Φαιίγε ἄν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὗτος ἀρέσοιτ^ε ἀν τὸδε.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτ' ἀρ' ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ^ρ [ἔστα-
ται φανταζόμενον] ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ; ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἄν τις πρὸς Δ
έαντὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τουαῦτ' ἄττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα ἔαντῷ
ποτέ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μή;

ΣΩ. Άρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦθ^ρ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος ἄν
πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποι ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπών;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνι γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παρενεκθείς γ' αὖ τάχ^ρ ἄν, ὡς τι τινῶν ποιμέ-
νων ἔργον ὅν, τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Καν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὐτὸν δηθέντ^ε Ε
ἶντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντ^ε αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἄν πάλιν
φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως δ τότε δόξαν ἐκα-
λοῦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μή;

ΣΩ. Άγ δ' ἀρα μόνος ἦ, τοῦτο ταῦτὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν δια-
νούμενος, ἐνίστε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον
δπερ ἐμοὶ;

every-day occurrence is described. It is ludicrous to see such words as "What's that yonder by the rock under a tree"? turned into bombast which we cannot even translate, for φανταζόμενον ἔσταντα is not even Greek.

Tί ποτ' ἀρα] *Iph. T.* 387 (399). Soph. *Ajax* 905. τίνος ποτ' ἀρ' ἐπράξε^ε χειρὶ δύσμορος;

ἐπιτυχῶς εἰτάν] *Chancing on the truth in what he says.* To this is afterwards opposed παρενεκθείς, straying from the mark, or swerving.

προσείποι] This is understood to mean, *He would say in addition.* But what he says here is no addition, but a substitution. By changing ἔστι into

τι, and adding ὃν to ἔργον, I think I have restored the passage to its old form and sense. "Looking upon it as the work of some shepherds or other, he would call what he described, a figure."

περὶ τοῦτο] The reading of the MSS. is περὶ τούτων, in defence of which one Editor quotes from *Phædo* 58, A, Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἐπύθεσθε, and refers to Heindorf's note on that passage. Heindorf's note is well worth reading and so likewise is his note to another passage in the same dialogue to which reference is made. But it is very unlikely that he would have looked upon this as an example, or have defended it. The analogy is merely ap-

ΠΡΩ. *Tὸ ποῖον;*

ΣΩ. *Δοκεῖ τόδι ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεπιέναι.*

ΠΡΩ. *Πῶς;*

39 **ΣΩ.** *Ἡ μνήμη, ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ἔνυπτιτονσα εἰς ταῦτον, [καὶ] ἐκεῖνα ἀ περὶ ταύτας ἔστι τὰ παθήματα φαίνεται· μοι σχεδὸν οἶον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε [λόγους]. καὶ,*

parent. It would be a great mistake to explain τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης as a change made from περὶ τῆς δίκης because of ἐπύθεσθε. The main thought is περὶ τῆς δίκης πυθέσθαι; to which another is added, πυθέσθαι τὰ γενόμενα, or, if any one likes it better, πυθέσθαι τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκην. The idiom therefore arises from an attempt to make an article do more than its natural function, and to graft an additional, though more direct, object, on that first one which is attached to the verb by the preposition. Here, on the contrary, περὶ τούτων is not an object at all. Socrates does not want to know Protarchus' opinion about things of any kind, but whether what happens in this case appears to him to be such and such. The mere occurrence of the word γενόμενα disposes of the whole argument; nor would περὶ τούτων be intelligible in any case, for the topic of conversation is singular; namely the man ὃς τὰ φαντασθέντα πλειό χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.

[Ἡ μνήμη] The reading of the Books is the same as that in my text, except that it has περὶ ταῦτα and φαίνονται, and, of course, I am answerable for the brackets. I will briefly point out the misconceptions which have prevailed about this sentence, and the difficulties which must have sorely perplexed every Editor or reader who desired clearness. We are told by one Editor that κάκεῖνα ἀ περὶ ταῦτ· ἔστι τὰ παθήματα, is to be understood as "those things which belong to these faculties, namely to Memory and the Senses". But what other things besides Memory and the Senses, yet belonging to the same, are intended, we are not told, nor is it easy to guess. Nor is any example given of that most extraordinary use of παθήματα which is thus transferred from the affection of an organ, or of a power, to the

organ or power itself. When I remember *this*, or see *that*, the remembering and the seeing produce no doubt παθήματα of my mind or of my sense of vision, but to call Mind a πάθημα or Vision a πάθημα is a monstrous abuse of language. Thus the second clause of the sentence must be so rendered that ἐκεῖνα τὰ παθήματα may mean 'those above-mentioned sensations' or perceptions, and ἀ περὶ τ. ἔστι, which are connected with these αἰσθήσεις. Well, what do these do? "They write, as it were, words in our minds." Are these words what we should call *impressions*? If so, it is an odd thing that Memory and the Senses and the Impressions upon them should be said to write *impressions* upon us. But these λόγοι, it will be said, are more than the momentary impressions, they are the abiding records, the subjective facts. If so, let us pass on: "and when this affection (here the commentators hasten to the rescue, saying "Do not be alarmed at this break-down of the plural; he is here speaking of a particular case", and like men obliged to change carriages at the small hours of the night, we try to make ourselves comfortable in this new singular, and proceed) "inscribes true things, the results are true λόγοι". That is to say, that true λόγοι are—the results of true λόγοι. At last we come to a γραμματεὺς who opens our eyes. "I am Memory, the Recorder (ἢ γραμματεὺς) also called the Writer (ἢ γραμματιστής); all that has been done above has been done by me. When I am quickened by any of the senses being moved, I write their παθήματα on your mind; and when these παθήματα which I write are true, then my λόγοι are true". Can there be any doubt about a correction which brings such light out of all this smoke?

ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράψῃ [τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα], δόξα τ' ἀληθῆς καὶ λόγοι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἔνυμβαινουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῆ δ' ὅταν δικοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τἀντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ἥη· Β θέντα οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἔτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, δις μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;

ΣΩ. Ὄταν ἀπ' ὄψεως ἡ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενοί ἀπαγαγάν τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῷ δρᾶ πας. ἡ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστι Κ γιγνόμενον παρ' ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΧ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' δρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις σκεψώμεθα, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὔ.

ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὥσαύτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἴδοναι καὶ λῦπαι Δ

τούτων γράφει] τούτων can have no other construction here except as agreeing with λεγομένων, which does not want it, and is too far removed from it to be taken with it, and not far enough to require being repeated in it, or represented by it. It is also probable that Plato would use a different verb for the second artificer; and for these reasons I venture to propose in place of τούτων γράφει, που λύγραφει.

Οὐκοῦν αἱ γε διὰ τ. ψ.] Two things were said of the second εἶδος of Pleasures and Pains, (the mental class),

first, that they preceded the others, ὅτι προγίγνοντο, and secondly, that our anticipation was thus connected with future time: ὡς ἔνυμβαντο .. εἶναι γιγνόμενον. The scribes have turned this into προγίγνονται ἄν, and ὅτες ἔνυμβανται. Eleven lines above we have had ἔστι γιγνόμενον, (not γίγνεται,) something that occurs; and in 42, A, we shall find the same usage. So here εἶναι γιγνόμενον is not a mere periphrasis of γίγνεσθαι, but = εἶναι τι τῶν γιγνομένων. Another instance which I have seen quoted, is nothing to the purpose:

ἐλέχθισαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἥδοντῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνοντο, ὡς οὐδὲν ἔντεινον τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὔποτεν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἀλλα πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα Ε καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἔστι, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Άρα σφόδρα λέγεις, διτὶ πάντ' ἔστι ταῦτ' ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὖσαι, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Άγε δῆ, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις καὶ τόδ' ἀπόκριναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Λίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἄρ' οὐ θεοφιλής ἔστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἄρ' οὐ τὸν-
40 παντίσιον ἔκείνω;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἄνθρω-
πος γέμει.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ἄσχημον γεννὶ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον γιγνόμε-
νόν ἔστι: "Either of these is unsightly,
when it occurs." (Above 33, n.)

Oὐκον] The Books have Πότερον οὐν. I make a very bold change, but not, as I think, a rash one. First, the argument requires it: "You admit that mental pleasures and pains have to do with the future; then surely you cannot say that, whereas our records and images concern the past and the present, they have no relation with the future." Secondly, Protarchus' answer Σφόδρα γε is a reply not to a question Πότερον, but to an assertion. Some Grammarian who read Οὐκον = *igitur*, and saw that

it gave the opposite sense to that intended, bethought of πότερον as the nearest suitable word, in point of meaning, to that which he supposed to require his correction.

παντάπασι κακός] I am disposed to believe that the word παντάπασι has been added to κακός by way of bringing it into correspondence with the πάντως of the preceding speech of Socrates, which the interpolator supposed to belong to ἀγαθές, whereas it is in fact intended to colour the whole question, and to give it the air of an appeal to the conscience or good sense of the person questioned.

ΣΩ. Λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῖν, ἀς ἐλπίδας ὁρούμενοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματ' ἔξωγραφημένα· καὶ τις δῷ πολλάκις ἔστι χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἥδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεξωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὐτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθιορᾶ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ; B

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ τὸ πολὺ τούτων, η̄ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα φατέον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἥδοναί γ' οὐδὲν ἡττον πάρεισιν ἔξωγραφημένα, ψευδεῖς δ' αἴται που.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήρ;

ΣΩ. Ψευδέσιν ἄρ' ἥδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουν· σιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ δὴ, πατὰ τοὺς τοῦ λόγους, ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἥδοναί, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα· καὶ λῦπαι δ' ὠσαύτως.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν η̄ δοξάζειν μὲν ὅντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπονον δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μηδ' ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μηδ' ἐπ' ἐσομέναις ἐνίστε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἦν, οἷμαι, τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν D ψευδῆ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. η̄ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ἐνεξωγραφημένον] ‘He sees the gold, and the pleasures which depend upon it, and moreover he sees himself, as part of the picture, rejoicing in himself exceedingly.’ It is strange that any difficulty could have been occasioned by so simple and well-chosen an expression. The change of αὐτὸν into αὐτὸν is indispensable; but the Editors

have thought it more prudent to make αὐτὸν mean himself, than to change a breathing.

ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα] *Conviv.* 215, A. *Polit.* 293, E, ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχύλον. *Horace, Epist.* ii. 1, 265.

ficto
In pejus vultu proponi cereus.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τινάρων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς;

ΣΩ. ‘Ως ἣν μὲν χαίρειν δύντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὄπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι μηδ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίστε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἵσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλοντί ποτε γενήσεσθαι.

Ε **ΠΡΩ.** Καὶ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀν εἴη περὶ φύσιν τε καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ τουαῖτ’ ἐνίστε;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας [καὶ χρηστὰς] ἄλλως [ἢ ψευδεῖς] γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν ἡδονάς γ’, οἶμαι, παταγοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ 41 τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηρὰ πλήν τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶν μὲν οὖν τούναντίον, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας.

τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν] If all that precedes is genuine, I fear that it is a waste of ingenuity to endeavour to explain τούτων. The έξις (namely that a thing may be real, and yet rest on false grounds,) has been shewn to be ἐν ἐκείνοις, that is in δόξῃ and τῷ δοξάζειν: and we are invited to attribute an analogous έξις to pleasures and pains; but if so, until this is granted and done, it is surely premature to talk of τὴν τούτων έξιν. The έξις also which we grant to these must be ἀντίστροφος to another, which is in those. This would lead us to read ἀντέξιν τῇ ἐν ἐκείνοις; but as to τούτων, it is difficult to see what can be done with it, except to leave it out altogether. But what if we could reverse the direction of the pronouns, and by τούτων understand the notions and beliefs, and by ἐκείνοις pleasures and pains? To do this we must remove ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς, and frame the sentence thus: οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν τούτων έξιν ἀντίστροφον ἐκείνοις; For those who think this remedy too bold I can offer no other.

Tl 84; πονηράς] Nothing is plainer than this sentence when we leave out the interpolations. καὶ χρηστὰς is evidently out of place; and a little attention to γιγνομένας shows that ἢ ψευδεῖς is no better. The complete sentence would be ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν πονηρὰς δόξας ἄλλως γιγνομένας (πονηράς τῇ τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι);

Πᾶν μὲν οὖν τούναντίον] The MSS. and Edd. have all Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τούναντίον, which is not Greek. As μὲν οὖν, like *immo*, is used when one *improves upon* another's assertion, and this may be done either by adding to it, or by completely changing it, it denotes either assent or contradiction, according to the words which accompany it. Thus πάνυ μὲν οὖν implies that the answerer does not think the first speaker positive enough; it amounts, therefore, to a strong assent. But an assent is out of the question in this passage; so that nothing would remain but to join πάνυ with τούναντίον, which would be as absurd in Greek as to say that one thing is *very opposite* to another would be in English.

σκεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψευδεῖ μὲν οὐ πάντα πονηρὰς ἄν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλῃ δ' ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὖσας τουατάς δὲ λίγον ὑστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἀντὶ ἔτι δοκῆ νῦν^{*} τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνομένας λεκτέον. τούτῳ γὰρ ἵσως χρησό- B μεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; εἴπερ γ' εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Άλλ, ὁ Πρωταρχε, εἰσὶ κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα, ἕως ἂν κένται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δῆ- πον γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Προσιστώμεθα δὴ παθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰωμεν.

ΣΩ. Άλλα μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, [δὲ λίγον] ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς, δταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὡσι, C δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διειληπταί.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προερρήθη ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἥν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώμα- τος ἐναντίων ἔξεων ἡ τότε, τὴν δὲ ἀληγόδονα ἡ τίνα διὰ πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἥν τὸ παρεχόμενον.

τῷ ψευδεῖ] I have altered τῷ ψεύδει into τῷ ψευδεῖ. He is speaking of the abstract quality, not of some particular lie.

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα] It is necessary to caution the reader against Stallbaum's translation of this passage. He explains τὸ δόγμα as the belief that no pleasures are false; ἔως ἂν κένται is consequently made to mean *so long as it continues*. To such a remark as is thus attributed to Socrates, Protarchus, who was maintaining the opposite side, would scarcely have answered Καλῶς. But τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα (not ἔκεινο) obviously refers to the preceding εἰσὶ κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν, and means the belief that pleasures may be false or true. This is made certain by παρ' ἡμῖν, and no less by κένται;

for παρ' ἡμῖν must apply to both Socrates and Protarchus, and κένται, which is the passive of Σένται, is a word of unequivocal force, whether applied to a law or a proposition. The sense of the passage thus becomes plain: *But until this judgment (of mine) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination.* I have endeavoured to give the force of the word γίγνεσθαι, which, as will be seen, signifies a great deal more than εἶναι.

ἔξεων ἡ τότε] Ξέσων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγ. is the reading of the received text. The Bodl. has however τοὺς for τὸ δέ, that is, the copyist had before him TOTE and read it as ΤΟΥC. On this is founded the emendation ΕΞΕΩΝΗΤΟΤΕ. The

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Συλλογίζου δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

Δ **ΣΩ.** †Ιγίνεται τοῖνν, δπόταν ἡ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρακείσθαι λύπας τε καὶ ἴδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἅμα παρ' ἀλλήλας ἐναρτίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, δ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδ' εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθε κεῖται, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἡττον ἄμφω τούτῳ δέχεσθαι, λύπῃ τε καὶ ἴδονή, [καὶ] ὅτι τῶν ἀπειρῶν εἴτην;

ΠΡΩ. Εἴρηται· τί μήν;

ΣΩ. †Τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὁρθῶς κρίνεσθαι;

necessary conjunction Δ' was probably lost from its resemblance to the succeeding Α, as H was from its likeness to N. The continual confusion of ΔH and AN in MSS., illustrates both these phenomena.

τίνα διὰ πάθος ἴδονήν] The best MSS. have πλῆνος; for πάθος, an error which arose from a confusion of Α and Δ. But though the sentence is thus rid of a second difficulty, another still lies in the sense. Plato is speaking of that condition in which the mind desires the opposite to what the body feels; so that the addition of τίδονήν makes the mind to desire pain. Many ways might be proposed to remove this difficulty, but the question is not what Plato might have written, but what he wrote, and the ways are too numerous to allow us to fix upon the very one. The sense would be secured by τὴν δὲ ἀλγηδόνα τὴν διὰ ΤΙ Ηὔθος ἴδη ἐνὸν κ. τ. δ. The meaning of διὰ πάθος appears to be, *through actual impression*, as opposed to the pleasure of *expectation*.

Γίγνεται] is not this an error occasioned by the reminiscence of the foregoing γιγνόμενον? If we read Φαίνεται, we shall get rid of the clumsy γίγνεται γίγνεσθαι, and we shall have a better correspondence to ἐφίην, and to Protagoras' Φαίνεται γοῦν.

εἴτην] The construction is εἴρηται

ώς δέχεσθαι, ὅτι εἴτην,—where ὃς introduces the fact, and ὅτι the reason of it. This gets rid of the causeless departure from the ordinary rules of construction, in defence of which I formerly quoted *Phaedo* 95, p. But there also the text is not trustworthy. καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ κ. τ. δ. has already excited the suspicion of Heindorf, though I do not assent to his mode of correcting it. By striking out ἀποφαίνεται and by changing καὶ into Ἡτε we clear away the two only difficulties. Then γί would take ζέψη and ἀπολλύσθαι for the same reason that ὅτι takes εἴτην.

Τίς οὖν μηχανὴ] The Zurich editors have adopted Stallbaum's reading, Τίς οὖν: but if Plato had wanted to use the enclitic, he would have written ξετί τίς, or have placed the enclitic anywhere rather than at the beginning of the sentence. A better correction would have been, Τί οὖν; μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὁρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; There is a want of adjustment in the different parts of the dialogue. For the question here asked is not more fully explained afterwards, and εἰ is no answer to Ηὔθος or to Becker's conjectural Ποῖα. It is not improbable that something has fallen out, perhaps to the following effect. Τί οὖν; μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὁρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; (τῇδε δε σκεφθάμενος πείρω ἀποκρίνεσθαι.)

ΠΡΩ. Ήη δὴ καὶ πῶς;

E

ΣΩ. Εἰ τόδε τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς χρίσεως τούτων· ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγρῶναι [βούλεται] ἐκάστοτε, τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μεῖζων καὶ τις ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον [καὶ τίς σφροδροτέρα], λόπη τε πρὸς ἥδονὴν καὶ λέπη πρὸς λέπην καὶ ἥδονὴ πρὸς ἥδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ ἔστι ταῦτα τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς χρίσεως αὗτη.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὅψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀληθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῆ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, 42 ἐν λέπαις δ' ἄρα καὶ ἥδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτὸν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθε γέγονεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὐταὶ γιγνόμεναι τὰς λόπας τε καὶ ἥδονὰς ἂμα τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν.

ΠΡΩ. Άληθέστατα.

B

Ἐτ τόδε τὸ βούλημα] I have changed the reading and punctuation. τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ is certainly not elegant, but by explaining τούτων to be the pleasures and pains and ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ to be on such occasions, some of us may be brought to tolerate it. But τὸ βούλημα τῆς χρίσεως διαγρῶναι βούλεται brings its own condemnation with it. It may be said that there is no impropriety in the expression—"The will wills". But τὸ βούλημα is not the will, but a particular wish, and τὸ β. τῆς χρίσεως is the wish to judge. In the *Laws* 863, π. Plato declares Pleasure πράττειν δὲ περ ἀν αὐτῆς τὸ βούλημας ἐνελήσῃ; but this expression though unusual was inevitable; for Pleasure cannot desire, and if he had said ἐπιθυμία, he would have been obliged to forego the main ground of opposition to θυμός, παῖδοι μετ' ἀπάτης. In that passage I will take this opportunity of remarking that βιάζεσθαι written compendiously has been miscopied βιάτου. But how can the wish to judge judge?

—and if it cannot judge, how can it wish to judge? My correction is fully borne out by Protarchus' answer — τὴ βούλησις τῆς χρίσεως αὕτη. By leaving out καὶ τίς σφροδροτέρα, the difficulty which beset τίς μᾶλλον disappears. Compare above 37, π. σφόδρα ἐκάτεραι, which answers exactly to μᾶλλον λύπη &c.

[Ἐναντίον] This is perhaps the most beautiful of all the remarks in this admirable disquisition on pleasure. Formerly it had been agreed that notions, as they happened to be true or false, occasioned a corresponding difference in the pleasures and pains depending on them; but now it has been shown that pleasures and pains, by their comparative distance in time, and by their mutual contrast, produce false notions about themselves.

[ἀνεπίμπλασαν] Observe the imperfect: *Were found to communicate their quality (of truth or falsehood) to the pains and pleasures.*

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ' αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγέθεν ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄμα τιθέμεναι παρ' ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ πάρα τὸ λυπηρὸν μεῖζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἡδονὰς τούναντίον ἐκείνας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀράγη γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, δσψ μεῖζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἐκάτεροι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτ' ἀποτεμόμενος ἐκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον οἱ ἀλλοὶ οὐκ ὅν, οὔτ' αὐτὸς ὁρθῶς φαινόμενον ἐρεῖς, οὐδὲ αὐτὸν τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὁρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμήσεις λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τοίνυν ἔξις ὀψόμεθα, ἐὰν τῇδ' ἀπαντῶμεν, ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον η ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὖσας ἐν τοῖς ζώοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴρηται πον πολλάκις ὅτι, τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων δια-
D φθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι καὶ
πενώσεσι καὶ τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι, λῦπαι τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες
καὶ ὀδύναι καὶ πάντα, ὅπόσα τοιαῦτ' ὄνόματ' ἔχει, ξυμβαίνει
γιγνόμενα.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, ταῦτ' εἴρηται πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δέ γε τὴν αἰτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην
αὐτὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον
ἡμῶν η;

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἀν γένοιτο, ὃ Σώκρατες;

Ε **ΣΩ.** Οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἔστιν, ὃ Πρωταρχε, οὐ σὺ νῦν ἔρον,
τὸ ἐρωτήμα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Λιότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερέσθαι
σε πάλιν.

Οὐκοῦν, δσψ] That much then, by that the appearance itself is a right ap-
which either appears greater than it really pearance, nor will you venture to call
is, that apparent and unreal quantity, that part of the pleasure or the pain
you will cut off, and you will neither say which is founded upon it, right and true.

ΠΡΩ. *Ποίαν;*

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὡς Πρώταρχε, φίσω, τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Μὴ κινούμενον τοῦ σώματος ἐφ’ ἐκάτερα φῆς;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως.

ΠΡΩ. Λῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γ’, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔθ’ ἡδονὴ γίγνουται ἀν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτ’ οὔτ’ ἀν τις λέπη.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ’ εἰπες. ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἷμαι, τόδε λέγεις, ὡς 43 ἀεὶ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοί φασιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἀπαντάτε τοι πάτω φεύγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γ’ οὐ φαύλως λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἀν, μὴ φαινοί γ’ ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκτίηται τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῇδ’ οὖν διανοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι ξύμφευγε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ὅπῃ.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους. οὐ δὲ ἀπόριναι πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα πάσχει τι τῶν Β ἐμψύχων, ταῦτ’ αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὔτ’ αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πάσχοντες, ή πᾶν τούναντίον; διλύγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάντ’ ἡμᾶς.

ΠΡΩ. *Ἄπαν δίπον τούναντίον.*

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νῦν δὴ δηθέν, ὡς αἱ μεταβολαὶ πάτω τε καὶ ἀντο γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται.

ΠΡΩ. *Tί μήν;*

ΣΩ. *Ωδ’* ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγό- C μενον.

ΠΡΩ. *Πῶς;*

ἀλλα γὰρ μάντα] The passages in Plato, from which we may learn a full account of this doctrine of Heraclitus, are *Theatet.* 179—80, *Sophist.* 249—50, and *Cratyl.* 402. It is here alluded to, because at first sight it would appear to exclude the possibility of that state of indifference to pleasure and pain from which Socrates is about to show another instance of a false pleasure, namely,

where relief from pain (which is indifference) is thought and spoken of as positive pleasure.

ὑπεκστήναι] *Soph.* *Ajax*, 82. φρονοῦται γάρ τιν οὐκ ἀν ἔξεστην δύνω.

Τί μήν] This generally amounts to nothing more than an assent; but as its original meaning is *What else?* it is perfectly suitable here.

ΣΩ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δὲ μέτραιαί τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ορθότερον οὕτως ἥττείνως, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτ' οὕτω, πάλιν δὲ τὸν δὴ ἡγητεῖς βίος ἄντες.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος;

ΣΩ. Όν τὸν πάλιν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμογῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Άληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριτοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἵνα μὲν δὲ οὐδύν, τὸν δὲ αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δὲ ἔνα μηδέτερα. ἥττας δὲν φαίνεται περὶ τούτων;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἢ ταύτη, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἄν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε ταῦτὸν τῷ χαίρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οπόταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς ὡς ἥδιστον πάντων ἐστὶν ὀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἀπαντα, τί τόθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιούτον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδὲ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγ' οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων ἡμῖν, ὃντινων βούλει, τίθει, καλέσιον οὐδὲν ὅνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δὲ ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτο ἄν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ τοιούτος δέ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς γενόμενος

[Ἄντινων βούλαι] He is not speaking of the three *lives* in particular, but supposes any three things, to two of which names have been given, but the third is merely known as *not either*. The question then is, can it *become either*? See the next note.

[γενόμενος] Commonly λεγόμενος. But when we consider how awkwardly this word is placed, and then look to the preceding γένοιτο ἄν, it seems scarcely

possible to doubt that this is one of the many instances where λεγόμενος has usurped the place of γενόμενος. It would be childish to say δέ μέσος βίος is not, and cannot be rightly thought to be, that from which it has been formally distinguished; but it is necessary for the argument to show that the circumstance of its coming immediately after pain cannot alter its nature, and make it *become pleasure*.

όρθως ἂν ποτε, οὐτ' εἰ δοξάζου τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὐτ' εἰ λέγοι,
λεχθείη, κατά γε τὸν ὄρθὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Άλλὰ μήν, ὃ ἔταιρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξά-
ζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα. 44

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυ-
πῶνται;

ΠΡΩ. Φασὶ γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν πον.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ψευδῆ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χω-
ρεῖς [τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν] ἡ φύσις ἐκατέρου.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μὴν χωρίς γ' ἦν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἰράμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι, καθά-
περ ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, λύπην μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, B
τὴν δ' ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ὅν, ἵδη προσ-
αγορεύεσθαι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τῦν τοῦτο, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφ'
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Ὁντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβον τοῦδε, ὃ Πρώ-
ταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις δ' αὐτοὺς τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἱ τὸ
παράπαν ἥδονάς οὖν φασιν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Αυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, δις τῦν οἱ περὶ C
Φιληβον ἥδονάς ἐπονομάζουσιν.

εἴπερ χωρίς] See Appendix.

Πότερον οὖν αἰρέμεθα] One alter-
native having been disposed of, the other
is taken up: "If freedom from pain is
not pleasure, is there such a thing as
absolute pleasure?" And thus is intro-
duced another question: "Is pleasure
possible without pain?" I have added,
in the Appendix, a translation of a pas-
sage from Kant's *Anthropologie*, which
may perhaps interest some readers.

τοὺς πολεμίους] This is generally un-
derstood of Antisthenes. The descrip-
tion applies very well to what we learn
of him from Diogenes Laertius. οὐ
τέχνη reminds one of the many sneers
against the Platonic Ideas which are
attributed to him and his friends. A
disposition without meanness but harsh,
is also in keeping with his character,
though not with Plato's general appre-
ciation of the Cynics.

ΠΡΩ. Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ἔνυμβουλεύεις,
ἢ πᾶς, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαι τισι, μαν-
τευομένοις οὐ τέχνη ἀλλά τιν δυσχερεῖα φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς
λίαν μεμισηρότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐ-
δὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγόν, γοήτευμα,
D οὐχ ἡδονήρ, εἶναι. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτ' ἀν προσχρῆσθαι, σκε-
ψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τὰλλ' αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα,
αἴ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, πεύσει, ἵν' ἐξ ἀμ-
φοῖν τοιν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα
πρὸς τὴν ηρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ορθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους ὥσπερ ἔνυμάχους, κατὰ
τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἔχρος. οἷμαι γὰρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν
αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς, εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὅτουον
Ε εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἶον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ
σκληρότατ' ἀποβλέποντες σύτως ἀν μᾶλλον συντομοῦσινεν ἢ
πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; δεῖ δή σε, ὃ Πρώταρχε, παθά-
περ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γ' αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ
πρῶτα μεγέθει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἥρτινά ποτ'
ἔχει φύσιν βουληθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπο-
45 βλεπτέον ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκρότατας καὶ σφιδρότατας λεγόμενας.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἂν σοι ταῦτη συγχωροί τὰ τῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροι γε, [αἵπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν
ἡδονῶν,] δὲ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ πέρι τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν αἴται.

μεμισηρότων] This is not a capricious change from the dative to the genitive, nor is to be taken absolutely, for then αὐτῶν would have been necessary; but it is in construction with δυσχερεῖα φύσεως—With the severity of men who have too much hated, &c.

ώστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς] So that this very attractiveness of it is a trick and imposture, and not pleasure.

δυσχεράσματα is condemned by Polux as bad Greek, and Lobeck observes that such compound verbs as ἀνοηταίνω, δυσθυμαίνω, and the like (where the

noun from which the verb comes is already a compound), have no substantives derived from them. But ἀκόλαστάσματα in Aristoph. *Lysist.* 398 is a sound reading, and the scarcity of such formations would arise partly from the scarcity of the verbs, and partly from a fear of their length.

τὰ πολλοστὰς ἡδονάς] The smallest pleasures. τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι, things having the smallest degrees of hardness. The word is formed like the ordinal numbers used to express fractions.

'Αλλ' οὖν] The MSS. have 'Αρ' οὖν,

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐν μείζους εἰσὶ τε καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τοὺς [κάμνοντας] ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας; εὐλαβηθῶμεν δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταίσωμέν πῃ. τάχα γὰρ οὗσας φαῖμεν ὅν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας. B

ΠΡΩ. Εἴκος γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐχ αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπερβάλλουσιν, ὃν ἀν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγισται προγίγνονται;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.

ΣΩ. Άλλ' οὐχ οἱ πιρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἔχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ φύοσι, καὶ πάντων, ὅπόσα διὰ

which is incompatible with γε, and as γε is not found in the Bodleian and its fellows, it has been omitted in the recent Editions. But as it is impossible to account for the intrusion of the word in the other MSS., its omission in the first-mentioned must be ascribed to negligence. With γε once restored, the change of 'Ἄρ' into 'Άλλ' becomes inevitable; and the latter appears to me to be infinitely more in keeping with the nature of the observation; as it is more reasonable in speaking of a matter of every-day talk, to say that *we conclude it is admitted*, than to *ask whether it is so*. But the rest of the sentence requires careful consideration. The subject for inquiry is simply this: "Which are the greatest pleasures?" "Whether they are easily procured", does not concern the inquiry, though it may serve to designate them when found. If we remember that αὗται represents αἱ ἀκρόταται καὶ σφοδρόταται, we see that so far there is nothing unsound in the sentence. 'Άλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροι γε, δὲ λέγομεν πολλάκις, εἰσὶ αὗται: but we may go further and introduce αἱ περὶ τὸ σώμα. If then we look at the remainder, we see not only that it was unsuited to our purpose, but that it begins with ΑΙΙΙΕΡ, the same beginning as that of one of the unsuspecting parts already admitted. That is to say; a copyist had got as far as ΑΙΙΙΕΡ and stopped. Afterwards he saw that he had skipped δὲ λέγομεν πολλάκις; so he returns to this, but forgets to cancel ΑΙΙΙΕΡ. "Here is some gap", says a grammarian, "which

we must fill up"; and he fills it up so as to make Plato say that the common bodily pleasures which are also the greatest are *the most intense*. *En cor Zenodoti! En jecur Cratetis!*

[κάμνοντας] I have put κάμνοντας in brackets. Plato could not use the article with one participle and not with the other, but he must use it with ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, whether the participle had it or not.

[προγίγνονται] This is Stephens' emendation for προσγίγνονται; any one who will take the trouble to attend to the Variae Lectiones of even the best collations, and see the blunders com-

mitted in πρὸ and πρ (i.e., πρὸς), will at once see that it is perfectly absurd to decide such differences as these by the authority of the MSS.

[πάντων, ὅπόσα] The received text is πάντα ὅπόσα. I have written πάντων, both because it is necessary, and because the neglect of terminations and the habit of giving the same termination to two consecutive words is confessedly of common occurrence. ἐνδεῖξεν alone might leave us in doubt whether it ought not to be περὶ πάντα; but the addition of ἀποτληρουμένων decides the question in favour of the genitive. Stallbaum's explanatory paraphrase πάντα εἰώντας πάσχειν ὅπόσα δτὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰώ. Σαοὶ πάσχειν shews an utter misconception of what brevity authorises or not, is untrue in fact, and while it gives καὶ the office of joining two co-ordinate clauses, leaves τε to join two sentences.

τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλόν τ' ἐνδείᾳ ξυντείνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μεῖζους ἡδονὰς ἵσχουσιν; ἢ τοῦτ' οὐ φί-
σομεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι;

C **ΠΡΩ.** Πάντι μὲν τοῦτον δηθὲν φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅρθῶς ἂν φανούμεθα λέγοντες ὡς, εἴ τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἴόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν; ὅρα δέ· μή με [ῆγῃ] διανόου[μενον] ἐρωτᾶν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαι-
νόντων, ἀλλ' οἵουν μέγεθός με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα
[περὶ τοῦ] τοιοῦτον ποῦ ποτὲ γίγνεται ἐπάστοπε. νοῆσαι γὰρ
δεῖν φαμὲν ἥντινα φέσιν ἔχει, καὶ τίνα λέγοντες οἱ φάσκοντες
Δ μηδέ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν.

ΠΡΩ. Άλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπομαι [τῷ λόγῳ σου].

ΣΩ. Τάχα, ὃ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἡττον δείξεις, ἀποκρινεῖ
γάρ· ἐν ὑβρει μεῖζους ἡδονάς, οὐ πλείονς λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα δὲ
καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας ὁρᾶς ἢ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ; λέγε
δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ' ἔμαθον δὲ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον ὅρῳ.
τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ δὲ παροιμιαζόμενος ἐπίσχει

[ξυντείνονται] The Books have ξυγγί-
γνονται. Τελοναι and γείνονται (for so
it is often written in MS.) are continually
confounded. This I first learned from a
note of Cobet in his Edition of a Frag-
ment of Philostratus. I have since
found another instance in Strabo xvi, 3,
where we must read ὅστε ἐπιτείνεσθαι
τὸ παράδοξον “so that the marvel is
intensified”. Compare below 46, D, ξύ-
τασιν ἄγριαν, and 47, A, ξυντέλει τε καὶ
ἐντοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ. I am acquainted
with the fragments of Eupolis and Te-
leclides where συγγίγνεσθαι is coupled
with μάζας and with φάγροισ; but
they are merely comic expressions for
enjoying, like Aristophanes’ *having an
interview with grapes*. Φροντίσι συγγε-
γένηναι (Eup. fragm.) is a little more
apposite, but συγγίγνεσθαι οὐκ ξετι τῶν
τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον δεχομένων.

Πάνυ μὲν οἷν ἥθεν] νῦν δήθὲν is
the common reading; but there is no
authority but that of a worthless copy
for νῦν. My impression is that οὐν
should be οὔτω, which will make νῦν
unnecessary.

[ὅρα δέ] If any one still retains his
belief that all the writers of our copies
were scrupulous about the text, so as
even to prefer nonsense to falsification
(for doubtless there were some such)
let him look at the words which follow
ὅρα δέ. διανόου is thought to be mu-
tilated, so it is turned into διανούμε-
νον; then the sense demands the very
thing which has been thus sacrificed,
and so ἓγῃ is invented. Again τοιοῦ-
τον by some blunder is read or written
as τοιούτου; immediately some one is
at hand with a healing supplement, and
περὶ τοῦ is plastered upon the text;
in the meanwhile τὸ σφόδρα τοιούτου
is utterly lost.

[τῷ λόγῳ σου] I have put this Alex-
andrian phrase in brackets.

[οὐχ ἡττον δεῖξες] I entirely agree
with Stallbaum that it is, ‘nodum in
scirpo quædere,’ to be dissatisfied with
these words; but his own translation
of them has led him to suspect another
word which is equally sound. The sense
is, You will presently prove it (that you
understand me) no less (than you now

λόγος ἐκάστοτε, ὁ τὸ Μηδὲν ἄγαν παρακελευθμενος, ϕ̄ πει- Ε
θονται· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ
σφροδεὰ ἥδονὴ κατέχουσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε ταῦτ' οὐτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τινι
πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς [καὶ τοῦ σώματος], ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀφετῇ μέγισται
μὲν ἥδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι, γίγνονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελομενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι,
τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἔχοντας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

ΠΡΩ. Άναγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἥδονάς, τίνα
ποτ' ἔχουσι τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημότων, ἃς οὖς εἴπομεν δυσχερεῖς μι-
σοῦσι παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

ΣΩ. Οἶνον τὰς τῆς ψώρας λάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ δσα
τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πά-
θος ἡμῖν, ὡς πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον
ἥδονὴν ἢ λύπην;

ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τοῦτό γε [ἄρα], ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔοικε γί-
γνεσθαι τι παπόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὴν ἂν Φιλήβον γ' ἔνεα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον· B

profess it), for you will answer my question.

[περιβοήτους] Frantic. The word is properly applied to men maddened by the noise of some Bacchanalian or other orgies, and then generally of extravagant and impetuous characters. It is here opposed to the staid and seemly demeanour of the temperate.

[καὶ τοῦ σώματος] It is impossible that this passage should be correct as we now read it. Plato has passed from the diseases of the body to ὕβρις, which is a disease of the mind. The presence of the article betrays the interpolator.

[ἄρα] I have cancelled ἄρα as perfectly unmeaning. Some scribe had written σύμμικτον τοῦτο γάρ through mistaking γέ. Another came and turned γάρ into γ̄ ἄρα.

Οὐ μὴν ἀν Φιλήβον γ'] The Collinian has μῆν, which one Editor adopts and so affords to another the opportunity for telling the world that δὴ is never put after μῆν. A little attention to the sense would have been better bestowed than it is on such a truism. As the words stand in the Books, Socrates is made to say that he did not bring forward these instances about itch on account of Philebus. Probably not; but why say so? Is he afraid lest Φιλήβος ὁ καλὸς should be troubled with the complaint? Or can he think it necessary to declare that it was not to make fun of him that he alluded to it? As this is out of the question, the only other reason for bringing Philebus in at all must be that Philebus is fastidious, and will look upon him as

ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων, ὃ Προώιαρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἀν μὴ πατοφθῶσι, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀν ποτε δεναίμεθα διαφρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἵτεον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ξυγγενεῖς, τὰς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινωνόσας, λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάρν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ τοίνυν [μίξεις] αἱ μὲν πατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. τὰς δὲ αἱ οἱ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρίσουμεν λύπας ἡδονᾶς μικθείσας, τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ ξυναμφότερα, τοτὲ δὲ λύπας ἐπικαλούμένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Οπόταν ἐν τῇ παταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ τάνατοῦ ἄμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ διγῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμαινόμενος ἐνίστηται ψύχηται, ζητῶν, οἴμαι, τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δὲ ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρόγλυκν [μεμιγμένον], μετὰ δυσαπαλλακτίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὑστερον ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ.

φροτικός; for making such nasty allusions. This is in keeping with the other traits of him in the dialogue; but then he must say: "For Philebus' sake I would not have introduced this topic, but I cannot do without it." And so the ΔΗ which helped Stallbaum to chastise Fischer disappears into AN, and as μῆν is the equivalent of μέντοι and γε is found in all the Books, I have adopted the latter particle also.

Οὐκοῦν ἵτεον] In the Books Protagorus' speech is continued down to ξυγγενεῖς: which arrangement makes the young man show the way and the philosopher follow it.

Εἰσὶ τοίνυν] I have cancelled μίξεις. Unless this be done, and τίδονα κοινωνοῦσαι be understood, the following clauses make downright nonsense. "There are bodily pleasures which mix in bodies, and mental pleasures which mix in the mind", is true and simple. But if you say there are mixtures—then one of each pair, either κατὰ τὸ σῶμα or ἐν τῷ σώμασι, either αὐ-

τῆς τ. ψ. or ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ becomes quite meaningless.

ποτὲ This word occurs twice in the Bodleian, both before and after διγῶν. It is properly cancelled in the second place, for being used in opposition to ἐνίστηται, it would be placed in such a part of the sentence as would mark that it is not used as a mere enclitic. Bekker's correction of πικρόγλυκν for πικρῷ γλυκῷ is fully borne out by τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον: but in recommending it he should also have advised the expulsion of μεμιγμένον. For δυσαπαλλακτίας Hirschig reads δυσαπαλλαξίας. But the departure from analogy is in favour of our reading, as a probable Atticism.

ξύντασιν] This is the reading of the best MSS.; the others have σύστασιν, which is irreconcilable with ἀγρίαν, such an epithet being only applicable to a word signifying some active process. Besides, σύστασις after ἀγανάκτησις would be an anticlimax; for it is properly used to denote the effect of sadness

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ’ ἀληθὲς τὸῦ νῦν λεγόμενον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μίξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἴσων εἰσὶ λυπῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἑτέρων πλειόνων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τὰς μέν, δταν πλείους λύπαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γίγνωνται, τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νῦν δὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν. ὅπόταν δὲ ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον ἥ καὶ τὸ φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τρίψει δὲ καὶ τῇ κυήσει μὴ ἐφικνῆται τις, τὰ δὲ ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέη, τοτὲ φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς Ετούναρτίον μεταβάλλοντες, ἀπορίας ἐνιοτέ ἀμηχάνους. [ἡδονάς], τοτὲ δὲ τούναρτίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας ἡδονὰς ἔνυκτερασθείσας, εἰς δπότερον δέψῃ, παρέσχοντο, τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἥ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν τκαὶ δμοῦ λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθένται.

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ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπόταν [αὖ] πλείων ἡδονὴ κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἔνυκτερασθῆ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμμένον τῆς λύπης γαργαλίζει τε καὶ ἡρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλείον ἔγκεχυμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ

in turning the mind back upon itself. Συντελετεν is used a little further on as the effect of pleasure; it is obvious that the figure of speech being derived from the strain upon a cord, is applicable alike to the rackings of pain (renes morbo tentantur acuto) or the thrill of pleasure (pertinant gaudia pectus).

Δέγε δὴ τὰς μέν] The first part of this passage is easy enough, when once we learn to separate the process referred to in the sentence ending with γαργαλισμῶν from that described afterwards. I have put δ' after ὅπόταν. The first case is that where κυῆσει and τρίψει are said δισχεῖν, because they discuss the heat in the part affected. When this is insufficient, the affection being too deep-seated, then recourse is had to irritation of the surface in order to relieve the interior. This is effected by bringing the parts to the fire, and shifting the affection to the opposite place: that is to say, by producing external heat in place of internal. When men do this, they sometimes produce terrible

ἀπορίας, states where pleasure and pain are confounded, and the patient does not know what to do with himself. This sense is brought out by transposing ἀπορίας, and cancelling ἡδονάς. The only difficulty that remains is in the last clause; they procure, as the case may turn out, sometimes great embarrassments, and sometimes mingled pleasure for the inner parts contrasted with the pain of the outer, by forcibly dissolving what is compacted and compacting what is separate, and by procuring to themselves pain mingled with pleasure. This is saying that they do a thing by doing it; what we need to be told is, how that which they do involves a mixture of pain and pleasure. I therefore propose to read τῷ τὰ σ. β. δ. ἥ τὰ δ. συγχεῖν, ὅμοι λυπᾶς ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέντες: procuring pain along with pleasure, by forcibly dispersing (κυῆσει καὶ τρίψει) what is congested (the accumulated heat), and determining what is dispersed (by inflaming the surface artificially).

παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, παντοῖα δὲ πνεύματα τάπεργάζόμενά πᾶσαν ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετ' ἀφροσύνης ἀπέργαζεται.

Β ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγειν γ', ὃ ἔταιρε, αὐτὸν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλου, ὡς ταύτας ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος οἶον ἀποθνήσκει. καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ ταντάπασιν ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερος τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ἡν̄ τυγχάνῃ· καὶ παλεὶ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν ταύτας δὲ τι. μάλιστ' ἀεὶ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριθμεῖται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῷν Σ πολλῷν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανας.

παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα] It causes all manner of changes in complexion, and changes in posture, and changes in breathing, which produce the utmost excitement and shouting with delirium. Though I have retained ἀπέργαζόμενα, and endeavoured to render it as above, it is rather as against Buttman's ἀπέργαζόμενον than as believing in the genuineness of the word. The singular would mean that the excess of the pleasure by producing the changes in complexion, posture &c., produced the mental defects; which is no truer than that these changes cause them. But the very combination ἀπέργαζόμενα ἀπέργαζεται is unworthy of even a third-rate writer. I say ἀπέργαζεται, for this is the Bodleian reading, and ἐνεργάζεται is merely a contrivance, and not a successful one, made by the corrector of some inferior copy, to avoid the inelegant repetition. As to πνεύματα, no doubt the respiration would be troubled; as in the description of Hercules' madness, we read (H. F. 869) ἀμυνός δὲ εὐ σωφρονίζει, ταῦρος δὲ ἐς ἔμβολήν. But πνεύματα do not admit of sufficient variety to be called παντοῖα. It is not unlikely that this addition is due to some corrupt dittographia, and that the old text ran thus; παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, πᾶσαν δὲ ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετ' ἀφροσύνης ἀπέργαζεται.

ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλου] One class of MSS. has ἄλλον, the other περὶ ἄλλου. I is not intended.

have combined the two readings.

παντάπασιν ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει] The word παντάπασιν is not applicable to ἀεὶ, nor does it seem compatible with τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, for while the first denotes thoroughness of pursuit, the other graduates the pursuit according to the moral condition of the man. As this whole speech is about what men say and think, what if Plato wrote thus: καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ πάντας φασὶ δεῖν μεταδιώκειν τ. μ., δοσῷ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τις κ. ὁ. ὥν τυγχάνῃ?

τὰ συμβαίνοντα] One Editor approves of Ficinus' translation, *omnia quae apud multos in existimationem veniunt*. But neither this rendering, nor what I once gave, *that which one meets with from the common run of men as to opinion*, is in keeping with the Greek; for we have not ξυμβαίνοντα τοῖς πολλοῖς nor ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν but ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν. If this is equivalent to περὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ξυμβαίνουσι, the sense will not be unsuitable; but I know of no such phrase. Perhaps Plato wrote: τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαν. I can offer no better rendering of εἰς δόξαν than, *as far as belief*. In the *Euthydemus* (905, D) we have it in this sense; νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἴεσσι τοφίας πέρι, "that they will carry off the prize of wisdom, *as far as public belief is concerned*". But this sense would make men's agreement

ΣΩ. Περὶ γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ ἐντός [κερασθέντων]. ἅπερ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι τάνατία ἔνυβάλλεται, λύπην θ' ἄμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν λέναι, ταῦτα ἐμπροσθε μὲν διήλθομεν, ὡς ὅπόταν αὖτε πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, πενούμενος δὲ ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, τὸν δὲ λέγομεν, ὡς ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα Διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλήθει ἀμηχάνοις οὖσι μῆξις μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἔνυπτει γιγνομένη.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις δρόθιτατα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία.

ἐντός [κερασθέντων]] As it is not the outward and inward parts which are mingled, but the pain of one with the pleasure of the other, the word *κερασθέντων*, which is borrowed from above, must be looked upon as a false gloss. In the rest of this sentence I have left everything as the MSS. present it, not because it is all sound, but because the remedy will perhaps not appear so certain to some as to myself. He says: "I have indeed told you all about these cases where pleasure and pain are mingled in the body; as to those where the mind contributes the opposites to the body **** those we have formerly described; one fact however we did not then bear witness to, but we declare it now, that, in the innumerable examples of mind and body being thus opposed, there is always one and the same mixture of pleasure and pain." This is true; for, when he mentioned this subject before, it was not to point out this *κράσις*, but to show the nature of Desire. But in that part of his statement, where I have marked a gap, there occurs this phrase: λύπην τε ἄμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν, καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην. The *ἡδονὴ* of the mind is ἐπιθυμία; and this he has fully described; but the λύπη, which is φόβος, he has never brought forward as co-existing with present bodily satisfaction. And yet ταῦτα μὲν δεήλωμεν looks as if

he claimed to have done this. Again in the same gap, we have ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν λέναι, but this μῆξις μία is the very thing which he declares that he *now* points out for the first time. There remains ὅπόταν αὖ τ. ἐ.. Stallbaum proposed at one time to change αὖ into τις, while I thought that it proved a lacuna, where the opposite ὅπόταν πληρῶται had once played its part; but it seems to follow from what I have said above that Socrates cannot have entered into any such detail. I will not conceal the suspicion which I have conceived about this very corrupt part of the Dialogue. I believe that of the words, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ΨΥΧΗ alone has any claims to legitimacy: that the damaged text was restored by a conjecture founded on the antithetical Περὶ γε τῶν ἡδονῶν τ. ἐ.: but that we may easily find such a beginning as will leave undisturbed and free from all taint of suspicion both ψυχὴ . . . ἔνυβάλλεται and ὥστε . . . λέναι, viz. ἔνει δέ καὶ ψυχὴ τ. ἐ. "Since this is the fact, part of this fact has been stated, but part we now declare". Instead of ὅπόταν αὖ κενῶται, I conjecture δοτις ἀν τ.

ἔνυπτει γιγνομένη] For ἔνυπτει γιγνομένη I have adopted ξ. γιγνομένη, which I formerly advocated without knowing that it had been already proposed by others.

ΠΡΩ. Ποία;

ΣΩ. Φημὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῇ πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σίγκρασιν [ἔφαμεν].

ΠΡΩ. Πόσος οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸν λέγομεν;

Ε **ΣΩ.** Ὁργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ ἔφωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἀρ' οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὐρήσομεν ἀμιχάνων; η δεόμεθ' ὑπομιμήσκεσθαι τὸ

ὅς τ' ἐφέρμε πολὺφρονά περὶ χαλεπῆραι,

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένου,

48 καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρίγοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὖσας ἀναμεμιγμένας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἀν ξυμβαίνοι γιγνόμενα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρίσεις, ὅταν ἂμα χαίροντες οὐλάστι, μέμνησαι;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρ' οἰσθ' ὡς ἔστι [καὶ τούτοις] μῆξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

[Ποία] The Books have Ποία, φήσ; to which the answer given is "Ὕπ σύτην τ. ψ. α. π. λ. σύγχραστν ἔφαμεν. Nobody believes in Ποία, φήσ; and some have the courage to replace it by Ποίαν φήσ; which is at least grammatical. But there is no reason for φήσ at all, and if any one will compare the instances where we have Πώς φήσ; Ηγ φήσ; and the rest, with the innumerable examples of the mere interrogative pronoun or adverb, he will desire a special reason for the departure from the ordinary expression; here no such reason exists, and the presence of the verb may be easily accounted for in another way. No exception has been taken to έφαμεν, and yet it is quite untrue that they have said anything as yet on this mixture, and Socrates declares as much in the foregoing paragraph. But if έφαμεν is false, can we offer the place to

φαμέν? No; for until Protarchus assents to it, it is no joint assertion. Again "Ὕπ is μῆξιν; and how can we have μῆξιν and ξύγχραστν governed both by λαμβάνεντν? A single correction (for I attribute the interpolation to the false reading) removes all these difficulties. It is probable that the MS. had τημ σύτην, the rubricator having neglected to put an initial Φ.

τὸ—ὅς τ' ἐφέρκε] Hom. Il. xviii. 108. I have omitted the words which all recent Editors are agreed in considering an interpolation, τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ὁργαῖς τό, standing after ἐφέρκε.

[καὶ τούτοις]] No ταῦτα have been mentioned, but the corrector was unfamiliar with so common an Atticism as οἰσθα τὴν διάθεσιν ὡς ἔστι μῆξις. Nor is ἐν τούτῳ at all more intelligible; there the neuters αὐτὸν and σχοτεινότερον, which obviously refer to

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πάντα πατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ δάδιον, ὡς Πρωταρχε, [ἐν τούτῳ] Β
ξυνησεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπάστοτε πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκουν ὡς γ' ἔστικεν ἐμοὶ.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ σκοτει-
νότερον ἔστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὁρῶν παταμαθεῖν τις οἶστι τ'
ἡ μῆτιν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΣΩ. Τό τοι νῦν δὴ φῆθὲν ὅνομα φθόνου πότερα λέπιν
τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Άλλὰ μὴν δὲ φθονῶν γ' ἐπὶ πακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας
ιδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

C

ΣΩ. Καπὸν μὴν ἄγρους καὶ ἦν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέρων ἔξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἥρτινα φύσιν ἔχει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἐστι δὴ πονηρία μέν τις τὸ πεφάλαιον, ἔξεώς τινος
ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δ' αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἔστι τι τούναντίον
πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ Γνῶθι σαντόν λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε. τούναντίον μὴν ἐπείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μηδαμῆ D
γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν [λεγόμενον ἐπὸ τοῦ γράμματος] ἀν εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ὡς Πρωταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῆ τέμνειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ηῆ φήσ; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὡς.

πάθος, were supposed to refer to some example or instance.

"Ἐστι δὴ πονηρία] The genitive ἔξεώς τινος does not depend on πονηρία, but upon ἐπίκλην. There is a certain πονηρία in general, called after name of a particular habit; that is, called so from πονηρός, which denotes a particular habit. I have added τι after ἔστι. A subject to έχον is indispensable.

[λεγόμενον ἐπὸ τ. γ.]] It is better to bracket these words, as Beck recom-

mended, than to think Plato capable of such a frigid joke, as Stallbaum, with some violence to the language, has extracted from them.

Πῆ φήσ;] Here is an instance of what was mentioned above. Had Socrates said not πειρῶ τέμνειν, but τέμνωμεν, the answer would have been Πῆ;

οὐ γ. μὴ δ. ᾧ οὐ μὴ ὡς is supported by Plato *Rep.* 341, c. οὐ μὴ οἶστι τε ἡς and by Xen. *Hiero* xi fin. οὐ μὴ δύνωμεν. The passage, οὐ μὴ—φῶμεν

ΣΩ. Λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγω, καὶ δέομαι γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ζῷον οὖν σὺ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοὺς κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἔκαστον;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλουσιώτεροι οὗτοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.

ΣΩ. Πλείους δέ γε, οὐ μείζους καὶ παλλίους αὐτοὺς δοξάζοντι, καὶ πάντα, ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς οὐσίης αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πολὺ δὲ πλειστοί γε, οἷμαι, περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήτασιν, ἀρετὴν δοξάζοντες βελτίους ἔναντιν, οὐκ ὄντες.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

49 **ΣΩ.** Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ᾧ οὐ σοφίας [πέρι] τὸ πλῆθος πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίθων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστί [ψευδοῦς];

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καπὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὁρθῶς ἄν εἴποι πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὡς Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ

in Rep. 486, δ, has been changed on *neuter* πάντα is put for *masculine* adjectives understood. See for examples my Praefatio ad Ionem p. xvii.

πλουσιώτεροι] The MSS. have πλουσιώτερον, which is indefensible. The construction of δοξάζειν may be with εἶναι, in which case the subject of a reflexive sentence follows in the nominative, or it may govern a direct accusative, as in the next sentences.

καὶ πάντα] And who, as to all things pertaining to the body, conceive themselves to be far above what they really are. Literally, 'to be all things which pertain to the body in a degree beyond the reality which belongs to them.' The

τὸ τῶν] The Books have τούτων, which is utterly superfluous; nor could ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς follow τὸ εἶδος without a repetition of the article.

ἀντεχόμενον] One Editor says: Intelligentum relinquitur αὐτῆς. I myself was driven to a conjecture: ἀντέχουν δι, but fortunately I admitted it to be too audacious. These are the shifts to which we are driven by the dunce who inserted πέρι. I have no faith in ψευδοῦς, for who ever heard of δοξοσοφία ἀληθής?

μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄνοιον ἰδοῦντος καὶ λί-
πης ὕψεσθαι μῆξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν τέμνωμεν δίχα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντες ὁπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν Β
ἀνοίτως δοξάζονται, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων
ἀναγκαιότατον ἐπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν φάμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν,
τοῖς δέ, οἷμαι, τούναντίον.

ΠΡΩ. Άνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσου μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ μετ'
ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελάμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι,
γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τάλιθη φθέγξει· τοὺς δὲ δυνα-
τοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ ἴσχυροὺς [καὶ] ἐχθροὺς προσαγο-
ρεύων ὁφθότατον τούτων σαντῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. ἄγνοια γὰρ Κ
ή μὲν τῶν ἴσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά· βλαφερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς
πέλασ αὐτῇ τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσίν· ἡ δ' ἀσθενής ἥμιν
τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁφθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἥδονῶν καὶ λυ-
πῶν μῆξις ἐν τούτοις οὕπω μοι καταφανήσ.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέπη τις ἄδικός ἐστι πον καὶ ἥδονή;

D

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὕτ' ἄδικον
οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων δρῶντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυ-
πεῖσθαι, καίρειν δέ, ἀρ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁφθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ

ισχυροὺς [καὶ] ἐχθρούς I have re- sentence would have been ἀρ' οὐ φατέον
moved the conjunction, which made γελοῖον εἶναι καὶ κακόν; But instead
utter nonsense of the passage, and drove of finishing the question, he breaks it
me to follow Schütz's conjecture al- into two, ἡ μὴ φῶμεν—; and Κακὸν
σχρούς. The strong become strong δ' οὐχ ὀμολογοῦμεν—; I have put τῶν
enemies, the weak objects of laughter. φίλων in brackets. No addition was
Τὴν οὖν] The completion of the ever more perverse.

Ε ἔσται τὸν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶ λέγοντες εἴδεσι γίγνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὅποσ' ἀσθενῆ, μισητὰ δ' ὅποσ' ἐρρωμένα—ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν [τῶν φίλων] ἔξιν ταῦτην ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοίαν εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δ' οὐκ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτήν, ἄγνοιαν οὖσαν, εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δ' ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;

50 **ΠΡΩ.** Αἵλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴν δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων πανοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν [τοῦτο] ἀπεργαζόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Γελῶντας ἄρετος ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησίν ὁ λόγος, περαννύντας ἡδονὴν φθόνῳ, λόπη τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔνυκεραννύναι· τὸν γάρ φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λόπην τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονή, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

B **ΣΩ.** Μηρύει δὴ τὸν δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ [ἐν τραγῳδίαις,] μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ βίου ἔμπαση τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ πωμαδίᾳ, λόπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα περάννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄδυνατον μὴ διμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰ καὶ τις φιλονεικοῦ πάνυ πρὸς τάνατία.

ΣΩ. Οργὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ξῆλον καὶ φθόνον προύθέμεθα καὶ διπόσα τοιαῦτα, Σ ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὑρήσειν μιγνύμενα τὰ τὸν πολλάκις λεγόμενα. ἡ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

τοῦτο] φῶνον καὶ γελῶτα. The MSS. have τοῦτο. seen, in the eyes of these men a gap was a place for the exercise of their healing powers. ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις, has one preposition too many.

[ἐν τραγῳδίαις] This could not occur without a corresponding mention of comedy; but the words are an idle addition. The unusual break after ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ made some grammarian think there was a gap, and, as we have

ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὑρήσειν] ἔφαμεν is my correction of the MS. reading φαμέν. The reference is to 46, ε.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήγου πέρι καὶ φθόνου καὶ ὀργῆς πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ διαπερανθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Λιὰ δὴ τί μάλισθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαι σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ ιωμῳδίᾳ μῆξιν; ἂρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν ὅτι τήν γ' ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁράσιον πρᾶσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι; Διαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαντῷ [ἀφεῖναι με] μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ίόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ ποιῆ μετ' ἄλληλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀφίησι με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἷμαί σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναι με· τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων αὔριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ Ε νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἦν Φίληβος ἐπιτάπτει.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, ὡς Σώκρατες· ὅλλ' ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μιχθείσας ἴδονάς ὑπὲ δὴ τυρος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμύκτους πορευοίμεθ' ἀνὸν τῷ μέρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες.

51

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταλαβὼν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν αὐτάς.

λαβόντα δὲ] When I affirmed that λαβόντα ἀφεῖναι could not depend on πίστεως χάριν, I was so little aware of the extent to which the text had been choked with foolish comments that sooner than suspect ἀφεῖναι, I threw the construction upon ἀρ' οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις δεῖν, confessing that δεῖν was out of its place, but pleading that there was no other possible way of accounting for these infinitives. But when we remove ἀφεῖναι με, everything is right: what Socrates has said is a pledge, that it would be easy to say more, and a proof that having given this earnest he need not prolong the conversation by proceeding to the consideration of the other passions. ἀφεῖναι με μηκέτι δεῖν μηκύνει is a strange combination to ex-

press ἀφεῖναι με τοῦ μηκύνειν; for while it is longer than the other, it is really more elliptical.

μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας] Will you make it midnight? The plural is used in speaking of the progress of the night, as πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν. *Symp.* 217, δ.; *Prot.* 310, δ.; *Arist. Nub.* 1. μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, *Rep.* 621, δ.

μεταλαβάν] Only a few inferior copies have this reading in place of μεταβαλών. But they have blundered on the truth. Socrates does not change but takes in exchange. Stallbaum has confounded these two senses in his note on 21, δ. quoting passages from the *Parmenides* and the *Symposium* where μεταβαλών is correctly given. There is a passage in the *Laws* which

τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάντα πως πείθομαι, ἀλλ', ὅπερ εἴπον, μάρτυσι παταχῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὕσας δ' οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἐτέρας τινὰς ἄμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, [εἴναι δ' αὐτὰς] συμπεφυμένας ὅμοι λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπάνεσσιν ὁδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίας.

Β ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖτις, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὁρθῶς τις διαροοῖτ' ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα, καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας, καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ δοσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀνασθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς δὴ ταῦτ', ὡς Σώκρατες, αὖτις λέγομεν οὕτως;

ΣΩ. Πάντα μὲν [οὖν] οὐκ εὐθὺς δῆλα ἐστιν ἢ λέγω, περιφατέον μήν δηλοῦν. σχῆμάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ὅπερ ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι τοῦ λέγειν, ἢ ζώων ἢ τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλ' εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν δὲ λόγος, καὶ περιφερεῖς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις γιγνόμεν' ἐπί-

contains both words, and will shew the distinction between the two. It is here given as, in my opinion, it ought to be read. *Laws*, 904, D. μείζω δ' ἡθη ψυχῆς κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὅταν μεταβάλῃ διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς βούλησιν τε καὶ διμιλῶν γενομένην λογοτάξιν, σπόταν μὲν ἀρετῆς θείᾳ προσμίξασα γίγνηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, διαφέροντα καὶ μετέλαβε τόπον, ἀγίαν ὅδον μετακομισθείσα [εἰς ἀμείων τινὲς τόπους ἔτερον]. Compare what has preceded: μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πάντα τοῦτο τὸ ποῖον τι γιγνόμενον αὐτὸν πάσιν ξόρων δεῖ μεταλαμβάνοντας οὐκίσσωνται, καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τότους.

[εἴναι δ' αὐτάς] These words interrupt the continuity of the description; πολλὰς φαντασθείσας appearing in many shapes, why?—συμπεφυμένας—because they are adulterated with pains and reliefs &c.

ἡδεῖας καθαρὰς λυπῶν] The two last words neither require a conjunction to precede them, nor is there the least ground of suspicion against them; they are added as descriptive of the manner in which the πληρώσεις are ἡδεῖαι.

Πάντα μὲν [οὖν]] Nothing can be more out of place here than this frequent formula. Socrates is not correcting, but conceding; and in this sense μὲν οὐκ cannot be employed. But it may be said that μὲν belongs to the sentence, and is in apodosis to a suppressed δε contained in μήν, while οὐκ characterises the answer, so that the combination of the two words here is purely accidental. I have no doubt that this is the true explanation of μὲν, but the particle after it in this case would most certainly be γοῦν. We must either restore this—but γοῦν οὐκ generally becomes οὔκουν—γε, or suppose οὐκ itself to be owing to the frequent combination of μὲν and οὐκ. Πάντα belongs more especially to δῆλα.

τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις] As Hesychius defines the τόρνος as a carpenter's instrument by which circular figures are described, ἐπιπέδα cannot be *trianguli* or *quadrata* (Stallb.). The order followed is an inverted one; the products of rules and compasses correspond to the εὐθὺν σχῆμα, and those of the τόρνος to the περιφερές.

πεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κυνόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ̄ μου μανθάνεις. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἰναι πρός τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς καλὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ πεφυνέναι καὶ τινας ἥδονάς Δούκειας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσφερεῖς· καὶ χρώματα δὴ τούτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἥδονάς]. ἀλλ’ ἄρα μανθάνομεν, ἢ πᾶς;

ΠΡΩ. Πειρῶμαι μέν, ὡς Σώκρατες· πειράθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων *** τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς, τὰς ἐν τι καθαρὸν ιείσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἔτερον καλὰς ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς καθ’ αὐτὰς εἰναι, καὶ τούτων ξυμφύτους ἥδονάς ἐπομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὁσμὰς ἥττον μὲν τούτων θείον γένος Εἶδον· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμειχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαῖον λύπας, καὶ ὅπῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονός ἡμῖν, τοῦτ’ ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἄπαν. ἀλλ’, εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἰδῆ δύο λέγομεν ἥδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μα- 52 θήματα ἥδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ’ οὕτω ξυνδοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὑστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορᾶς τινὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλ’ ἐν τισι λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθήματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεὶς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν.

[κνήσεων] This is Van Heusde's correction for κνήσεων; the same scholar also changed κνήσει to κνήσαι in the passage above. It is strange that the Zurich editors should not have adopted these corrections.

[φθόγγων] The feminine noun which denotes the description of sounds, and which has dropped out here, as is evident from the repetition of the article, is perhaps θέας. Some propose φω-

νῶν in place of φθόγγων, but leave the second τὰς to shift for itself. It is more likely that Plato would use φθόγγων, as he had done so before, and as it is more comprehensive than φωνῶν.

[λέγομεν] For this all MSS. and Editions have λεγομένων; but Plato would not speak of the *real* pleasures as *things called pleasures*.

[λογισμοῖς τ. π.] The genitive does not express *concerning*, but λογίζονται

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν, ὃ μακάριε, νῦν γ' ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραινομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Άληθη τοίνυν λέγεις, διτι χωρὶς λύπης ὥμιν λίθη γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἴδονάς ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ὁγκέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄλλὰ τῶν σφρόδρᾳ δλίγων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ δρτέον;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἥδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τάς τε παθαράς ἴδονάς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὁρθῶς ἀν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ τὰς μὲν πατὰ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφρόδρον αὐτῶν καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς τοῦ ἀπέιδον τ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἵππον καὶ μᾶλλον διά τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου εἶναι γένονται, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων.

ΠΡΩ. Όρθότατα λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐπι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτῶν διαθεατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι τὸ παθαρόν

τὸ πάθημα is what they do; so that the phrase should be rendered “in the account they take of the accident”.

Οὐκοῦν] I should have bracketed but left in the text the interpolations, by which this passage has been so long rendered unintelligible, but that there were other corrections needed, so that it would only have created confusion to put the new and the old together. προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ is surely not difficult to understand. Socrates wishes to add one more remark to this part of his subject. But some one who took no notice of τῷ λόγῳ must needs have it that some quality is to be added to some kind; so he inserts after τῷ λόγῳ the sentence ταῖς μὲν σφρόδραις ἴδοναις ἀμετρίαιν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τούναντιν ἔμμετραιν. But the λόγος is intent not merely on giving the names but on dividing into the several classes of τὰ ἄπειρα and τὰ ἔμμετρα, and does not even use the greatness and the intensity as proofs,

but says that all such as vary in their greatness and intensity belong to the ἄπειρον which itself pervades mind and matter, now less and now more. I will now mention the other changes I have made, ταῖς μὲν—τὰς μέν, καὶ τὸ—κατὰ τό, σφρόδρον αὐ—σφρόδρον αὐ i.e. αὐτῶν, ἀπέρου γε—ἀπέρου τε, (the Bodleian has τε γε), [προσθῶμεν αὐταῖς] after φερομένου, ταῖς—τάς, the last with MS. authority.

διαθεατέον] This is Van Heusde's emendation for διαθετέον; it had been anticipated by the Venice MS. Σ, a copy full of conjectural variations.

πρὸς ἀλήθεαν] “i.e. in relation to truth.” As this is the constant and only admissible meaning of these words, ἦ before εἰλικρινὲς can only be retained on condition of our changing Τί ποτε into Τί πρότερον. Otherwise, we must change ἦ itself into καὶ. The remainder of the sentence is faulty as to the arrangement of the conjunctions and articles. I would

τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τε [καὶ τὸ] πολὺ καὶ [τὸ] μέγα, καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλόν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾶς βούλομενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδέν, ὁ Πρόταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν ἐκατέφον καθαρόν ἔστι, Ε τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρόν, ἵνα καθαρὸν ἐκάτεφον ἵὸν εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν ἔμοι καὶ σοὶ καὶ ξυνάπτασι τοῖσδε φάω παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ορθότατα.

ΣΩ. "Ιδι δί, περὶ πάντων, δσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὐτωσὶ διανοηθῶμεν προελόμενοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐν τι διασκοπῶμεν. 53

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν προελόμενα;

ΣΩ. Τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον, εἰ βούλει, θεασώμεθα γέρος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τις καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη; πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλειστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν τῷ κράματος μηδεμία μοῦσα ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐνείη;

read τὸ σφόδρα πολύ τε καὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ ἰκανόν. Which must we consider as the first in relation to Truth? The pure and the unmixed? or the exceedingly numerous or great, and the sufficient? According to this arrangement, each member of the comparison will consist of two parts, for πολὺ ἡ μέγα or πολὺ καὶ μέγα are merely explanatory adjuncts of σφόδρα; compare below μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλειστον." I leave this note as I wrote it many years ago. There is very little in it that I would wish to modify, except as to ἰκανόν. On reference to the Introduction it will be seen that μέτρον which is just disposed of, and ἀληθεία and κάλλος are those Ideas which play a most important part in the concluding pages of the Dialogue. It will also be seen in the very next page that ἀληθεστάτον and κάλλιστον, κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων are dwelt on together in the conclusion of the argument here started. Now what was to be proved, must have been propounded; and it cannot have been propounded elsewhere. For this reason I have written καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλόν.

ἢ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν] Not whether but if, as is plain from the addition of ἄρα. If it should prove that one part of either is pure, and another impure.

ἵνα καθαρόν] This depends upon μηδὲν ἐπιλείπειν. Socrates wants to find all the pure kinds so far as he is able, because in these alone can the comparative merits of ἡδονῆ and νοῦς be determined. I believe the MS. εἰς τὴν χρήσιν to be a corruption, for it is unnecessary, and occasions an inelegant repetition. As the χρήσις was to be, 'Which ingredient was of most importance in the mixture,' and this must be determined by mixing the purest specimens of each, I have so little doubt that εἰς τὴν χράσιν is the true reading that I have now admitted it into the Text.

ἀκρατέστατον] The ancient grammarians inform us that this is the superlative of ἀκρατος, an usage which to our ears destroys all distinction between the superlative of this word and that of ἀκρατής. I distrust them, but make no change.

ἄλλον μηδένδε ἐνέιη] I have changed ἄλλη into ἄλλον, which is absolutely necessary for the sense. We must not

ΠΡΩ. Αἴλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστ' εἰλικρινὲς ἔν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτ' ἀληθέστατον, ὡς Πρωταρχε, καὶ ἄμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θήσομεν, ἀλλ' οὐ
Β τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατά γε.

ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιγμένου πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λεικότερον ὅμια καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐὰν φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐφοῦμεν ὁρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐ δή που πολλῶν δεησόμεθα παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν, ὃς ἄρα καὶ ἔνυπασσα ἡδονὴ σμικρὰ μεγάλης καὶ Κ ὀλίγη πολλῆς καθαρὰ λύπης ἥδιον καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίσσων γίγνονται ἐν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παραδειγμόν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόσιμεν ὃς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παραπάντα ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες αὖ τούτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διαπεράνομαί σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸν ἐπανερωτῶν, ὡς Πρώτης ταρχε φίλε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐφώτα μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἐστὸν δή τινες δέοντο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δὲ εἰς ἐξιέμενον ἄλλον.

suppose that ἀν is omitted before ἔντιν: it would be as contrary to Greek usage to employ it after a descriptive relative, as after εἰ with the optative.

καθαρὰ λύπης] If it be unmixed with pain, which of course supposes that the other is not. ηδίων is in fact ἀληθεστέρα, but it is added because of λυχότερον.

κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες] Trendelenburg understands this of Aristippus, who, according to Diogenes Laertius, ii. 87, taught that all pleasure was in κλήνσις. But the school of Heraclitus and of Protagoras must have held the same doctrine. These could not, indeed, have φίλε.

formally denied οὐσία to pleasure, for that would have implied their concession of it to other things; but pleasure itself would probably be one of the examples by which they supported their argument.

Τι δή;) Protarchus' answer is not germane to the question ἀρα οὐκ ἔχηκόσι. Probably the words belong not to Protarchus but to Socrates, who stops himself and says—τί δέ; Διαπεράνομαί σ. τ. ἔ. To which Protarchus answers not by an ungracious Λέγε, but by Ω φίλε, λέγε σ. τ. ἔ. This will rid us of the absurd collocation, ὡς Πρωταρχες doctrine.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς τούτῳ καὶ τίνε λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμινάταν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δὲ ἐλλιπὲς ἔκεινον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Παιδικά πον καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήματα ἄμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτοις τοίνυν ἐσινότα δυοῖν σὺν δύ' ἄλλα ζῆται κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι. E

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ, λέγε σαφέστερον, ὡς Σώνιρας, δὲ τι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὡς Πρωταρχεῖ· ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐρεσηχτεῖ νῦν, λέγει δὲ δῆτι τὸ μὲν ἔνεκά τον τῶν ὅντων ἔστιν ἀεὶ, τὸ δὲ σὸν χάριν ἐκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἔνεκα γυγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μόγις ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Τύχα δὲ ἵσως, ὡς παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προελθόντος τοῦ λόγου. 54

ΠΡΩ. Τί γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Λύσο δὴ τάδε ἔτερα λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἔτερον ἔν.

ΠΡΩ. Αὐτὸν ἀποδέχομαι σον ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν.

ΣΩ. Ορθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἔνεκα ποτέρον, τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἔνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἔνεκα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο, δὲ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία, εἰ γενέσεως ἔνεκα τοῦτο ἔστιν ὅπερ ἔστι, νῦν πινθάνει;

Τὸ τρίτον ήτοι ἐρῶ] The Books have time telling Socrates to speak more οὗτα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρω, out plainly. It is true that he has only of which some have endeavoured to extract a miserable metaphysical joke.

Protarchus had already asked twice for Socrates' meaning.—Πώς τούτῳ καὶ τίνε λέγεις; and again Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον. For οὗτα λέγομεν εἶναι, compare above 16, c., τῶν λεγομένων εἶναι. The correction proposed by Hirschig in the Paris edition was made after I had communicated mine to him. I suppose that by this time he is convinced that Protarchus is for the third

ἐρεσχητεῖ] The quotation from Parthenius in the *Etym. Mag.* referred to by Pierson on *Maris* in v. ἐρεσχετεῖ, is apparently decisive as to the orthography of this word. If Pierson had known that the oldest MSS. of Plato have the η, he would have pronounced with greater certainty in its favour. ἐρεσχετεῖ seems to have been a later form.

ΣΩ. Φαινομαι.

Β ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς θεῶν, ἀρ' [ἄν] ἐπανερωτᾶς με τοιόνδε τι; λέγ', ὁ Πρώταρχε, μοι, πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἔνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἔνεκα ναυπηγίας; καὶ πάνθ' ὅπόσα τοιαῦτ' ἔστι;

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὁ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαντῷ, ὁ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ· σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμμέτεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Ήτάν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἔνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντ' οὕργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὑλὴν παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἐκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἐκάστης ἔνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἔνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἔστιν, ἔνεκα τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτο ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τό γε μήν οὗ ἔνεκα τὸ ἔνεκα τοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνεται, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἔστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἔνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὁ ἄρριστε, μοίραν θετέον.

Δ ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατον.

ΣΩ. Άλλ' οὖν ἡδονή γ' εἴπερ γένεσίς ἔστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὁρθῶς θήσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Όρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ

[Πρὸς θεῶν] The MSS. and Edd. have Πρὸς θεῶν, ἀρ' ἀν ἐπανερωτᾶς με; Σω. Τοιόνδε τι λέγω, ὁ Πρώταρχε μοι,—τοιαῦτ' ἔστι, λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὁ Πρώταρχε. It is strange that Becker's note, 'τοιόνδε'—hec eidem dant ΣΕΗ, has never led any one to the right distribution of this passage. ἀν before ἐπανερωτᾶς has led to all manner of conjectural emendations, but I believe it to have arisen from a negligent repetition of ἀρ'. The absurdity of Socrates calling the same thing τοιόνδε τι and τοῦτ' αὐτό, seems not to have struck the Editors.

[γίγνεται] Commonly γίγνοιτο ἄν,

which is barbarous. Had ἔχειν ἀν εἴη followed, γίγνοιτο without ἀν would have been correct; but with ἔστι we must have either ἀεὶ γίγνεται or ἀεὶ γίγνηται, and even the latter would be in much better accordance with something more remote than ἔστι, such as ἔσται or ἀνάγκη είναι.

[Άλλ' οὖν—γε] Here again the MSS. have the absurd reading Ἄρ' οὖν. The conclusion follows so necessarily from that which has been said, that it would be quite out of place to make it the subject of a question; the presence of γε shows not only the corruption, but the sure method of correcting it.

μηρίσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ' ἡ-
τινοῦ αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν
φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι παταγελᾶ.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν δὲ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς Ε-
γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων παταγελάσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἢ τι τῶν τοι-
ούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἐξιάται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἄτε ἡδο-
νῆς οὖσης αὐτῆς, καὶ φασι ζῆν οὐκ ἀν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές
τε καὶ πεινῶντες, καὶ τάλλα, ἃ τις ἀν εἴποι, πάντα τὰ ἐπό-
μενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθίμασι, μὴ πάσχοντες.

ΠΡΩ. Έοίκασι γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γε τούντατον ἀπαντες τὸ φθει-
ρεσθαι φαίμεν ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἰροῦτ' ἀν τις τοῦθ'
αἰρούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ᾧ μήτε
χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δὲ ἢν δυνατὸν ὡς οἶόν τε κα-
θαρώτατα.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλή τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλογία ἔνμ-
βαινει γίγνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἴμιν τιθῆται.

ΣΩ. Πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι λέγωμεν,—

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ πα-
λὸν μήτ' ἐν σώμασι μήτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ
ἐνταῦθ' ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρίαν δὲ ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ τοῦν ἢ τι
τῶν ἄλλων ὅστε [ἀγαθὰ] εἴληχε ψυχή, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι;

ἔχει δε] The best MSS. have δεῖ.
This error is of continual occurrence in infinitives having the circumflex, which is so easily confounded with the sigma of γ.

δε αὐτὸς οὗτος] This is a bitter sneer at Aristippus, defining pleasure as a γένεσις, and yet preaching pleasure. The difference between οἱ φάσκοντες and οἱ ἀποτελούμενοι is that between philosophers, and men who follow a

certain mode of life. By understanding this difference we are enabled to do without my change of σσοι into σσοι, but I still doubt whether we do not require εὔδαιμόνων or μαχαρίων after ἀποτελουμένων.

[ἄγαθά] "It is unreasonable to suppose that of all the things which belong to the mind such as courage, temperance, intelligence, &c. pleasure is the only one entitled to be called good."

πρὸς τούτους δ' ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δέ, ἀναγκάζεσθαι φάναι πακόν εἶναι τότε, ὅταν ἀλγῇ, καὶν ἢ ἄφιστος πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντ' αὐτὸν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε, ὅταν χαίρῃ, **С тосоуту дияфреин πρὸς ἀλητήν;**

ΠΡΩ. Πάντ' ἔστι ταῦτα, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατὸν ἀλογώτατα.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖνν ἥδονῆς μὲν πάντως ἐξέτασιν πᾶσαν ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης οὗτον φειδόμενοι σφόδρᾳ φανῶμεν· γενναιώς δέ, εἴ πῃ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν περικούμενον, [ἔως] ὅ τι δὲ παθαρώτατόν ἔστιν αὐτῶν φύσει, τοῦτο κατιδόντες εἰς τὴν ιράσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινὴν τοῖς τε τούτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἥδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μέν, οἷμα, δημιουργικόν ἔστι τῆς

This is a fair appeal to common sense; but if you add ἀγαθά, you beg the question. Philebus could not say that of all ἀγαθά this is the only one without a manifest contradiction.

εἴ πῃ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει] The verb σήνω, to strain or percolate, has the same relation to σαθρός as σήπω to σαπρός. Hence the proper meaning of the word σαθρός is, that which suffers anything to run through it; it is therefore used of a leaky or cracked vessel. To ring a vessel in order to ascertain its soundness, is περιχρόνειν (with coins καθανάτειν); and then it was said either ὑγείας or σαθρὸν βομβεῖν—τὴν εἰν—φωνήγεοθαι. The conjecture on this place, σαθρὸν τὴν εἰν, is not admissible, for if this had been the meaning, the future must have been used.

ὅ τι δὲ καθαρώτατον] The common reading is ἔως ὅ τι καθαρώτατον. But ἔως χρώμεθα is barbarous; and if we desired to retain ἔως, no change short of the following would be really sufficient: ἔως δὲν κατιδώμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ —χρησώμενα.

ὅς τὴν κράσιν] Stallbaum has unsuccessfully defended κρίσιν against Schleiermacher, who proposed κράσιν. There is no question of the comparison at present, but of the admixture, in order to which, as Socrates had already observed (52, II), it is necessary to have

each kind in its purest state. χρῆσθαι μέρεσιν εἰς κράσιν is as elegant as χρῆσθαι μ. εἰς κράσιν (τῶν μερῶν) is the reverse.

Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν] If we would understand the drift of this question, we must divest ourselves of any notion that Plato is intending to establish a formal classification. His sole object is to show that there are two elements in ἐπιστήμη, namely the production of tangible results, and the information of the mind. The latter is not pointed out for its own sake, but to give relief and definiteness to the former which is its opposite; and the former is mentioned, because it enables him to introduce music and several other arts under one head as χειροτεχνίαι. This explanation disposes of the suspicion about some portion of the text having been lost, and fully accounts for the fact that Socrates never returns to the head of arts περὶ ποιείσαν. But why does he choose the arts which he calls χειροτεχνίαι as the subject of particular enquiry? Because in these again there is a twofold element; the element of certainty derived from the mathematical sciences under which they work, and the empirical element. Now as one of these is scientific (ἐπιστήμης ἔχόμενον) and the other not, it is necessary to show this, as determining the greater or less

[περὶ τὰ μαθήματα] ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν. Υἱὸς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνίαις διανοηθῶμεν πρώταις εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὖ μᾶλλον ἔχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ἡπτον ἔνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτερα νομίζειν, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἀκαθαρτότερα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΣΩ. Τὰς τοίνυν ἱγεινοικὰς διαληπτέον ἐκάστων αὐτῶν χωρίς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Οἶνον πασῶν πον τεχνῶν ἄν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ Ε καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, φαῦλον τὸ παταλειπόμενον ἐκάστης [ἄν γίγνοιτο].

ΠΡΩ. Φαῦλον μὲν δῆ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζειν λείποιτ' ἂν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν, ἃς πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονομάζοντι, μελέτη καὶ πόνῳ τὴν δώμην ἀπειργασμένας.

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pureness of these parts of Intellect, as καθαρότατα has been already changed into καθαρώτερα before me. Not only ought the comparative to match the comparative, but any art which is καθαρώτητα would on the withdrawal of the scientific element cease altogether; for if the pureness is according to the presence of the mathematical science, the most pure must have this not only as predominating but as excluding all empirical admixture, and when this is withdrawn, there remains—nothing.

Ἄν τις δὲ χωρίζῃ—[ἄν γίγνοιτο] This combination is not Greek; and the second half can be omitted without any detriment to the sense.

Φαῦλον μὲν δῆ! This is the form of simple assent; if, in place of repeating φαῦλον, he had said φαῦλότατον, μὲν οὖν would have been added; if his assent had been restricted, γοῦν. There is also a shade of difference between μέντοι the old reading, and μὲν δῆ; the reading of the Bodleian. The former is the more suitable when the answerer adds the weight of his own authority to the mere assent.

τὴν δώμην ἀπειργασμένας] The pro-

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μεστὴ μὲν πον μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ ξύμφωνον ἀρμόττοντα σὲ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτῃ στοχασμοῦ, καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῇ καὶ αὐλητικῇ, τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι τρεφόμενης θηρεύουσα, ὥστε πολὺ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

Β ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἰστρική τε καὶ γεωγίαν καὶ αὐθεντικήν καὶ στρατηγικήν ὁσαίτις εὑρήσομεν ἔχουσας.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντα γε.

ΣΩ. Τεκτονικὴν δέ γε, οἷμαι, πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ δργάνοις χρωμένην, τὰ πολλὴν ἀκριβεῖσαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν παρέχεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

ΣΩ. Κατά γε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ' οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολ-

priety of the word δώμη depends on μελέτη καὶ πόνῳ, which are used of training in the palaestra. The subject of προσχρωμένους is the possessors of the senses, that of ἀπειργασμένας is δυνάμεις.

[μεστὴ κ. τ. ξ.] This passage has suffered from the well-known practice of transcribers, who, when they could not or would not decipher terminations, invented those which the immediate neighbourhood suggested. From οὐ μέτρῳ the copyist inferred that he must write στοχασμῷ and then altered μελέτῃ into μελέτης. The reasoning proves clearly what Plato must have written. In proportion as an art trusts less to measure and more to practice, it must be full of guesswork.

[αὐτῇ καὶ αὐλητικῇ] The MSS. have καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητική. But ξύμπασα belongs to the *summum genus*, and flute-playing has no subdivisions worth notice. It was an old subject of dispute between two schools of early musicians whether questions about the intervals in music should be determined by proportions of strings only or also by ear; but in the case of αὐλητικῇ the task of settling such questions by length of pipe was too intricate, so that there especially the empirical method was pursued.

χορδῆς] It is unnecessary to enter into the question whether χόρδη is applicable to wind instruments, although the passage quoted with such confidence by Mr. Chappell (Hist. of Music p. 146) from Plato *Rep.* 399, δ. is quite inconclusive, being itself confessedly corrupt; and I can find no other. The very context in that passage would seem to show that Socrates objects to the flute, because the admitted defects of stringed instruments were due to an imitation of the flute. I am inclined to read η οὐ τὰ πολύχορδον αὐτό, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὅντα μηδηπατα; But here αὐλητική is represented as hunting after the measure of the chord in a *stringed instrument*: that is, having no measure of its own to trust to, it derives its certainty from that which possesses such a measure.

[φερομένη] For this word which, though a term in music (see Chappell H. of M. p. 98) is quite inapplicable here, I conjecture θηρωμένη, of which the more common form θηρεύουσα was a gloss.

[τὰ πολλήν] In place of this reading, the Zurich Editors have adopted the conjectural one of ξ. This only spoils what is perfectly plain. "The things which give this art its accuracy, make it τεχνικωτέραν, and therefore more akin to pure ἐπιστήμη."

λοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ἔνδον ργικῆς. πανόν γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ τόρηρ
χρῆται καὶ διαβήτη καὶ στάθμη καὶ τινι προσαγωγίῳ πεπομ-
ψευμένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, δρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν
μουσικὴς ἔντεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάτιονος ἀκριβείας μετ-
ισχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῆς πλείονος.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας είναι τέχνας, ἃς νῦν
δὴ πρώτας εἴπομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσας μετὰ ταύ-
της τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νῦν δῆ.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ὀλλ', ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἀρ' οὐ διπτὰς αὐτὸν
καὶ ταύτας λεπτέον; ἢ πᾶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἀρ' οὐκ ἄλλην μέν τινα τὴν
τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δ' αὐτὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ ποτὲ διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην
θεὶη τις ἀν ἀριθμητικήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐ σμικρῷ ὅφῳ, ὡς Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μο-
νάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατό-
πεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δέο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάν-

κανόνι] κανὼν is the rule for measuring straight lines; τάρνος for curved; διαβήτης the cross pieces, (in shape of a compass stretched out,) from the angle of which the plumb-line depended; στάθμη the plumb-line itself; and προσαγώγιον is explained to be the instrument for reducing warped timber to straightness. If this is correct, it is much less χειροψευμένον than the rest, which are scientific helps, while this is a mere engine of force. Perhaps it was an instrument for taking the angles of curves. It is scarcely necessary to say that χειροψευμένον has nothing to do with the workmanship, though Stallbaum translates "scire factum".

ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην] This is a common ellipsis for τὴν μὲν ἀ. τὴν δὲ ἀ. Compare *Laws* 862, B. which I quote for the sake of correcting it: καὶ τὸ

μὲν βλαβεῖν ἀβλαβεῖς τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ποιητέον, τό τε ἀπολόμενον σώ-
ζοντα, καὶ τὸ πεσὸν ὑπό του πάλιν
ἔξοδοῦντα, καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἢ τρω-
θὲν ἕντες, τὸ δὲ ἀπονοεῖς ἔξιλασθὲν τοῖς
δρῶσι καὶ τοῖς πάσχουσι (παρέχοντα)
ἐκάστους ἔχ διαφορᾶς εἰς φιλαν πε-
ριπέτερον ἀλλα καθιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.

Οὐ σμικρῷ δρῳ] οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος is the common reading. But this is out of structure, and if any one wishes to understand ἀστι, he must at least insert the article. But the words are evidently an answer to Πῆ ποτὲ διορισάμενος.—The word-αὐτοῖς three lines below was supplied to give a case to συναχολου-
θῆσεται, and the consequence is that the condition of B assenting to A is not, A changing his mind, but some third C propounding the same doctrine as B.

τῶν μέριστα· οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἄν ποτε [αὐτοῖς] συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ' ἐν λέγεις οὐ συναρπάν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δύ' αὐτάς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ πατὰ τευτονικὴν καὶ πατ' ἐμπορικὴν τὴν πατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρία τε καὶ λογισμῷ 57 [καταμελετωμένων]; πότερον ὡς μία ἐκατέρα λεκτέον, ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπόμενος ἔγωγ' ἄν δύο πατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθείην ἐκατέραν τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. οὖν δὲ ἐνεκα ταῦτα προηρευκάμεθ' εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀρ' ἐννοεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἄν ἀποφίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγ' οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐχ ἡττον ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἡρχόμεθα, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζητῶν τάντιστροφον ἐν-
B ταῦθα προβεβηκέναι σκοπῶν εἰ ἀρ' ἐστί τις ἑτέρας ἄλλη πα-
θαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, παθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτο γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἐνεκα τού-
των ἐπικεχείρημεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλοις

εἰ μὴ μονάδα] Except a man shall consider no monad to differ from any other single monad out of all innumerable monads. There is an intentional redundancy in this triple opposition (μονάδα—μονάδος, μηδεμίαν—ε. τ. μ., ἄλλην—ἄλλης) in order to mark the perfect indifference of every monad from every other.

τευταζόντων] Rep. 521 B, Tim. 90 B, who give their time to Arithmetic.

Τί δὲ λογιστικῇ] In this passage I have changed τῆς κ. φ. γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν, so as to render the sentence complete. This is far better than supplying διαφέρει, which would make Socrates first ask whether two things differ, then whether they are one, and again whether they differ. The only question that can by any possibility be asked as introductory to the other

two is "How do these stand to each other"? The word καταμελετωμένων is nothing but a wretched attempt to bolster up the construction by making a genitive absolute of it; and for this purpose some one has borrowed the remarkably elegant word from its context above and used it where it means about as much as would τυπωμένων.

τάντιστροφον] I have added the article which is necessary to the sense. ἀντίστροφόν τι is not to be thought of. The case of ἡδοναί has been already determined, and the corresponding case is to be sought in νοῦς.

προβεβηκέναι] This is Schleiermacher's emendation for προβεβληκέναι; it is obvious that no πρέβλημα is put forward.

Τί οὖν] In this sentence the Books turn two distinct questions into one

ἄλλην τέχνην οὐσαν ἀνεύρισκε [σαφεστέραν] καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν
ἄλλην ἄλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τούτοις δ' ἀρ' οὐ τίτα τέχνην ὡς διμώνυμον φεγ-
ξάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μίαν, πάλιν ὡς δυοῖν ὅντοιν
ἐπανερωτᾶ τούτοιν αὐτοῖν [τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ ο
ταῦτα] πότερον ἡ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων
ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.

ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν, ὁ Πρωταρχε, αὐτῷ διδώμεν ἀπόκρισιν;

ΠΡΩ. ΩΣ Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγεθος εἰς
σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινούμεθα ἥπαν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήρ; καὶ εἰρήσθω γ' ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὗται τῶν
ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν Δ
ὅντως φιλοσοφούντων δρμὴν ἀμήχανον ἀκριβείᾳ τε καὶ ἀληθείᾳ
περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστείοντες θαρ-
ροῦντες ἀποκρινώμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων δλκήν—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ως εἰσὶ δέν ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δέν μετρητικαὶ καὶ ταύ-
ταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται ξυνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητ' ἔχου-
σαι ταύτην, δύναματος δ' ἐνὸς κεκοινωμέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Αἰδῶμεν τύχη ἀγαθῆ τούτοις, οὓς φῆς δεινοὺς εἰ—Ε
ραι, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστ'
εἰραι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

question asked twice. I have removed σαφεστέραν and for ἀνεύρισκεν written ἀνεύρισκε.

[εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας] The same expression occurs in *Euthyd.* 305 b. Compare also *Cratyl.* 431 A, εἰς τὴν αἰσθη-
σιν καταστῆσαι.

[ὡς μίαν] The MSS. have ὡς μιᾶς, an alteration probably made to suit δυοῖν, as if the construction were the same. I have also supplied ἔντον in its right place, and put the absurd

supplement τὸ σαφὲς . . . περὶ ταῦτα into brackets. ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει is precisely the same as τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρόν. A little further on εἰς σα-
φήνειαν is used as to this same quality; and still further he uses ἀλήθεια and ἀκριβεία in the same sense.

[περὶ λόγων δλκήν] Compare *Cratylus*, 435 C, *Theaetet.* 168 C, βῆμάτων τε καὶ ὄνομάτων, ἀντὶ πολλοὶ δῆη ἂν τύχωσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπάς παρέχουσι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὁ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτ' ἀν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην ιρίναμεν.

58 **ΠΡΩ.** Τίνα δὲ ταῦτην αὖ δεῖ λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι πᾶς ἀν τίν γε τῦν λεγομένην γνοίη. τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὃν [καὶ τὸ] ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκός πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἥρεισθαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις τοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήργηται, μικρῷ ἀληθεστάτῃν εἰναι γνῶσιν. σὺ δὲ τί; [πῶς τοῦτο, ὁ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνους ἄν;]

ΠΡΩ. Ἡπονον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου τὸ πολλάκις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν· Β πάντα γὰρ ὁφέλιμον τὸν δοῦλα τὸν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῦτο, καὶ μικρῷ ἀρίστῃ πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν. τῦν δ' οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἄν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δύπλα μοι δοκεῖς βουληθεῖς εἰπεῖν αἰσχυνθεῖς ἀπολιπεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστω τῦν ταῦτα ταῦτη, ὅπη σοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Άρειον αἴτιος ἔγω τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

Δῆλον ὅτι πᾶς ἄν] For this emendation we are indebted to W. H. Thompson. The old reading was Δῆλον ὅτι ἡ πάταν. There can be no doubt that the phrase περὶ τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ὄντως is incorrect. τὸ ὄντως would be rightly placed where the question was about the *meaning of the word*, but here we are considering the objects of a given science. But the object of Dialectic is Truth, and Truth is found either in that which is absolute (τὸ ὃν ὄντως), or in that which is invariable, because it is the effect of the absolute; and this latter Plato expressed by καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκός (*γέγενεται*). To make τὸ ὄντως, and even τὸ κατὰ ταῦτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, mere explanations of τὸ ὃν, as one Editor has done, betrays great looseness of thought.

σὺ δὲ τί; [πῶς τοῦτο, ὁ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνους ἄν;]] I have made separate sentences: σὺ δὲ τί; answering to ἔγωγε οἶμαι and πῶς τ. δ. ἄν; to the general question. But πᾶς διακρίνονς ἄν is so contrary to the usual order, and a second quotation of a more vague sort

following the only question to the purpose is so unworthy of our author, that I cannot but look on it as a later addition.

πολλάκις] I cannot say what should be done with this word which is quite incompatible with ἐκάστοτε. Nor can I propose anything certain in place of διὰ ἔκόντων, of which the sense seem as necessary as the mode of expression is objectionable. But it is not unlikely that the right reading is διὰ ἔκόντων αὐτῶν.

Τὰ δύπλα] This is a play upon the word τίθεσθαι, which Protarchus had used merely in the sense of *advancing an opinion*; but Socrates, taking up the words ἐναντία τίθεσθαι, replies, ‘*I think you were going to say δύπλα, but you were ashamed, and dropped the word.*’ Τὰ δύπλα ἐναντία τίθεσθαι is in acie stare, as in Herod. 1. 62, καὶ ἀντία ἔθεντο τὰ δύπλα. There is a further play upon ἀπολιπεῖν; for ἀπολιπεῖν τὰ δύπλα would properly mean to *desert*, but here it is merely to *forego* or *give up the word*.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὃ φίλε Πρωταρχε, τοῦτ' ἔγωγ' ἐζήτοντι πω,
τις τέχνη ἡ τις ἐπιστήμη πασῶν [διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστη καὶ C
ἀριστη καὶ πλεῖστ ὀφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τις ποτε τὸ σαφὲς
καὶ τἀριθμὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθεστάτον ἐπισυνοπεῖ, καὶ ἡ σμικρὰ καὶ
σμικρὰ δύνησσα. τοῦτ' ἔστιν δὲ τὸν δὴ ἐζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅραι
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεκθήσει Γοργίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπερέχειν τέχνη
διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, χρατεῖν δὲ ἡ εἶπον ἔγω
τον πραγματείᾳ, παθάπερ τοῦ λεντοῦ πέρι τότε ἐλεγον, καὶν εἰ
σμικρόν, παθαρὸν δὲ εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέ-
ρειν, τούτῳ γέντιῷ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ. καὶ τὸν δὲ τσφόδρα δια- D
νοηθέντες καὶ ἵσταντος διαλογισάμενοι, μήτ' εἴς τινας ὀφελείας
ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκιμίας, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέ-
φυε τῆς Ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντας
ἔνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν διερευνησάμενοι [τὸ
παθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως,] εἰ ταύτην μάλιστ' ἐκ τῶν εἰ-
κότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν
ἡμῖν ζητητέον.

E

[διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστη] I once attempted to defend this construction by such examples as that of Aristophanes (*Wasps* 666) τοὺς “οὐχὶ προδώσω κ. τ. ἐ.” There never was an interpolation which more clearly betrayed itself. If Plato had used any such word as διαφέρει, he would have made both grounds of comparison, *certainty* as well as *general merit*, depend upon it.

ἐζητοῦμεν] MSS. and Edd. give ζη-
τοῦμεν.

πρὸς χρείαν] These words are to be taken as governing τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, *to surpass as to their use to men.*

κρατεῖν δὲ ἡ εἶπον ἔγὰν τὸν πραγμα-
τείᾳ] The reading of the MSS. and Edd. is ὑπάρχειν (for ὑπερέχειν) and κρατεῖν, γέντιον δὲ εἶπον. This has been ad-
duced as an instance of the ἀνακόλου-
θον, and it will be well to look closely
into it. The case of πραγματείᾳ, ac-
cording to this supposition, will be
owing to a construction intended to be
analogous to that of τῇ μὲν ἐ. ν. τέχνῃ
— διδούς, which construction is lost or
changed by reason of the long paren-
thesis, so that, when this ends, a new
construction, ταύτην εἴπωμεν, is sub-
stituted. A conclusive answer to all

these subtleties is, that not only the construction is different, but the sense is altogether unlike. For in the first part, if completed, we should expect *if you assign, or you ought to assign, or something which implies a claim for νοῦς*: but in the second part there is a call on Protarchus to declare what he really thinks about νοῦς (ταύτην εἴπωμεν κ. τ. ἐ.). Another objection to the passage as it stands is the awkwardness of διδοὺς ὑπάρχειν κρατεῖν, which means διδοὺς κρατεῖν, and nothing more. All these difficulties are removed by so simple a process that I have not hesitated to introduce it into the text, and to change the punctuation accordingly.

ταύτην εἴπωμεν] This ταύτην refers to δύναμιν, the second to ἐπιστήμην.
τὸ καθαρόν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως is not the proposed object of investigation, as the interpolator thought; they are to search out the dialectic art itself.

καὶ τὸν δὲ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες] For καὶ τὸν δὴ I have written καὶ τὸν δέ, as opposed to οὐκ ἐζήτουν πω. There is some corruption in σφόδρα διανοηθέντες, for διανοεῖσθαι cannot be used in the sense of διασκοπεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπόν, οἷμαι, συγχωρῆσαι τιν'
ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
ταύτην.

ΣΩ. Άρ' οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρημας δὲ λέγεις τὸν,
ώς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὅσαι περὶ ταύτας πεπόνηται, πρῶ-
59 τον μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζητοῦσι ξυντετα-
μένως; εἴτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως τίχειται τις ζητεῖν, οὐσθ' ὅτι τὰ
περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ
ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαῖμεν ἀν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὅντα ἀεὶ, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα
καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρηται τὸν
πόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἀν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἀλη-
θείᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὃν μήτ' ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κανὰ ταῦτα μηδ'
ἔξει μήτ' εἰς τὸ τὸν παρὸν ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεντημένα βεβαιότητα μηδ' ἡντινοῦν
πῶς ἀν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιτο ἡμῖν καὶ διοῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς.

[πεπόνηται] This word and ξυντετα-
μένως (Schütz's correction for ξυντε-
ταγμένως) explain each other. He is
evidently speaking of pursuits which
require great assiduity; but what these
are it would be difficult to say, if we
retained the old reading ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα
πεπόνηται. This has been explained
by a reference to the passages in the
Phædo, where ταῦτα is used of visible
things; but this would at least include
τὸ περὶ φύσεως ζητεῖν, which is here
spoken of as a distinct branch. By
means of this change we have the arts
mentioned first, because they are the
subject; but as the following remark
turns on the means employed, it is con-
venient to mention the persons who
follow the arts, to avoid the awkward-
ness of saying that the arts them-
selves χρῶνται δόξας, or ζητοῦσι τὰ
περὶ δόξαν.

ἡγέται] If the physicist mistook what

φύσις was, and while supposing that
he investigated it was searching out
something else, τίγεται would be ap-
propriate. But nothing more is meant
than the usual enquiries of the Ionic
Philosophy, and no intimation is given
that there is any higher sense of φύ-
σις or of the investigation of it. I
therefore propose ηγέται. For while
in the handicrafts above mentioned he
speaks of those who labour at them,
he speaks of physical investigations as
things in which men choose to engage.
The tense of ηγέται is borne out by
ἀνήρηται τὸν πόνον. In explanation
of this latter phrase I observe that in
those well-known combinations πόλεμον
— πόνον — κτλδυνον — γείκος αἰρεσθαι,
ἀναγρεῖσθαι may be used in place of
the other verb. Some who did not no-
tice this have proposed unnecessary
conjectures. Compare *Phædrus* 233 c,
243 c, *Laws* 921 A and B.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἔρα [νοῦς] οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά ἔστι τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκονν εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἔαρ, τόδε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ,— C

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἡ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον [καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν] καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὠσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἡ [δεύτερος] ἐκείνων ὁ τι μάλιστ' ἔστι ξυγγενές· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὑστερα λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα δρ' οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιότατον ἀπονέμειν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰνός γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκονν νοῦς ἔστι καὶ φρόνησις ἄττ' ἂν τις τιμήσει D μάλιστ' ὄνόματα;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

Οὗδ' ἄρα [νοῦς] οὐδὲ τ. Λ.] We should have expected οὔτε .. οὔτε. But if there is any ἐπιστήμη, however weak or vague, there is some νοῦς, for all ἐπιστῆματα are parts of νοῦς and are discussed as such. The νοῦς of the text is plainly the opposite of that of Anaxagoras, and throws all things into confusion. The scribes were not familiar with the idiom which we meet both in Homer and in the Attic writers, οὐδὲ γάρ οὐδέ, οὐδ' ἄρ' οὐδέ. In the 5th Epistle of Synesius our modern texts have οὐδὲ γάρ οὐδὲ ὅμοιος ἦν ἔχοντες; but in my collations I find that the best MSS. have οὐδὲ γάρ οὐδὲ ὅμοιος ἦν ἔχοντες.

Tὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ] See note on 20, n. This article here has a depreciating effect. It has, in fact, the force of turning the first and second persons into a third, or more properly still, of abstracting the individual from his personality, and making a mere *somebody* of him.

[καὶ τὸ καθαρόν] These words are spurious. For βέβαιος cannot be se-

parated from ἀληθές, since the want of truth in physical knowledge has been declared to arise from the instability of the objects. Again καθαρὸν is so nearly the same as εἰλικρινές that it could not occur unless in close proximity to it, and the only place for εἰλικρινές is that which it occupies as a quality deduced from the other two; and as τὰ ἀεὶ—ὠσαύτως answer to βέβαιος and ἀληθές, so does ἀμικτότατα answer to εἰλικρινές.

[δέυτερος] The Zurich Editors have changed this into δεύτερως, which is at least more rational than Stallbaum's defence of it as a parenthetical proverb with πλοῦς understood. It is incredible that Plato should make two δεύτερα to one and the same *first*. It is therefore a waste of time to enquire how δεύτερος should be corrected.

ἄττ' ἄγ] The common reading is ἄττ' ἄγ. It is evident that this is no place for γε. The confusion between the two readings is of very frequent occurrence.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὃν ὅντως ἐννοίας τέστιν ἀπηκριθωμένα ὁρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ᾧ γ' εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγώ τότε παρεσχόμην, οὐκ ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ ταῦτα τὰ ὄντα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἶνεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεως τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι πρὸς Ε τὴν ἀλλήλων μῆξιν εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι, παραπεισθαι, καλῶς ἀν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἄρ' οὐ μαγνύναι ἐπιχειρητέον;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁρθότερον ἀν ἔχοι,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. ΖΑ καὶ πρότερον [ἔμνήσθημεν]· εὐδὲ δὲ ἡ παροιμία δο-
60 κεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπανα-
πολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Λιός· οἶμαι γὰρ οὕτω πως τὰ τότε λεχθέντα φηθῆναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φίληρός τησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὁρθὸν πᾶσι ζώοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τάγαθὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸν εἶναι ξύμπασι, καὶ δέ ὄντα, ἀγαθὸν

Ταῦτ' ἄρ' κ. τ. ἐ] Although the reading of this passage has been pronounced to be *verissima*, yet as the authority who states this bids us take

ἔστι καλεῖσθαι together (he was perhaps thinking of έστι καλεῖν) and talks

strange stuff about ἀπηκριθωμένα and ξνοιατ, we cannot throw off all suspi-

cion of its unsoundness. If ἀπηκριθωμένα could mean *accurately proved to be* (not *accurately made*) there would

be some handle for the infinitive καλεῖσθαι. But as this cannot be, and

likewise for other reasons, which good

scholars will readily discern, I am inclined to read έστω ἀπηκριθωμένως

καλεῖσθαι.

ἔξ ὧν ἡ τὸ οἷς] The first is the material, considered as a kind of secondary cause, *out of which* things are produced; the second, the same material considered as the substance *in which* the workman realises his art.

[ἔμνήσθημεν]] This is a supplement originating with some one who did not see that the verbs to be understood are εἴπομεν καὶ ἀνεμνήσαμεν τημᾶς αὐτούς.

καὶ ἡδὺ, ἐνί τινι [καὶ φύσει μᾶ] τούτῳ ὁρθῶς τεθέντ' ἔχειν.
Σωμάτης δὲ ἐν μὲν οὐ φρσι τοῦτ' εἶναι, διό δὲ καθάπερ τὰ B
δύνατα, καὶ τὸ τ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύ-
σιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν
φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστι τε καὶ ἡ τὰ τότε λεγό-
μενα, ὃ Πρώταρχε;

ΠΡΩ. Σφρόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἀν̄ ξυνομο-
λογοῦτο,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τἀγαθὸν διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων;

ΠΡΩ. Τίν;

C

ΣΩ. Ωι παρείη τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους πάντως
καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτ' ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἵκα-
νὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἐκάτερον ἐκα-
τέρου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἐκάστων, ἄμικτον μὲν ἡδονὴν φρο-
νήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὡσαντικός ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον
ἔχουσαν;

ΠΡΩ. Ήν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἵκανὸν ἔδοξεν D
εἶναι τῷ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε παρηγέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν δστισοῦν ἐπανα-
λαβὼν ὁρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην
καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος, καὶ σκοπῶν εἰ'
τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἀν̄ οἱ καὶ διοῦν εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι,
μὴ ὅτι δή γ' ἡδονήν, εἴδ' ὡς πλείστην εἴδ' ὡς σφοδροτάτην,

[καὶ φύσει μᾶ] These words which separate τὸν from τούτῳ and leave ἐνὶ without a noun expressed or implied to lean upon, and say nothing more than what is said in ἐνὶ τῷ τούτῳ, are an evident contribution of some im-
properer.

ἐν μὲν οὐ φῆσι] The scribe has here confounded the ordinal and the cardinal number, both of which are written with

the same compendium. α was taken for πρῶτον, which is in all the Books, but it was meant for ἐν as is plain from the antithesis ἐν μὲν οὐ, δύο δέ.

ἐπαράθημεν—θέντες[We made the experiment of placing, &c. Stallbaum compares the expression used above, (21, A) ἐν τοῖς πειρώμενα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα.

μὴ δη δή γ' ἡδονήν] This formula

εὶς μήτ' ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι χαίρειν, μήτε τὸ παράπαν γιγνώσκοι Ε τί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος, μήτ' αὐτὸν μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδὲ δοτινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι. ταῦτὰ δὲ λέγω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἀν φρονησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον [ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν] ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς [χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ] μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινός.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τοιεῖ ταῦτα γε πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν.

61 **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἀν τούτων εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἦτοι σαφῶς ἢ καὶ τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, ἵνα, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ δώσουμεν ἔχωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δόδον μέν τιν' ἐπὶ τάγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Καθάπερ εἴ τις τιν' ἀνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν οἰκησιν Β πρῶτον δοθῶς, ἵν' οἰκεῖ, πνέθοιτ' αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δή που πρὸς τὴν εὑρεσιν ἀν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητούμενου.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δ' οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δή τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ πατ' ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίντῳ βίᾳ τάγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μικτῷ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μικθέντι καλῶς τὸ ζητούμενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μή.

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι περαννίωμεν,

occurs in several Attic writers. Plato and Xenophon sometimes use merely μή δτι and sometimes add δή only. In the cases where γε is added, it is found sometimes before δή, sometimes after it. Compare this passage with one in Demosth. *against Conon*, μή δτι γε δή, and with one in *Politicus*, μή δτι δή βασιλεῖς γε.

[ἢ μ. τ. ἡδονῶν]] I bracket the insertions which make nonsense of a

question put by Plato with the utmost subtlety. In the words given to Protarachus, the part which purports to be the answer is no answer at all; and his objection to the repetition of the question looks like an addition contrived to mask a corrupt sentence. Protarachus' answer ought to be ἔστι ταῦτα, or in other words οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἢ ταῦτα γε.

εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴθ' Ἡφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τι-
μὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡμῖν καθάπερ οὐνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι κρῆ-
ται, μέλιτος μὲν ἀνὰ ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς
φρονήσεως τηφαντικὴν καὶ ἔσιτον αὐστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινὸς
ἴδιατος· ἀς προθυμητέον ὡς πάλλιστα συμμιγνύναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς γάρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἀρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονή· Τοι
σει μιγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἀν μάλιστ' ἐπιτέχουμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἱσως.

ΣΩ. Άλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές· οὐδὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἀν μιγνύο-
μεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τιν' ἀποφίνασθαι ἀν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνα.

ΣΩ. Ἡν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε τάληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἔτέ-
ρας ἄλλη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα;

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς γάρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, οὐ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ
γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμεν' ἀποβλέποντα, οὐ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε
γιγνόμενα μήτ' ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταντὰ δέ ὁσαντας ὅντες ἀεί. Εἴ
ταύτην [εἰς τὸ ἀληθές] ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθ' ἐκείνης ἀλη-
θεστέραν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν [εἰ] τάληθέστατα τμήματα ἐκατέρας ἴδωμεν
πρῶτον ξυμμίξαντες, ἀρά ἵναν ταῦτα ξυγκενταμένα τὸν ἀγαπη-
τάτατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, οὐ τινος ἔτι προσ-
δεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μη τοιούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Εμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως.

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ΣΩ. Ἐστω δή τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς πέρι δι-
καιοσύνης, οὐ τι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἐπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ

παρεστᾶσι κρήνας] Winckelmann, in his Preface, observes that this is an allusion to the libations in honour of the Eumenides and other divinities, which consisted of water and honey. Compare Aesch. *Eum.* 107, Sopb. *Æd. Col.* 100 and 471, with the Scholiast.

"Ἡν ἡμῶν] I leave this passage in a corrupt state. ὡς οἰόμεθα is quite hope-

less, and we have nothing whereby to decide our choice between ἀληθῶς τοι-
αύτη μᾶλλον or (following the Bodleian
which omits μᾶλλον), ἀληθέστερα ἀλ-
λης ἄλλη.

Οὐκοῦν [εἰ] τάληθέστατα] I have bracketed εἰ and changed ἴδωμεν into
ἴδωμεν.

δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστω γάρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Άρ' οὖν οὗτος ἵπανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει, κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαιρᾶς αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαιρὰν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ ταῖς ἄλλοις ὅμοιας κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις;

ΠΡΩ. Γελοίαν διάθεσιν ἡμῶν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμαις λέγομεν.

ΣΩ. Πᾶς φήσ; ἢ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόρος ἄμα καὶ τοῦ κύκλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ συγχρατέον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἑιδότοτε ἐξενρήσειν οἴκαδε.

ΣΩ. Ή καὶ μουσικήν, ἣν ὀλίγον ἐμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν, στο-
C χάσεως τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν, καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, εἴπερ γ' ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ δωδοῦν ποτὲ βίος.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωφός ὑπὲρ ὄχλου τις ὀδούμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετέσσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν, καὶ μίγνυσθαι δοῦν καθαρὰ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν;

D ΠΡΩ. Οὕτουν ἔγωγ' οἶδα, ὃ Σώκρατες, διὰ τι τις ἀν βλάπτοιτο πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

ΣΩ. Μεθιῶ δὴ τὰς ξυμπάσας ἔχειν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὁμίλου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχήν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μεθεῖνται. καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν ἴτεον. οἷς γάρ διενοήθημεν αὐτὰς μιγνύναι πρῶτον, τὰ τῶν

καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅμοιως] Many notes question, we might read ὁμοῖοις, and have been written in defence and ex- omit καὶ: "Using, in building and in planation of these words. If they are other things, patterns like the circles, correct, we must understand by them, i.e. divine."

using other pattern figures in the same manner as the circles. Compare below, μισγαγκείας] Hom. Il. 4. 452, 'Ως ὅτε γέλιαρροι ποταμοὶ κατ' ὄρεστοι δέοντες ταύτων καὶ ἀληθεια, the same as truth. Εἰς μισγάγκειαν συμβάλλετον ὄβριμον But as it is not the manner of using ὄδωρο. οἷς γάρ διενοήθημεν] It is vain to

ἀληθῶν μόρι' οὐκ ἔξεγένεθ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταῦταν μεθεῖμεν ἀθρόας καὶ πρόσθεν τὸν Εἰδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ωρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι νῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἀθρόας ἀφετέον ἢ καὶ τούτων πρώτας μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσα ἀληθεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ τι διαφέρει πρός γ' ἀσφάλειαν πρώτας τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι.

ΣΩ. Μεθείσθων δὴ. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἀρ' οὐκ εἰ μέν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, παθάπερ ἐκεῖ, ἔνυμικτέον καὶ ταύτας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τάς γ' ἀναγκαῖας δῆπονθεν εἰ δέ γε καὶ παθάπερ τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι 63 διὰ βίου, καὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, εἴπερ πάσας ἡδονὰς ἡδεῖσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον θ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀβλαβές ἄπασι, πάσας ἔνυμικτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὁ Πρωταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς δ' αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις, διαπινθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδ' ἀλλήλων πέρι,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ω φίλαι, εἴθ' ἡδονὰς ἡμᾶς χρὴ προσαγορεύειν εἴτ' ἄλλῳ ὑπῷοῦ ὀνόματι, μῶν οὐκ ἀν δέξαιος³ οἴκειν μετὰ φρο-

look for any coherence in this passage so long as we retain ὡς γάρ. The sense requires οἷς γάρ. For the parts of the true sciences, with which we first proposed to mingle them, were not sufficient for us. I have also changed the place of πρώτον, which commonly follows μάρτια, where it has no meaning.

Tάς γ' ἀναγκαῖας δῆπονθεν] These words are commonly given to Protagoras, but Ficinus had long ago seen that they belong to Socrates. Van Heusden thought them spurious. Stallbaum defends them on the ground that δῆπονθεν in asseverando haud infrequens. No doubt; but with an appeal to another for his assent. "Must we

mix the necessary pleasures?" "I see no objection." "I presume you do not, if they are necessary." This way of laughing at the question and answer, as if there could be any question about what was necessary, is quite in Plato's manner. In the following sentence observe the very artistic finish of the antithesis in an inverted order. τέχνας πάσας = πάσας ἡδονάς, ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον = συμφέρον τε καὶ ἀβλαβές, ἐπίστασθαι = ἡδεῖσθαι. This shows how false is the sagacity of those who smell out an interpolation here. In Protagoras' answer, λέγωμεν refers to λέγομεν, and ποιῶμεν to ἔνυμικτέον. μετὰ φρονήσεως η πάσης] The Books

νήσεως, ἢ πάσης χωρὶς [τοῦ φρονεῖν]; οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα
τόδ' αὐτὰς ἀναγνωστάτον εἶναι λέγειν,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὄτι, παθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρη-
μον [εἰλικρινὲς] εἶναι τι γένος οὐτε πάντι τι δινατὸν οὔτε ἀφέ-
ται μονονοματικόν· πάντων γε μὴν ἥρονμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς
συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γηγνώσκειν τὰλλα τε πάντα καὶ αὐτὴν
αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως [εἰς] δίναμιν ἐκάστης.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ παλῶς γ' εἰρήματε τὰ νῦν, φήσουμεν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο, [τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ
τὸν νῦν ἀνερωτητέον]. Άρος ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθ' ἐν τῇ ξιγ-
κράσει; φαῖμεν ἀν τὸν νῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶν-
τες. Ποίων, φαῖεν ἀν ἵσως, ἡδονῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός.

Δ **ΣΩ.** Ο δέ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅδε. Πρὸς
ταῖς ἀληθέσιν ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς, φήσουμεν, ἀρος ἔτι προσδεῖσθ'

ἡμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ξυντίκους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφρόδοτά-
τας; Καὶ πᾶς, ὁ Σώφρατες; φαῖεν ἀν, αὐτὸν γ' ἔμποδίσματά
τε μυριὶ ἡμῖν ἔχοντι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι
[διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς], καὶ γίγνεσθαι τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐλα.
Ε ἔνσι τά τε γηγνόμεν' ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολύ, δι' ἀμέλειαν
λήθην ἔμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρονται; ἄλλας δ' ἡδο-
νὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ παθαρὰς ἀς εἴπεις, σχεδὸν οὐείας ἡμῖν νό-

have μ. φ. πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν. There seems no ground for the omission of μᾶλλον in an ordinary prose passage, and the attempt at variety in φρονήσεως, τοῦ φρονεῖν, is very poor. Nor is there any fairness in the alternative "either with all or without any". For these reasons I have preferred μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἢ πάσης χωρὶς. In the next paragraph εἰλευχίες is obviously an interpolation.

αὐτὴν αὖ τῇ] The MSS. have some τὴν αὐτὴν, others αὖ τὴν αὐτὴν. The reason for this answer of the Pleasures is that they like that which appreciates the nature of each of themselves. I have therefore written ἐκάστης and cancelled εἰς.

[τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νῦν ἀνερωτη-

τέον]] The verbal is plainly out of keeping with φαῖμεν ἀν, and both the repetition of νῦν καὶ φρόνησιν, and still more the would-be variety in "we must ask", "we shall say, asking", is most clumsy. Another conclusive reason against the genuineness of these words is the position of αὖ; for the opposition commences at πάλιν, and there was nothing to prevent the author writing τὴν φρό-
νησιν αὖ καὶ τὸν νῦν. But the simplest argument is, that if Plato had written τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νῦν ἀνερωτητέον, he would have had no motive for adding anything whatever to φαῖμεν ἀν.

[διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς]] This is no doubt a true explanation; but who would ever dream of saying αἱ ἡδοναὶ ταράττουσαι
ἡμᾶς διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς?

μιᾶς, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ἔγειας καὶ τοῦ σωματοειν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς, ὅπουσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὁπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ ξυναυιλονθοῖσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυ· τὰς δ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πανίας ἐπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μηγνύει τὸν βούλομένον ὃ τι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μῆξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πει- 64 φᾶσθαι, τί ποτ' ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον. ἀρ' οὐκ ἐμφρόνως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἔσαντὸν τὸν νῦν φίσομεν ὑπέρ τοῦ αἰτοῦ καὶ μηδίμης καὶ δόξης ὅρθῆς ἀποφίγνασθαι τὰ νῦν δηθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Άλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γ' ἀναγναῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἀν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδὲ ἀν ἐν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

B

ΣΩ. Ωι μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἀν ποτε τοῦτον ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδὲ ἀν γενόμενον εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οἰδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σύ τε καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ παθαπερεὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων παλῶς ἐμψύχον σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὡ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι.

ταύτας μίγνυ· τάς] All subsequent Editors have adopted this brilliant conjecture of Van Heusde for ταύτας μιγνύντας.

καὶ τιν' ἰδέαν αὐτήν] Of the various changes which might be proposed for the removal of the difficulty which this sentence presents, I think the most probable would be καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἰδέαν αὐτῆν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον. Compare *Sophist.*, 252, A. ὅσῳ κατ' εἶδον τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναι φασι.

ἔχόντως ἔσαντον] This is a playful allusion to the phrase νοῦν ἔχόντως.

κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων] Socrates speaks of his present argument (οὗν λόγος), that is the speculation concerning combining combinations and what admits of them, as concluded; he compares it to

the invisible power which orders the world, because it is capable of regulating man's life. Nothing can be simpler or clearer than this passage, and yet it has been twisted into the most absurd fancies, such as the following: *Descripta est adhuc mixtioneis ratio, atque ostensum, quoniam ejus elementa esse debeant, ita ut τὸ πέρας, τὸ ἀπειρον, et τὸ ξυμπισγόμενον in mixtione ista jam nunc conspiciantur.* (τὸ ξυμπισγόμενον in mixtione, would imply that τὸ ξυμπισγόμενον is something different from mixtio; if so, it is τὸ ἀπειρον and τὸ πέρας.) And again: *Quippe voluptatis constituant veluti corpus, sapientia vero ψυχήν.* Of all this metaphysical cobweb not a single thread belongs to Plato.

C ΣΩ. Άρε' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἡδη προθύροις [καὶ] τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι [τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου] λέγοντες ὅσιος δρθῶς ἂν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δῆτ' ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιότατον ἄμα καὶ μάλιστ' αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ὃν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴθ' ἡδονῆ εἴτε [τῷ] οὐρῷ προσφιέστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ξυνέστημεν.

D ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν ορίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ ξυμφορότατον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ξυμπάσσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αὐτίαν, δι' ἣν ἡ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἡτισοῦν ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδενός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδείς πον τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὄτι μέτρον καὶ τῆς ξυμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τιχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ξύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὐτήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ πρᾶσις, ἀλλά τις Εἄκρατος ξυμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε ὅντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις ξυμφορά.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ καταπέφενγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τάγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμέτρια πάλλος δίπον καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γ' ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ οράσει μεμιγθαί.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

65 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὶ μὴ μιᾶ συνάμεθ' ἰδέα, τὸ ἀγαθὸν [Θηρεῦσαι,] σύντρισι λαβόντες, πάλλει καὶ ἐμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέ-

[καὶ] By cancelling this word we arrive at the right construction, ἐπὶ τοῖς προθύροις τῆς τάγαθοῦ οἰκήσεως. τῆς τοιούτου seems to have been inserted after this intrusive καὶ had made τῆς οἰκήσεως seem to be without an

owner.

ξυμφορά] Observe the play on the word ξυμπεφορημένη.

μετριότης] This answers to ἀρετή, and ξυμμετρία to πάλλος.

λαβόντες] This has nothing to do

γωμεν ὡς τοῦτο τοῖον ἐν ὀρθότατ' ἀν αἰτιασαιμεθα [ἢν] τῶν
ἐν τῇ ξυμψίᾳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὃν τοιάντην αὐτὴν
γεγονέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἡδη τοίνυν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἵκανός ἡμῖν γένοιτο ἀν
δσπισοῦν κριτῆς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονήσεως, ὀπότερον αὐ-
τοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου ξυγγενέστερον τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώ- B
ποις τέ ἔστι καὶ θεοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Αῆλον μέν, ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν
βέλτιον.

ΣΩ. Καθ' ἐν ἔκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν
καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν. δεῖ γὰρ ἴδειν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον [ξυγγε-
νὲς] ἔκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλος καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ναι. πρῶτον δέ γ' ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὡς Πρώταρχε·
καὶ λαβόμενος, βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἡδο- C
νίν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον, ἀπόφιναι σαντῷ, πότερον ἡδονὴ^η
ξυγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ.

with catching, though the scribe who interpolated ὥηρεύσατο thought so. The infinitive to be understood is λαβεῖν. No ἴδειν can be the instrument for ensnaring or seizing on τάγαθόν. We have in fact found it; and we form our notion of it, (compare ἔπειδαν λαβῆν, 17, c) not by a single but by a triple character. For this reason as σὺν is quite inappropriate (else we should also read σὺν μᾶ), I have written σύντριτος, and as the three characters have been repeatedly mentioned, and are soon to be mentioned again, as Beauty or Symmetry, Measure, and Truth, I have changed συμμετρός into ἀμμετρός. τοῦτο is manifestly τάγαθόν, and this they consider the cause τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμψίᾳ, which is not quite so easy as it looks. For τάγαθόν is not spoken of as the cause of the ingredients; and if τὸ ἐν τῇ ξυμψίᾳ does not mean these, it must be constrained to mean the triple conditions of a good mixture just mentioned. But perhaps this constraint would be no longer felt, if we could find out what is lurking under the cor-

rupt οἷον ἐν. Indeed it is not so certain that τῶν itself is correct, for the repeated ἐν in αἰτιασαιμεθα' ἐν, which I have omitted as intolerable in Attic prose, might make one suspect that αἰτιασαιμεθα' αὐτῶν was to be read, and that some word like παρουσίας had preceded. The argument is very plain. There is ἀγαθὸν in χρᾶσις, for all prefer the mixed to the unmixed. But μέτρον, κάλλος, ἀλήθεια must be present at all χρᾶσις; therefore we may conclude that these three represent that one, and that ἀγαθὸν is the cause of their presence in the χρᾶσις, and that the χρᾶσις is good (τοιάντην) because of the Good that causes it.

[ξυγγενές] This word I have put in brackets. If any one wishes to retain it, he must insert ὡς. But although Socrates afterwards uses this figure of speech, —πότερον ἡδονὴ ξυγγενέστερον—it is not wanted, and its absence is fully compensated by the verb ἀπονεμοῦμεν. “To which of the two shall we rather declare Measure, Beauty, and Truth to belong?”

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ; πολὺ γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τὰφροδίσια, αὐλ δὴ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ Θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παίδων τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν δλίγιστον κεκτημένων· νοῦς δ' ἡτοι ταύτην καὶ ἀλήθειά ἔστιν ἢ πάντων ὅμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὥσαύτως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέπηται;

ΠΡΩ. Εἴσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδέν ἄν ξεν ποτε.

Ε **ΣΩ.** Καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὅμως δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νοῦς ἡμῖν πάλλους μετείληφε πλεῖον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστ' εἶναι παλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τούναντίον;

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὐδὲν ὑπαρ οὔτ' ὄντας αἰσχρὸν οὔτ' εἰδεν οὔτ' ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῆς οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτ' ὄντας οὔτ' ἐσόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονάς δέ γέ πον, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας, δταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὄντινον, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ 66 πάντων αἰσχυστον ἐπόμενον ὁρῶντες, αὐτοὶ γ' αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες πρόπτομεν δι τι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τουαντα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐδέσον ὁρᾶν αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Πάντη δὴ φίσεις, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τ' ἀγγέλων [πέμπων] καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα ὥντες ἔστι πρῶ-

ἀμετράτερον .. ἐμμετράτερον] I have followed the authority of the oldest MS. Buttmann, though disposed to extend the analogy of ἀκροτέρος, σφοδρότερος &c. to compound words, and to consider εὐτεχνώτερος and such like as licenses taken by the Attic poet in unusual words, is content to await a fuller induction. The presence of these forms in a MS. which has preserved so many

Atticisms is a part and no small part of the kind of proof which he wanted.

'Αλλ' οὖν] Here again the MSS. and Edd. have 'Αρ' οὖν, which is evidently out of place where an admission is made in answer to a previous question, and where the only answer made by the next speaker is 'Ορθῶς.

[πέμπων]] ὑπ' ἀγγέλων φράζειν is the same as ἀγγέλους πέμπων φράζειν.

τον οὐδέ αὐλ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῃ περὶ μέριον καὶ τὸ μέριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὑπόσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν ἀΐδιον ηὔρησθαι φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ Β τέλεον καὶ ἴκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὑπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖτης ἔστιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστε γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεῖς οὐκ ἀν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ιαρός οὖν [οὐ τέταρτα,] ἀ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὁρθὰς λεκθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστι μᾶλ- C λον τῆς ἡδονῆς ξυγγενῆ;

ΠΡΩ. Τάχ' ἄν.

ΣΩ. Πέμπτιας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὄρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμας, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν, ἐπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Εκτῇ δέ ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὁρφείς, καταπαύσατε κόσμου ἀοιδῆς. ἀτὰρ μνδυνεύει καὶ δὲ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἔκτῃ

Comp. Eur. *Alcest.* 737, 738. But οὐδὲ ἀγγέλων πρέπειν is nothing at all.

[τοιαῦτα χρῆ] The MSS. are divided between τοιαῦτα χρῆ and χρῆ τοιαῦτα, the former, which alone makes sense, being supported by the inferior MSS.

[τὴν ἀΐδιον ηὔρησθαι φύσιν] I have discussed the proper reading and interpretation of this passage in my Introduction. With regard to the expression τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν in place of ἀγαθόν, which he has all along been employing, it is not difficult to see that Plato here, knowing that the mere argument is virtually at an end, breaks loose from dialectic trammels and allows his enthusiasm full play. It is to be noticed that he uses the word ἀΐδιος which to a common hearer meant only *perpetual* or *eternal*, in a further sense with which his scholars were familiar, of the in-

visible or undiscoverable. That for the sake of which all things are is the end, and being the end it cannot be explained, as other things are, by that to which it belongs, or of which it is the effect; but its name is also its definition. It is, and there is nothing beyond.

[τῆς ἀληθείας] These words are introduced with a certain bye-purpose of shewing that this νοῦς owes its place to the Truth of which it is the realisation.

[οὐ τέταρτα] If τέταρτα is in its right place here, it is of no use lower down; but it seems better placed there than here.

[ἐπιστήμας] The MSS. have ἐπιστήμας, τὰς δέ. The scribe was put out by the want of τὰς μέν, but it is understood in τὰς δέ, according to a common idiom.

Δικαταπεπαυμένος εἶναι υρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὕσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΣΩ. Ἡδι τὴν τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποιον δὴ τὸ τρίτον, ὃ Σώκρατες; ὡς Φιλήβος τὰ γαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἥδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ πάντη; ὡς γὰρ ἔσπειρας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

Ε ΣΩ. Ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτ' ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδῶν ἄπερ τὴν δὴ διελίλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἴπον ὡς ἥδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιον τε καὶ ἀμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀρθρώπων βίῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλ' εἶναι πολλά, εἴπον ὡς, εἰ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῦν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων τῷ πρὸς ἥδονὴν ἔννοδιαμαχούμεν, ἥδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο.

67 ΠΡΩ. Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γε πάντων ἵκανώτατον τούτοιν οὐδέτερον [ἴκανὸν] ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Άληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἥδονὴ μή τι τάγαθόν γ' αὐτὸν μηδέτερον αὐ-

τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι] A common proverb for adding the finishing stroke to any performance. The third libation was offered to Ζεὺς Σωτῆρος.

[Ποῖον δῆ] If the reader will look into any other edition, he will see wherein I have departed from the received text. The reasons for so doing need scarcely be given. Φιλήβος χ. τ. ξ. in the mouth of Socrates is made to cut Protarchus' question Ποῖον δὴ τὸ τρίτον; in two, making nonsense of both halves, and looking like nonsense itself. I have joined it by ὡς to that part of Protarchus' speech, where it must occur to give sense to Socrates' answer. I have also added γὰρ to the second ὡς,

and for παντελῆ, which is absurd, put πάντη.

[ἴκανόν] The interpolation of this word is easily accounted for, if we suppose that the reading of the Coislinian πάντων ἵκανώτατα ἐφάνη was founded on some old copy. For in this way there was no predicate to οὐδέτερον. Afterwards the correctors of the copies which, like the Bodleian, retained ἵκανώτατον, on collation with such another copy, adopted the reading, not suspecting that it was invented as a salve to a corruption from which their own text was exempt.

[ἀπήλλακτο] This confirms my conjecture on Thucydides 1, 138: where

τοῖν εἶναι, στερόμενον αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἴκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Φανέντος δέ γ' ἄλλον τρίτου κρείττονος τούτοιν ἔκατέφον, μιχίψ αὐτὸν δύναμης οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφιέστερον Β πέφανται τὴν τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέα.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Οὔκον πέμπτον πατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἢν τὴν δὲ λόγος ἀπεφίγατο, γίγνοιτο ἀνὴρ η τῆς δύναμις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐπικεν.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον δέ γε, οὐδὲν ἀνὸν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τάλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἵς πιστεύοντες, ὡσπερ μάντεις ὅρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ πρίνουσι τὰς δύναμάς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἥμεν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τὸν θηρίων ἔφωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον [ἢ τοὺς] τῶν ἐν Μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαρτευμένων ἑλάστοτε λόγων. C

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰρήσθαι σοι τὸν ἕδη φαμὲν ἀπαντεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετε με;

ΠΡΩ. Σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὡς Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δή πον σύ γ' ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἥμῶν. ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.

he says in speaking of the character of Themistocles: *κρίναται δ' ἵκανῶν οὐκ ἀπύλλαχτο.* "He did not shut himself up from men capable of judging." For μή τι—γε the Books have μή τοι—γε, which is a blunder of continual occurrence.

Πρῶτον δέ γε, οὐδὲν ἄν] The second class of MSS. and Eusebius have the reading οὐκ ἄν, which, if it be written οὐ, καν would be no way inferior to

that in the text.

φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διάκαν] They declare it, not by word, but by deed, by following pleasure.

ἐν Μούσῃ] Compare *Laws* 899 ε, ἐν ταῖς Μούσαις οὐκ ὁρῶσις ὑμνούμενατ; not by the Muses, but in songs inspired by them. I have put ἢ τοὺς in brackets. The same double construction after a comparative is offered by the MSS. in a passage of the *Euthydemus*.

PALÆOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

TRANSPOSITIONS AND INTERPOLATIONS.

Those who have not paid much attention to the Critical History of our Texts will probably think that they cannot have suffered much from the placing of words out of their proper order, and that consequently we ought not to rely on corrections attempted by means of transposition. But if any one will take the trouble to compare the various readings of the MSS. say of Thucydides or Plato, he will find instances continually recurring in which one copy differs from another in this respect, although in others it presents very few diversities of reading. Again if he will search for those cases where a transposition of two or more words restores the sense of an otherwise hopeless passage, he will soon find that their number accumulates far more rapidly than he had expected. Nor will it be long before he is able to make a considerable muster of sentences in which a word has strayed so far from its place that it is found at the other end of the sentence, or even in another to which it cannot belong. And not only single words or phrases, but whole sentences have thus changed places, as in those parts of Tragedy where the dialogue consists of alternating lines or couplets, and the sense has enabled critics to discover the places to which these originally belonged. These faults of transcription are no more than we should have a right to expect: for in the first place it is nothing unusual that a scribe should leave out one or more words, or that having left them out he should place them where the reader will notice the omission, or that his copyist should in his hurry fail to observe the mark in the text corresponding to another in the margin which shewed where the words were to be inserted; or if the first writer was content to write the words in

the body of the text, with certain letters to shew that two parts of a sentence were to be read in an inverted order, it was no wonder if the transcriber neglected those letters. Some of these transpositions are so strange that one can scarcely figure to oneself the state of the MS. in which the blunder first began.

I give two instances of this; of which the first is from the *Plutus* vv. 119-20.

Πλ. ὁ Ζεὺς μὲν οὐν οἰδ' ᾧς γμ' εἰ
πύθοιτ' νῦν δ' οὐ τοῦτο δρᾶ;

The first place where I have left a gap is commonly filled up with the words *τὰ τούτων μῶρον* and the second with *ἄν ἐπιτρίψειε*. The result is that you are obliged to take *τὰ μῶρα* for *τὴν μωρίαν*, that the speaker must be understood to say *τούτων* of those whom he is addressing, that Jove is represented as likely to punish one person for the folly of two others with whom he has nothing to do, and that we have to digest such an order of words as we can find no match for in all Greek literature. But transpose these, and fill up the first gap with *ἄν ἐπιτρίψειε*, and the second with *τουτωμώρες*, and you get

Πλ. ὁ Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν οἰδ' ᾧς ἄν ἐπιτρίψειέ μ', εἰ
πύθοιτο τοῦτ'. Χρ. ὡς μῶρες, νῦν δ' οὐ τοῦτο δρᾶ;

In the *Heraclidæ* of Euripides the following verses (682 foll.) occur.

Θεράπων.

ἥκιστα πρός σου μῶρον ἦν εἰπεῖν ἔπος.
'Ιόλαος.

καὶ μὴ μετασχεῖν γ' ἀλκίμου μάχης φίλοις.

Θεράπων.

* * * * *

'Ιόλαος.

τι δ', οὐ θένοιμι καν̄ ἐγὼ δι' ἀσπίδος;

Θεράπων.

θένοις ἄν, ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν αὐτὸς ἄν πέσοις.

'Ιόλαος.

οὐδεὶς γέν' ἐχθρῶν προσβλέπων ἀνέξεται.

Θεράπων.

* * * * *

'Ιόλαος.

ἀλλ' οὖν μαχοῦνται γ' ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσοσι.

Θεράπων.

σμικρὸν τὸ σὸν σήκωμα προστίθης φύλοις.

I have written *μαχοῦνται* for *μαχοῦμαι* because Iolaus is thinking of his enemies, as we see from his foregoing speech, and his plea is that at least he will help to make up the number on his side. "Our enemies shall at least fight men not fewer in number." If this wanted confirmation, it would be confirmed by the answer *σμικρὸν κ. τ. ξ.* But how are we to fill up the gaps? Here are two lines for the purpose which I give from the MSS. and Editions; they both begin alike.

1. *οὐκ ἔστ' ἐν ὅψει τραῦμα, μὴ δράσης χερός.*

2. *οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς τὰν, ητις ἦν φῶμη σέθεν.*

If we ask the merest beginner which answers best in either passage, he will say that nothing can be more appropriate than to remind an old man of his weakness, when he threatens to join the battle, nor more inappropriate than when he counts on his enemies flying from his very look; and that as the proper answer to the last boast would be to tell him, that *looks do not wound*, so the same observation is altogether foreign to the purpose, when the old man has just said, "It is not worthy of me to refuse to share the fight with my friends". Now the Books all agree in the very opposite decision, and assign no. 1. to the first gap and no. 2. to the second; and what is far more wonderful, Elmsley mentions the change, which was first proposed by Musgrave, without giving the slightest hint that he even thinks it probable.

In the *Iphigenia Taurica* v. 513 foll. we find the same error. Iphigenia asks the unknown Orestes whether he will tell her something. Orestes answers that he will. And now that we are on the tiptoe to know what question Iphigenia will ask, because we naturally expect the first unravelling of the plot from the answer thereto, she breaks into a sentimental reflexion.

καὶ μὴν ποθεινός γ' ἥλθες ἐξ Ἀργους μολών.

to which Orestes answers very naturally, "You may be glad to see me here, but I am not so glad to be here": after which interruption the expected questioning and answering begin. But if we take this interrupting couplet out of the way and put it immediately after Iphigenia has learnt that the stranger is from Argos, in this order,

- I. φυγὰς δ' ἀπῆρας πατρίδος, ἦ ποιη τύχη;
 O. φεύγω τρόπον γε δή τιν' οὐχ ἐκάνη ἐκάνη.
 I. καὶ μὴν ποθεινός γ' ἥλθες ἐξ "Ἄργους μολών.
 O. οὔκουν ἐμαυτῷ γ', εἰ δὲ σοι, σὺ τοῦθ' ὅρα.
 I. ἀρ' ἂν τι μοι φράσεις ὡν ἔγω θέλω;
 O. ᾧς γ' ἐν παρέογει τῆς ἐμῆς δυσποραξίας.—

we find each verse naturally arising out of that which precedes and introducing to that which follows it.

For the same reason, to such a line as this (*Ion* 1295)

Ἐμελλεις οἰκεῖν τᾶμ', ἐμοῦ βίᾳ λαβών,

the retort

κἀπειτα τοῦ μέλλειν μ' ἀπέκτεινες φόβῳ;

ought to answer without anything intervening; but that passage would lead me into another topic, that of wilful interpolation, for the four lines πατρός γε—χθονός contain nothing but what is said with equal clearness further on.

The same reason does not apply to the passage in the *Euthydemus* (305, c. v) which I have mentioned elsewhere in this Book (p. iii), where the following most necessary connexion has been broken by the negligence of some copyist: οἶνται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν ἀν πάντι παρὰ πολλοῖς, | ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, νῦν τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούνεσθαι. | ὥστε (τοῦ) παρὰ πᾶσιν εὑδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἦ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. It is true that the words which I have here introduced into their proper place, have, where they now occur, been the innocent cause of the silly interpolation, εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, but they were not displaced on purpose to make room for an interpolation, like the verse in the *Ion* quoted above.

This whole matter of transposition may be summed up thus. If the misplacing of words is an accident of frequent occurrence in writing, and the correction of such errors is liable to be misunderstood and so to lead to further confusion; if the examples of such confusion are to be found in several places where the nature of metrical dialogue would generally be a safeguard against their occurrence; and if these examples often concern not only single words but even whole verses, it is unreasonable to refuse assent to those conjectural emendations which consist of trans-

position, when by such transposition we obtain sentences of which the grammatical construction and the sense are such as satisfy the reader, because it is most unlikely that good grammar and good sense should be produced by accident, and not be the sense and the grammar intended by the author.

The question of the *a priori* probability of interpolations may be disposed of in a few words; probably no one will deny the likelihood that words appearing in the margin, where they were intended as mere observations, should be mistaken by a copyist for restorations of matter omitted in the text; but some persons may feel reluctant to believe that the scribes would wilfully interpolate words of their own, and endeavour to pass them off as the words of the author, or perhaps they would concede such a possibility only where the text which the copyist had before him was corrupt or unintelligible; but this belief that the writers of our manuscripts were scrupulous and were generally guided by common sense, is altogether contrary to experience. Hundreds of passages may be adduced from all the masters of Attic prose, to shew that the scribes were in the habit of inserting unnecessary words, words which were intended to eke out the construction, and which only serve to confound it, and words which shew that the whole drift of the passage was misunderstood. Too much stress cannot be laid on the last class, for if we find a clause added which either contradicts the rest of the sentence or is utterly irrelevant to it, the scribe is at once convicted of deliberate forgery.

I have already pointed out that in *Laws* 710, A, the words *τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς* are an antithesis invented to answer to *τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς*, and that *τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς* itself is a corrupt reading, for the speaker is describing that vulgar kind of temperance which is developed even in children and in beasts, to prevent their being unrestrained as to pleasure, *ὅπερ εὐθὺς παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις, τοῦ μὴ ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἥδονάς, ξύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ*. I have also mentioned a passage in the *Phædo*, where the difference between Plato's meaning and that of the interpolator amounts to a contradiction. For while the one bids us, if we are sure of our principle, disregard any seeming contradictions that may arise out of it, (*χαίρειν ἐφῆς ἀν τὰ ἀπ' ἔκεινης ὁμηρέντα*) the other

tells us to hold our principle only provisionally, until such a contradiction arises. See *Phædo* 101, n.

In *Laws* 841, B, we read, τὸ δὴ λανθάνειν τούτων δρῶντά τι καλὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔστω [νόμιμον] οὐθεὶς καὶ ἀγράφῳ νομισθὲν νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρόν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ μὴ πάντως δρᾶν. If this is correct, the writer asserts that *not* to do the forbidden things is not disgraceful. But so flat a truism never dropped from Plato's pen. Remove τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρόν, and then we see that it is not τὸ μὴ δρᾶν that is to be the καλὸν of these men of weak virtue, but that they are to be allowed a lower kind of καλόν, namely τὸ λανθάνειν δρῶντα. And so Plato comments on his own words, οὗτοι τό τε (vulgo τοῦτο) αἰσχρὸν αὖτις καὶ καλὸν δευτέρως ἀντὶ ήμιν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γενόμενον κέοιτο.

It is difficult to account for such interpolations as those which I have pointed out in my edition of the *Symposium* (Ep. ad Th. pp. xiv-xvi) and yet they are of continual occurrence in Plato. On the one hand we can hardly conceive how any one who knew the construction well enough to supply ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν (*Laws* 817, c) should fail to see that ἔστειν had already been provided for the same purpose, or why any one should have thought it necessary for the sense in *Theætetus* 171, c, to add τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ἔνγκωρήσεται, in order to give construction to what follows, when he had before him ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δέ γ' ὑπὲρ ἐπείνου ὅμολογήσεται.

But the interpolators are not merely intent on helping out the construction by their supplements; sometimes they endeavour to give an additional beauty to the text, as in the following passage of Demosthenes in *Midium*, which I quote *instar omnium* as a specimen of the manner in which our scribes thought they could add finishing touches to Attic oratory, 546, A. εἰδ' ὑμεῖς τὸν οὕτως ὡμόν, τὸν οὕτως ἀγνώμονα, τὸν τηλικαύτας δικας λαμβάνοντα, ὃν αὐτὸς ἡδικῆσθαι φησι μόνον, (οὐ γὰρ ἡδικητό γε,) τοῦτον ὑβρίζοντα λαβόντες εἰς τινα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφίσετε, καὶ μήθ' ἔορτῆς, μήθ' ἱερῶν, μήτε νόμου, μήτ' ἄλλου μηδενὸς πρόνοιαν ποιούμενον οὐ καταψηφιεῖσθε; οὐ παράδειγμα ποιήσετε; If ever there was a passage where the rules of Art required that nothing should interrupt the swelling indignation of the speaker till it burst out in one single call to vengeance, it is this one which

our copyists have garnished with ἀφῆσεται and οὐ καταψηφίεισθε. But luckily for us, this second ornament is fastened on to an accusative ποιούμενον, which refuses to hold it. Perhaps those who believe that all interpolations in Demosthenes are posterior to the MS. Σ, will allow this to be an exception; while they are making up their minds, let me inform the reader of my suspicion that τὸν οὐτως ἀγνώμονα is nothing but a foolish dittographia of τὸν οὐτως ὡμόν, and that μόνον is an addition but no improvement to φησι.

A very common source of interpolation is the attempt to fill up gaps left in the copy, or to complete passages which seem to be defective. In at least two passages of the *Philebus* it is pretty certain that we have supplements of this kind, but we have nothing to guide us to the detection of these, except the hopelessness of the present reading; and as long as there are ingenious men who undertake to explain everything, (Have they not even explained every Chorus in Sophocles, and that too according to various readings?) it will be difficult to hold one's ground against such adversaries, who offer positive results against a mere οὐ μανθάνω. But the tables are turned when we come to passages, where we can shew the source of the corruption or prove that there is none, as when a marginal note has slipped into the text, and then, being treated as a part of it, has been so supplemented as to bring it into harmony with its surroundings. Cobet supplies me with an instance from the celebrated fragment of the *Cretans*. Euripides had written φοινικογενοῦς τέκνον Εὐρώπης, and a Scholiast had in the Margin explained the first word by τῆς Τυρίας. This was by accident incorporated with the text and considered as a part of it; but then the Anapæstic metre required another syllable. This was soon found; and so from that day to the *Epistola ad Millium*, and from it to our own they write or print, φοινικογενοῦς παῖ τῆς Τυρίας τέκνον Εὐρώπης.

I will give an example of the same kind from the *Iphigenia Taurica*. In v. 464, Iphigenia prays, δέξαι θυσίας, ἃς ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν ρόμος οὐχ ὄστας ἀναφαίνει. Some commentator thinks it worth his while to warn the reader that παρ' ἡμῖν does not mean the Taurians but the Greeks, and this he does by writing one word, "Ἐλλησι. When this word comes to be mixed up with the rest, it is found very troublesome to the metre, but an ingenious person

discovers that if it is placed very near the end with a convenient dissyllable of no particular meaning after it, it will give no further trouble at least to the metrical critic. And so we have δέξαι θυσίας, ἃς ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος οὐχ ὀσίας "Ελλησι διδοὺς ἀναφεινει.

A more striking example is that which I have elsewhere given from the *Medea* vv. 734, foll.

πέποιθα, Πελίου δ' ἐχθρός ἐστι μοι δόμος
Κρέων τε· τούτοις δ' ὄρκιοισι μὲν ξυγεὶς
ἄγονσιν οὐ μεθεῖ ἀν ἐκ γαίας ἔμε.
λόγοις δὲ συμβάσι, καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι ἀν, κάπικηρυκεύμασιν
οὐκ ἀν πίθοι, τάμα μὲν γάρ ἀσθενῆ,
τοῖς δ' ὄλβος ἐστι, καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

Elmsley's note on κάπικηρυκεύμασι is as follows. "κάπικηρυκεύματα legit Scholiasta. ἐπικηρυκεύματα γάρ εἰσι τὰ διὰ τῶν κηρυγμάτων γιγνόμενα πρὸς φίλιαν. τῇ δὲ εὐθείᾳ ἀντὶ δοτικῆς κέχορται. ἔδει γάρ εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοῖς ἐπικηρυκεύμασιν οὐκ ἀν πίθοι. Διδυμος δέ φησιν ἐλλείπειν τὴν δια. διὰ τὰ ἐπικηρυκεύματα. Paullo ante legitur; μὴ ὄμόσας δὲ φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύματος. Θέλει εἰπεῖν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύμασιν. λείπει δὲ ή δια, Latet hic aliquid quod extricare nequeo." Let us take account of the difficulties in the whole passage. First there is μεθεῖ ἀν, which ought to govern the genitive, and although Porson's note is an excellent one, the question still recurs, "why not ἔμοι after the nearer verb?" For ἀνώμοτος in the best MSS. there is ἀνώμοτος, but this old Scholium by its μὴ ὄμόσας δέ supports the former. Then we have κάπικηρυκεύμασι in the text, but the scholiasts most certainly read either κάπικηρυκεύματα, or τάπικηρυκεύματα, or both. Last of all we find in all MSS. and in the Scholia οὐκ ἀν πίθοι, which, as Dindorf observes, is the contrary of what was to be said. For this reason modern editions have adopted Wytténbach's τάχ' ἀν πίθοι. But if we look at the second Scholium quoted by Elmsley φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύματος, we observe a new combination, which proves that τάπικηρυκεύματα must have been so placed that it could be taken, whether rightly or not, as standing ἀπὸ κοινοῦ to the two optatives γένοι ἀν and οὐκ ἀν πίθοι; but this would be impossible if the verses ran thus:

φίλος γένοι' ἀν τάπικηρυκεύματα,
οὐκ ἀν πίθοιο.

Therefore the verses must have been so arranged that while
οὐκ ἀν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα

made one line, φίλος γένοι' ἀν followed in such a way as to admit of being construed also with the same word. And this is in fact the key of the enigma. οὐκ ἀν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα should have followed immediately on ζυγεῖς. But it was left out, and afterwards restored at the side or at the foot of the page. From hence the last part was fetched and fitted in immediately after φίλος γένοι' ἀν: after which οὐκ ἀν πίθοιο, which still remained on hand, was admitted into the vacant place. But in the meantime the sense contained in οὐκ ἀν πίθοιο could not wait for all these adjustments; so the corrector made a line *de suo*, and that is the very line which Porson defended. The passage therefore should be restored thus:

πέποιθα· Πελίου δ' ἔχθρός ἐστι μοι δόμος,
Κρέων τε· τούτοις δ' ὄρκοισι μὲν ζυγεῖς
οὐκ ἀν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα·
λόγοις δὲ συμβάσις, καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι' ἀν, τάμα μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῆ,
τοῖς δ' ὅλβος ἐστί, καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

The construction of the third line is just the same as the Homeric
ἢ ρά νύ μοι τι πίθοιο.

In conclusion I will point out some of the most striking interpolations in another Dialogue of Plato which has fared pretty nearly as ill as the *Philebus*, viz. the *Politicus*. 286, a. μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰ μείζω. 286, b. δυσχερῶς (read ἥπτε). 286, d. δεῖν (read μεμερίσθαι and compare 284, e). 287, a. τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. 287, e. καὶ ἐμπύροις καὶ ἀπύροις. (The dialogue is ill distributed, and should be arranged thus. προσφθέγγομεθα.—N. Σ. καὶ μάλα γε συχνὸν εἶδος. Ε. καὶ τῇ ζ. γε—ἐπιστήμη. N. Σ. πῶς γάρ;) 288, c. προσαγορευθέν. 293, a. ὁρθή (read οὐ ἀν γίγνηται). 293, b. ἥγονυμεθα (comma after ἀρχοντας). 295, a. παχυτέρως. (The structure is: Θήσει τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς προσῆκον, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ τό πως οὐτωσί. Read ἐν ἐκάστοις τῶν νόμων.) 295, d. παρὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα. 295, d. ποτε νομοθετηθέντα. 297, b. οἷοι τε ὁσι. 298, a. ἀναλώματα. 299, e. ζητεῖν. 303, e. λείπεται.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

I have pointed out several passages in the *Philebus* where the dialogue has found its way into the wrong person's mouth. Similar blunders have been noticed in the *Epistle* prefixed to my *Euthydemus*. I will now bring forward two or three more. *Pol.* 287, ε. mentioned above under the head of interpolations. *Pol.* 304, c. N. Σ. Ταύτην ἐκείνων. Ξ. Τὴν δ' εἰ δεῖ μανθάνειν . . . σὺ γ' ἡμῖν ἀποφαίνει δεῖν ἄρχειν; *Pol.* 306, Δ. πάντως γε μὴν δητέον is a part of the Stranger's speech. *Laws* 811, β. πολυμαθίαν. πᾶς οὖν . . . νομοφύλακι; *ΚΛ.* Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις; *ΑΘ.* Τοῦ πρὸς τί π. . . ἀποκωλύοι. *ΚΛ.* Λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκνει λέγειν. In Euripides' *Ion* 1356 foll. every one is now agreed that the dialogue should run thus: *Πν.* λαβών νυν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκούσαν ἐκπόνει. *Ιων.* πᾶσαν δ' ἐπελθὼν Ἀσιάδ', Εὐρώπης δ' ὁρούς; *Πν.* γιώσει τάδ' αὐτός.—But I quote the passage in order to complete its correction. When the second line stood as part of a continuous speech, it first acquired that δὲ which the MSS. offer us. But in order to bring δὲ in, a transposition was necessary; so the critic changed

'Ασιάδ' ἐπέλθω πᾶσαν, Εὐρώπης δ' ὁρούς;
into πᾶσαν δ' ἐπελθὼν Ἀσιάδ'. Yet the old reading which he altered is obviously correct. 'Ἐπελθὼν would mean that he was to look for his mother *after* he had wandered even the world, and not while he was doing so, which would require ἐπιών.

FALSE COALITION OF SYLLABLES.

Tò τρίτον ἐτέρῳ and *tò τρίτον ἐτ' ἔρῳ* would be undistinguishable in MSS. where neither accents nor breathings were used. In Dion. Halic. *De Lysia*, 7. the words ὅθεν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἄν δρᾶσαι, τοὺς δὲ παθεῖν, were until Markland's time read, οὐθὲν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας αἰτοῦσα εἰ ταθεῖη. A fresh instance of this has just presented itself to me in the *Politicus* 290, δ. ἥδη τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦμεν οἷον γειτόνος ἵχνους . . . ἐφάπτεσθαι. Such is the reading of the oldest MS.; some others change γειτόνος into γέ τινος, but no one has yet pointed out that *OION ΓΕΙΤΟΝΟC* is a mere blunder for *OIONEI TINOC*. Even the youngest scholar will remember Porson's correction of ἐγνώσμεθ' ἐξ Ἰσον πάνι ὑστάτοις κακοῖς, and Bentley's of μή τινα φάναι τὰ Ἐρικέπεω.

OMISSION OF OT.

One example among many of the confusion caused by the omission of *οὐ* is to be found in the Vatican Scholia on Euripides printed at the end of Geel's *Phænissaæ*. *Androm.* v. 103 Ἰλίω
αἰπεινά: μονῳδία ἔστι 1 τὸ δὴ ἐνὸς προσώπου θρηνοῦντος. ὥστε
τὸ “Ασιατίδος γῆς σχῆμα” 2 μονῳδία ἔστι. τραγῳδία γὰρ καὶ
3 οὐκ ἔδει οὔτε τὰ ἐν θεοφορούμενῃ ἀδόμενα, οὐθὲ θρηνεῖ γάρ. Read,
1) ἔστιν ὡδή, 2) οὐ μ. ἐ., 3) οὐκ ἔδει. At other times *οὐ* is intruded into a text by mistake for another word, or from a misunderstanding of the author's drift. Synesius in one of his letters tells his friend that the parcel must by this time have reached him, *οὐ γὰρ ἐπεγέγραπτο*; a most whimsical inference. But the Bishop wrote *σοὶ γάρ*. In Thuc. II, 43, *οὐ γὰρ οἱ πανοπλαγοῦντες δικαιότερον ἀφειδοῖεν ἀν τοῦ βίου, οἵτις οὐκ ἔστιν αγαθῶν*, the negative spoils the whole argument, which is that while the poor have something to hope for, the rich have something to fear, and that therefore the rich ought to value life less than the poor.

ΓΑΡ ΟΤΝ.

I have asserted that *γὰρ οὖν* is only admissible, where the speaker concedes what another has affirmed. It is not used in this sense in *Agam.* v. 674, where the Herald after forebodings of Menelaus' shipwreck adds

γένοιτο δ' ὡς ἄριστα· Μενέλεων γὰρ οὖν
πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόκα μολεῖν.

Anyone may see that the apparent sense of these words is in contradiction to the fears that precede, and to the faintly hoping *εἰ δ' οὖν* that follows. But the passage is not Greek; for *προσδόκα μολεῖν* ought to be either *προσδόκα μολεῖσθαι* or *π. μολεῖν* ἄν. The emendation is obvious: “Let us hope that some have escaped. Menelaus at least has not the best chance”

Μενέλεων γ' ἄν οὐ
πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδοκῶ μολεῖν.

A P P E N D I X.

EXTRACTS FROM BÖCKH'S PHILOLAUS.

That such an association as the Pythagorean, which united religious and political aims with science, should insist on silence and should have its secrets, is suited to the nature of the case, but it admits of doubt whether the scientific matter, which from its very nature is withdrawn from the eyes of the multitude without deliberate concealment, can have required to be kept secret by means of severe commands. If need for secrecy existed, it must rather have been in relation to their doctrines concerning the Divine Nature and its relation to the world and to man, at variance as they were with popular belief; and yet these very doctrines, expressed in the Pythagorean form, could have been neither dangerous to the common people nor accessible to them. Nevertheless the ancients agree in the firm belief that the doctrines and books of the Pythagoreans were a secret of the order, and as there were no writings to be procured, either of Pythagoras, or of his older disciples or followers, we must at all events allow that *they* told the world nothing; not perhaps however so much because a law expressly forbade them, as because custom bred in them a certain reserve toward strangers, while for those who had capacity and inclination to receive their doctrines oral teaching within the limits of the society seemed more convenient, and lastly because under these circumstances, there was scarcely any occasion for books, whilst again the old members of the order must have been kept from writing by their political occupations, and their life of seclusion, contemplation and asceticism. Yet, if Porphyry is to be believed, Lysis and Archippus and the few others who by their absence were saved from the ruin of the order, preserved a few

feeble sparks of the doctrine, and fearing lest the name of philosophy should wholly disappear from mankind, and lest they should in consequence incur the hatred of the gods, brought together writings of the older Pythagoreans and from these, together with what they themselves remembered, composed brief memorials, which they bequeathed to their sons, their daughters, and their wives, with the order not to communicate them to any stranger; and so this injunction was handed on from generation to generation. Frequent as is the mention of unrighteous and unfaithful revelation of Pythagorean doctrines, we find little agreement as to details. Thus it is related that of the two sects, the ἀκονθματικοὶ and the μαθηματικοὶ, the former was recognised by the latter as Pythagorean, but the latter were recognised by the former only as the disciples of Hippasos, the first according to this story to divulge Pythagorean matter in a mathematical treatise, and who in consequence, met with his death by drowning; yet the same Hippasos, according to a more credible account, never wrote anything. And to say nothing of the poets Empedocles and Epicharmus, Lysis, in an evidently spurious letter, reproaches Hipparchus with having tasted of Sicilian luxury and even of philosophising in public, for which offence he is said to have been banished and to have had a gravestone set up for him as for one dead. But the blame of having spread abroad Pythagorean writings applies more especially to Philolaus, although what is said concerning him is no less filled with contradictions than the rest. Neanthes, whom even Plutarch designates as credulous, informs us that until Empedocles and Philolaus abused their trust, as he terms it, the Pythagoreans had been more free in their communications; Diogenes and Iamblichus tell us that before Philolaus, nobody found out the Pythagorean doctrines, but that he first brought out the three celebrated Books which Dion the Syracusan at Plato's instance bought for a hundred minæ, according to Iamblichus, from Philolaus himself, who had fallen into great and urgent poverty, a story which by the bye admirably suits a man who is said to have been put to death for aiming at despotic power. But then again in order, to some extent, to remove the guilt from him, Iamblichus adds that Dion had himself formerly belonged to the Pythagorean connection, and for this reason had been allowed to possess the Books. Among older

authors the first I shall name is Satyrus the Peripatetic, a contemporary of Aristarchus the grammarian. Diogenes follows Satyrus in his account, and tells us on his authority, that Plato wrote to Dion about those Books, and that Dion bought them of Philolaus himself; and he adds, from the same author, that Plato became very rich through the liberality of Dionysius. Indeed one might even suppose that the whole story was invented by the spite of the Peripatetics against Socrates and the Academy, (a subject which Luzac has well treated in his essay *De Digmia Socratis*,) in order to fix a charge of plagiarism upon Plato, were there not two older witnesses than Satyrus at hand. Hermippus, who was certainly not a more trustworthy man than Neanthes, but yet ancient enough (for he lived under Ptolemy Euergetes) assures us, on the authority of an ancient writer, that Plato when in Sicily bought the Book written by Philolaus from that author's relations in Dionysius' service for forty Alexandrian minæ, and with its contents composed the *Timæus*. Others again make Plato procure the work in return for having prevailed on Dionysius to release a young man, the disciple of Philolaus, from prison. And Timon the sillographer who flourished about the 127th Olympiad, has already a palpable allusion to this story. For Gellius, after mentioning the purchase of the three Books of Philolaus, the money for which Plato is said to have received from Dion, quotes Timon as saying that Plato purchased a little Book for much money and with this as his groundwork wrote his *Timæus*. It is true that Lamblichus, Synesius and Proclus have referred the passage of Timon to the little Book of Timæus the Locrian, a supposititious work of a very late date and quoted by no ancient writer before Clemens of Alexandria, but Satyrus and especially Hermippus prove conclusively that what Timon said had reference to the writings of Philolaus, and Tzetzes so represents the matter. After attributing the *Timæus* and a great deal besides to the Book purchased of Philolaus through Dion, he represents not Philolaus himself as the seller but certain poor women and widows who sell the Book under a condition that it must not be imparted to any one save a Pythagorean; and I take this opportunity of remarking that Tzetzes makes Dion buy the *Mimes* of Sophron also in the same manner for Plato. However I do not reckon Timon as

the originator of the story, for he so touches upon the matter, that it can be understood only by one who knows of it already, while Hermippus appeals to an author who made a formal narration of it. It is much more likely that the tale was put in circulation by some earlier historian, not perhaps a Sicilian but apparently one of the first Alexandrians, as may be inferred from the Alexandrian minæ. This reckoning according to Alexandrian money is indeed not well adapted to commend the credibility of the tale, since in Plato's time no part of Greece reckoned according to Egyptian money, and Alexandria was not yet in existence; nor is there any great probability that the sum was computed by the narrator according to its value in Alexandrian coin, and that a statement in some other coin, whether Attic or Sicilian, was the basis of this calculation. Lastly, the work could not well have been purchased from Philolaus himself, as he can scarcely have been still alive in the fourth year of the 97th Olympiad, the time of Plato's first Sicilian voyage. We should therefore have to suppose that relations or descendants of his disposed of the work, as is indeed asserted by some writers; their statement evidently resting upon the notion of the keeping secret of Pythagorean writings even after the dissolution of the order, and being at the same time intended to set Philolaus free from the reproach of having divulged them, which others in fact brought against him. But that the secrecy of the Pythagorean doctrine had ceased long before the age of Plato, has already been remarked by Meiners, and one can scarcely see why Philolaus, if he taught in Thebes, could have had any scruple about writing there; in which case Plato may have acquired an early knowledge of his doctrine. My conclusion is that in all these contradictory accounts about a supposed purchase of Books, the substantial basis is simply this,—that Philolaus was in fact the first to publish a Pythagorean work, that Plato had read it and used it according to his manner, that is, intelligently and not as a mere transcriber. The former fact is asserted in so many words by an author who deserves all credit, since the purpose of his Book was critical, that is by Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of Pompey and Cæsar in his work *περὶ ὁμωνύμων ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων*, quoted by Diogenes: *Τοῦτον φησι Αἰμινίτριος ἐν Ὁμωνύμοις πρῶτον ἐκδοὺνατε τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν περὶ φύσεως.*

After which follows the somewhat strangely worded beginning, as it purports to be, of Philolaus' work, of which we shall have to speak more than once. Now if, assuming for the present the genuineness of the extant fragments, we compare them with Plato, we shall find in the *Phædrus*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus* and *Timæus*, allusions to Philolaus, upon which however I shall advance nothing here, since it is only the consideration of the fragments themselves that can justify my assertion; in the *Gorgias* however it seems to me there is a much more distinct reference to Philolaus' work, and although in this as well as in the *Phædo*, where Philolaus' views as to the unlawfulness of suicide are touched upon, the knowledge of his doctrines is attributed to hearsay only, yet I cannot help observing that in both dialogues this reference to hearsay is put into the mouth of Socrates, who had read very few books, whereas Philolaus' tenets are quoted with such distinctness, and in the *Gorgias*, at least, with such particularity, as is only possible when one has an author before him in writing, seeing that attention is paid even to the expression and the words; so that this contrivance about hearsay is a mere figure of speech, which accords well with Plato's irony and by means of which he attempts to mask his somewhat unceremonious handling of the *divine man*. But at the same time, we cannot fail to perceive that what Plato blames, is not so much the inner substance of Philolaus' view, as the mythical character of his exposition, and more especially the want of clearness and dialectic accuracy in his investigation and the oddity of his expressions, and this is pretty broadly stated in the *Gorgias* as well as in the *Phædo*.

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that a work by Philolaus was quoted in times much earlier than the earliest date of the Pythagorean forgeries, such as those attributed to Ocellus and the Loerian Timæus. He discusses the probable contents of his Book, which he divides on ancient authority into three parts. These he supposes to have been respectively entitled, *περὶ κόσμου*, *περὶ φύσεως*, *περὶ ψυχῆς*. And these he further identifies with the *Bacchæ*, a work attributed by Proclus to Philolaus, after which he continues as follows.]

Our enquiry up to this point, if the result of it is admitted, is more important for forming a judgment about the fragments of

Philolaus, than might at first sight appear: if there was only one work of Philolaus, whether spurious or genuine, nothing remains for us but either to admit all that is offered, or to reject all. Now what we have, is to a great extent so remarkable and contains such peculiar ideas, that no man can possibly be inclined to attribute it to a forger, and at the same time it perfectly coincides with that which, according to Plato, Aristotle, and the universal tradition of antiquity, must be viewed as really Pythagorean.

With the exception therefore of some pieces of Archytas, I hold these fragments and extracts to be the surest remains of the Pythagorean School; indeed Meiners also himself felt compelled to consider some few of them as genuine. Now the spirit of Pythagorism, as it appears according to the most trustworthy data, may be most clearly apprehended in contrast with the Ionic philosophy; since the Hellenic character habitually separates itself into this dualism of Ionic and Doric, and the difference of these races is perceptible in all that concerns life and culture. Pythagorism is the genuine Doric form of philosophy, and the philosophy of a people is nothing else than the peculiar mode of perception of that people, which in the deepest and most distinguished thinkers becomes itself the object of its own thought and explains itself to itself, whereas in the rest it works and creates unconsciously. On this account it is in philosophy on the prose side of literature that the popular character will always present itself most distinctly, as on the poetical side it will appear in lyrical art, because the latter springs forth most immediately from the feeling and sentiment of the people. The sensuousness of the Ionians, their attachment to what is outward, their susceptibility to outward impressions, and their lively activity in this outward world, presents itself in their materialistic view of the origin of things and in the manifold vitality and restlessness of matter, upon which all the Ionic systems rest; they all look for the essence of things in matter, they more or less derive the spiritual from it and neglect the moral element. The want of the sense of unity which is essentially connected with this, was favourable to the atomic view of physical science, and Heraclitus' doctrine, which was built upon strife, clearly expresses the restlessness of the Ionic nature, when it calls repose the death of the soul. The Doric on the contrary presents in comparison the aspect of an inward depth,

from which at the same time powerful action bursts forth, and of a tranquil persistence in established and almost inviolable forms, through which genuine Doric characters were exalted high above the whirl of sensuous impressions, whilst a certain inward consistency was introduced into their lives, which is not found in the same degree among the Ionians. In philosophy, this tendency of their mind displays itself in ethical endeavours, although they never made their way to a complete theory; but it especially appeared in this, that they sought for the essence of things not in a ground which was purely material, but in one that was formal and which gave to things unity and order, just as Pythagoras is said to have been the first to call the world Kosmos: and although Anaxagoras makes the order of the world to be produced through Reason, yet this thought, as Socrates has already observed, did not pierce at all deeply into his philosophy. In keeping with the peculiar character of the Dorians and even with their civil life, the outward appearance of the Doric philosophy took the form of a society or order, which was subject to a discipline and rule almost monastic, or at least Moravian, to which there can scarcely be found a more suitable analogy in all antiquity than the Spartan constitution. This organisation is united with depth in religion, symbolism, mysticism and ascetism, and moreover with the practice of music, all which formed essential elements of the Pythagorean mode of life; for which reason indeed so early a writer as Herodotus speaks of Pythagorean *orgies*. But to return to the ground of their speculations, the Ionic philosophers, though they mostly rejected the criterion of the senses, started from matter, which is the object of sensuous cognition, and then sought by reflexion to arrive at some material ground of all things, which ground, it must be confessed, some of them did not hold to be cognizable by the senses. From this sensuous philosophy the bound was too great and violent to the Socratico-Platonic, which sought for the essence of things in pure ideas furnished through the inward intuition, and the Pythagorean view was exactly that which formed the bridge; since the formal ground which they assumed is cognizable through that mathematic intuition, *διάνοια*, which hovers in the midst between the sensuous and the non-sensuous. And yet in its ideas they recognised typical forms of something higher,

though as it seems, they were unable to resolve the sense of these types so as to put them into clear intellectual light. Thus philosophy passed from a thoroughly sensuous beginning, through an intervening grade, to the unsensuous view of Plato, (who indeed had been preceded by the sagacious but one-sided members of the Eleatic school, but who by the power of the Socratic criticism had raised these partial views as well as all former views, through the proper limitation and modification of the one by the other, to the most perfect view of which the Hellenic mind was capable,) and the essence of things was thus sought in an ascending scale, first in matter, then in mathematical forms, and lastly in ideas of the reason.

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2. *Περιτονά* does not mean *limited* as some have understood it but *limiting*, what Plato in the *Philebus* calls *πέρας limit*. ** It remains for us to consider what the Pythagorean meant by the *limiting* and the *unlimited*. The ancients, very naturally, thought of them from the numerical point of view; and in fact the limiting has been taken to mean unity, parity, and identity, and the unlimited duality, disparity, and diversity, in which sense both Nicomachus and Boethius clearly express themselves and with a distinct reference to Philolaus. ** But this view is nevertheless quite untenable, partly on this account that what is odd is not therefore necessarily to be called indefinite, because, as a determinate magnitude, for example three or five, it derives a limit from unity; and partly because, as we see quite clearly from Aristotle, the Pythagoreans rather compared the *even* number to the indefinite; at least they did so in a certain sense and without reference to the definite magnitude of any such number. In his *Physics* iii. 4, he tells us expressly that some laid down the unlimited, *ἄπειρον*, as the origin of all things and he says of the Pythagoreans, *καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἀριτον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναπολαμβανόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ περιττοῦ περαινόμενον παρέχει τοῖς οὖσι τὴν ἄπειριαν*, for which also he adduces Pythagorean testimony. ** Shall we then say that Philolaus by the unlimited meant the *even* and by the limiting meant the *odd*? Against this view likewise the same objection as before holds good, because the even also as a definite number is limited by unity, so that if the even is called by the Pythagoreans unlimited, it must have some peculiar circumstantial application.

But this supposition is unnecessary, since according to Philolaus himself, the unlimited has no number in it, for which reason also, since, according to him, it is only through number that we understand, nothing would be intelligible if everything were unlimited. On the other hand the following explanation seems to me perfectly satisfactory. As, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held one to be both odd and even, and thus to contain both opposites, so Philolaus too set up above both these opposites a higher unity in which both have their roots. ** In the same way Plato in his *Philebus* sets up above the limit and the unlimited, out of which two the limited comes to be, the Cause as God. But how do the two elements proceed therefrom?—for proceed they must as from the Beginning of all things. I cannot conceive this otherwise than as follows. The highest Unity, simple Unity, what the later Pythagoreans and Platonists called the Monad, is merely One: but Unity is also conceivable as endlessly divisible, as the same authorities likewise remark. Through an opposition between the One and the Many or Indefinite, which opposition resides even in Unity itself, there is produced out of the highest Unity, which has no opposite, the twofold nature of the One and the Many, of the Limit and the Unlimited; and here we come at once to that which Philolaus means by limit and unlimited. By the former he meant the One or, as the ancients express it, the Same, by the latter the Many or the Different. And of these two the former has the more affinity with the highest Unity. These opposites are the constituents of all that is produced, *τὸ γιγνόμενον*, while the highest Unity, as being that which is not produced, is exalted above it. For, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held that Number is the essence of things, and things themselves, no less as Matter, than as the properties of Matter, or in other words Form. But the same author allows that the Pythagoreans expressly named the numbers which compose the essence of things, *τὸν* and *απειρον*, out of which two the *πεπερασμένον* is produced. (Aristotle *Metaph.* i. 5.) These same elements are also called Unity and the Indefinite Duality (*ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς*). Under the latter the conception of diversity or plurality simply is represented, and the definite number Two only accrues to it by a limitation bestowed by Unity. **

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that the next step in Philolaus' work must have been to describe the evolution of the world out of the two opposite elements, and he quotes a passage given below (*Kαὶ πάντα γὰ μὲν κ. τ. ἐ.*) in which the elements are divided in the same manner as numbers. He supposes that he must have then proceeded from the combination of odd or even to that of harmony, because all the chief ratios of harmony [1 : 2, 2 : 3, 3 : 4, 8 : 9, 243 : 256] consist of an even and an odd number; and he supposes that Philolaus meant by harmony the result of reconciled opposites, and attributes to him the following passage in Nicomachus, *ὅτι γὰρ ἀρμονία πολυμεγέων ἔνωσις καὶ διχα φρονεόντων σύμφρασις* (of the Doric nature of which passage I entertain strong doubts).

The last extract which will be given is of great importance for the understanding of more than one passage in Plato and is the beginning of a very learned disquisition upon the music of the ancients.]

In the immediate sequel of the former passage [he refers to the passage given below, beginning *Περὶ δὲ φύσιος*] which sequel we shall presently quote, one is surprised by the phenomenon, that Philolaus' harmony is nothing else than the octave, but there is no objection on the side of usage to this interpretation, since the ancients called the octave "harmony", as Aristotle does (see Plutarch's treatise on Music: but it is precisely in this that we find the explanation of the Pythagorean view of the harmony of the Universe in general, and especially of the mode in which the composition of the world was conceived to have been effected out of the opposite elements of the limit and the unlimited; for Unity as we have seen is limit, while the Unlimited is the indefinite duality, which becomes definite duality when the measure of Unity has been twice introduced into it. Thus then the limitation is given through the measuring of duality by means of Unity, that is by laying down the ratio of 1 : 2 which is the mathematical ratio of the octave. The octave therefore is harmony itself, through which the opposite elements are reconciled; and every reasonable man must confess that there is a deep perception contained in this, since the unity of the One and of the Diverse (*ἕτερον*) or Many (*πολλά*), which Plato in his Doctrine of Ideas has presented

in a dialectic form, and the conception of which was one of the chief problems of Greek philosophy, is here expressed by mathematical symbolism. ** The magnitude of harmony, says Philolaus, is συλλαβὴ καὶ δι' ὁξεῖαν. Συλλαβὴ is the old name of the Fourth, because it is the first combination of concordant tones, πρώτη σύλληψις φθόγγων συμφώνων. Λί' ὁξεῖαν is the Fifth, because it comes after the Fourth in the ascending scale. Now as a fourth and a fifth comprise the octave, since $3 : 4$ with $2 : 3 = 1 : 2$, as we see from these numbers $2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4$, Philolaus says that συλλαβὴ καὶ δι' ὁξεῖαν is the magnitude of harmony, because $2 : 4$ is harmony, $2 : 3$ is δι' ὁξεῖαν, and $3 : 4$ is συλλαβὴ. But the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the interval of a tone which is $8 : 9$, as the following numbers shew, $6 \cdot 8 \cdot 9$. For $6 : 8$ is the Fourth, $6 : 9$ is the Fifth, and the difference is $8 : 9$ or the tone. And now to prove the truth that the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the tone, he states the position of the Fourth and Fifth in the octave, for in the ascending scale, there is from the ὑπάτη to the μέση a Fourth, but from the μέση to the νήτη a Fifth. (See the fragment beginning Ἀρμονίας δὲ μέγεθος.)

Φιλολάου. Stob. Ecl. Phys. i. 1, 2.

Θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἔσσιαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ καττὰν δύναμιν ἡ τις ἐντὸν ἐν τῷ δεκάδι. Μεγάλα γάρ καὶ παντελῆς καὶ παντοεργός, καὶ θείω καὶ οὐρανίῳ βίῳ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμῶν κοινωνοῦσα . . . δύναμις καὶ τὰς δεκάδος. "Ανεν δὲ ταύτας πάντ' ἀπειρα καὶ ἄδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ. Γνωμονικὰ γάρ ἃ φύσις ἀ τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τῷ ἀπορουμένῳ παντὸς καὶ ἀγνοουμένῳ παντὶ. Οὐ γάρ καὶ ἡς δῆλον οὐδὲν οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε αὐτῶν ποθ' αὐτά, οὔτε ἄλλω ποτ' ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ ἡς ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἀ τούτῳ ἔσσια. Νῦν δὲ οὐτος, καττὰν ψυχὰν ἀρμόσδων αἰσθήσει πάντα, γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάγορα ἄλλάλοις κατὰ γνώμονος φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται, τσωμάτων καὶ σχίζων τοὺς λόγους χωρὶς ἐκάστους τῶν πραγμάτων, τῶν τὲ ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν περαινόντων. "Ιδοις δέ κα οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαιμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τὰν τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσιν καὶ τὰν δύναμιν ἰσχύουσαν, ἄλλας καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι παντῷ, καὶ κατὰ τὰς δαμιουργίας τὰς τεχνικὰς πάσας, καὶ κατὰ τὰν

μουσικάν. Φεῦδος δὲ οὐδὲν δέχεται ἀ τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσις, οὐδὲ ἀρμονία· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰκεῖον αὐτοῖς ἐστι. Ταῦς γὰρ ἀπείρω καὶ ἀνοήτω καὶ ὀλόγω φύσιος τὸ φεῦδος τκαὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστι. Φεῦδος δὲ οὐδαμῶς ἐς ἀριθμὸν ἐπιπνεῖ, πολέμιον γὰρ καὶ ἔχθρον τῷ φύσει τὸ φεῦδος, ἀ δ' ἀλλάθεια οἰκεῖον καὶ σύμφυτον τῷ τῷ ἀριθμῷ γενεῖ.

Φιλολάου Πνθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Ψυχῆς. Stob. Ecl. Phys. i. 20, 2.

Παρ' ὅ καὶ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀκαταπόνατος διαμένει τὸν ἀπειρον αἰῶνα. Οὕτε γὰρ ἔντοσθεν ἄλλα τις αἰτία δυναμικωτέρα αὐτᾶς εὑρεθήσεται, οὗτ' ἔντοσθεν, φθεῖραι αὐτὸν δυναμένα. Ἀλλ' ἦν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἰς ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τῷ συγγενέω καὶ προτίστω καὶ ἀνυπερθέτῳ κυβερνώμενος. "Εχει δὲ καὶ τὰν ἀρχὰν τᾶς κινάσιός τε καὶ μεταβολᾶς ὁ κόσμος εἰς ἑών, καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ φύσει διαπνεόμενος καὶ περιαγέόμενος ἐξ τάρχιδίου. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλατον αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἐστι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβολον ἀπὸ τᾶς τὸ ὅλον περιεχούσας ψυχᾶς μέχρι σελάνας περαιοῦται, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἀπὸ τᾶς σελάνας μέχρι τᾶς γῆς. Ἐπεὶ δέ γε καὶ τὸ κινέον ἐξ αἰῶνος εἰς αἰῶνα περιπολεῖ, τὸ δὲ κινέόμενον ὡς τὸ κινέον ἄγει, οὗτο * διατίθεσθαι ἀνάγκα τὸ μὲν ἀεικίνατον τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθὲς εἶμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν νῶ καὶ ψυχᾶς ἀνάπομα πᾶν, τὸ δὲ γενέσιος καὶ μεταβολᾶς· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρᾶτον τῷ δυνάμει καὶ ὑπερέχον, τὸ δ' ὕστερον καὶ καθυπερεχόμενον. Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν ἀεὶ θέοντος θείου, τοῦ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοντος γεννατοῦ, κόσμος. Λιὸς καὶ παλῶς ἔχει λέγεν κόσμον ἥμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀτδίον θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τᾶς μεταβλατικᾶς φύσιος· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀεὶ διαμένει κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸν καὶ ὠσαύτως ἔχων, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα πολλά. Καὶ τὰ μὲν φθορᾶ ὄντα καὶ φύσει κατὰ μορφὰς σώζεται, τῷ γονᾷ πάλιν τὰν αὐτὰν μορφὰν ἀποκαθίσταντα τῷ γεννήσαντι πατέρι καὶ δημιουργῷ.

Ἐκ τῶν Φιλολάου Περὶ Κόσμου. Stob. Ecl. Phys. i. 21, 7.

'Ανάγκα τὰ ἔντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαιόντα, ἢ ἄπειρα, ἢ περαινόντα τε καὶ ἄπειρα· ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐ καὶ εἴη. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαινεται οὕτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἔόντα, οὕτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δῆλον ἐντ' ἄρα ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἄπειρων ὁ τε κόσμος καὶ

* i.e. ὁμολογεῖν.

τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόζθη. Αἱλοῦ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαινόντων, περαινοντα, τὰ δ' ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπειρων περαινοντά τε καὶ οὐ περαινοντα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀπειρων ἄπειρα φανέονται.

Καὶ πάντα γα μὰν τὰ γιγνωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι. οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἀνευ τούτω. "Ο γα μὰν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει δύο μὲν ἵδια εἰδή, περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων μιχθέντων, ἀριτοπέρισσον. Ἐκατέρῳ δὲ τῷ εἴδεος πολλὰ μορφαὶ, ἃς ἔκαστον αὕταντο τὸν τομαῖνει. Περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἀρμονίας ὅδε ἔχει· ἀ μὲν ἐστὸν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀτίδιος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μόνα, φύσις θεία ἐντὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίναν ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν, πλάν γα ὅτι οὐχ οἶον τ' ἡς οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γιγνωσκομένων ύψος ἀμῶν γεγενῆσθαι, μὴ ὑπαρχοίσας τᾶς ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπειρων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπάρχουν οὐχ ὅμοιαι οὐδὲ ὄμοφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἥδη ἀδύνατον ἡς κα αὐτοῖς κοσμηθῆμεν, αἱ μὴ ἀρμονία ἐπεγένετο, ὡς τινὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. Τὰ μὲν ὧν ὅμοια καὶ ὄμοφυλα ἀρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὄμοφυλα μηδὲ ἰσοτελῆ ἀνάγκα τῷ τοιαύτῃ ἀρμονίᾳ συγκεκλεῖσθαι, αἱ μέλλοντι ἐν πόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.

Ἀρμονίας δὲ μέγεθός ἐντὶ συλλαβῆς καὶ δι' ὀξειᾶν. Τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν μείζον τᾶς συλλαβῆς ἐπογδόω. Ἐντὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐς μέσον συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσας ποτὶ νεάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς τρίταν συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν. Τὸ δὲ ἐν μέσῳ μέσας καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον. Ά δὲ συλλαβὴ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν ἡμιόλιον, τὸ διὰ πασῶν δὲ δίπλοον. Οὕτως ἀρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ δύο διέσιες, δι' ὀξειᾶν δὲ τρι' ἐπόγδοα καὶ διεσις, συλλαβὴ δὲ δυ' ἐπόγδοοα καὶ διεσις.—.

Platonis *Timaeus*, 35 A.

Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχουσης οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὐ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῦ ἐν μέσῳ συνεκράσατο οὐσίας εἰδος, τῆς δὲ ταύτου φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς θατέρου* κατὰ ταῦτα. Καὶ ξυνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. Καὶ τρία λαβὼν ὄντα αὐτὰ συνε-

* Commonly θατέρου. Καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα. I have altered the text according to the evident requirement of the sense. The passage itself has been appended as serving to illustrate the πέρας in the

Philebus. The soul of the world is the πέρας of the whole and of all its parts; and we here see that this soul partakes of the opposite ἀρχαῖ, τὸ ἐν καὶ ταῦταν and τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ θάτερον.

κεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτὸν ἔυναρμόττων βίᾳ.

'Ἐκ τοῦ Ἀρχύτου περὶ Ἀρχῶν. Stob. Ecl. i. 35, 2.

Ἄνάγκα καὶ δύο ἀρχὰς ἦμεν τῶν ὄντων, μίαν μὲν τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχοισαν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὁριστῶν, ἐτέραν δὲ τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχοισαν τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀορίστων. Καὶ τὰν μὲν φητὰν καὶ λόγον ἔχοισαν καὶ τὰ ἐόντα ὅμοιως συνέχειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐόντα δρίζειν καὶ συντάσσειν· πλατιάζουσαν γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς γινομένοις εὐλόγως καὶ εὐρυθμῶς ἀνάγειν ταῦτα καὶ τῷ καθ' ὅλῳ οὐσίας τε καὶ ἰδέας μεταδίδομεν· τὰν δ' ἄλογον καὶ ἀρρητὸν καὶ τὰ συντεταγμένα λυμαίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἐς γένεσιν δὲ καὶ ὡσίαν παραγινόμενα διαλύειν, πλατιάζουσαν γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἔξομοιοῦν αὐταύτῳ. Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ ἀρχαὶ δύο κατὰ γένος ἀντιδιαιρούμεναι τὰ πράγματα τυγχάνοντι, τῷ τὰν μὲν ἀγαθόποιὸν τὰν δ' ἦμεν κακοποιόν, ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο λόγους ἦμεν, τὸν μὲν ἔνα τᾶς ἀγαθοποιῶν φύσιος, τὸν δ' ἔνα τὰς κακοποιῶν. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ τέχνα καὶ τὰ φύσει γιγνόμενα δεῖ τούτων πρᾶτον μετειληφέν, τᾶς τε μορφοῦς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας. Καὶ ἀ μὲν μορφώ ἐστιν ἀ αἰτία τοῦ τόδε τι ἦμεν· ἀ δὲ ὡσία τὸ ὑποκειμένον, παραδεχόμενον τὰν μορφώ. Οὕτε δὲ τῷ ὡσίᾳ οἶόν τε ἐστὶ μορφᾶς μετεῖμεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὐτᾶς, οὔτε μὰν τὰν μορφώ γενέσθαι περὶ τὰν ὡσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέραν τινὰ ἦμεν αἰτίαν τὰν κινάσσοισαν τὰν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφώ, ταύταν δὲ τὰν πράταν τῷ δύναμει καὶ καθυπερτάταν ἦμεν τὰν ἀλλᾶν· δινομάζεσθαι δ' αὐτὰν ποθάκει θεόν· ὥστε τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ ἦμεν ἥδη, τὸν τε θεόν, καὶ τὰν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰν μορφώ. Καὶ τὸν μὲν θεόν τεχνίταν καὶ τὸν κινέοντα, τὰν δ' ἐστὼ τὰν ὕλαν καὶ τὸ κινέομενον, τὰν δὲ μορφώ τὰν τέχναν καὶ ποθ' ἄν κινέεται ὑπὸ τῷ κινέοντος ἀ ἐστώ. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κινέομενον ἐναντίας ἐαυτῷ δυνάμιας ἔσχει τὰς τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων, τὰ δ' ἐναντία συναρμογᾶς τινος δεῖται καὶ ἐνώσιος, ἀνάγκα ἀριθμῶν δυνάμιας καὶ ἀναλογίας καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ γεωμετροῖς δεικνύμενα παραλαμβάνειν, ἀ καὶ συναρμόσαι καὶ ἐνώσαι τὰν ἐναντιότατα δυναστεῖται ἐν τῷ ἐστοῖ τῶν πραγμάτων ποττὰν μορφώ. Καθ' αὐτὰν μὲν γὰρ ἔσσα ἀ ἐστὼ ἀμορφός ἐστι, κιναθεῖσα δὲ ποττὰν μορφώ ἔμμορφος γίνεται καὶ λόγον ἔχοισα τὸν τᾶς συντάξιος. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ κινέεται τὸ κινέομενόν ἐστι τὸ πράτως κινέον· ὥστ' ἀνάγκα τρεῖς ἦμεν τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰν τε ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰν μορφώ, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶ κινατικὸν καὶ πράτον τῷ δυνάμει. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ νόον μόνον ἦμεν δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ νόω

τι κρέσσον. Νόω δὲ κρέσσον ἐστὶν ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν θεόν. "Οθεν φανερὸν ὡς ὁ μὲν τῶν ἵσω λόγος περὶ τὰν φητὰν καὶ λόγον ἔχοισαν φύσιν ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀνίσω περὶ τὰν ἄλογον καὶ ἄρρητον· αὐτὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀ-ἐστώ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ γίνεται περὶ ταύταν, καὶ οὐκ ἀνευ ταύτας.

Kant's *Anthropology*, Book II. § 59.

We may also explain these feelings by the effect which the sensation of our state produces upon the mind. That which directly (through sense) urges me to quit my state (to come out of it), is unpleasant to me, it pains me. That which in like manner urges me to maintain it (to remain in it), is agreeable to me, it gives me pleasure. But we are irresistibly carried along in the stream of Time, and through all the changes of sensations involved in the fact. Now, though the quitting of one moment of time and the entrance into another is one and the same act (that of change), yet in our thought and in the consciousness of this change there is a *succession*, such as belongs to the connection of cause and effect. The question then is, whether it is the consciousness of quitting the present state, or the prospect of the entrance into a future one, that excites in us the sensation of pleasure? In the former case, the delight is nothing else than the removal of pain, something negative; in the latter it would be an anticipation of something agreeable; consequently, an expansion of a condition of pleasure, and hence something positive. But we may already infer, *a priori*, that the former alone can take place. For time carries us from the present to the future, and not contrariwise; and the fact that we are compelled first of all to quit the present, uncertain into what other we are about to enter, only that it is *another*, can alone be the cause of pleasurable feeling. Pleasure is the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it. But life (animal life) is, as the physicians themselves have remarked, a continual play of the antagonism of the two.

Consequently, every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continual advancement of vital power (which, however, cannot mount beyond a certain degree), but a speedy death for joy?

Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but between the one and the other pain must have place. It is the slight intermissions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, that together make up the healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously-felt state of well-being; whereas in fact this condition consists only of a succession of pleasurable feelings, following each other with alternations,—that is, after continually intervening pain.

Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life: without it an inanimate state would ensue.

A D D E N D A.

My friend Mr E. R. HORTON, who has most kindly undertaken the laborious task of superintending the edition of this work, has sent me some important suggestions as to the text of the first sheet. In the passage (12, A) he is inclined to read* *τούναντίον*. I have more than once had the same suspicion, but suppressed it through fear of being taxed with the love of unnecessary changes. But I am now convinced that the construction of the sentence imperatively requires the alteration proposed. The *contrary* intended is not a contrary to the main part of the sentence, *κύριος ἀν εἴης*, but only to the subordinate phrase *τῆς π. Σ. ὁμολογίας*. The alternative is not between being *κύριος*, and not being *κύριος*, but between being *κύριος* of the agreement and *κύριος* of the disagreement.

p. 13, B. Mr HORTON reminds me of Dr W. H. THOMPSON'S conjecture *ἐνορῶν* in place of *ἐνόν*. But my note will shew why I cannot assent to this conjecture. Protarchus is not, and cannot

* [My later view of the expression *ἢ καὶ τούναντίον* is that it is a troublesome interpolation. In order that the argument may proceed, there must be an ὁμολογία between Socrates and Protarchus. Cf. *διομολογησάμενα καὶ τόδε. ταῦτα' οὔτως ὁμολογούμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς*; (11, D, E and also 20, C). *τούτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον δὲ' ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσάμενα.* (14, C). The question is how far Protarchus may go to meet Socrates, since the conduct of the discussion belongs to the latter. But this question is one for himself, not Philebus, to decide. Yet Philebus by his profession of unalterable faith in his goddess, not for the present only but for the future also, *δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει* (for so the MSS. read), is endeavouring to prejudice him, even whilst in the same breath he acknowledges his freedom of judgment, *αὐτὸς γνώσει*. With this implied interference Protarchus accordingly twists him. "Now that you have resigned your brief to me, your rights of dictation are over."—St. Paul's expression in 2 Cor. i, 24; *οὐχ διτὶ κυριεύουμεν ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως* is closely analogous. The word *ὁμολογία* itself may be illustrated from the same Epistle (ix, 13). *δοξάζοντες τὸν Θεόν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποταγῇ τῆς ὁμολογίας ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

be, asked to shew why he calls *all pleasures good*, for Socrates assumes already that he looks upon some as bad; but he is challenged to point out any further ground of likeness between them beyond that indicated by their common name of *ηδοναί*. As this is the only question which can be asked him without clashing with the rest of the argument, ἀγαθὸν εἶναι is a manifest interpolation. But if we omit ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, προσαγορεύεις is necessarily to be construed with *τι ταῦτὸν ἐνόν*: else it would be without any government at all. For I do not suppose that any person will have recourse to such an intolerable ellipsis as the following: *τι ταῦτὸν ἐνορῶν, π. ἡ. (τοῦτο) προσαγορεύεις*; Apart from this I very much doubt whether a good Greek prose writer would say, *ἐνορῶ ἐν σοι τοῦτο*, without adding some participle.

p. 14, d. Read: ἐπεὶ μηδὲ [τὰ τοιάδε,] ὅταν τις κ. τ. ἐ.

p. 17, d. *ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα*. "Is not one of these *de trop*?" E. R. H.

Most assuredly, and I thank my friend for this fresh instance of what I have before pointed out as a peculiar feature in these supplements. The word *ἐνεῖναι* under various forms has occurred several times in this sense, and it is therefore no wonder that some sciolist should insert *ἐνόντα* without troubling himself to look further on, where he would have found *γιγνόμενα*. Or perhaps he merely meant it as a note and had no intention of disturbing the text; but if so, and if this is to be the explanation of the many similar passages, this would shew the extent to which the copyists must have gone in blindly copying what they found in the Margin, as if it had been accidentally omitted in the body of the text, and afterwards supplied in the blank space.

M^r HORTON also mentions two conjectures made by English scholars on this passage. I will briefly state my objections to each of them. It is proposed to read *μάθης* for *πάθη*. Now we do not want a verb, for *λάβης* may be easily conceived to run through the whole passage; and if we wanted one, it could not be *μάθης*, for *μανθάνω ταῦτα γιγνόμενα* is not such a construction as one will find in any good prose author. But we do want *πάθη*, because otherwise *τοιαῦτα* would imply *διαστήματα*, a word not applicable to rhythm and metre. Indeed there is no word so applicable, and for that very reason Plato employs the more general term *πάθη*.

It is also proposed to read ἐννοῆσ, but to this there are two very strong objections. In the first place ὅταν λάβης . . . καὶ ἄμα— would certainly need ἐννοήσης, and in the next place the alteration runs counter to the whole arrangement of the sentence, and cannot be reconciled with γέρ, which can stand where it now is only on the condition that it belongs to the clause immediately following the parenthesis; whereas this change would make the parenthesis end at ἐπονομάζειν. Indeed the true balance of the sentence is lost by any such change; for whereas Plato might have arranged his clauses thus: The men of old have taught us (A) the power of number in Music and Rhythm, and have directed us (B) to look for the same power in all ἀπειρα, and so whenever you learn A, (λάβης), or detect B, (ἔλης), σοφὸς ἔγένον—, he thought fit to introduce the first part of this sentence in a kind of running parenthesis alongside of the second. By reading ἐννοῆσ you destroy the antithesis between what the ancients taught (καὶ ἄμα ἐννοεῖν κ. τ. ξ.) and what we are counselled to do in order to get σοφία, (ὅταν τ' ἄλλο—ἔλης,) and you put a tautology in its place.

The reader will observe that the contrast between λάβης and ἔλης is a real one, but that between σοφὸς ἔγένον and ἔμφρων γέγονας is a very paltry verbal variation, where no real contrast can take place; for while there is a difference between the man who is taught and the man who discovers, there is none in the method or in its result.

As here we have a foolish variation between ἔγένον and γέγονας, so in *Euthyd.* 287, b, we have a verbal antithesis between the present, which is correct, and the future, which is quite inappropriate. Οὗτῳ Κρόνος εἰ, ὥστε ἡ τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμιμήσκει, καὶ εἴ τι πέρσιν εἶπον [· νῦν ἀναμησθήσει]. I referred to this passage in my *Letter* (page III), but inadvertently put the branch of spuriousness upon the wrong part of it.

But before I leave the *Euthydemus*, I would fain point out some other false supplements which have occurred to me quite recently in lecturing upon that Dialogue.

274, b. [τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας].

276, b. Read ἐθορύβησαν for ἀνεθορύβησαν.

277, d. [καταβαλῶν].

281, a. [τῶν ἀγαθῶν] and [τὸ ὁρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι] The genitives πλούτου etc. are governed by ἡγονμένη.

281, c. [μᾶλλον].

282, a and b. This is one of the places where from not perceiving the interpolation I was led into a wrong mode of restoring the syntax. Read: *Καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε δήπου τοῦτ' οὐόμενον δεῖν μεταλαμβάνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χοήματα, καὶ παρ' ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων, τῶν τ' ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἔχαστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ ἵκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδιδόναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν οὐδὲ νεμέσητον διοῦν ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων, προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι.* This is as elegant a sentence as any in Plato, and a model of symmetry without formality. The foolish writer who supplied ἐθέλοντα has not only destroyed the construction, but has caused another to bolster it up with the clumsy contrivance of ἔνεκα τούτου ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἔραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.

282, b. Read: *οἶον ἐπιθυμῶ τὸν προτρεπτικὸν λόγον εἶναι.*

But the most impudent attempt at improving the text occurs in 284, b. The Sophist wishes to prove ὅτι οὐδεὶς λέγει τὰ μὴ ὄντα, and this he does by bringing Ctesippus to admit the following propositions. 1. τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν. 2. τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐδεὶς ἀν ποιήσειν. 3. οἱ λέγοντες πράττουσι τι. 4. οἱ πράττοντες ποιοῦσι. 5. οἱ λέγοντες ποιοῦσι. 6. οἱ λέγοντες τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ποιοῖεν ἀν τὰ μὴ ὄντα, τοῦτο δὲ ὡμολόγηται ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

From this it follows that the words "Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἔστιν; Οὐδαμοῦ. are quite foreign to the argument, and were probably invented to give some force to ἐν τῷ δήμῳ: and likewise that Euthydemus' question is simply this: "Ἐστιν οὖν ὅπως τὰ μὴ ὄντα ποιήσειν ἀν καὶ ὀστισοῦν;

This quite throws into the shade such minor invasions as 297, c, ἀφιγμένῳ, 298, b, βοιδίων or καβίων, 302, b, ἔφευγόν τε, 290, b, τοῦτο ὃ ἀν θηρεύωνται, and τούτοις ἢ ἐθῆρευσαν, (for πόλιν θηρεύσωνται read either χειράσωνται or θηράσωνται.) 278, b, οἶον αὐτὸν μεταλαμβάνω, and a score of others, in which I cannot with certainty include 302, b, *σοὶ* [*θεοί*], as this may arise from a two-fold reading *COI* and *ΘΟΙ*, but in 303, b, the words ὥσθ' ὁμολογεῖν—σοφούς, are so manifestly a false interpretation of οὐτω διετέθην, and so completely spoil what immediately follows, that they can be nothing but a deliberate forgery.

There are others which are yet upon their trial, such as the following, 307, a, ὥστ' οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειότερον ἐπὶ

φιλοσοφίαν. Crito's faith in philosophy is already shaken by Isocrates' sneer, and by his own impressions about these ἐριστικοί. Otherwise Socrates' exhortation not to care about the men, but to look into the thing itself, is altogether idle. His embarrassment is ὅποι προτρέπῃ τὸ μειράκιον, πότερον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν η̄ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα.

I will end this digression *vineta mea cædendo*. To make the question tally with the answer in 304, ε, I formerly edited ἀπεφαίνοντο, but this is applicable only to γνώμας, and by no means the right word to use of the displays of the Sophists. But the question is rightly given in the received text: *τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι*, "well, what did you think of them"? The answer however is corrupt, and interpolated after its corruption. I believe the true reading to be: *Tί δ' ἄλλο, η̄ δ' ὅς, η̄ ὅτι περὶ ἀεὶ δὴ τις τῶν τοιύτων, ληρούντων καὶ περὶ οὐδένος ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων*; "What else should they look like but what every one of the men of their class at all times looks like, a class of triflers etc."

p. 16, ε. *τότε δὴ δεῖν*] For *τότε δὴ δῆ*, the reading of most MSS., the Bodl. gives *τότε δὴ δεῖ*. For the Bodl. δεῖ, δεῖν has been substituted in the text.

p. 17, ε. *ὸλλόγιμον*] The meaning of ἔλλόγιμον and that of ἐνάρτιμον are so nearly the same, that one is tempted to suspect either that the former word is a later addition, or that Plato must have justified the twofold expression by a twofold reason; namely, by writing, *ατ̄' οὐκ εἰς λόγον, οὐδὲ εἰς ἀρτ̄ιμόν οὐδένα . . . ἀπιδόντα*. But, as the importance of πέρας is uppermost in the writer's mind, any addition to ἀρτ̄ιμός weakens the effect which he wishes to produce. For this reason I look upon the words *καὶ οὐκ ἔλλόγιμον* with some suspicion. It may be said, in answer to this, that λόγος and ἀρτ̄ιμός are by no means equivalent, and that Shakspeare illustrates the difference when he says that certain offences "*stand more for number than account*", and that the Tragic ἀρτ̄ιμός ἄλλως and the Horatian '*Nos numerus sumus*' shew that ἀρτ̄ιμός is rather the antithesis of λόγος than its equivalent. But in this passage who can doubt that the idea which ἐνάρτιμος presents is identical with that presented by ἔλλόγιμος? Then why was it introduced?

p. 18, Α. *τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφαμεν*] The Books read φαμεν. But Socrates is comparing a past observation with a present one, and for this reason uses λάβοι with the former, and ἀναγκασθῇ with the latter, according to the common rule as to the optative and subjunctive moods.

p. 18, Α. *Θει*] I have substituted this for the δεῖ of the MSS., to accord with λάβοι and φαμεν.

p. 18, B. μὴ ἐπὶ κ. τ. ἐ.] I have placed the absurd supplement μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν κ. τ. ἐ. in brackets, but there is still something amiss, and any body trying to correct it must be guided by the illustration presently offered in the discovery of the Alphabet. We want δεῖ or some equivalent to accompany χατανοεῖν, and we require that πλῆθος should have number, i.e. be definite, and not that number should have πλῆθος, which every number above one has in any case. It is not improbable that Plato wrote ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν πλῆθος ἔχαστον ἔχον χατανοεῖν ΔΕΙ.

p. 18, B. Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν ἀ. κ.]] Unless we reject the words φ. ἄ. κ. as a supplement of some expounder, we have a mass of words without any construction, and furthermore a statement which Plato could not have made. The word χατανοεῖν implies that the discovery has already begun, but there is no act τοῦ χατανοεῖν in acknowledging the existence of φωνή, nor indeed of any object while still in its indefinite state; so that φωνὴν ἀπειρον χατανοεῖν is a contradiction in terms. The first stage of discovery is χατανοεῖν τὰ φωνήντα.

p. 18, B. λέγων, πρῶτος] I retract my former conjecture of λέγω ὡς, and hold ὡς, the reading of most MSS., and ὡς, that of the Bodl., to be mere grammatical attempts to give coherence to that which the above named supplement had thrown out of gear. ὁ λόγος λέγει is perfectly good Greek, but the passage from the *Republic* 360, D, affords no example of it. We ought there to read ὁ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιύτου λόγου λέγων, "the advocate of this view." For πρῶτος τὰ φωνήντα, read πρῶτα τ. φ. i.e. "first the Vowels, then the Mutes, after that the Liquids."

[p. 19, D. τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὅρθες [ἄ. ἦ. γ']] The interpolation here is similar to that in 11, B.

p. 22, D. αἰτίωμεθ' ἀν] αἴτιον and εἶναι have been put in brackets, the sense and construction being complete without them.

p. 23, D. πρὸς τοὺς τριστύ] Here as well as below in 26, E, the article has been inserted without the authority of the MSS.

p. 24, C. ἀνέμνησάς μ'] The pronoun με is wanting in the MSS.

p. 27, E. [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ίκ. ἔτερον ὃν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here bracketed, as being an obvious marginal gloss. Nine lines above, γνωσμένον has been dealt with in the same way and for the same reason.

p. 44, A. εἴπερ χωρίς] The Editor has omitted to state his reasons for bracketing τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν. He has evidently regarded the clause as a gloss on ἔκατέρου. An alternative correction of the sentence might be proposed, viz. to retain the bracketed words and cancel ἔκατέρου.

E. R. H.]

p. 14, D. ἐπεὶ μῆδε τὰ τοιάδε] I have tried to make excuses for this phrase, and to explain the whole passage as it stands. But I cannot reconcile myself to the text for many reasons. (1) Though we may say συγχωρῶ μὴ δεῖν ἀπτεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων, we cannot say ταῦτα συγχωρεῖται μὴ δεῖν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν, and still less ἀπτεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων. (2) συγκεχωρημένα ἔστι is not the same as ὅμολογεῖται, and cannot mean that we admit *something concerning* certain things, but that the things themselves have been *given up, admitted to be true*, because we wish to get rid of them and their propounders. (3) The words μὴ δεῖν τ. τ. ἀπτεσθαι sever ὑπὸ πάντων from the rest of the clause and from the participle ὑπολαμβανόντων, which is a great offence against elegance. (4) ὑπολαμβανόντων needs an accusative, such as αὐτὰ or some equivalent. (5) ἐπεὶ μῆδε is only appropriate when a preceding assertion is upheld *a fortiori* on the ground of a statement which follows. But Socrates' instance is neither weaker nor stronger than those of Protarchus, but a mere addition of something akin to the foregoing. (6) There is no good defence to be made of μῆδε, unless we read τῶν τοιούτων, and even then the sentence is rendered very clumsy by the intervening παιδαριώδῃ κ. τ. ἐ., which separate μὴ δεῖν from μῆδε. These grounds lead me to the conclusion that the passage is interpolated by some one, who not understanding the artificial turn of the sentence, supposed it to be suffering from some omission. If we leave out μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἀπτεσθαι and ἐπεὶ μῆδε, τὰ τοιάδε becomes the accusative to ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι, and gives a kind of unexpected addition to Socrates' speech. This contrivance was adopted in order to introduce an additional example of ἐν καὶ πολλά, without resorting to a tedious and formal introduction of new matter.

p. 24, B. In my former edition I left ἀνέμυησας, as I found it, without an object. But it may be doubted whether we should read, 'Αλλ εὖ γε, or 'Αλλ' εὖ τε. Εὖ γε as a mere exclamation is well known; but here εὖ is an adverb joined with two verbs, and it does not begin the sentence. I am decidedly in favour of εὖ τε.

p. 27, B. I am responsible for τὴν αἰτίαν appearing in brackets. The reason of this is obvious; but it is not quite so obvious why I have preferred λέγωμεν, according to which reading δεδηλωμένον should have been followed by a mark of interrogation, to λέγομεν which is the reading of the Bodleian. The passage as I have printed it is far from satisfactory; and I have great misgivings about this double question and answer, and fear that this λέγωμεν, or λέγομεν, is a mere Will o' the wisp, which has led me into a false conjecture. For if this word is a gloss, we see at once why the oldest MS. has *nothing to correspond to it in the answer*, whereas the revisor of some later copy would see that it must have an answer, and so one gloss would beget another. If we continue the structure of the preceding speech Οὐχοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ζεῖ ὡν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο τῷ μὲν γένη—the natural sequel would be Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν τὸ τέταρτον (sc. παρέχεται τῷ μὲν γένος) ᾧς Ἐτερον κ. τ. ἐ. To this Protarchus needs only to answer with the Bodleian, "Ἐτερον γάρ οὖν—"Ωστε ὑπὸ σφίξις ἔλαβον οὐδὲν εἰπών.

p. 62, E. εἰ δέ γε καὶ—καὶ νῦν δῆλον only admits of one καὶ, and the other is a mere repetition occasioned by the interrupting sentence. But if the

second καὶ is superfluous, δὴ is something worse, for whether we join it to νῦν or to εἰ, it changes the sense of either, so as to make it quite unsuitable to this passage.

p. 63, b. ἀλλήλων πέρι] That is ἐκατέρας τῶν ἑτέρων πέρι. But this is a very slovenly substitute, and moreover we have a most suspicious stranger in φρονήσεις. The plural is used for *thoughts, intentions* and *dispositions*. But here we want only the equivalent to νοῦς, and therefore the singular noun. When Plato introduces plurality to match with the plural ήδονάται, he speaks of ἐπιστῆμαι, μαθήματα or τέχναι. Again αὐτὰς ought to belong to φρονήσεις as well as to ήδονάται, but its place renders this impossible. As the address first proposed is made to pleasures only, there can be no doubt that καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις and ἀλλήλων πέρι are as unnecessary as they are incorrect. I should therefore now not scruple to edit the text thus: Ούχ τῆς; ὡς Προτάρχε, διερωτᾶν χρῆ, τὰς ήδονάται δέ, διαπυνθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδε. Further on I can propose something better than what I offered in my note, namely, this: μῶν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης [ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν]; "Would you refuse to dwell with *any intellect whatever!*?" In the answer to this question, it now appears to me that τελέως εἰς δύναμιν "*as thoroughly as possible*" is added, to imply that the clearer the consciousness, the fuller justice is done to pleasure. But ταῦλά τε πάντα (or rather τά τ' ἄλλα πάντα) requires αὐτῶν τήμον in the opposite clause. Perhaps we should read, καὶ αὐτῶν τιν' ήμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἐκάστην. "Any one of us, each to the utmost possible degree of completeness." This use of τις followed by ἔκαστος can be supported by examples.

p. 63, e. Expel θεοῦ. καθάπερ ὄπαδοι should be taken together. The structure is: δόποσαι γιγνόμεναι καθάπερ ὄπαδοι τῆς ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς, ξυνακολουθοῦσιν αὐτῇ πάντῃ. But in the text I think that αὐτῇ is either misplaced or altogether foreign. As to τὸν ίδεαν αὐτήν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον, nothing more seems wanting than the article; τίνα τὸν ίδεαν αὐτήν. He adds αὐτήν to contrast the Idea itself, or the absolute Good, with the forementioned (relative) Good ἢ τὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἢ τῷ παντὶ.

p. 64, c. Read προσφυέστερον θν.

p. 64, d. As ήτισοῦν and πᾶσα cannot both be retained, which is the intruder? Certainly ήτισοῦν, which the scribes have repeated from above; for it so separates τυχοῦσα from δύσωσοῦν that they cannot be taken together, so that the adverb is left to itself. Read, τυχοῦσα δύσωσοῦν ξ. πᾶσα.

p. 64, e. It is strange that such expressions as μετριότης ἀρετὴ γίγνεται or ξυμμετρία κάλλος γίγνεται should have passed so long unchallenged. Moderation cannot become Moral καλὸν or ἀρετή, nor Symmetry Physical κάλλος, else they would cease to be Moderation and Symmetry. Read, μετριότητι καὶ ξυμμετρίᾳ.

Ibid. αὐτοῖς] with what? If with τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ξυμμέτρῳ, the author should have said τούτοις. But the Bodleian has ἔκαυτοῖς, a word often confounded with ἔκαστοις, which would yield a good sense. See 64, b.

p. 65, A. Protarchus should have answered to λέγωμεν: but ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν is an answer to one of two dependent clauses ὅρθότατ' ἂν αἰτιασαμένα. This fact renders λέγωμεν ἡς very suspicious, but I question whether αἰτιᾶσθαι can govern αὐτήν γεγονέναι.

p. 65, v. Δῆλον μὲν is not only indirect, but also bald, and quite contrary to Plato's practice. But ὅμως δ' οὐν certainly belongs to the same speaker as "Ηδη τοίνυν κ. τ. ἐ. Besides, the colour of the phrase βέλτιον τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν is suited to the person conducting the dispute, and to no other. But whoever says this, must certainly have said something more; such as, that it is better to continue the argument in *its several particulars*. Now, if we add καὶ' ἐν ἔκαστον το βέλτιον, we not only gain this improvement, but we are also able to remove the objection, which all must feel, to χρήματα *without a case*. Repeat ἔκαστον, and all difficulty ceases. Read: "Ηδη τοίνυν, ω̄ Π., ιχανός ήμεν γένοιτ' ἀν δύτισον χριτής καὶ θεοῖς. ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν βέλτιον καὶ' ἐν ἔκαστον. ἔκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν—.

p. 66, d. Read διαμαρτυρόμενοι. I must ask the reader to take no notice of my proposed change of the passage beginning Ποῖον δή—and ending at δεῖν λόγον. The received text is correct in everything except παντελὴ for which I read πάντη. It should therefore have been printed thus: ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. Φίληβος . . . πᾶσαν καὶ πάντη. ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον, . . ως ξουκας κ. τ. ἐ. The apparent abruptness of Socrates' answer is explained by what follows: Ναὶ. τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτ' ἀκούωμεν. Everything in this part of the dialogue is intended to shew that Socrates is *in haste* to sum up and conclude. The meaning of Protarchus' answer is; "Then, when you spoke of repeating a third time, it was the old argument that you meant us to repeat." But although this passage is nearly correct as the MSS. present it, the same cannot be said of what follows: ἐγὼ γάρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἀπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φίληβου λόγον σὺ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ως κ. τ. ἐ. It is quite foreign to Plato's intention to represent Socrates as discerning from the first the nature of the argument which he is to pursue. He follows the λόγος whithersoever it leads him; and therefore even if ἀπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα meant the general argument, κατιδὼν cannot be applied to it. The most that he admits afterwards is a *suspicion* that there might be other claimants to the name of Good (ύποπτεύων καὶ ἄλλα εἰναι πολλά). And now we see why the oldest Manuscript has ἀπερ νῦν δὴ δυσχεράνας διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας—. Here we find the confusion, caused by some ancient misplacement of δυσχεράνας, in its undisguised condition. But if we try to conceive what must have been the appearance of the text before this displacement arose, the most probable supposition is that δυσχεράνας occurred where κατιδὼν was afterwards contrived to fill up the place of the missing participle. For these reasons I propose, ἐγὼ γάρ δὴ δυσχεράνας ἀπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, τὸν Φίληβου λόγον σὺ μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλακισμυρίων κ. τ. ἐ. "For I as you know (δὴ) disliking the saying which I have just repeated (Φίληβος τάγαδὸν ἐτίθετο κ. τ. ἐ.) which is the saying not of Philebus alone but of many thousand others &c."

p. 67, A. Remove the brackets from ιχανόν, and read with the *inferior* MSS. ιχανώτατα. I was misled by the Zurich editors, who in spite of common sense invariably adhere to the Bodleian MS. The play on ιχανόν ιχανώτατα is quite in the manner of the author.

CORRIGENDUM.

Page 115, Line 8 (of notes). For *quonam* read *quaenam*.

C O R R I G E N D A.

(See also Page XXVI.)

| Page Line | |
|--------------------------|--|
| III, 5. | <i>For nonsense read nonsense.</i> |
| , 16. | <i>For ἐφ. δ. μεμερίσθαι, read ἐφ. [δεῖν] μεμερίσθαι. See p. 130.</i> |
| , last. | <i>Correct from p. 151.</i> |
| V, last. | <i>For substitution read insertion [the Editor's original word]. $\overline{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon$ ($\overline{\alpha} = \dot{\alpha}n\acute{e}r$, $\overline{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\iota\sigma = \dot{\alpha}n\delta\rho\acute{e}\zeta$) is changed into $\dot{\alpha}\chi\rho\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon$ by the insertion of χ.</i> |
| 1 4 | <i>For 1. read $\Sigma\Omega$.</i> |
| 4 12 (of notes) | <i>For 'source' read 'sources'.</i> |
| 8 16 | <i>For $\dot{\alpha}n\theta\rho\acute{e}\pi\omega\mu\omega\zeta$ read $\dot{\alpha}n\theta\rho\acute{e}\pi\omega\mu\omega\zeta$.</i> |
| , 10 (of notes) | <i>For $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}\rho\omega$ read $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}\rho\omega\zeta$.</i> |
| 34 last but 2 (of notes) | <i>For $\pi\omega\delta\omega$ read $\pi\omega\delta\omega\zeta$.</i> |
| 71 5 (of notes) | <i>For $\kappa\alpha\iota\tau$ read $\kappa\alpha\iota\tau\zeta$.</i> |
| 75 1 (of notes) | <i>For Appendix read Addenda.</i> |
| 92 last but 5 (of notes) | <i>For $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\kappa\rho\acute{e}\mu\nu\acute{e}\zeta$ read $\tau\omega\sigma\acute{e}\delta\rho\omega\zeta$.</i> |

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